

The Hardness of Factoring

The security of RSA rests on the assumption that the problem of factoring a large number is hard. What is the assumption? At first glance it doesn't seem like a particularly challenging problem; we've seen it in math classes before. However, it turns out that as the number grows larger, it becomes exponentially harder to factor. In 2009, researchers took two years to factor a 232-digit number, and this was using the most efficient algorithms we know! It would seem, then, that factorization is a *computationally hard* problem and that building a cryptosystem on the foundation of factorization would be a safe bet. Since we believe that RSA cryptography is computationally secure, this is a good sign.

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But how can we show mathematically that factoring is a hard problem? Sure, we could make an appeal to authority (like what Shamir, and Adleman do in the RSA paper) that hundreds of great mathematical minds have believed in the hardness of factorization, dating back to Fermat in the 1600s, and no one has come up with an efficient algorithm yet. But we'd really like to have some mathematical guarantees here.

The field of computational complexity theory is devoted to determining how difficult mathematical problems are to solve. In complexity theory, we try to assign a given problem to a class, or a set of problems. We show that two problems are comparably hard by performing a *reduction*, that is, showing that problem A can be turned into an instance of problem B, solving problem B, and converting the result into a solution for problem A. When we reduce A to B, we are essentially saying "Instances of problem A are no harder than instances of type B".

[cartoon-hardness-3]

But how do we *know* whether a problem is intrinsically hard, or whether it only seems hard because we haven't found a better algorithm or function that hasn't been discovered yet? After all, we used to think that testing whether a number is prime or not (primality testing) was "hard" — but then in 2005 the first provable polynomial-time algorithm for primality (the AKS test) was put forth by three Indian mathematicians. Is RSA just one algorithm away from being insecure?

To talk about the relative hardness of different problems, we use *complexity classes*. The two most important are **P** and **NP**. P contains all of the problems that can be deterministically solved in a polynomial amount of time. That is, as the size of the problem increases, the time it takes to solve that problem increases polynomially. You can express the time it will take to solve a problem of size n in an equation that is polynomial in n .

NP stands for non-deterministic polynomial time. All of its members have answers that can be verified in polynomial time, but unlike P, it is not guaranteed that solving a NP problem will take polynomial time. This has been a major topic of discussion in the computer science and math community over whether $P=NP$, that is, whether every problem in NP can be solved in polynomial time.

polynomial time can also be solved in polynomial time. The problem is of such great importance selected as one of the Millennium Prize Problems, for which the first correct solution will earn a million dollars and fortune await!

So where does our factorization problem rank in the world of complexity classes? Well, we can verify a solution once we have one — we simply multiply the two numbers of the solution, and compare the result to the number we were trying to factor. So factorization is in NP. However, we don't have a polynomial time algorithm (yet) so for now we believe factorization is not in P. This is good, because we want factorization to remain intractable. But if anyone proves that $P=NP$, then factorization would become an easy problem and become insecure.

How would being able to do efficient factorization break RSA's security? Well, recall that the RSA algorithm uses a modulus n , the product of two secret primes p, q , and an exponent e . If an adversary could then compute $\phi(n) = (p-1)(q-1)$. Knowing $\phi(n)$, the adversary can then compute the private key d from the RSA algorithm that $(d * e) \bmod \phi(n) = 1$, so we just need to compute the modular inverse of $e \bmod \phi(n)$ in order to compute the private key. Once the adversary has Alice's private key, they can decrypt all messages sent to Alice.

