

PasswordStore Security Review

Review completed by 0xKowalski

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Table of Contents

- Introduction
 - About 0xKowalski
 - Disclaimer
- Risk Classification
 - Overview
 - Severity Levels
- Protocol Summary
 - Overview
 - Scope
 - Issues found
- <u>Findings</u>
 - <u>High Severity Findings</u>
 - [H-1] Secret s password is stored on chain and visible to anyone
 - [H-2] setPassword() has no access control, allowing non-owner to set the password
 - Informational Findings
 - [I-1] The getPassword() natspec includes a incorrect parameter

Introduction

About 0xKowalski

I am 0xKowalski, a specialized Web3 security researcher with a focus on identifying and mitigating vulnerabilities in decentralized applications. With extensive experience in blockchain technology, my work encompasses the analysis of smart contracts, protocols, and DeFi platforms to enhance their security posture. My professional commitment is to safeguard the Web3 ecosystem, ensuring its integrity and reliability for users and stakeholders.

You can find me at: - X - Github

Disclaimer

I have exerted every effort to identify as many vulnerabilities as possible within the allocated time period. However, I do not bear responsibility for the findings detailed in this document. It's important to note that a security audit does not serve as an endorsement of the underlying protocol. This audit was conducted within a specific timeframe, and the review focused exclusively on the security features of the Solidity implementation of the contracts.

Risk Classification

Overview

Risk classification for Web3 security findings involves evaluating the potential impact and likelihood of each vulnerability. This process helps in prioritizing responses based on the severity of the risk posed to the system.

Severity Levels

The severity of a finding is determined by assessing its impact and likelihood:

| | | Impact | | |
|------------|--------|--------|--------|-----|
| | | High | Medium | Low |
| | High | Н | H/M | M |
| Likelihood | Medium | H/M | М | M/L |
| | Low | М | M/L | L |

The combination of impact and likelihood helps in assigning a precise severity level to each finding, ensuring that the most serious vulnerabilities are prioritized and addressed swiftly to maintain the integrity and security of the system.

Additionally, informational findings may be noted in this report to shed light on non-critical issues or good practices. They offer context and detail that can help improve system understanding and security posture, even though they don't represent immediate threats.

Protocol Summary

Overview

PasswordStore is a smart contract application for storing a password. Users should be able to store a password and then retrieve it later. Others should not be able to access the password.

Scope

Files nSloc src/PasswordStore.sol 20

Issues found

Severity Level Number of Findings

High 2 Medium 0 Low 0 Informational 1

Findings

High Severity Findings

[H-1] Secret s_password is stored on chain and visible to anyone

Description The private variable s_password is intended to only be accessible to the owner of the contract through the getPassword() method, however all data submitted to the blockchain can be accessed by anyone.

Impact This allows anyone to read the password, breaking the functionality of the protocol and leaking sensitive information.

Proof of Concept The following proof of concept can be followed to confirm this issue, note you will need foundry.

1. Create a local blockchain using anvil

make anvil

2. Deploy the contract to the chain.

make deploy

3. Use cast to find the storage item at storage slot 1.

```
cast storage <CONTRACT ADDRESS HERE> 1 --rpc-url http://127.0.0.1:8545
```

This will return a hex representation of the spassword secret.

4. Finally we can get the string representation of s_password using the following.

This will return the string representation of s password which is:

myPassword

Recommended Mitigation Due to this finding, the overall architecture of the contract should be rethought. You could encrypt the password offchain and then store the encrypted password onchain. However, the user would then need to remember a second password to decrypt the encrypted password.

[H-2] setPassword() has no access control, allowing non-owner to set the password

Description The setPassword() lacks access control, however, according to the natspec is should only be callable by the owner: This function allows only the owner to set a new password.

Impact This allows anyone to set the password, breaking the invariant that only the owner should be able to set the password.

Proof of Concept The following can be added to your test suite in tests/PasswordStore.t.sol to verify this issue:

```
function test_non_owner_setting_password_reverts() public {
    vm.startPrank(vm.addr(1));

    vm.expectRevert(PasswordStore.PasswordStore__NotOwner.selector);
    passwordStore.setPassword("nonOwnerPassword");
}
```

Now when running the test suite with forge test we get one failing test with the following output:

```
Failing tests:
Encountered 1 failing test in test/PasswordStore.t.sol:PasswordStoreTest
[FAIL. Reason: call did not revert as expected]
test_non_owner_setting_password_reverts() (
gas: 15587)
```

Recommended Mitigation Copy the access control check from getPassword() to setPassword() as follows:

```
function setPassword(string memory newPassword) external {
    if (msg.sender != s_owner) {
        revert PasswordStore__NotOwner();
    }

    s_password = newPassword;
    emit SetNetPassword();
}
```

Once this is added, all tests, including the one added in the proof of concept, pass.

Informational Findings

[I-1] The getPassword() natspec includes a incorrect parameter

Description The natspec for getPassword() is incorrect as it states that the function takes newPassword as a parameter, which it does not, it takes no parameters.

```
/*
    * @notice This allows only the owner to retrieve the password.

* @param newPassword The new password to set.
    */
function getPassword() external view returns (string memory) {
```

Impact The natspec is incorrect.

Recommended Mitigation Remove the incorrect line from the natspec.

* @param newPassword The new password to set.