HITCON 2019 QUAL

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Outline

- Description
- Vulnerability
- Exploit

- Windows x64 on windows sever 2019
 - Similar to Windows 10 (1809)
- DEP
- ASLR
- CFG
- Disallow Child Process
 - You can not create new process.

- It a windows heap challenge
 - If you are unfamiliar at windows heap, you can reference my slide
 - https://www.slideshare.net/AngelBoy1/windows-10-nt-heapexploitation-english-version
 - https://slideshare.net/AngelBoy1/windows-10-nt-heap-exploitation-chinese-version

- It a windows heap challenge
 - The following command in Windbg will be very helpful
 - !heap
 - !heap -a [heap address]
 - dt _HEAP [heap address]
 - dt _HEAP_LIST_LOOKUP
 - dt LFH_HEAP

- Login
 - Add
 - View
 - Remove
 - logout
- Private Heap
 - More stable than default heap


- A simple database
- After login
 - You can add/read/remove data by key
 - Use array and linked list to store data

- Structure
 - KEY_SIZE 0x40

```
struct node{
    char* data;
    size_t size;
    char key[KEY_SIZE+1];
    struct node* next;

};
```

table[256]



- Login
 - Read user data from "user.txt"
 - If user & pass match
 - Set is_login flag

```
printf("User:");
read_input(user, 0x20);
printf("Password:");
read_input(pass, 0x20);
memset(buf, 0, 0x100);
if (!fp) {
    fopen_s(&fp,"user.txt", "r");
    if (!fp)
        _exit(0);
fread(buf, 0x100, 0x1, fp);
fseek(fp, 0, SEEK_SET);
snprintf(cmpbuf,0x20,"%s:", user);
ret = strstr(buf, cmpbuf);
```

- ADD
 - Add data by key
- It will search node in table.
- If not found, it will create new node and insert node to the table
 - Insert into in front of linked list
- If found it will reuse the node and allocate a new data buffer

- READ
 - Read data by key
- It will use key to search node in table
- If found, it will write data to stdout

- REMOVE
 - Delete data by key
- It will use key to search node in table
- If found, it will delete the node in table and linked

- Private Heap
 - Only use in my malloc
 - Independent memory pool

```
void* hcalloc(size_t cnt,size_t size) {
    return HeapAlloc(hHeap, HEAP_ZERO_MEMORY, size*cnt);
}

void hfree(void* ptr) {
    HeapFree(hHeap, 0, ptr);
}
```

Vulnerability

- Heap Overflow
- When it reuse the node
 - It will use the size of old data buffer when reading data to new buffer
- It will lead to heap overflow, when the old size of data buffer larger than new buffer

```
read_input(buf, KEY_SIZE);
target = search(buf);
if (target) {
    hfree(target->data);
    printf("Size:");
    size = read_long();
    if (size >= 0x1000)
        size = 0x1000;
    target->data = (char*)hcalloc(1,size);
    printf("Data:");
    read_input(target->data, target->size);
}
```

- Leak
- Arbitrary memory writing
- ROP

- Leak
 - Because it use private heap, we can easy use heap overflow to overwrite data pointer to do arbitrary memory reading
 - But I will demonstrate in normal case (default heap)

- Leak
 - In default heap case, it will use Heapallocate when program start.
 - There are many unstable hole in the heap.
 - It also used in many Windows API, so it hard to locate heap and heap layout

Default heap

Default heap

_HEAP

Chunk

Chunk

Chunk

_HEAP

Chunk

Chunk

....

Chunk

Chunk

Chunk

- Leak
 - If we want to have a stable leakage, we can use LFH
 - There are less checks in LFH.
 - We can use it to prevent some heap detection.

Default heap

LFH

Old Data

Size = 0x100

yuawn

Next

Use node to fill Userblock

_HEAP

Chunk

Chunk

....

Chunk

Chunk

Userblock

Userblock header

Chunk

Chunk

Chunk

Node Chunk

Chunk

Chunk

Chunk

Chunk

Userblock header

Node

Node

Node

Node

Node

Node

Node

Node (Key = yuawn)

Old Data
Size = 0x100

yuawn

Next

EXPOID

Userblock header
Node
Node (key = yuawn)

Userblock header
Node
Node (key = yuawn)

remove a node

Old Data
Size = 0x100

yuawn

Next

Exploit

New data
Size = 0x100

yuawn

Next

ADD(yuawn,sizeof(node),'dada')


Userblock header
Node
Node (key = yuawn)

Userblock header
Node
Node (key = yuawn)

Userblock header Node Node Data Node Node Node Node Node (key = yuawn)

remove a node

Fill usexblock with data



New data

Size = 0x100

yuawn

Next

- Now we can use vulnerability to leak something in next chunk.
 - Heap address (from data ptr)
 - Key of next chunk (node)
- Assume key of next chunk is ddaa

- Leak
 - After leaking heap address, we can use heap overflow to overwrite next chunk with address we want to leak
 - By the way, Heap overflow will corrupt header of next chunk.
 - When we use add to update data, it will free original data. In back-end allocator it will encounter heap corruption detect if you do not forge header.
 - In LFH, it does not check!
 - That is, we can do arbitrary memory reading by key(ddaa)

Data

Leak address
Size

ddaa

Next

- Leak
 - After we can do arbitrary memory reading
 - We can get address of
 - ntdll (from _HEAP->lock)
 - PEB (from ntdll)
 - binary (from ntdll!PebLdr)
 - kernel32 (from IAT of binary)

- Leak
 - After we can do arbitrary memory reading
 - We can get address of
 - TEB (from PEB)
 - Stack address (from TEB)
 - The location of return address (scan return address at stack)

- Arbitrary memory writing
 - Next step, we need to do arbitrary memory writing to overwrite return address.
 - Intended solution
 - Forge a fake chunk at bss to overwrite fp.
 - Unintended solution
 - Forge a fake chunk at stack to overwrite return address directly.

- Arbitrary memory writing
 - In order to forge a fake chunk at bss to overwrite fp, we need to prepare some chunk in back-end allocator first.
 - I divide into three part
 - Prepare a chunk used to overwrite other chunk (chunk A)
 - Forge a legal chunk at password buffer
 - Prepare a free chunk to be overwrite with fake Flink & Blink.

- Arbitrary memory writing
 - Prepare a chunk used to overwrite other chunk
 - We can choose a suitable chunk such that allocate in the largest free chunk

_HEAP _HEAP _HEAP Chunk Chunk Chunk malloc(A) free(A) Userblock Userblock Userblock A (0x200) A (0x200)

_HEAP

Chunk

...

Userblock

A (0x200)

free(A)

malloc:A-E

free(D)

free(B)

_HEAP

Chunk

Userblock

A (0x100)


B (0x100)

C (0x100)


D (0x100)

E (0x100)


- Arbitrary memory writing
 - After we prepare some chunks, the heap layout will like the diagram
 - A can be used to overflow B
 - B, D are free chunk with same size
 - We can use A to leak Flink and Blink of B
 - That is, we can get address of B and D




- Arbitrary memory writing
 - Next step is forging a legal chunk at password buffer so that we can use malloc to get the chunk.
 - At first, the layout will like the diagram.





- Arbitrary memory writing
 - We can forge a legal chunk with same header of chunk B



- Arbitrary memory writing
 - Then use chunk A to overwrite Flink and Blink of chunk B
 - You should make sure that double linked does not corrupted.








- Arbitrary memory writing
 - malloc(0xf0)
 - We will get fake chunk at bss!!


ListHint[0x10] Fake chunk at pass buffer

ListHint




Chunk header(0x100) **Oxdeadbeef** Fake chunk at pass buffer **hHEAP** Chunk header(0x100) Fake chunk at user buffer fp

- Arbitrary memory writing
 - By the way, it only check header and double linked list of chunk when it use malloc.
 - It does not check the header of next chunk
 - Sometimes it's very useful



- Arbitrary memory writing
 - Now, we can overwrite fp!!
 - We can forge the FILE structure follow by fp and overwrite fp with the fake FILE structure.
 - That is, we can use fread to do arbitrary memory writing!



- How about FILE on Windows ?
 - No vtable in FILE
 - It also has stream buffer pointer
 - You can corrupt it to achieve arbitrary memory reading and writing

• File Structure in ucrtbase.dll

- _ptr
 - Current pointer
- base
 - The base of stream buffer

```
121 struct __crt_stdio_stream_data
122 {
123
        union
124
125
            FILE _public_file;
            char* _ptr;
126
127
        };
128
129
        char*
                          _base;
130
        int
                          _cnt;
131
        long
                          _flags;
132
        long
                          _file;
133
                          _charbuf;
        int
134
        int
                          _bufsiz;
135
        char*
                          _tmpfname;
136
                  _SECTION
        CRITICAL
                          _lock;
137 };
138
```

• File Structure in ucrtbase.dll

_cnt

• The rest of the buffer is not read out.

```
121 struct __crt_stdio_stream_data
122 {
123
        union
124
125
            FILE _public_file;
126
            char* _ptr;
127
        };
128
129
        char*
                          _base;
130
        int
                          _cnt;
131
                          _flags;
        long
132
                          _file;
        Long
133
                          _charbuf;
        int
134
        int
                          _bufsiz;
135
        char*
                          _tmpfname;
                 _SECTION _lock;
136
        CRITICAL.
137 };
138
```

• File Structure in ucrtbase.dll

- _flags
 - Record the attribute of the File stream
 - Has buffer
 - Read/Write

• ...

```
121 struct __crt_stdio_stream_data
122 {
123
        union
124
            FILE _public_file;
125
            char* _ptr;
126
127
        };
128
129
        char*
                          _base;
130
        int
                          _cnt;
131
                          _flags;
        long
132
                          _file;
        Long
133
        int
                          _charbuf;
                          _bufsiz;
134
        int
135
                          _tmpfname;
        char*
                 _SECTION _lock;
136
        CRITICAL
137 };
138
```

• File Structure in ucrtbase.dll

- _file
 - File descriptor
- _charbuf
 - Local buffer

```
121 struct __crt_stdio_stream_data
122 {
123
        union
124
125
            FILE _public_file;
126
            char* _ptr;
127
        };
128
129
        char*
                          _base;
130
        int
                          _cnt;
131
        lona
                           _flaas;
132
                          _file;
        long
133
        int
                           _charbuf;
134
        int
                          _bufsiz;
135
        char*
                          _tmpfname;
                 _SECTION _lock;
136
        CRITICAL.
137 };
138
```

• File Structure in ucrtbase.dll


- bufsiz
 - Size of buffer
- Lock
 - Just lock

```
121 struct __crt_stdio_stream_data
122 {
123
        union
124
125
            FILE _public_file;
126
            char* _ptr;
127
       };
128
129
        char*
                          _base;
130
        int
                          _cnt;
131
        long
                         _flags;
132
                         _file;
        long
                           charbuf:
        int
133
134
        int
                          _bufsiz;
135
                           tmpfname:
        char*
136
        CRITICAL_SECTION _lock;
137 };
138
```

- Arbitrary memory reading
 - fwrite
 - Set the _file to the file descriptor of stdout
 - Set _flag to _IOWRITE | IOBUFFER_USER | _IOUPDATE
 - Set _cnt to 0
 - Set the _base & _ptr to memory address which you want to read
 - Elementsize*count > _bufsize


Arbitrary memory reading

```
const char* msg = "secret";
FILE* fp = NULL;
char* buf = (char*)malloc(0x100);
_read(0, buf, 0x100);
fopen_s(&fp,"key.txt", "w");
((struct file_stream*)fp)->_cnt = 0x0;
((struct file_stream*)fp)->_bufsize = 0;
((struct file_stream*)fp)->_base = (char*)msg;
((struct file_stream*)fp)->_ptr = (char*)msg+6;
((struct file_stream*)fp)->_file = 0x1;
fwrite(buf, 1, 100, fp);
```



Arbitrary memory reading

```
const char* msg = "secret";
FILE* fp = NULL;
char* buf = (char*)malloc(0x100);
_read(0, buf, 0x100);
fopen_s(&fp,"key.txt", "w");
((struct file_stream*)fp)->_cnt = 0x0;
((struct file_stream*)fp)->_bufsize = 0;
((struct file_stream*)fp)->_base = (char*)msg;
((struct file_stream*)fp)->_ptr = (char*)msg+6;
((struct file_stream*)fp)->_file = 0x1;
fwrite(buf, 1, 100, fp)
```



- Arbitrary memory writing
 - fread
 - Set the _file to file descriptor of stdin
 - Set _flag to _IOALLOCATED | _IOBUFFER_USER
 - Set _cnt to 0
 - Set the _base to memory address which you want to wirte
 - Elementsize*count < _bufsize


Arbitrary memory writing

```
FILE* fp = NULL;
char* buf = (char*)malloc(0x100);
                                                       C:\Users\angelboy\sou
char msg[0x100];
memset(msg, 0, 0x100);
                                                      DADADA
fopen_s(&fp, "key.txt", "r");
((struct file_stream*)fp)->_cnt = 0x0;
((struct file_stream*)fp)->_base = msg;
((struct file_stream*)fp)->_bufsize = 0x30;
((struct file_stream*)fp)->_file = 0x0;
fread(buf, 1, 6, fp);
printf("msg:%s\n",msg);
```

Arbitrary memory writing

```
FILE* fp = NULL;
char* buf = (char*)malloc(0x100);
                                                       C:\Users\angelboy\sou
char msg[0x100];
memset(msg, 0, 0x100);
fopen_s(&fp, "key.txt", "r");
((struct file_stream*)fp)->_cnt = 0x0;
((struct file_stream*)fp)->_base = msg;
((struct file_stream*)fp)->_bufsize = 0x30;
((struct file_stream*)fp)->_file = 0x0;
fread(buf, 1, 6, fp);
printf("msg:%s\n",msg);
```

- ROP
 - After we have arbitrary memory writing we can overwrite return address on stack with ROP
 - But it disallow child process, you can not create new process.
 - We need use ROP to read flag.txt, but it's a little complicated.
 - So we use ROP to do VirtualProtect to change page permission so that we can jump to shellcode.



- ROP
 - After we can run shellcode, we can read files more easily.
 - Kernel32
 - CreateFile/ReadFile/GetStdHandle/WriteFile
 - In default heap
 - You should create new heap for windows API, otherwise you will encounter heap detection
 - Overwrite _PEB->ProcessHeap/ucrtbase!crtheap/ntdll!ldrpheap with new heap.

- Unintended Solution
 - Forge a fake chunk on stack to overwrite return address
 - You need to leak more data
 - Cookie
 - RSP