## Al security threats and controls navigator at OWASP Al Exchange - owaspai.org

1. General controls:

- AIPROGRAM
- SECPROGRAM
- SECDEVPROGRAM
- DEVPROGRAM
- CHECKCOMPLIANCE

### Sensitive data limitation:

- DATAMINIMIZE
- ALLOWEDDATA SHORTRETAIN
- **OBFUSCATETRAININGDATA**

### Limit effect of unwanted behavior:

- OVERSIGHT
- MINMODELPRIVILEGE
- AITRANSPARENCY
- **EXPLAINABILITY**

LEGEND:

Development-time Datascience control

2. Controls against threats through runtime use:

### Always:

### Integrity of model behaviour

- See Always

- EVASIONROBUSTMODEL
- TRAINADVERSARIAL
- INPUTDISTORTION
- ADVERSARIALROBUSTDISTILLATION

### Confidentiality of data

### 2.2 Against data disclosure by use:

# Against data disclosure by model:

- See always
- FILTERSENSITIVETRAINDATA

# **Against model inversion and**

- See always
- OBSCURECONFIDENCE
- **SMALLMODEL**
- **ADDTRAINNOISE**

### Confidentiality of intellectual property

### 2.3 Against model theft by use:

• See always

### Availability of model

### 2.4 Against failure by use:

- See always
- DOSINPUTVALIDATION

3. Controls against developmenttime threats:

### Integrity of model behaviour

### 3.1 Against broad model poisoning:

- See Always
- MODELENSEMBLE

### Against data poisoning:

- See always
- MORETRAINDATA
- DATAQUALITYCONTROL **TRAINDATADISTORTION**
- **POISONROBUSTMODEL**

### Against dev-time model poisoning: See always

See always

### Confidentiality of data / ip

## 3.2 Against data leak development-

### Against Train/test data leak:

See Always

### Against dev-time model leak:

See Always

### Against source code/config leak:

See Always

4. Runtime

security

controls:

application

### DEVDATAPROTECT

- CONFCOMPUTE
- **FEDERATIVELEARNING**

### All CIA risks

## 4.1 Against non Al-specific

application security threats:

Operational security

## Integrity of model behaviour

# 4.5 Against direct prompt

Embedded in the model

### Integrity of model behaviour

### 4.2 Against runtime model poisoning:

Against transfer learning attacks:

Integrity of model behaviour

4.6 Against indirect prompt injection:

PROMPTINPUTVALIDATION INPUTSEGREGATION

# Confidentiality of intellectual property

### 4.3 Against runtime model theft:

- RUNTIMEMODELCONFIDENTIALITY
- MODELOBFUSCATION

### **Confidentiality of data**

### 4.7 Against leaking input data:

### CIA risks through injection

### 4.4 Against insecure output handling:

Threat model based on Software Improvement Group AI framework