Flanker

KeenLab Tencent

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#### Table of Contents

- 1 Introduction
  - About
- 2 IOKIT SECURITY BACKGROUND
  - Core of the Apple
- 3 Introducing Kitlib
  - Introducing Kitlib
- 4 Introducing KextHelper
  - Introducing KextHelper
- 5 Case Studies
  - Case Studies





#### ABOUT ME

Senior Security Researcher at KeenLab, Tencent

- Pwn2Own 2016 OSX Category Winner
- BlackHat, CanSecWest, HITCON, QCon Speaker
- \*nix platform sandbox bypass and kernel exploitation
- Google Android Security Top Researchers Hall of Fame





## ABOUT KEENLAB

- Former KeenTeam with all researchers move to Tencent and form Keenlab
- 8 Pwn2Own Champions
- Universal Rooting
- We're hiring!





#### Objective of this talk

- Basic description of IOKit
- Kernel Zone Allocator and Fengshui Technique
- Introducing KitLib and distributed Fuzzer
- Introducing Kexthelper, a IDA plugin for OSX KEXT
- Case Studies





#### WHAT'S IOKIT

I/O Kit is a collection of system frameworks, libraries, tools, and other resources for creating device drivers in OS X

 Security researchers tend to refer it as Kernel drivers and frameworks written with IOKit and accessible via IOKit method calls

#### Why attacking IOKit

- IOKit drivers runs in Kernel space, some of them even reachable from browser sandbox for efficiency (Graphics).
- Huge number of drivers implemented
- Few access restrictions (compared to Android)



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#### IOSERVICE

Different services are exposed via IOKit. We can consult most of them in Hardware IO tools and ioreg.

- IOAccelerator
- IOHIDDevice
- IOPMrootDomain
- ...





#### **IOUSERCLIENT**

External method calls are first routed via IOUserClient, triggered by mach\_msg IPC

kern\_return\_t IOServiceOpen( io\_service\_t service, task\_port\_t owningTask, uint32\_t type, io\_connect\_t \*connect );

- When userspace openService is called, corresponding newUserClient at Kernel space is invoked
- Different types may map to different userClient
  - IOAccelerator
- May check caller's identity: is root? (OSX and iOS differ)
- IOServiceClose maps to clientClose in is\_io\_service\_close (race condition here?)





#### EXTERNALMETHOD

Method calls are dispatched through getTargetMethodForIndex and/or externalMethod

```
virtual IOExternalMethod * getTargetAndMethodForIndex(IOService ** targetP, UInt32 index );
                    externalMethod(uint32 t selector, IOExternalMethodArguments *
      args, IOExternalMethodDispatch * dispatch, OSObject * target, void * reference)
```

- IOExternalMethodArguments is constructed in is\_io\_connect\_method containing incoming parameter
- IOExternalMethod/IOExternalMethodDispatch specifies parameters constraint





#### CALLING CONVENTIONS

- structureInput will be converted to descriptor if size >0x4000 in IOConnectCallMethod
- if size <0x4000 passes through inband buffer
- io\_connect\_method generate and send mach\_msg
- of course we can directly call io\_connect\_method, bypass this constraint





### LIBKERN C++ RUNTIME

- Reduced set of C++
  - No Exception
  - No Multiple Inherience
  - No template
  - Custom implementation of RTTI
- OSMetaClass
  - OSMetaClass is defined by macros
  - Contains Name, size and father class for each corresponding class





#### IOCONNECTCALLMETHOD

```
kern_return_t
IOConnectCallMethod(
  mach_port_t connection,
  uint32_t selector, // In
  const uint64 t *input.
  uint32_t inputCnt, // In
  const void *inputStruct, // In
  size t
            inputStructCnt, // In
  uint64_t *output, // Out
  uint32_t *outputCnt, // In/Out
  void
          *outputStruct, // Out
            *outputStructCntP) // In/Out
  size t
```





#### IOKIT HISTORICAL VULNERABILITIES

- Race condition (hottest) (CVE-2015-7084)
- Heap overflow
- UAF
- TOCTOU
- OOB write (Our P2O bug!)
- NULL dereference (not exploitable with SMAP and in sandbox)





## Cons of traditional fuzzer

- written in C/C++, more time consuming
- error-prone, easy to make mistakes
- less supporting library
  - socket
  - logging
- not dynamically expandable due to language nature





Introducing Kitlib

## Introducing Kitlib

```
io connect t t:
io_service_t svc =
      IOServiceGetMatchingService(kIOMasterPortDefault.
      IOServiceMatching("fuckliangchen"));
IOServiceOpen(svc, mach_task_self(), 0, &t);
uint32_t outputCnt = 0x100;
size t outputStructCnt = 0x2000:
uint64_t* output = new uint64_t[outputCnt];
char* outputStruct = new
      char[outputStructCnt]:
const uint32_t inputCnt = 0x100;
uint64_t input[inputCnt];
const size_t inputStructCnt = 0x2000;
char inputStruct[inputStructCnt];
IOConnectCallMethod(t, 0, input, inputCnt,
      inputStruct, inputStructCnt, output,
      &outputCnt, outputStruct,
      &outputStructCnt);
```

```
import kitlib
h = kitlib.openSvc('fuckliangchen', 0)
kitlib.callConnectMethod(h, [OL]*0x100,
      'a'*0x2000, 0x100, 0x2000)
```





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## What's Kitlib

- Kitlib is a Python wrapper for IOKit calls
- Internally written in C++ and Python, provides convenient functions for writing fuzzers, using SWIG and ctypes
- Performance cost is low





## SWIG USAGE

- Define interfaces in header file (kitlib.h)
- C++ wrapper layer in cpp file (if needed) (kitlib.cpp)
- Writing wrapping code for argument convention from Python to C++ in glue file (kitlib.i)

#### QUESTIONS

- Memory management?
- Type conventions?





## HEADER FILE

#### Defining basic types

- mach\_port\_t
- mach vm address t
- io\_object\_t
- io service t
- io iterator t

#### DEFINE INTERFACES

```
mach_port_t openSvc(const char* svc_name, uint32_t type);
mach_port_t* openMultiSvc(const char* svc_name, uint32_t* typearr);
size_t getSvcCntForName(const char* svc_name);
bool svcAva(const char* svc_name,uint32_t type);
```

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#### GLUE FILE

#### Wraps functions

```
size_t getSvcCntForName(const char* svc_name)
   io_iterator_t iter;
   kern_return_t kr;
   io_service_t device;
   size_t ret = 0;
   kr = IOServiceGetMatchingServices(kIOMasterPortDefault, IOServiceMatching(svc name), &iter);
   while ((device = IOIteratorNext(iter)))
       ++ret:
       IOObjectRelease(device);
   IOObjectRelease(iter);
   return ret:
```





#### GLUE FILE

#### Wraps functions

```
unsigned int callConnectMethod(
                  mach_port_t connection, // In
                  uint32 t selector, // In
                  const uint64 t *input.
                  uint32_t inputCnt, // In
                                *inputStruct, // In
                  const void
                  size_t inputStructCnt, // In
                  uint64_t *output, // Out
                  uint32_t *outputCnt, // In/Out
                         *outputStruct, // Out
                  void
                  size t
                           *outputStructCnt)
    kern_return_t kt = IOConnectCallMethod((mach_port_t) connection, /* Connection */
                                     selector.
                                                      /* Selector
                                                                       */
                                     input, inputCnt,
                                                                 /* input, inputCnt */
                                     inputStruct,
                                                      /* inputStruct */
                                     inputStructCnt,
                                                              /* inputStructCnt */
                                     output, outputCnt, outputStruct, outputStructCnt); /*
                                           Output stuff */
   return kt:
                                                                                            IN
unity lab
```

国实验室

## ARGUMENT WRAPPING

```
/*
This function handles scalar input, translate the incoming python value, which is list,
to native representation. Memory cleanup is needed afterwards
*/
%typemap(in) (const uint64_t *input, uint32_t inputCnt) {
   /* Check if is a list */
   if (PvList Check($input)) {
       uint32_t size = PyList_Size($input);
       uint32_t i = 0;
       $2 = size:
       $1 = (uint64 t*) malloc(size * sizeof(uint64 t));
       for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {</pre>
           PvObject *o = PvList GetItem($input.i):
           if (PyLong_Check(o)) {
              $1[i] = PyLong_AsUnsignedLongLong(o);
           else {
              PyErr_SetString(PyExc_TypeError, "list must contain L numbers");
              free($1);
              return NULL:
   } else if ($input == Py_None) {
       $1 = NULL:
       $2 = 0:
   } else {
       PvErr SetString(PvExc TypeError, "not a list"):
```



#### ARGUMENT WRAPPING

#### FREEING MEMORY

```
%typemap(freearg) (const uint64_t *input, uint32_t inputCnt) {
   free($1):
```

#### Call flow

- user Python code calls in SWIG auto-generated function
- SWIG auto-generated function calls user convention typemap code, mapping python types to C++ arguments \$1 \$2, etc
- SWIG auto-generated function passes \$1 \$2, etc into C++ glue code
- SWIG auto-generated function calls freearg code to free memory

in unity lab

### KITLIB IMPLEMENTATION

#### Example source code

```
import kitlib
h = kitlib.openSvc('fuckliangchen', 0)
kitlib.callConnectMethod(h, [OL]*0x100, 'a'*0x2000, 0x100, 0x2000)
```

- inputScalar to list
- inputStruct to string/bytearray
- outputScalar/outputStruct maps to len
- output maps to tuple (retcode, outscalar, outstruct)





## Problems for Kitlib1

- I'm lazy and I don't want to write wrapper for each interface
- Argument passing is immutable, cannot do TOCTOU fuzzing





Introducing Kitlib

## CALLING DIRECTLY INTO LIBRARY FUNCTIONS

#### CTYPES

- For functions without need for wrapping we directly call ctypes
- Build-in mutable support (TOCTOU and race condition fuzzing)





## Basic Ctypes Primitives

#### CTYPES

- c\_int, c\_ulonglong, c\_char\_p
- create\_string\_buffer





## PARSING KEXT FOR ARGUMENTS

- static const IOExternalMethodDispath/IOExternalMethod array (parseable)
- dynamic routed via code (oops)

- for former we can automatically retrieve arguments via pattern matching
- Scan const-data section for matching
- Map class to arguments array





# Example IOExternalMethodDispatch

\_\_const:0000000000064BC0 ; IGAccelCLContext::attach(IOService \*)::methodDescs

```
__const:0000000000064BC0 __ZZN16IGAccelCLContext6attachEP9IOServiceE11methodDescs db 0
const:0000000000064BC0
                                                           : DATA XREF:
      IGAccelCLContext::attach(IOService *)+16
__const:0000000000064BC1
                                     db
                                          0
const:0000000000064BC2
                                          0
                                     dh
__const:0000000000064BC3
                                     db
__const:0000000000064BC4
const:0000000000064BC5
const:0000000000064BC6
__const:0000000000064BC7
const:0000000000064BC8
                                    da offset
      __ZN16IGAccelCLContext15map_user_memoryEP22IntelCLMapUserMemoryInP23IntelCLMapUserMemoryOutyPy
      ; IGAccelCLContext::map_user_memory(IntelCLMapUserMemoryIn *,IntelCLMapUserMemoryOut
      *,ulong long,ulong long *)
const:0000000000064BD0
                                     dh
__const:0000000000064BD1
                                     db
__const:0000000000064BD2
                                     db
const:0000000000064BD3
                                     dh
const:0000000000064BD4
                                     dh
__const:0000000000064BD5
                                     db
const:0000000000064BD6
                                     dh
const:0000000000064BD7
__const:0000000000064BD8
                                     db
__const:0000000000064BD9
                                     db
const:0000000000064BDA
                                          ٥
                                     dh
```

Introducing KextHelper

#### AFTER PARSING

```
const:000000000064BC0 : IGAccelCLContext::attach(IOService *)::methodDescs
__const:000000000064BC0 __ZZN16IGAccelCLContext6attachEP9IOServiceE11methodDescs
      IOExternalMethod <0. \
__const:0000000000064BC0
                                                          ; DATA XREF:
      IGAccelCLContext::attach(IOService *)+16
const:0000000000064BC0
                                                    offset
      __ZN16IGAccelCLContext15map_user_memoryEP22IntelCLMapUserMemoryInP23IntelCLMapUserMemoryOutyPy,\
      ; IGAccelCLContext::map_user_memory(IntelCLMapUserMemoryIn *,IntelCLMapUserMemoryOut
      *,ulong long,ulong long *)
__const:0000000000064BC0
                                                    0, 3, OFFFFFFFh, OFFFFFFFh>
const:0000000000064BF0
                                    IOExternalMethod <0. \:
      IGAccelCLContext::unmap user memory(IntelCLUnmapUserMemoryIn *.ulong long)
const:0000000000064BF0
                                                    offset
      __ZN16IGAccelCLContext17unmap_user_memoryEP24IntelCLUnmapUserMemoryIny,\
```

0. 4. 0. OFFFFFFFFh>





const:0000000000064BF0

# EXAMPLE: IOEXTERNALMETHODDISPATCH MATCHING

- +0 points to TEXT or zero
- $\blacksquare$  +8, +16, +24 reasonable integers (NO TEXT pointing)





Introducing KextHelper

## Example: Vtable matching

- Reference from constructor
- $\blacksquare$  +8, +16, ... all points to TEXT section or EXTERN(UNDEF) section





### Pseudo Algo

```
matchers = [IOExternalMethodDispatchMatcher, VtableMatcher, IOExternalMethodMatcher]
for matcher in matchers:
    if matcher.isSectionBegin(const_data_section):
        matcher.deflateToList(section, offset)
        break

map userclient with arguments
scan newUserClient for service-userclient mappings
add father's userclient to children service
scan constructor for service size
scan for offset access to determine field offset

Construct vtable as a structure S, set vt(offset 0, size 8) type to S*
```





### Restoring object structure

- Scanning MetaClass function for object's size
- Create the object's whole vtable area as a struct
- Setting +0(8) field as vt and type to previous struct pointer





# RESTORING OBJECT STRUCTURE(CONT.)

```
//...
text:0000000000048079
                                     mov
                                            r14, rdi
__text:000000000004807C
                                            eax, word ptr [rbx+22h]
text:0000000000048080
                                            eax. 3
                                     cmp
text:0000000000048083
                                            loc 48122
                                     jnz
__text:0000000000048089
                                            qword ptr [rbx], 0
                                     cmp
text:000000000004808D
                                            loc 48129
                                     iz
__text:00000000000480A6
                                     cmp
                                            rax, rcx
__text:00000000000480A9
                                     jnb
                                            short loc_48129
text:00000000000480AB
                                            rax, [r14]
                                     mov
__text:00000000000480AE
                                            rdi, r14
                                     mov
__text:00000000000480B1
                                            rsi, rbx
                                     mov
text:00000000000480B4
                                            gword ptr [rax+9E8h]
                                     call
                                            rdi, [r14+1030h]
text:00000000000480BA
                                     mov
__text:00000000000480C1
                                     mov
                                            rax, [rdi]
text:00000000000480C4
                                            esi, [r15+8]
                                     mov
text:00000000000480C8
                                            rsi. 6
                                     shl
__text:00000000000480CC
                                     add
                                            rsi, [r14+610h]
__text:00000000000480D3
                                     call
                                            gword ptr [rax+140h]
text:00000000000480D9
                                            dword ptr [rbx+2Ch]
                                     inc
__text:0000000000480DC
                                     cmp
                                            byte ptr [rbx+30h], 0
__text:00000000000480E0
                                     įΖ
                                            short loc_480F8
text:00000000000480E2
                                            eax, [r15+8]
                                     mov
text:00000000000480E6
                                            rcx. [r14+608h]
                                     mov
```





# RESTORING OBJECT STRUCTURE(CONT.)

- Scanning functions and perform forward-flow analysis on registers starting RDI
- Retriving MOV/LEA offset and do addStructMember





```
__int64 __fastcall IGAccelCLContext::process_token_SetFence(__int64 this, __int64 a2)
 int64 v2: // r15@3
 int64 result: // rax@6
 unsigned int v4; // esi@7
 if ( *( WORD *)(a2 + 34) != 3 )
   v4 = -5:
   return IOAccelContext2::setContextError((IOAccelContext2 *)this, v4):
 }
 if ( !*(_QWORD *)a2
   | | (v2 = *(QWORD *)(a2 + 24), (unsigned int 4)*(unsigned int *)(v2 + 8) << 6 >=
         *(unsigned int *)(this + 1600)) )
 ł
   v4 = -2:
   return IOAccelContext2::setContextError((IOAccelContext2 *)this. v4):
 (*(void (__cdecl **)(__int64))(*(_QWORD *)this + 2536LL))(this);
 (*(void ( fastcall **)( QWORD, unsigned int64))(**( QWORD **)(this + 4144) + 320LL))(
   *(_QWORD *)(this + 4144),
   *(_QWORD *)(this + 1552) + ((unsigned __int64)*(unsigned int *)(v2 + 8) << 6));
 ++*(DWORD *)(a2 + 44):
 if ( *( BYTE *)(a2 + 48) )
   *(_DWORD *)(*(_QWORD *)(this + 1544) + 16LL * *(unsigned int *)(v2 + 8)) = 0;
 *(BYTE *)(this + 4154) = 1:
 result = (*( int64 ( fastcall **)( int64, int64))(*( QWORD *)this + 2528LL))(this.
 *(_BYTE *)(this + 4154) = 0;
 return result:
```



```
int64 fastcall IGAccelCLContext::process token SetFence(IGAccelCLContext *this, int64 a2)
 int64 v2: // r15@3
 int64 result: // rax@6
 unsigned int v4; // esi@7
 if ( *( WORD *)(a2 + 34) != 3 )
   v4 = -5:
   return IOAccelContext2::setContextError((IOAccelContext2 *)this, v4):
 7
 if ( !*(_QWORD *)a2
   | | (v2 = *(QWORD *)(a2 + 24), (unsigned int64)*(unsigned int *)(v2 + 8) << 6 >=
         LODWORD(this->field 640)) )
 ł
   v4 = -2:
   return IOAccelContext2::setContextError((IOAccelContext2 *)this. v4):
 ((void (__cdecl *)(IGAccelCLContext
        *))this->vt-> ZN16IGAccelCLContext16endCommandStreamER24IOAccelCommandStreamInfo)(this):
 (*(void ( fastcall **)( int64, unsigned int64))(*( QWORD *)this->field 1030 + 320LL))(
   this->field_1030,
   *( QWORD *)&this->gap610[0] + ((unsigned int64)*(unsigned int *)(v2 + 8) << 6));
 ++*(DWORD *)(a2 + 44):
 if ( *(_BYTE *)(a2 + 48) )
   *( DWORD *)(this->field 608 + 16LL * *(unsigned int *)(v2 + 8)) = 0:
 this->field 103a = 1:
 result = ((__int64 (__fastcall *)(IGAccelCLContext *,
       __int64))this->vt->__ZN16IGAccelCLContext18beginCommandStreamER24IOAccelCommandStream
                                                                                               Security lab
           this.
           a2):
                                                                4日 > 4周 > 4 3 > 4 3 >
```

#### Running fuzzer

- retriving metadata for all kexts and store using pickle
  - idc.Batch
- Set up multiple VM on fuzzing server
- add fuzzer as start-up item, load pickle and record progress





# Fuzzing outcome

- Heap overflow in AppleXXX (CVE-2016-?)
- Race condition in IOXXX (CVE-2016-?)
- Double free in AppleXXX (CVE-2016-?)
- Integer overflow in IOXXX (CVE-2016-?)
- NULL pointer dereferences in IOXXX (CVE-2016-?)
- ....(more waiting disclosure)





### A HIDDEN IGNORED ATTACK SURFACE IN IOKIT

oops, Apple hasn't fixed it yet, will disclose later.





# Infoleak in AppleBDWGraphics/IntelHD5000 via racecondition

- IGAccelCLContext/IGAccelGLContext provides interface via externalMethod for mapping/unmapping user memory, passed in mach vm address t
- Ian Beer and us both discovered a race condition in unmapping user memory, which lead to code execution
- Apple fixes this issue by adding a lock in un\_map\_usermemory (the delete operation), but its incomplete.





#### MAP\_USER\_MEMORY

- contains
  - index slot using hash function
  - iterate the list for matching
- add
  - Append item to corresponding slot list


#### UNMAP\_USER\_MEMORY

- contains
- get
- remove (get a object ptr and call virtual function)
  - Update head and tail when appropriate
  - Update prev-inext and next-iprev






# THE IGHASHTABLE STRUCTURE








# THE LINKEDLIST CONNECTING ELEMENTS WITH SAME HASH VALUES





# The normal idea that failes (Ian Beer one)


The ideal situation is both threads passes hash table::contains, and when one is retrieving IOAccelMemoryMap\* after get returns valid pointer, the other frees it and we control the pointer



However in reality more frequently they do passes contains but thread 1 will remove it before thread 2 do get and thread 2 hit a null pointer dereference










#### THE NEW VULNERABILITY





# Unmap frees the element while map is still TRAVERSING

```
*** Panic Report ***
panic(cpu 0 caller 0xffffff80165ce40a): Kernel trap at 0xffffff80165c4e90, type 13=general protection, registers:
CR0: 0x000000008001003b, CR2: 0xffffff81210ea000, CR3: 0x00000001b8fd30b7, CR4: 0x0000000003627e0
RAX: 0x000000000000001, RBX: 0xdeadbeefdeadbeef, RCX: 0x0000000000059, RDX: 0x0000000000000
RSP: 0xffffff9122e3bae0. RBP: 0xffffff9122e3bae0. RSI: 0xffffff803197ee34. RDI: 0xdeadbeefdeadbeef
R8: 0x000000000000004, R9: 0x0000000caca00d2a, R10: 0x8000000caca00d2a, R11: 0x000a0d200caca0000
R12: 0xffffff803197ee34, R13: 0x00000000e00002c2, R14: 0xffffff803197ee34, R15: 0xffffff80323fd600
RFL: 0x00000000010202, RIP: 0xffffff80165c4e90, CS: 0x0000000000008, SS: 0x0000000000000010
Fault CR2: 0xfffffff81210ea000, Error code: 0x0000000000000, Fault CPU: 0x0, PL: 0
Backtrace (CPU 0), Frame : Return Address
0xffffff80f8808c50 : 0xffffff80164dab12 mach kernel : panic + 0xe2
0xffffff80f8808cd0 : 0xfffffff80165ce40a mach_kernel : _kernel_trap + 0x91a
0xffffff80f8808eb0 : 0xffffff80165ec273 mach kernel : return from trap + 0xe3
0xffffff80f8808ed0 : 0xffffff80165c4e90 mach_kernel : _memcmp + 0x10
0xffffff9122e3bae0 : 0xfffffff7f989e71d4 com.apple.driver.AppleIntelBDWGraphics :
ZNK11IGHashTableIvP16IGAccelMemorvMap12IGHashTraitsIvE25IGIOMallocAllocatorPolicyE8containsERKv + 0x42
0xffffff9122e3bb00 : 0xfffffff7f989e56cc com.apple.driver.AppleIntelBDWGraphics :
ZN16IGAccelCLContext15map user memorvEP22IntelCLMapUserMemorvInP23IntelCLMapUserMemorvOutvPv + 0x66
0xffffff9122e3bb50 : 0xffffff8016ae1592 mach_kernel : _shim_io_connect_method_structure1_structure0 + 0x122
0xffffff9122e3bb80 : 0xfffffff8016ae220a mach kernel :
__ZN12IOUserClient14externalMethodEjP25IOExternalMethodArgumentsP24IOExternalMethodDispatchP80S0bjectPv + 0x34a
0xffffff9122e3bbe0 : 0xffffff8016adf277 mach kernel : is io connect method + 0x1e7
0xffffff9122e3bd20 : 0xffffff8016597cc0 mach kernel : iokit server + 0x5bd0
0xffffff9122e3be30 : 0xfffffff80164df283 mach_kernel : ipc_kobject_server + 0x103
```



000000000000000



KEENLAB TENCENT

Case Studies

# OVERWRITING FREE'D ELEMENT'S NEXT POINTER.

```
Anonymous UUID:
                     D09DE92C-8710-4673-953D-BACF9F5B3C09
Thu Mar 24 01:34:03 2016
*** Panic Report ***
panic(cou 2 caller 0xffffff800931f92b): "a freed zone element has been modified in zone kalloc.32; expected 0xdeadbeefdeadbeef but
found 0xffffff8029eb73a0, bits changed 0x2152416ff746cd4f, at offset 16 of 32 in element 0xffffff8029eb7440, cookies
0x3f0011330a841290 0x53521934cf94203"@/Library/Caches/com.apple.xbs/Sources/xnu/xnu-3248.40.184/osfmk/kern/zalloc.c:503
Backtrace (CPU 2), Frame : Return Address
0xffffff810b7a2a80 : 0xfffffff80092dab12 mach kernel : panic + 0xe2
0xffffff810b7a2b00 : 0xffffff800931f92b mach kernel : zone find largest + 0x8fb
0xffffff810b7a2c30 : 0xffffff800983ca36 mach_kernel : _ZN6OSData16initWithCapacityEj + 0x66
0xffffff810b7a2c50 : 0xffffff800983cab0 mach kernel : ZN60SData13initWithBytesEPKvj + 0x30
0xffffff810b7a2c80 : 0xffffff800983cc4e mach kernel : ZN60SData9withBytesEPKvj + 0x6e
0xfffffff810b7a2cb0 : 0xffffff800985d475 mach kernel : Z210SUnserializeXMLparsePv + 0x13f5
0xffffff810b7a3d40 : 0xffffff800985db76 mach_kernel : __Z160SUnserializeXMLPKcPP80SString + 0xc6
0xffffff810b7a3d70 : 0xffffff80098de1da mach kernel : is io service open extended + 0xfa
0xffffff810b7a3de0 : 0xffffff80093977a1 mach_kernel : _iokit_server + 0x56b1
0xffffff810b7a3e30 : 0xffffff80092df283 mach kernel : ipc kobject server + 0x103
0xffffff810b7a3e60 : 0xffffff80092c28b8 mach kernel : ipc kmsq send + 0xb8
0xffffff810b7a3ea0 : 0xffffff80092d2665 mach kernel : mach msg overwrite trap + 0xc5
0xffffff810b7a3f10 : 0xffffff80093b8bda mach_kernel : _mach_call_munger64 + 0x19a
0xffffff810b7a3fb0 : 0xffffff80093eca96 mach_kernel : _hndl_mach_scall64 + 0x16
BSD process name corresponding to current thread: fuckaddremovebdw
Boot args: keepsyms=1
Mac OS version:
15F65
```





# QUESTIONS?

Case Studies





# **CREDITS**

- Liang Chen
- Marco Grassi
- Wushi





Thanks!

CASE STUDIES



