Al security threats and controls navigator

- from the OWASP AI Exchange at owaspai.org

1. General controls against all threats:

<u>Governance</u>:

- AIPROGRAM
- SECPROGRAM SECDEVPROGRAM
- DEVPROGRAM
- CHECKCOMPLIANCE

Sensitive data limitation:

- DATAMINIMIZE
- ALLOWEDDATA
- SHORTRETAIN **OBFUSCATETRAININGDATA**
- DISCRETE

Limit effect of unwanted behavior:

- OVERSIGHT
- MINMODELPRIVILEGE
- AITRANSPARENCY
- CONTINUOUSVALIDATION
- EXPLAINABILITY
- UNWANTEDBIASTESTING

LEGEND:

Standard information security control (with attention points)

Runtime Data science control

Development-time Data science control

Other control

Threat (clickable)

Impact on Confidentiality, Integrity or Availability

2. Controls against threats through runtime use:

Always against use threats:

- RATELIMIT

Integrity of model behaviour

2.1 Against evasion:

- See Always
- DETECTODDINPUT
- **DETECTADVERSARIALINPUT**
- EVASIONROBUSTMODEL TRAINADVERSARIAL
- INPUTDISTORTION
- **ADVERSARIAL ROBUST DISTILLATION**

Confidentiality of data

2.2 Against data disclosure by use:

Against data disclosure by model:

- See always
- **FILTERSENSITIVETRAINDATA**

Against model inversion and

- See always
- OBSCURECONFIDENCE
- **SMALLMODEL**
- **ADDTRAINNOISE**

Confidentiality of intellectual property

2.3 Against model theft by use:

• See always

Availability of model

2.4 Against failure by use:

- See always
- DOSINPUTVALIDATION
- LIMITRESOURCES

3. Controls against developmenttime threats:

threats:

- DEVDATAPROTECT
- DEVSECURITY
- SEGREGATEDATA
- **FEDERATIVELEARNING SUPPLYCHAINMANAGE**
- CONFCOMPUTE

Against data poisoning:

- MORETRAINDATA
- DATAQUALITYCONTROL
- POISONROBUSTMODEL

Against dev-time model poisoning:

Against transfer learning attacks:

Confidentiality of data / ip

3.2 Against data leak development-

Against Train/test data leak:

• See Always

Against dev-time model leak:

See Always

Against source code/config leak:

See Always

Integrity of model behaviour

3.1 Against broad model poisoning:

- See Always
- MODELENSEMBLE

- See always
- **TRAINDATADISTORTION**

See always

See always

Confidentiality of intellectual property

4.3 Against runtime model theft:

- RUNTIMEMODELCONFIDENTIALITY
- MODELOBFUSCATION

CIA risks through injection

4.4 Against insecure output handling:

ENCODEMODELOUTPUT

4. Runtime application security controls:

All CIA risks

4.1 Against non Al-specific application security threats:

Integrity of model behaviour

- Technical appsec controls
- Operational security

4.6 Against indirect prompt injection:

4.2 Against runtime model poisoning:

- PROMPTINPUTVALIDATION
- INPUTSEGREGATION

Confidentiality of data

4.7 Against leaking input data:

MODELINPUTCONFIDENTIALITY

Threat model based on Software Improvement Group AI framework

4.5 Against direct prompt · Embedded in the model

Integrity of model behaviour

Integrity of model behaviour

RUNTIMEMODELINTEGRITY

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