

# Classic Passwd

Thursday, February 17, 2022 10:31 AM

We put the program in Ghidra, and interestingly main calls two functions but doesn't seem to do anything else

```

*
* FUNCTION
*
*****
[undefined main()
AL:1      <RETURN>
main
XREF[4]:  Entry Point(*),
          _start:001010bd(*), 0010207c,
          00102168(*)

001012f6 55      PUSH    RBP
001012f7 48 89 e5  MOV     RBP, RSP
001012fa b8 00 00  MOV     EAX, 0x0
          00 00
:
001012ff e8 81 fe  CALL     vuln          undefined vuln()
          ff ff
00101304 b8 00 00  MOV     EAX, 0x0
          00 00
00101309 e8 7b ff  CALL     gfl          undefined gfl()
          ff ff
0010130e b8 00 00  MOV     EAX, 0x0
          00 00
00101313 5d      POP     RBP
00101314 c3      RET

```

Going to the vuln function we find an interesting comparison that should get us past the first authentication check

```

8 89 d6  MOV     RSI, RDX
8 89 c7  MOV     RDI, RAX
8 01 fe  CALL     <EXTERNAL>::strcmp          int strcmp(char * __s1, char...
f ff
5 c0    TEST     EAX, EAX
5 0e    JNZ      LAB_00101271
8 8d 3d  LEA     RDI, [s_welcome 0010201e] = "\nwelcome"

```

Going to that call in the dynamic analysis leaks the username

```

0x55555555257 <vuln+210>  mov     rdi, rax
> 0x5555555525a <vuln+213>  call    strcmp@plt          <strcmp@plt>
s1: 0x7fffffffdc10 ← 0x74736574 /* 'test' */
s2: 0x7fffffffdc92 ← 'AC[REDACTED]'

```

AGC, [REDACTED]

That gets us to the gfl() function

```

▶ 0x5555555528d <gfl+4>      sub    rsp, 0x10
0x55555555291 <gfl+8>      mov     dword ptr [rbp - 4], 0x52c8d5
0x55555555298 <gfl+15>     jmp     gfl+96                <gfl+96>
↓
0x555555552e9 <gfl+96>     cmp     dword ptr [rbp - 4], 0x77d088
0x555555552f0 <gfl+103>    jle     gfl+17                <gfl+17>
↓
0x5555555529a <gfl+17>     cmp     dword ptr [rbp - 4], 0x638a78
0x555555552a1 <gfl+24>     jne     gfl+92                <gfl+92>
↓
0x555555552e5 <gfl+92>     add     dword ptr [rbp - 4], 1
0x555555552e9 <gfl+96>     cmp     dword ptr [rbp - 4], 0x77d088
0x555555552f0 <gfl+103>    jle     gfl+17                <gfl+17>
↓
0x5555555529a <gfl+17>     cmp     dword ptr [rbp - 4], 0x638a78

```

Based on the decompilation in Ghidra, it looks like we can get passed this and print the flag if we just bypass all the comparisons

```

local_c = 0x52c8d5;
do {
    if (0x77d088 < local_c) {
        return;
    }
    if (local_c == 0x638a78) {
        for (local_10 = 0x1474; local_10 < 9999; local_10 = local_10 + 1) {
            if (local_10 == 0x2130) {
                printf("THM{%d%d}", 0x638a78, 0x2130);
                /* WARNING: Subroutine does not return */
                exit(0);
            }
        }
    }
    local_c = local_c + 1;
} while( true );

```

So we should be able to set the registers to satisfy the comparisons and walk our way through this function

```

pwndbg> c
Continuing.
THM[REDACTED][Inferior 1 (process 3406) exited normally]
pwndbg>

```

Interestingly, converting the decompiled function values to ints proved to be the correct flag as well

```

for (local_10 = 0x1474; local_10 < 9999; local_10 = local_10 + 1) {
    if (local_10 == 0x2130) {
        printf("THM{%d%d}", [REDACTED], 8[REDACTED]);
        /* WARNING: Subroutine does not return */
        exit(0);
    }
}

```