

# Identity Round Robin Workshop Permission Boundaries

AWS Pop-up Loft

**Greg McConnel** 

Solutions Architect Amazon Web Services (AWS)



### Agenda

- Intro
- Permission boundary basics
- Policy categories
- Permission boundary mechanism
- Resource restrictions
- Q & A
- Workshop
- Final Q & A



### What are permission boundaries?

Mechanism to delegate the permission to create users and roles while preventing privilege escalation or unnecessarily broad permissions.




### **Use cases**

- Developers that need to create roles for Lambda functions
- Application owners that need to create roles for EC2 instances
- Admins that need to be able to create users for particular use cases
- Any others?




### Two viewpoints – the problem









## Two viewpoints – old solution 1







## Two viewpoints – old solution 2







# Permission boundary basics



### **Before and After Permission Boundaries**

### **Before**

- Certain IAM policy actions (e.g. PutUserPolicy, AttachRolePolicy) are essentially full admin-like permissions.
- Doing any form of self-service permissions management was non-trivial.

### Now

 Administrator can grant full adminlike permissions, but specify a "permissions boundary."

 Allow developers to create principals for their applications and attach policies, but only within the boundary.



### **Permission Boundaries – mechanism**

### **Admins**





# Delegated admins





# "Bound" IAM users and roles







# Restricted resources



#### **Create delegated admins**

Admins create delegated admins with permissions such that users and roles created must have a permission boundary

#### Create "bound" user & roles

Delegated admins create users and roles that have permission boundaries attached

### Permission boundary restricts the users and roles

Delegated admins attach the IAM roles to resources (or use the IAM user)

### Resource permissions restricted

Effective permissions of resources like Lambda functions are limited by permission boundary



### A condition



# A condition applied to principal creation actions (users and roles)



### Mechanism

### Developer creates a role for a Lambda function


```
# Step 1: Create role
$ aws iam create-role -role-name roleforlambda
-assume-role-policy-document file://Role_Trust_Policy_Text.json
-permissions-boundary arn:aws:iam::<ACCOUNT_NUMBER>:policy/department_a/boundary_1
# Step 2: Create policy
No change
```

# Step 3: Attach policy No change



### Two viewpoints – the new solution









# **Policy categories**




# **Policy permission categories**



# **Policy permission categories**




# But, it's just an IAM policy right?





# But, it's just an IAM policy right?






# Permission boundary mechanism



# **Policy permission categories**




### **Everything after authentication**


- 1. Authenticate the principal
- 2. Determine which **policies** apply to the request
- 3. **Evaluate** the different policy types that apply which affect the order in which they are evaluated.
- 4. **Allow or Deny** the request





### **Effective Permissions - intersection**














# Effective permissions – allow example




### **Effective permissions – scenario 1**

### Request: s3:GetObject / bucket name: example1

### **Permission Boundary**

### **Permission Policy**





### **Effective permissions – scenario 1**


### Request: s3:GetObject / bucket name: example1

### **Permission Boundary**

```
"version": "2012-10-17",
"Statement": [
    "Effect": "Allow",
     "Action": [
          "logs:CreateLogGroup",
          "logs:CreateLogStream",
          "logs:PutLogEvents"
   "Resource": "arn:aws:logs:*:*:*"
    "Effect": "Allow",
    "Action": ["s3:GetObject"],
    "Resource": "arn:aws:s3:::example1/*"
```

### **Permission Policy**





### **Effective permissions – scenario 1**


### Request: s3:GetObject / bucket name: example1


### **Permission Boundary**

```
"version": "2012-10-17",
"Statement": [
    "Effect": "Allow",
     "Action": [
          "logs:CreateLogGroup",
          "logs:CreateLogStream",
          "logs:PutLogEvents"
   "Resource": "arn:aws:logs:*:*:*"
    "Effect": "Allow",
    "Action": ["s3:GetObject"],
    "Resource": "arn:aws:s3:::example1/*"
```

### **Permission Policy**







### **Resource Restrictions**

Goal: carve out a space for the delegated admins to be able to modify resources without impacting other resources.

https://docs.aws.amazon.com/general/latest/gr/aws-arns-and-namespaces.html#arns-paths

https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/reference\_identifiers.html#identifiers-arns



### **Resource Restrictions**

- We are granting admin-like permissions (create and delete policies and roles)
- Permission boundary is one part of the delegation
- The other part is restricting the policies and roles they can impact then they could

```
"Effect": "Allow",
"Action": [
    "iam:CreatePolicy",
    "iam:DeletePolicy",
    "iam:CreatePolicyVersion",
    "iam:DeletePolicyVersion",
    "iam:SetDefaultPolicyVersion"
    ],
"Resource": "**"
```



#### **Resource Restrictions**

#### **Resource restriction using paths:**

arn:aws:iam::123456789012:role/department1/\*

Example role: arn:aws:iam::123456789012:role/department1/role1

#### **Resource restriction using names:**

arn:aws:iam::123456789012:policy/development-users\*

Example policy: arn:aws:iam::123456789012:policy/development-users-

policy1



## **Resource Restrictions - policies**

- Examine permissions assigned to a delegated admin to create policies
- If there is not a resource restriction then the delegated admins could modify any customer managed policies

```
"Effect": "Allow",
"Action": [
    "iam:CreatePolicy",
    "iam:DeletePolicy",
    "iam:CreatePolicyVersion",
    "iam:DeletePolicyVersion",
    "iam:SetDefaultPolicyVersion"
    ],
"Resource": "*"
```

VS



#### **Resource Restrictions - roles**

- Just like with policies we want to carve out a safe space for roles.
- Permission boundaries play a part here, but not all actions support the condition
- In addition different teams could be using the same permission boundaries

```
"Effect": "Allow",
"Action": [
    "iam:UpdateRole",
    "iam:DeleteRole"
    ],
"Resource": "*"
```

VS



## Presentation Q & A



### Presentation Q & A

- How does a permission boundary differ from a standard IAM policy?
- What would happen if we delegated permissions without resource restrictions?
- The scenario where you have user in an account that need to be able to create IAM polices, roles and Lambda functions is common. How was this situation handled before permission boundaries came along?

## Agenda reminder

- Intro
- Permission boundary basics
- Policy categories
- Permission boundary mechanism
- Resource restrictions
- Q & A
- Workshop
- Final Q & A



# **Workshop Overview**




## Workshop

The round is broken down into a <u>BUILD</u> and <u>VERIFY</u> phase.

BUILD (60 min): First each team will carry out the activities involved in the BUILD phase.

VERIFY (30 min): Each team will carry out the VERIFY activities as if they were part of the web admin team.

### Workshop



# Workshop



# Final Q & A



### Final Q & A

What is the fundamental mechanism of permission boundaries?

There are two ways of doing resource restrictions (naming and pathing.)
 Which option allows you to create policies using both the AWS Console and CLI?

Is there an advantage to using one over the other?

 Why do we not allow the web admins to attach any role to the Lambda functions?

## **End of day survey**

https://tinyurl.com/yb6naz8f



