

MALWARE ANALYSIS REPORT

WannaCry Ransomware

MARCH 2022 | V2.0

Prepared by
Dipankar Lama (Zuk0)


A decorative graphic consisting of multiple thin, light purple lines that flow and curve across the bottom right portion of the page, creating a sense of motion and depth.

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Executive Summary

28th February 2022

Wannacry is a ransomware cryptoworm which was used for WannaCry ransomware attack in the year 2017. To propagate this ransomware a well known vulnerability known as EternalBlue was exploited which was developed by National Security Agency (NSA).

Wannacry ransomware is a x32 bit program written in C++ for Windows Operating system.

The attack consists of 3 stages.

1. Drops a 2nd executable by replacing tasksche.exe in the C:\Windows Directory
2. The 2nd executable drops the resources like encryption DLL and EXE file, cryptographic keys, bitcoin address etc..
3. Creates multiple thread to carry out encryption of files in the victim machine.

The Symptoms of infections include

1. Changing of Desktop image to black background with red text.
2. Encrypted File with WNCRY extension
3. Service with service name mssecsvc.exe and display name Microsoft Security Center (2.0) Service
4. Presence of Registry Key
HKLM\SOFTWARE Wow6432Node\WannaCrypt
Or

YARA signature rules are attached in the end of the report. Malware sample and hashes have been submitted to VirusTotal for further examination.

High Level Technical Summary

28th February 2022


Wannacry ransomware works on 3 phases

In the 1st phase it tries to reach out to `www[.]iuqerfsodp9ifjaposdfjhgosurijfaewrwergwea[.]com` domain which is a kill switch. If the domain respond to the request then wannacry immediately exits and does not execute. If the domain is not active then wannacry will begin the attack by creating a windows service with service name `mssecsvc2.0`, display name `Microsoft Security Center (2.0) Service` and binary path "`<PATH_TO_WANNACRY>\wannacry.exe -m security`". The service will constantly try to reach out to a range of IPv4 addresses.

After creating windows service it checks if `tasksche.exe` exists or not in `C:\Windows` directory. If the binary exists then it renames it to `qeriuwjhrf.exe` and then drops an executable in the `C:\Windows` directory with name `tasksche.exe` from it's resource section.

In the 2nd Phase it creates a new process with command line argument "`C:\Windows\tasksche.exe /i`". `/i` tells the process to begin the initialisation process. In this initialisation it creates a directory in "`C:\ProgramData\rfeyrytrymm176`". After creating the directory it will move copy itself to this newly created directory and then creates a service with binary path "`C:\ProgramData\rfeyrytrymm176\tasksche.exe`". The created service will then proceed with dropping encrypting EXE, DLL, cryptokeys, images, bitcoin address in the "`C:\ProgramData\rfeyrytrymm176\`" directory.

In the 3rd Phase it creates multiple threads which will process with encrypting all the important files in the local system, changing desktop background, copying instructions to desktop and many more.



Malware Composition

28 February 2022

Wannacry consists of following components

FileName	SHA-1 Hash
wannacry.exe	E889544AFF85FFAF8B0D0DA705105DEE7C97FE26
tasksche.exe	5FF465AFAABCBF0150D1A3AB2C2E74F3A4426467
tasksche_res.zip	30F8820CF93A627C66195F0D77D6A409024C6E52
taskdll.exe	47A9AD4125B6BD7C55E4E7DA251E23F089407B8F
taskse.exe	BE5D6279874DA315E3080B06083757AAD9B32C23

wannacry.exe

The initial executable that runs in the beginning

tasksche.exe

This executable is dropped by wannacry.exe file after execution. It is responsible for creating a directory in the C:\ProgramData directory and copies itself into it in order to drop more files.

tasksche_res.zip

Resides in the resource section of tasksche.exe file which contains executable and files for encryption

taskdll.exe and taskse.exe

These executable are responsible for encrypting files in the local system.

Static Analysis

28th February 2022

Basic information about the executable using CF Explorer

Property	Value
File Name	C:\Users\Analyst\Desktop\wannacry.exe
File Type	Portable Executable 32
File Info	Microsoft Visual C++ 6.0
File Size	3.55 MB (3723264 bytes)
PE Size	3.55 MB (3723264 bytes)
Created	Thursday 24 February 2022, 11.13.31
Modified	Tuesday 19 March 2019, 11.32.14
Accessed	Monday 28 February 2022, 10.53.58
MD5	DB349B97C37D22F5EA1D1841E3C89EB4
SHA-1	E889544AFF85FFAF8B0D0DA705105DEE7C97FE26

Property	Value
CompanyName	Microsoft Corporation
FileDescription	Microsoft® Disk Defragmenter
FileVersion	6.1.7601.17514 (win7sp1_rtm.101119-1850)
InternalName	lhdfgui.exe
LegalCopyright	© Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.
OriginalFilename	lhdfgui.exe
ProductName	Microsoft® Windows® Operating System


The Time Date Stamp was found using PEstudio tool.

100	Time Date Stamp	4ce78ecc	Saturday, 20.11.2010 09:03:08 UTC
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Examining sections of wannacry.exe I found out the .rsrc section contains an executable file

Disasm: .rsrc

Offset	Name	Value	Meaning
FC	Machine	14c	Intel 386



Using Cutter we found some interesting strings inside the binary

```

0x00431344 C:\\%s\\qeriuwjhrf
0x0071f604 ativeSystemInfo
0x0071f4d0 cmd.exe /c "%s"
0x0071f604 need dictionary
0x004313d0 http://www.iuqerfsodp9ifjaposdfjhgosurijfaewrwergwea.com
0x0071f130 Microsoft Enhanced RSA and AES Cryptographic Provider
0x0071f558 Global\\MsWinZonesCacheCounterMutexA
0x0071f5a0 icacls . /grant Everyone:F /T /C /Q
0x0071f764 incomplete dynamic bit lengths tree

```

Some interesting Import functions

Call via	Name	Ordinal	Original Thunk	Thunk	Forwarder	Hint
A134	InternetOpenA	-	A7DC	A7DC	-	92
A138	InternetOpenUrlA	-	A7C8	A7C8	-	93
A13C	InternetCloseHandle	-	A7B2	A7B2	-	69

Call via	Name	Ordinal	Original Thunk	Thunk	Forwarder	Hint
A054	TerminateThread	-	A4E4	A4E4	-	35F
A058	LoadResource	-	A5A6	A5A6	-	257
A05C	FindResourceA	-	A5B6	A5B6	-	E3
A060	GetProcAddress	-	A5C6	A5C6	-	1A0
A064	GetModuleHandleW	-	A5D8	A5D8	-	182
A068	ExitProcess	-	A5EC	A5EC	-	B9
A06C	GetModuleFileNameA	-	A5FA	A5FA	-	17D

Call via	Name	Ordinal	Original Thunk	Thunk	Forwarder	Hint
A000	StartServiceCtrlDispatcherA	-	A6F6	A6F6	-	24A
A004	RegisterServiceCtrlHandlerA	-	A6D8	A6D8	-	20C
A008	ChangeServiceConfig2A	-	A6C0	A6C0	-	34
A00C	SetServiceStatus	-	A6AC	A6AC	-	244
A010	OpenSCManagerA	-	A69A	A69A	-	1AD
A014	CreateServiceA	-	A688	A688	-	64
A018	CloseServiceHandle	-	A672	A672	-	3E


Dynamic Analysis

28th February 2022

When executed the wannacry.exe tries to make a DNS request

1	0.000000	192.168.56.3	192.168.56.4	DNS	109 Standard query 0xb472 A www.iuqerfsodp9ifjaposdfjhgosurijfaewrwergwea.com
2	0.000275	192.168.56.4	192.168.56.3	ICMP	137 Destination unreachable (Port unreachable)
3	0.000360	192.168.56.3	192.168.56.4	DNS	109 Standard query 0xb472 A www.iuqerfsodp9ifjaposdfjhgosurijfaewrwergwea.com
4	0.000563	192.168.56.4	192.168.56.3	ICMP	137 Destination unreachable (Port unreachable)
5	0.000625	192.168.56.3	192.168.56.4	DNS	109 Standard query 0xb472 A www.iuqerfsodp9ifjaposdfjhgosurijfaewrwergwea.com
6	0.000760	192.168.56.4	192.168.56.3	ICMP	137 Destination unreachable (Port unreachable)
7	0.000810	192.168.56.3	192.168.56.4	DNS	109 Standard query 0xb472 A www.iuqerfsodp9ifjaposdfjhgosurijfaewrwergwea.com
8	0.001062	192.168.56.4	192.168.56.3	ICMP	137 Destination unreachable (Port unreachable)
9	0.001114	192.168.56.3	192.168.56.4	DNS	109 Standard query 0xb472 A www.iuqerfsodp9ifjaposdfjhgosurijfaewrwergwea.com
10	0.001244	192.168.56.4	192.168.56.3	ICMP	137 Destination unreachable (Port unreachable)

After not getting any response it carries on to create a service.



The newly created service will try to connect to range of IPv4 addresses

1:53:...	wannacry.exe	2872	Thread Exit	
1:53:...	wannacry.exe	2872	TCP Reconnect	DESKTOP-98I24CQ:58632 -> 169.254.126.7:microsoft-ds
1:53:...	wannacry.exe	2872	TCP Reconnect	DESKTOP-98I24CQ:58633 -> 169.254.127.7:microsoft-ds
1:53:...	wannacry.exe	2872	TCP Disconnect	DESKTOP-98I24CQ:58632 -> 169.254.126.7:microsoft-ds
1:53:...	wannacry.exe	2872	Thread Exit	
1:53:...	wannacry.exe	2872	TCP Disconnect	DESKTOP-98I24CQ:58633 -> 169.254.127.7:microsoft-ds
1:53:...	wannacry.exe	2872	Thread Exit	
1:53:...	wannacry.exe	2872	TCP Reconnect	DESKTOP-98I24CQ:58634 -> 169.254.128.7:microsoft-ds
1:53:...	wannacry.exe	2872	TCP Disconnect	DESKTOP-98I24CQ:58634 -> 169.254.128.7:microsoft-ds
1:53:...	wannacry.exe	2872	Thread Exit	
1:53:...	wannacry.exe	2872	TCP Disconnect	DESKTOP-98I24CQ:58705 -> 169.254.129.7:microsoft-ds
1:53:...	wannacry.exe	2872	Thread Exit	
1:53:...	wannacry.exe	2872	TCP Reconnect	DESKTOP-98I24CQ:58706 -> 169.254.130.7:microsoft-ds
1:53:...	wannacry.exe	2872	TCP Disconnect	DESKTOP-98I24CQ:58706 -> 169.254.130.7:microsoft-ds
1:53:...	wannacry.exe	2872	Thread Exit	
1:53:...	wannacry.exe	2872	TCP Reconnect	DESKTOP-98I24CQ:58707 -> 169.254.131.7:microsoft-ds
1:53:...	wannacry.exe	2872	TCP Disconnect	DESKTOP-98I24CQ:58707 -> 169.254.131.7:microsoft-ds
1:53:...	wannacry.exe	2872	Thread Exit	
1:53:...	wannacry.exe	2872	TCP Reconnect	DESKTOP-98I24CQ:58728 -> 169.254.132.7:microsoft-ds
1:53:...	wannacry.exe	2872	TCP Disconnect	DESKTOP-98I24CQ:58728 -> 169.254.132.7:microsoft-ds
1:53:...	wannacry.exe	2872	Thread Exit	
1:53:...	wannacry.exe	2872	Thread Create	
1:53:...	wannacry.exe	2872	Thread Create	
1:53:...	wannacry.exe	2872	TCP Disconnect	DESKTOP-98I24CQ:58819 -> 169.254.133.7:microsoft-ds

after creating service it will go on and replace the original tasksche.exe binary with it's own malicious executable

11:49:...	wannacry.exe	3348	Thread Create	
12:26:...	wannacry.exe	3348	CreateFile	C:\Windows\tasksche.exe
12:34:...	wannacry.exe	3348	CreateFile	C:\Windows\tasksche.exe
12:34:...	wannacry.exe	3348	CreateFile	C:\Windows\tasksche.exe
12:34:...	wannacry.exe	3348	QueryBasicInfor...	C:\Windows\tasksche.exe
12:34:...	wannacry.exe	3348	CloseFile	C:\Windows\tasksche.exe
12:34:...	wannacry.exe	3348	QueryNameInfo...	C:\Windows\tasksche.exe
12:34:...	wannacry.exe	3348	QueryNameInfo...	C:\Windows\tasksche.exe
12:34:...	wannacry.exe	3348	QueryNormalize...	C:\Windows\tasksche.exe

tasksche.exe	2/25/2022 10:25 AM	Application	3,432 KB
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and then create a new process with newly dropped executable

<pre> push eax rep movsb lea ecx,dword ptr ss:[esp+28] lea edx,dword ptr ss:[esp+6C] push ecx push ebx push ebx push 8000000 push ebx push ebx push ebx push ebx push ebx push ebx mov dword ptr ss:[esp+4C],44 mov word ptr ss:[esp+7C],bx mov dword ptr ss:[esp+78],81 call dword ptr ds:[<&CreateProcessA>] test eax,eax je wannacry.407F08 mov eax,dword ptr ss:[esp+18] push eax call dword ptr ds:[<&CloseHandle>] </pre>	<pre> edx:"C:\\WINDOWS\\tasksche.exe /i" 44: 'D' </pre>
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The newly created process will first generate a random string by getting the hostname of the local machine and then multiplying their ascii value to get seed for random function

<pre> 0x0040125e push eax ; LPWSTR lpBuffer 0x0040125f call dword [GetComputerNameW] ; 0x4080d0 ; Gets the hostname of the local machine 0x00401265 mov esi,dword [wcslen] ; 0x408138 0x0040126b and dword [var_4h], 0 0x0040126f push 1 ; 1 0x00401271 lea eax,[lpBuffer] 0x00401277 pop ebx 0x00401278 push eax 0x00401279 call esi ; wcslen (Returns the length of the wide string) 0x0040127b test eax,eax 0x0040127d pop ecx 0x0040127e jbe 0x4012a0 0x00401280 lea edi,[lpBuffer] 0x00401286 movzx eax,word [edi] 0x00401289 imul ebx,eax ; gets the hostname and multiplies the ascii value of all the character to get a seed for srand generator 0x0040128c inc dword [var_4h] 0x0040128f lea eax,[lpBuffer] 0x00401295 inc edi 0x00401296 push eax 0x00401297 inc edi 0x00401298 call esi 0x0040129a cmp dword [var_4h], eax 0x0040129d pop ecx 0x0040129e jb 0x401286 0x004012a0 push ebx ; int seed 0x004012a1 call dword [srand] ; 0x408124 ; generates random value ; void srand(int seed) 0x004012a7 mov ebx,dword [rand] ; 0x408120 </pre>	<pre> 0x004012be jle 0x4012d6 0x004012c0 call ebx 0x004012c2 push 0x1a ; 26 0x004012c4 cdq 0x004012c5 pop ecx 0x004012c6 idiv ecx 0x004012c8 mov eax,dword [arg_8h] 0x004012cb add dl,0x61 ; 97 0x004012ce mov byte [edi + eax],dl 0x004012d1 inc edi 0x004012d2 cmp edi,esi 0x004012d4 jl 0x4012c0 0x004012d6 add esi,3 ; Generates a string "rfeyrytrymm176" 0x004012d9 cmp edi,esi 0x004012db jge 0x4012f1 </pre>
---	--


the random function will generate the string and then will create a new directory with that name inside C:\ProgramData directory. It will also create a registry key as below

```


0x00401b01  push    esi
0x00401b02  push    0
0x00401b04  push    dword [format] ; C:\ProgramData
0x00401b07  call    esi             ; CreateDirectoryW
0x00401b09  push    dword [format]
0x00401b0c  mov     edi, dword [SetCurrentDirectoryW] ; 0x408058 ; C:\ProgramData
0x00401b12  call    edi             ; SetCurrentDirectoryW
0x00401b14  test    eax, eax
0x00401b16  je      0x401b27
0x00401b18  mov     ebx, dword [arg_ch]
0x00401b1b  push    0
0x00401b1d  push    ebx             ; Randomly generated string "rfeyrytrymm176"
0x00401b1e  call    esi             ; CreateDirectoryW
0x00401b20  push    ebx
0x00401b21  call    edi
0x00401b23  test    eax, eax
0x00401b25  jne     0x401b2b
0x00401b27  xor     eax, eax

```

File name	Created	File type
rfeyrytrymm176	2/27/2022 1:25 AM	File folder
shimaaen	11/14/2021 8:28 PM	File folder



and copy itself to this new directory.




After copying itself it will create a new service

<pre> add esp,4 lea eax,dword ptr ss:[ebp-40c] push edi push edi push edi push edi push edi push eax push 1 push 2 push 10 push ebx push esi push esi push dword ptr ss:[ebp-4] call dword ptr ds:[<&CreateServiceA>] mov esi,eax cmp esi,edi je tasksche_401008 </pre>	<pre> eax:"cmd.exe /c \"C:\\ProgramData\\rfeyrytrymm176\\t esi:"rfeyrytrymm176" esi:"rfeyrytrymm176" esi:"rfeyrytrymm176", eax:"cmd.exe /c \"C:\\Program esi:"rfeyrytrymm176" </pre>
---	--

with following binary path

```
eax:"cmd.exe /c \"C:\\ProgramData\\rfeyrytrymm176\\tasksche.exe\""
```



Now the activated service will drop new files from the resource section. The resource section contains a zip file which contains the dropped file. Some files like 00000000.eky, 00000000.pky contains cryptographic keys which will be used for the encryption. The password for zip file is "WNcry@2ol7"

Name	Date modified	Type	Size
msg	2/28/2022 11:57 AM	File folder	
@Please_Read_Me@.txt	2/28/2022 11:57 AM	Text Document	1 KB
@WanaDecryptor@.exe	5/12/2017 3:22 AM	Application	240 KB
00000000.eky	2/28/2022 11:57 AM	EKY File	0 KB
00000000.pky	2/28/2022 11:57 AM	PKY File	1 KB
00000000.res	2/28/2022 11:57 AM	Compiled Resourc...	1 KB
269231646078247.bat	2/28/2022 11:57 AM	Windows Batch File	1 KB
b.wnry	5/11/2017 9:13 PM	WNRY File	1,407 KB
c.wnry	2/28/2022 11:57 AM	WNRY File	1 KB
r.wnry	5/11/2017 4:59 PM	WNRY File	1 KB
s.wnry	5/9/2017 5:58 PM	WNRY File	2,968 KB
t.wnry	5/12/2017 3:22 AM	WNRY File	65 KB
taskdl.exe	5/12/2017 3:22 AM	Application	20 KB
tasksche.exe	2/28/2022 11:57 AM	Application	3,432 KB
taskse.exe	5/12/2017 3:22 AM	Application	20 KB
u.wnry	5/12/2017 3:22 AM	WNRY File	240 KB

After extracting all the resource it will begin the encryption process by finding all the important files in the victim machine and encrypt them.

Below are some import functions from taskdll.exe which will be use to find files in the victim machine

OFTs	FTs (IAT)	Hint	Name
Dword	Dword	Word	szAnsi
00002204	00002204	01D6	GetTempPathW
00002214	00002214	01F4	GetWindowsDirectoryW
0000222C	0000222C	0084	DeleteFileW
0000223A	0000223A	00CE	FindClose
00002246	00002246	00DD	FindNextFileW
00002256	00002256	00D5	FindFirstFileW
00002268	00002268	0356	Sleep
00002270	00002270	0154	GetDriveTypeW
00002280	00002280	0178	GetLogicalDrives
00002654	00002654	017F	GetModuleHandleA
00002668	00002668	01B7	GetStartupInfoA

in the end after all the encryption process is done the victim desktop will look like below image.



Indicators of Compromise

1st March 2022

Network Indicators

1. Making request to www.iuqerfsodp9ifjaposdfjhgosurijfaewrgwea.com

```
Frame 5: 109 bytes on wire (872 bits), 109 bytes captured (872 bits) on interface enp0s3, id 0
Ethernet II, Src: PcsCompu_09:ea:4b (08:00:27:09:ea:4b), Dst: PcsCompu_b8:16:a4 (08:00:27:b8:16:a4)
Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 192.168.56.3, Dst: 192.168.56.4
User Datagram Protocol, Src Port: 59998, Dst Port: 53
Domain Name System (query)
  Transaction ID: 0x5717
  Flags: 0x0100 Standard query
  Questions: 1
  Answer RRs: 0
  Authority RRs: 0
  Additional RRs: 0
  Queries
    www.iuqerfsodp9ifjaposdfjhgosurijfaewrgwea.com: type A, class IN
    [Response in frame 6]



Frame 10: 154 bytes on wire (1232 bits), 154 bytes captured (1232 bits) on interface enp0s3, id 0
Ethernet II, Src: PcsCompu_09:ea:4b (08:00:27:09:ea:4b), Dst: PcsCompu_b8:16:a4 (08:00:27:b8:16:a4)
Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 192.168.56.3, Dst: 192.168.56.4
Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 49678, Dst Port: 80, Seq: 1, Ack: 1, Len: 100
Hypertext Transfer Protocol
  GET / HTTP/1.1\r\n
  Host: www.iuqerfsodp9ifjaposdfjhgosurijfaewrgwea.com\r\n
  Cache-Control: no-cache\r\n
  \r\n
  [Full request URI: http://www.iuqerfsodp9ifjaposdfjhgosurijfaewrgwea.com/]
  [HTTP request 1/1]
  [Response in frame: 14]
```

Host Indicators


- Presence of following files "[qeriuwjhrf](#)" and "[tasksche.exe](#)".

name	date modified	type	size
msscript.ocx	4/14/2008 3:40 AM	ActiveX control	108 KB
notepad.exe	3/18/2019 9:45 PM	Application	177 KB
PFR0.log	2/20/2022 3:23 PM	Text Document	8 KB
Professional.xml	3/18/2019 9:46 PM	XML Document	35 KB
ProfessionalEducation.xml	3/18/2019 9:46 PM	XML Document	35 KB
ProfessionalWorkstation.xml	3/18/2019 9:46 PM	XML Document	35 KB
PSEXESVC.exe	1/23/2022 11:29 PM	Application	375 KB
py.exe	8/17/2020 7:02 PM	Application	884 KB
pyshellxtd.amd64.dll	8/17/2020 7:04 PM	Application exten...	57 KB
pyw.exe	8/17/2020 7:02 PM	Application	885 KB
qeriuwjhrf	3/18/2019 9:45 PM	File	177 KB
regedit.exe	3/18/2019 9:45 PM	Application	350 KB
richbx32.ocx	3/12/2001 4:07 PM	ActiveX control	254 KB
splwow64.exe	10/6/2019 7:56 PM	Application	129 KB
system.ini	3/18/2019 9:49 PM	Configuration sett...	1 KB
tasksche.exe	3/1/2022 11:01 AM	Application	3,432 KB
twain_32.dll	3/18/2019 9:46 PM	Application exten...	63 KB
win.ini	3/18/2019 9:49 PM	Configuration sett...	1 KB
WindowsShell.Manifest	3/18/2019 9:44 PM	MANIFEST File	1 KB
WindowsUpdate.log	3/1/2022 11:00 AM	Text Document	1 KB
winhlp32.exe	3/18/2019 9:46 PM	Application	12 KB
WMSysPr9.prx	3/18/2019 11:23 PM	PRX File	310 KB
write.exe	3/18/2019 9:45 PM	Application	11 KB

- Presence of following services



- Presence of following Registry Key



- Presence of following files the directory saved in the registry key shown above

Name	Date modified	Type	Size
msg	3/1/2022 11:01 AM	File folder	
@Please_Read_Me@.txt	3/1/2022 11:02 AM	Text Document	1 KB
@WanaDecryptor@.exe	5/12/2017 3:22 AM	Application	240 KB
@WanaDecryptor@.exe	3/1/2022 11:02 AM	Shortcut	1 KB
00000000.eky	3/1/2022 11:01 AM	EKY File	0 KB
00000000.pky	3/1/2022 11:01 AM	PKY File	1 KB
00000000.res	3/1/2022 11:02 AM	Compiled Resourc...	1 KB
b.wnry	5/11/2017 9:13 PM	WNRy File	1,407 KB
c.wnry	3/1/2022 11:01 AM	WNRy File	1 KB
r.wnry	5/11/2017 4:59 PM	WNRy File	1 KB
s.wnry	5/9/2017 5:58 PM	WNRy File	2,968 KB
t.wnry	5/12/2017 3:22 AM	WNRy File	65 KB
taskdl.exe	5/12/2017 3:22 AM	Application	20 KB
tasksche.exe	3/1/2022 11:01 AM	Application	3,432 KB
taskse.exe	5/12/2017 3:22 AM	Application	20 KB
u.wnry	5/12/2017 3:22 AM	WNRy File	240 KB

Yara Rule and Signature

1st March 2022

Full Yara rules can be found in the following github link

<https://github.com/0xZuk0/rules-of-yaras/blob/main/wannacry.yara>

```
import "hash"
import "pe"

rule WannaCry
{
    meta :
        last_updated = "01-03-2022"
        author = "Zuk0"
        description = "Yara rule to detect wannacry ransomware"

    strings :
        $killswitch_domain = "www.iuqerfsodp9ifjaposdfjhgosurijfaewrwergwea.com" ascii
        $string1 = "C:\\\\%s\\\\qeriuwjhrf" ascii
        $reg_name = "WanaCrypt0r" wide
        $password = "WNcry@2017" ascii
        $exe1 = "taskdl.exe" ascii
        $exe2 = "taskse.exe" ascii
        $service_name = "Microsoft Security Center (2.0) Service" ascii

    condition :
        pe.is_pe and
        hash.sha256(0, filesize) == "24d004a104d4d54034dbcf2a4b19a11f39008a575aa614ea04703480b1022c" and
        hash.sha256(204964, 3514368) == "ed01ebfbc9eb5bbea545af4d01bf5f1071661840480439c6e5babe8e080e41aa" and
        $killswitch_domain and
        $string1 and
        $reg_name and
        $password and
        $exe1 and
        $exe2 and
```

