




The challenge involves exploiting an Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) vulnerability in the password reset functionality and then leveraging a Local File Inclusion (LFI) vulnerability in the markdown parser.

Solution

When visiting the home page, the following interface is displayed:




We can register an account, log in, and reset the password. An email inbox is provided, and our email is test@email.htb to receive an OTP for resetting the password.



Created by Xclow3n with 🐗

After logging in, the dashboard appears as shown below:



This dashboard represents the extent of the functionality available to us.

IDOR on Password Reset

Let's examine the password reset functionality:

```
router.post("/reset-password", async (req, res) => {
  const { token, newPassword, email } = req.body;
  if (!token || !newPassword || !email)
    return res.status(400).send("Token, email, and new password are required.");


try {
  const reset = await getPasswordReset(token);
  if (!reset) return res.status(400).send("Invalid or expired token.");

  const user = await getUserByEmail(email);
```

```
if (!user) return res.status(404).send("User not found.");
    await updateUserPassword(user.id, newPassword);
    await deletePasswordReset(token);
    res.send("Password reset successful.");
 } catch (err) {
   console.error("Error resetting password:", err);
    res.status(500).send("Error resetting password.");
 }
});
async function getPasswordReset(token) {
  const query = `SELECT * FROM password_resets WHERE token = ? AND expires_at > ?
;
  try {
   const reset = await get(query, [token, Date.now()]);
    return reset;
 } catch (error) {
    throw error;
 }
}
```

This functionality is vulnerable to IDOR because it verifies the validity of the token but does not check which user the token belongs to. This allows anyone with a valid token to reset another user's password.

By resetting the admin's password and logging in as the admin, we gain access to new functionality:




We can dispatch weapons to users via email, and in the note section, we can add markdown content.

```
router.post("/weapons/dispatch", authenticate, async (req, res) => {
  const { role } = req.user;
  if (role !== "admin") return res.status(403).send("Access denied.");
```

```
const { name, price, note, dispatched_to } = req.body;
 if (!name || !price || !note || !dispatched_to) {
   return res.status(400).send("All fields are required.");
 }
 try {
   const parsedNote = parseMarkdown(note);
   await dispatchWeapon(name, price, parsedNote, dispatched_to);
   res.send("Weapon dispatched successfully.");
 } catch (err) {
   console.error("Error dispatching weapon:", err);
   res.status(500).send("Error dispatching weapon.");
 }
});
// markdown.js
const MarkdownIt = require("markdown-it");
const { execSync } = require("child_process");
const md = new MarkdownIt({
 html: true,
});
function parseMarkdown(content) {
 if (!content) return "";
 return md.render(
   try {
       const fileContent = execSync(`curl -s ${url}`);
       const base64Content = Buffer.from(fileContent).toString("base64");
       return `<img src="data:image/*;base64,${base64Content}" alt="Embedded</pre>
Image">`;
     } catch (err) {
       console.error(`Error fetching image from URL ${url}:`, err.message);
       return `Error loading image: ${url}`;
     }
   }),
 );
}
module.exports = { parseMarkdown };
```

The markdown parser searches for image tags and fetches the image content, storing it in the database as base64. Since it uses curl, we can include files and potentially leak sensitive information.

By using a payload like the one below:



We are able to retrieve the content of flag.txt:

