




# 네트워크보안2

⌚ 작성일시	@November 29, 2022 1:06 AM
📅 강의날짜	@2022/11/29
⌚ 편집일시	@November 29, 2022 1:09 AM
📁 분야	네트워크
📁 공부유형	스터디 그룹
☑ 복습	<input type="checkbox"/>
⋮ 태그	


## Chapter 8 roadmap

- 8.1 What is network security?
- 8.2 Principles of cryptography
- 8.3 Message integrity
- 8.4 Securing e-mail
- 8.5 Securing TCP connections: SSL
- 8.6 Network layer security: IPsec
- 8.7 *Securing wireless LANs*
- 8.8 Operational security: firewalls and IDS

## SSL and TCP/IP



*normal application*




*application with SSL*

- ❖ SSL provides application programming interface (API) to applications
- ❖ C and Java SSL libraries/classes readily available

## Toy SSL: a simple secure channel

- ❖ *handshake*: Alice and Bob use their certificates, private keys to authenticate each other and exchange shared secret
- ❖ *key derivation*: Alice and Bob use shared secret to derive set of keys
- ❖ *data transfer*: data to be transferred is broken up into series of records
- ❖ *connection closure*: special messages to securely close connection

## Toy: a simple handshake




**MS:** master secret

**EMS:** encrypted master secret

## Toy: data records

- ❖ why not encrypt data in constant stream as we write it to TCP?
  - where would we put the MAC? If at end, no message integrity until all data processed.
  - e.g., with instant messaging, how can we do integrity check over all bytes sent before displaying?
- ❖ instead, break stream in series of records
  - each record carries a MAC
  - receiver can act on each record as it arrives
- ❖ issue: in record, receiver needs to distinguish MAC from data
  - want to use variable-length records



## Toy: sequence numbers


- ❖ *problem*: attacker can capture and replay record or re-order records
- ❖ *solution*: put sequence number into MAC:
  - $MAC = MAC(M_x, \text{sequence}||\text{data})$
  - note: no sequence number field
- ❖ *problem*: attacker could replay all records
- ❖ *solution*: use nonce

## Toy: control information


- ❖ *problem*: truncation attack:
  - attacker forges TCP connection close segment
  - one or both sides thinks there is less data than there actually is.
- ❖ *solution*: record types, with one type for closure
  - type 0 for data; type 1 for closure
- ❖  $MAC = MAC(M_x, \text{sequence}||\text{type}||\text{data})$



## Toy SSL: summary



## SSL record protocol



**record header:** content type; version; length


**MAC:** includes sequence number, MAC key  $M_x$

**fragment:** each SSL fragment  $2^{14}$  bytes (~16 Kbytes)

# Firewalls

## *firewall*

isolates organization's internal net from larger Internet, allowing some packets to pass, blocking others



## Firewalls: why

prevent denial of service attacks:

- ❖ SYN flooding: attacker establishes many bogus TCP connections, no resources left for "real" connections

prevent illegal modification/access of internal data

- ❖ e.g., attacker replaces CIA's homepage with something else

allow only authorized access to inside network

- ❖ set of authenticated users/hosts

three types of firewalls:

- ❖ stateless packet filters
- ❖ stateful packet filters
- ❖ application gateways

## Stateless packet filtering: more examples

<i>Policy</i>	<i>Firewall Setting</i>
No outside Web access.	Drop all outgoing packets to any IP address, port 80
No incoming TCP connections, except those for institution's public Web server only.	Drop all incoming TCP SYN packets to any IP except 130.207.244.203, port 80
Prevent Web-radios from eating up the available bandwidth.	Drop all incoming UDP packets - except DNS and router broadcasts.
Prevent your network from being used for a smurf DoS attack.	Drop all ICMP packets going to a "broadcast" address (e.g. 130.207.255.255).
Prevent your network from being tracerouted	Drop all outgoing ICMP TTL expired traffic

## Access Control Lists

❖ **ACL:** table of rules, applied top to bottom to incoming packets: (action, condition) pairs

action	source address	dest address	protocol	source port	dest port	flag bit
allow	222.22/16	outside of 222.22/16	TCP	> 1023	80	any
allow	outside of 222.22/16	222.22/16	TCP	80	> 1023	ACK
allow	222.22/16	outside of 222.22/16	UDP	> 1023	53	---
allow	outside of 222.22/16	222.22/16	UDP	53	> 1023	----
deny	all	all	all	all	all	all



# Stateful packet filtering


- ❖ *stateless packet filter*: heavy handed tool
  - admits packets that “make no sense,” e.g., dest port = 80, ACK bit set, even though no TCP connection established:

action	source address	dest address	protocol	source port	dest port	flag bit
allow	outside of 222.22/16	222.22/16	TCP	80	> 1023	ACK

- ❖ *stateful packet filter*: track status of every TCP connection
  - track connection setup (SYN), teardown (FIN): determine whether incoming, outgoing packets “makes sense”
  - timeout inactive connections at firewall: no longer admit packets

## Application gateways

- ❖ filters packets on application data as well as on IP/TCP/UDP fields.
- ❖ *example*: allow select internal users to telnet outside.



1. require all telnet users to telnet through gateway.
2. for authorized users, gateway sets up telnet connection to dest host. Gateway relays data between 2 connections
3. router filter blocks all telnet connections not originating from gateway.



# CSE327: Course information

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- ❑ By the time you are finished ...
  - ❑ You understand variety of concepts (not just factoids)
  - ❑ Internet, HTTP, DNS, P2P, ...
  - ❑ Sockets, Ports, ...
  - ❑ Congestion Control, Flow Control, TCP, ...
  - ❑ Routing, Basic Graphs, Dijkstra's Algorithm, IP, ...
  - ❑ MAC, Aloha, CSMA, TDMA, Token, WiFi 802.11, ...
  - ❑ ARP, DHCP, Switch/Hub, Routers, ...
  - ❑ Security, RSA, ...
  - ❑ Cellular Networks, Mobile Networks, Satellite Networks, ...
  - ❑ SSL, IPSec, Firewall, ...
  - ❑ ...

If you understand 75% of these terms, you shouldn't be here

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