## Overview of AI security threats and controls at OWASP AI Exchange - owaspai.org

1. General controls:

- AIPROGRAM
- SECPROGRAM
- SECDEVPROGRAM
- DEVPROGRAM
- CHECKCOMPLIANCE

#### Sensitive data limitation:

- DATAMINIMIZE
- ALLOWEDDATA
- SHORTRETAIN **OBFUSCATETRAININGDATA**

#### Limit effect of unwanted behavior:

- OVERSIGHT
- MINMODELPRIVILEGE
- AITRANSPARENCY
- **EXPLAINABILITY**

LEGEND:

Development-time Datascience control

2. Controls against threats through runtime use:

#### Always:

#### Integrity of model behaviour

- See Always

- EVASIONROBUSTMODEL
- TRAINADVERSARIAL
- INPUTDISTORTION ADVERSARIALROBUSTDISTILLATION

#### Confidentiality of data

### 2.2 Against data disclosure by use:

#### Against data disclosure by model:

- See always
- FILTERSENSITIVETRAINDATA

# **Against model inversion and**

- See always
- OBSCURECONFIDENCE
- **SMALLMODEL**
- **ADDTRAINNOISE**

#### Confidentiality of intellectual property

### 2.3 Against model theft by use:

• See always

### Availability of model

#### 2.4 Against failure by use:

- See always
- DOSINPUTVALIDATION

3. Controls against development-

- **FEDERATIVELEARNING**

### Integrity of model behaviour

#### 3.1 Against broad model poisoning:

- See Always
- MODELENSEMBLE

#### Against data poisoning:

- See always
- MORETRAINDATA
- DATAQUALITYCONTROL **TRAINDATADISTORTION**
- **POISONROBUSTMODEL**

### Against dev-time model poisoning:

See always

### Against transfer learning attacks:

See always

#### Confidentiality of data / ip

# 3.2 Against data leak development-

#### Against Train/test data leak:

See Always

### Against dev-time model leak:

See Always

#### Against source code/config leak:

See Always

# time threats:

4. Runtime

security

controls:

application

#### DEVDATAPROTECT

- CONFCOMPUTE

# All CIA risks

#### 4.1 Against non Al-specific application security threats:

- Operational security

### Integrity of model behaviour

# 4.5 Against direct prompt

Embedded in the model

#### Integrity of model behaviour

### 4.2 Against runtime model poisoning:

4.6 Against indirect prompt injection:

PROMPTINPUTVALIDATION INPUTSEGREGATION

Integrity of model behaviour

### RUNTIMEMODELCONFIDENTIALITY

4.3 Against runtime model theft:

**Confidentiality of intellectual property** 

MODELOBFUSCATION

### CIA risks through injection

#### 4.4 Against insecure output handling:

#### **Confidentiality of data**

### 4.7 Against leaking input data:

Threat model based on Software Improvement Group AI framework