# Theoretical Constructions of Pseudorandom Objects

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## **Outline**

1 One-Way Functions


2 From OWF to PRP (FYI)

## **Content**

1 One-Way Functions

2 From OWF to PRP (FYI)


## **Overview**



## One of contributions of modern cryptography

The existence of one-way functions is equivalent to the existence of all (non-trivial) private-key cryptography.

# One-Way Functions (OWF)



The inverting experiment Invert $_{A,f}(n)$ :

- **1** Choose input  $x \leftarrow \{0,1\}^n$ . Compute y := f(x).
- $\mathbf{2}$   $\mathcal{A}$  is given  $1^n$  and y as input, and outputs x'.
- Invert<sub>A,f</sub>(n) = 1 if f(x') = y, otherwise 0.

# Definitions of OWF/OWP [Yao]

For polynomial-time algorithm  $M_f$  and  $\mathcal{A}$ .

#### **Definition 1**

A function  $f: \{0,1\}^* \rightarrow \{0,1\}^*$  is **one-way** if:

- **1** (Easy to compute):  $\exists M_f: \forall x, M_f(x) = f(x)$ .
- **2** (Hard to invert):  $\forall A$ ,  $\exists$  negl such that

$$\Pr[\mathsf{Invert}_{\mathcal{A},f}(n) = 1] \leq \mathsf{negl}(n).$$

or

$$\Pr_{x \leftarrow \{0,1\}^n}[\mathcal{A}(f(x)) \in f^{-1}(f(x))] \leq \mathsf{negl}(n).$$

#### **Definition 2**

Let  $f: \{0,1\}^* \to \{0,1\}^*$  be length-preserving, and  $f_n$  be the restriction of f to the domain  $\{0,1\}^n$ . A OWP f is a **one-way permutation** if  $\forall n, f_n$  is a bijection.

# **Candidate One-Way Function**


- Multiplication and factoring:  $f_{\text{mult}}(x, y) = (xy, ||x||, ||y||)$ , x and y are equal-length primes.
- Modular squaring and square roots:  $f_{\text{square}}(x) = x^2 \mod N$ .
- Discrete exponential and logarithm:  $f_{g,p}(x) = g^x \mod p$ .
- Subset sum problem:  $f(x_1, ..., x_n, J) = (x_1, ..., x_n, \sum_{j \in J} x_j).$
- Cryptographically secure hash functions: Practical solutions for one-way computation.

# **Examples**

$$f: \{0,1\}^{128} \to \{0,1\}^{128}$$
 is a OWF. Is  $f'$  OWF?

- f'(x) = f(x) ||x|
- $f'(x) = f(x) \oplus 1^{|x|}$
- f'(x||x') = f(x)||x'|
- $f'(x) = f(x) \oplus f(x)$
- $f'(x) = \begin{cases} f(x) & \text{if } x[0,1,2,3] \neq 1010 \\ x & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$
- more examples in homework

# Hard-Core Predicates (HCP) [Blum-Micali]



#### **Definition 3**

A function hc :  $\{0,1\}^* \to \{0,1\}$  is a hard-core predicate of a function f if (1) hc can be computed in polynomial time, and (2)  $\forall$  PPT  $\mathcal{A}$ ,  $\exists$  negl such that

$$\Pr_{x \leftarrow \{0,1\}^n}[\mathcal{A}(f(x)) = \mathsf{hc}(x)] \leq \frac{1}{2} + \mathsf{negl}(n).$$

## A HCP for Any OWF

#### Theorem 4

f is OWF. Then  $\exists$  an OWF g along with an HCP  $\mathrm{gl}$  for g. If f is a permutation then so is g.

Q: is  $gl(x) = \bigoplus_{i=1}^{n} x_i$  the HCP of any OWF?

## Proof.

$$g(x,r)\stackrel{\mathrm{def}}{=}(f(x),r)$$
, for  $|x|=|r|$ , and define

$$\operatorname{gl}(x,r) \stackrel{\mathsf{def}}{=} \bigoplus_{i=1}^n x_i \cdot r_i.$$

r is a random subset of  $\{1, \ldots, n\}$ . [Goldreich and Levin]

## **Content**


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## PRG from OWP: Blum-Micali Generator

#### Theorem 5

f is an OWP and hc is an HCP of f. Then  $G(s) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} (f(s), \text{hc}(s))$  constitutes a PRG with expansion factor  $\ell(n) = n+1$ , then  $\forall$  polynomial p(n) > n,  $\exists$  a PRG with expansion factor  $\ell(n) = p(n)$ .




# PRF from PRG [Goldreich, Goldwasser, Micali]

## Theorem 6


If  $\exists$  a PRG with expansion factor  $\ell(n) = 2n$ , then  $\exists$  a PRF.

$$G(k) = G_0(k) || G_1(k)$$



$$F_k(x_1x_2\cdots x_n) = G_{x_n}(\cdots(G_{x_2}(G_{x_1}(k)))\cdots), G(s) = (G_0(s), G_1(s)).$$

# PRP from PRF [Lucy, Rackoff]



 $F^{(r)}$  is an r-round Feistel network with the mangler function F.

#### Theorem 7

If F is a length-preserving PRF, then  $F^{(3)}$  is a PRP that maps 2n-bit strings to 2n-bit strings (and uses a key of length 3n).

#### Theorem 8

If F is a length-preserving PRF, then  $F^{(4)}$  is a strong PRP that maps 2n-bit strings to 2n-bit strings (and uses a key of length 4n).

# **Necessary Assumptions**

#### Theorem 9

Assume that  $\exists$  OWP. Then  $\exists$  PRG, PRF, strong PRP, and CCA-secure private-key encryption schemes.

## **Proposition 10**

If  $\exists$  a private-key encryption scheme that has indistinguishable encryptions in the presence of an eavesdropper, then  $\exists$  an OWF.

### Proof.

$$f(k, m, r) \stackrel{\mathsf{def}}{=} (\mathsf{Enc}_k(m, r), m).$$

# **Summary**

- OWF implies secure private-key encryption scheme
- Secure private-key encryption scheme implies OWF