The Self-Arbing DEX

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Abstract

We describe how a DEX can include backrunning logic that can be used to keep substantial arbitrage profits for itself.

1	Introduction	1
2	Setup and Notation	1
3	Main Theorem	2
4	Optimal Arbitrage Amount	3
5	Algorithm	4
6	Additional Notes 6.1 Opportunities	4 4

1 Introduction

With the advent of Layer 2 networks, subnets, supernets etc, we expect to see DEXes that serve local economies without the need for bridging. In these DEXes we expect to see only a small number of different tokens with a handful of pools containing significant liquidity. In such cases a DEX contract can check for arbitrage in a small set of predetermined potential opportunities. This paper describes how this can be done efficiently.

2 Setup and Notation

We assume the DEX consists solely of UniswapV2-style pools. Each pool i is described by the tokens s_i, t_i and the respective reserves p_i, q_i . We let R be the mapping from token pairs to reserves so that for every pool i we have $R(s_i, t_i) = p_i, q_i$ and $R(t_i, s_i) = q_i, p_i$.

The DEX administrator has identified a set of opportunities that are simply lists/paths of tokens $[a, b, c, \ldots, a]$ such that the first and last token are the same

and for every adjacent pair in the list $(a, b), (b, c), \ldots$ the exists a pool in the DEX. When a user trades with the DEX the DEX executes the trade the same way that UniswapV2 does so. As part of the same transaction however, the DEX subsequently checks if any arbitrage opportunities are available, and if so executes the arb and gives the profits to stakers.

3 Main Theorem

For the case of all UniswapV2 pools where the trading fee is $(1-\gamma)$ (with $\gamma=0.997$ in most deployments) we derive a closed form expression that tells us for any input amount x_0 the amount of tokens x_n we would get if we traded along the path $[a_0,a_1,a_2,\ldots,a_n]$ i.e. trade x_0 tokens of a_0 for x_1 tokens of a_1 , then x_1 tokens of a_1 for x_2 tokens of a_2 and so on until we get x_n tokens of a_n . The following theorem shows that x_t has a form that can be updated easily. In the next section we use this observation to compute the optimal amount x_0 to maximize profits on paths of the form $[a_0,a_1,a_2,\ldots a_0]$

Theorem 1. Given a DEX of Uniswap V2 pools with trading fee $1 - \gamma$ and a path of tokens $[a_0, a_1, \ldots, a_n]$, the output amount x_n satisfies

$$x_n = \frac{K_n x_0}{x_0 + M_n} \tag{1}$$

where K_n, M_n are defined via the recurrences

$$K_t = \frac{\gamma q_t K_{t-1}}{p_t + \gamma K_{t-1}} \tag{2}$$

$$M_t = M_{t-1} - \frac{\gamma M_{t-1} K_{t-1}}{p_t + \gamma K_{t-1}} \tag{3}$$

where $p_t, q_t = R(a_{t-1}, a_t)$ are the reserves of tokens a_{t-1} and a_t in their pool. and with starting values $K_1, M_1 = q_1, p_1/\gamma$.

Proof. The proof is by induction on the path length. For n=1 we have $p_1, q_1 = R(a_0, a_1), K_1 = q_1, M_1 = p_1/\gamma$ and $x_1 = \frac{q_1 x_0}{x_0 + p_1/\gamma}$ We know check that the Uniswap invariant is maintained with the new reserves

This proves the base case. We now assume that the claim holds for paths of length n-1 and show that it holds for paths of length n. By the induction hypothesis when we trade the path $[a_0, a_1, \ldots, a_{n-1}, a_n]$ we know that we have

$$x_{n-1} = \frac{K_{n-1}x_0}{x_0 + M_{n-1}}$$

amount of a_{n-1} . Now let $p_n, q_n = R(a_{n-1}, a_n)$ and consider the Uniswap invariant again

$$p_n q_n = (p_n + \gamma x_{n-1})(q_n - x_n).$$

We see that x_n must satisfy

$$x_n = \frac{\gamma q_n x_{n-1}}{p_n + \gamma x_{n-1}}$$

Plugging in the value of x_{n-1} we have

$$x_n = \frac{\frac{\gamma q_n K_{n-1} x_0}{x_0 + M_{n-1}}}{p_n + \gamma \frac{K_{n-1} x_0}{x_0 + M_{n-1}}}$$

$$x_n = \frac{\gamma q_n K_{n-1} x_0}{p_n (x_0 + M_{n-1}) + \gamma K_{n-1} x_0}$$

$$x_n = \frac{\gamma q_n K_{n-1} x_0}{(p_n + \gamma K_{n-1}) x_0 + p_n M_{n-1}}$$

$$x_n = \frac{\frac{\gamma q_n K_{n-1}}{p_n + \gamma K_{n-1}} x_0}{x_0 + \frac{p_n M_{n-1}}{p_n + \gamma K_{n-1}}}$$

$$x_n = \frac{\frac{\gamma q_n K_{n-1}}{p_n + \gamma K_{n-1}} x_0}{x_0 + M_{n-1} - \frac{\gamma M_{n-1} K_{n-1}}{p_n + \gamma K_{n-1}}}$$

$$x_n = \frac{K_n x_0}{x_0 + M_n}$$

where in the last step we used the recurrences for K_n, M_n .

4 Optimal Arbitrage Amount

Given a cycle $[a_0, a_1, \dots, a_{n-1}, a_0]$ we can solve for the optimal arbitrage amount by setting to zero the derivative of the profit

$$y(x_0) = x_n - x_0 = \frac{K_n x_0}{x_0 + M_n} - x_0$$

with respect to the input amount x_0 . Doing so leads to the solution

$$x_0^* = \sqrt{K_n M_n} - M_n$$

For an arb to be possible we need $x_0^* > 0$ or, equivalently, $K_n > M_n$. Furthermore the optimal profit is

$$y(x_0^*) = K_n - M_n - 2x_0^*$$

5 Algorithm

Let $g(x, p, q, \gamma)$ be the amount that we receive when we swap x amount of tokens with reserve p for the other token in the pool with reserve q with the fee being $(1 - \gamma)$, i.e:

 $g(x, p, q, \gamma) = \frac{\gamma qx}{p + \gamma x}$

Below is a basic algorithm. Gas optimizations are up to the implementation.

Require: List of opportunity paths a for $i \leftarrow 0, \ldots, a.$ length -1 do $p, q \leftarrow R(a[i][0], a[i][1])$ $K, M \leftarrow q, p/\gamma$ for $j \leftarrow 2, \ldots, a[i].$ length -1 do $p, q \leftarrow R(a[i][j-1], a[i][j])$ $M \leftarrow M - g(K, p, M, \gamma)$ $K \leftarrow g(K, p, q, \gamma)$ end for if K > M then $x \leftarrow \sqrt{KM} - M$ Swap x tokens along path a[i] break end if end for

6 Additional Notes

6.1 Opportunities

Suppose we have identified the cycle $[a_0, a_1, a_2, a_0]$ as an interesting opportunity. Should we also consider the cycles $[a_1, a_2, a_0, a_1]$ and $[a_2, a_1, a_0, a_2]$ which consist of the same pools? The answer is no: All these cycles allow one to extract the same amount of value. The difference is only on the token being paid out. While cyclical shifts need not be considered, the reverse order cycle $[a_0, a_2, a_1, a_0]$ should always be considered.