

# RSA Problem and Encryption

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- 1 RSA Problem
- 2 Attacks against “Textbook RSA” Encryption
- 3 RSA Encryption in Practice

## 1 RSA Problem

## 2 Attacks against “Textbook RSA” Encryption

## 3 RSA Encryption in Practice

# RSA Overview

- **RSA**: Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir and Leonard Adleman, in 1977
- **RSA problem**: Given  $N = pq$  (two distinct big prime numbers) and  $y \in \mathbb{Z}_N^*$ , compute  $y^{-e}$ ,  $e^{\text{th}}$ -root of  $y$  modulo  $N$
- **Open problem**: RSA problem is easier than factoring  $N$ ?
- **Standards**: PKCS#1 (RFC3447/8017), ANSI X9.31, IEEE 1363
- **Key sizes**: 1,024 to 4,096 bit
- **Best public cryptanalysis**: a 768 bit key has been broken
- **RSA Challenge**: break RSA-2048 to win \$200,000 USD

**Key lengths** with comparable security :

Symmetric	RSA
80 bits	1024 bits
128 bits	3072 bits
256 bits	15360 bits

# “Textbook RSA”

## Construction 1

- Gen: on input  $1^n$  run  $\text{GenRSA}(1^n)$  to obtain  $N, e, d$ .  
 $pk = \langle N, e \rangle$  and  $sk = \langle N, d \rangle$ .
- Enc: on input  $pk$  and  $m \in \mathbb{Z}_N^*$ ,  $c := [m^e \bmod N]$ .
- Dec: on input  $sk$  and  $m \in \mathbb{Z}_N^*$ ,  $m := [c^d \bmod N]$ .

## Insecurity

Since the “textbook RSA” is deterministic, it is insecure with respect to any of the definitions of security we have proposed.

Q: How to generate  $N, e, d$ ? What's  $\mathbb{Z}_N^*$ ? How to compute  $m^e \bmod N$ ? Is it TDP? Why is it hard?

## Textbook

“A Computational Introduction to Number Theory and Algebra”  
(Version 2) by Victor Shoup

# Primes and Modular Arithmetic

- The set of **integers**  $\mathbb{Z}$ ,  $a, b, c \in \mathbb{Z}$ .
- $p > 1$  is **prime** if it has no factors; otherwise, **composite**.
- **Greatest common divisor**  $\gcd(a, b)$  is the largest integer  $c$  such that  $c \mid a$  and  $c \mid b$ .  $\gcd(0, b) = b$ ,  $\gcd(0, 0)$  undefined.
- Remainder  $r = [a \bmod N] = a - b[a/b]$  and  $r < N$ .  $N$  is called **modulus**.
- $\mathbb{Z}_N = \{0, 1, \dots, N-1\} = \{a \bmod N \mid a \in \mathbb{Z}\}$ .
- $a$  is **invertible modulo**  $N \iff \gcd(a, N) = 1$ . If  $ab \equiv 1 \pmod{N}$ , then  $b = a^{-1}$  is **multiple inverse** of  $a$  **modulo**  $N$ .

# Examples of Modular Arithmetic

**Euclidean algorithm:**  $\gcd(a, b) = \gcd(b, [a \bmod b])$ .

**Find**  $\gcd(12, 27)$

**Extended Euclidean algorithm:** Given  $a, N$ , find  $X, Y$  with  $Xa + YN = \gcd(a, N)$ <sup>1</sup>.

**Find the inverse of 11 (mod 17)**

Reduce and then add/multiply

**Compute**  $193028 \cdot 190301 \bmod 100$

**Cancellation law:** If  $\gcd(a, N) = 1$  and  $ab \equiv ac \pmod{N}$ , then  $b \equiv c \pmod{N}$ .

$a = 3, c = 10, b = 2, N = 24$

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<sup>1</sup>Bézout's lemma

$$\mathbb{Z}_N^* \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \{a \in \{1, \dots, N-1\} \mid \gcd(a, N) = 1\}$$

A **group** is a set  $\mathbb{G}$  with a binary operation  $\circ$ :

- **(Closure:)**  $\forall g, h \in \mathbb{G}, g \circ h \in \mathbb{G}$ .
- **(Existence of an Identity:)**  $\exists$  **identity**  $e \in \mathbb{G}$  such that  $\forall g \in \mathbb{G}, e \circ g = g = g \circ e$ .
- **(Existence of Inverses:)**  $\forall g \in \mathbb{G}, \exists h \in \mathbb{G}$  such that  $g \circ h = e = h \circ g$ .  $h$  is an **inverse** of  $g$ .
- **(Associativity:)**  $\forall g_1, g_2, g_3 \in \mathbb{G}, (g_1 \circ g_2) \circ g_3 = g_1 \circ (g_2 \circ g_3)$ .

$\mathbb{G}$  with  $\circ$  is **abelian** if

- **(Commutativity:)**  $\forall g, h \in \mathbb{G}, g \circ h = h \circ g$ .

Existence of inverses implies **cancellation law**.

When  $\mathbb{G}$  is a **finite group** and  $|\mathbb{G}|$  is the **order** of group.

Is  $\mathbb{Z}_N^*$  a group under ' $\cdot$ '? How about  $\mathbb{Z}_N$  under ' $\cdot$ '?  
 $\mathbb{Z}_{15}^* = ?$   $\mathbb{Z}_{13}^* = ?$



# Group Exponentiation

$$g^m \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \underbrace{g \circ g \circ \cdots \circ g}_{m \text{ times}}.$$

## Theorem 2

*Euler's theorem:*  $\mathbb{G}$  is a finite group. Then  $\forall g \in \mathbb{G}, g^{|\mathbb{G}|} = 1$ .

**calculate all exponentiation of  $3 \in \mathbb{Z}_7^*$**

## Corollary 3

*Fermat's little theorem:*  $\forall g \in \mathbb{G}$  and  $i$ ,  $g^i \equiv g^{[i \bmod |\mathbb{G}|]}$ .

**Calculate  $3^{78} \in \mathbb{Z}_7^*$**

# Arithmetic algorithms

- **Addition/subtraction:** linear time  $O(n)$ .
- **Multiplication:** naively  $O(n^2)$ . Karatsuba (1960):  $O(n^{\log_2 3})$   
Basic idea:  $(2^b x_1 + x_0) \times (2^b y_1 + y_0)$  with 3 mults.  
Best (asymptotic) algorithm: about  $O(n \log n)$ .
- **Division with remainder:**  $O(n^2)$ .
- **Exponentiation:**  $O(n^3)$ .

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## Algorithm 1: Exponentiating by Squaring

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**input** :  $g \in G$ ; exponent  $x = [x_n x_{n-1} \dots x_2 x_1 x_0]_2$

**output:**  $g^x$

```
1  $y \leftarrow g; z \leftarrow 1$ 
2 for  $i = 0$  to  $n$  do
3   |   if  $x_i == 1$  then  $z \leftarrow z \times y$ 
4   |    $y \leftarrow y^2$ 
5 return  $z$ 
```

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# Euler's Phi Function

**Euler's phi function:**  $\phi(N) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} |\mathbb{Z}_N^*|$ .

## Theorem 4

$N = \prod_i p_i^{e_i}$ <sup>2</sup>,  $\{p_i\}$  are distinct primes,  $\phi(N) = \prod_i p_i^{e_i-1}(p_i - 1)$ .

$N = pq$  where  $p, q$  are distinct primes.  $\phi(N) = ?$   
 $\phi(12) = ?$     $\phi(30) = ?$

## Corollary 5 (Euler's theorem & Fermat's little theorem)

$a \in \mathbb{Z}_N^*$ .  $a^{\phi(N)} \equiv 1 \pmod{N}$ .

If  $p$  is prime and  $a \in \{1, \dots, p-1\}$ , then  $a^{p-1} \equiv 1 \pmod{p}$ .

$3^{43} \bmod 49 = ?$

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<sup>2</sup>Fundamental theorem of arithmetic

# Permutation by Group Exponentiation Function

**Exponentiation function**  $f_e : \mathbb{Z}_N^* \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_N^*$  by  $f_e(x) = [x^e \bmod N]$ .  
 **$e$ 'th root of  $y$ :**  $x^e \equiv y, x \equiv y^{1/e}$ .

## Corollary 6

*If  $\gcd(e, \phi(N)) = 1$ , then  $f_e$  is a permutation.*

## Proof.

Let  $d = [e^{-1} \bmod \phi(N)]$ , then  $f_d$  is the inverse of  $f_e$ .  
 $y \equiv x^e; \quad f_d(y) \equiv y^d \equiv x^{ed} \equiv x.$  □

**In  $\mathbb{Z}_{10}^*$ ,  $e = 3$ ,  $d = ?$ ,  $f_e(3) = ?$ ,  $f_d(f_e(3)) = ?$ ,  $9^{\frac{1}{3}} = ?$**

**What if we cannot get  $\phi(N)$  for some 'special'  $N$ ?**

**What if we cannot factorize these 'special'  $N$ ?**

# Factoring Is Hard

- **Factoring**  $N = pq$ .  $p, q$  are of the same length  $n$ .
- **Trial division**:  $\mathcal{O}(\sqrt{N} \cdot \text{polylog}(N))$ .
- **Pollard's  $p - 1$  method**: effective when  $p - 1$  has “small” prime factors.
- **Pollard's rho** method:  $\mathcal{O}(N^{1/4} \cdot \text{polylog}(N))$ .
- **Quadratic sieve** algorithm [Carl Pomerance]: sub-exponential time  $\mathcal{O}(\exp(\sqrt{n \cdot \log n}))$ .
- The best-known algorithm is the **general number field sieve** [Pollard] with time  $\mathcal{O}(\exp(n^{1/3} \cdot (\log n)^{2/3}))$ .

# The RSA Problem Is Hard

**Idea:** factoring is hard

$\implies$  for  $N = pq$ , finding  $p, q$  is hard

$\implies$  computing  $\phi(N) = (p-1)(q-1)$  is hard

$\implies$  computing  $e^{-1} \bmod \phi(N)$  is hard

**There is a gap.**

$\implies$  RSA problem is hard:

Given  $y \in \mathbb{Z}_N^*$ , compute  $y^{-e}$  modulo  $N$ .

**Open problem**

RSA problem is easier than factoring?

# Generating Random Primes

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**Algorithm 2:** Generating a random prime

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**input** : Length  $n$ ; parameter  $t$

**output:** A random  $n$ -bit prime

```
1 for  $i = 1$  to  $t$  do
2    $p' \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{n-1}$ 
3    $p := 1 \| p'$ 
4   if  $p$  is prime then return  $p$ 
5 return fail
```

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- $\exists$  a constant  $c$  such that,  $\forall n > 1$ , a randomly selected  $n$ -bit number is prime with probability at least  $c/n$ .
- If  $N$  is prime, then the Miller-Rabin primality test always outputs “prime”. If  $N$  is composite, then the algorithm outputs “prime” with probability at most  $2^{-t}$ .

# Generating RSA Problem

Let  $\text{GenModulus}(1^n)$  be a polynomial-time algorithm that, on input  $1^n$ , outputs  $(N, p, q)$  where  $N = pq$ , and  $p, q$  are  $n$ -bit primes except with probability negligible in  $n$ .

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## Algorithm 3: GenRSA

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**input** : Security parameter  $1^n$

**output:**  $N, e, d$

- 1  $(N, p, q) \leftarrow \text{GenModulus}(1^n)$
  - 2  $\phi(N) := (p - 1)(q - 1)$
  - 3 **find**  $e$  such that  $\gcd(e, \phi(N)) = 1$
  - 4 **compute**  $d := [e^{-1} \bmod \phi(N)]$
  - 5 **return**  $N, e, d$
- 

**Show an example of RSA problem**



# The RSA Assumption

The RSA experiment  $\text{RSAinv}_{\mathcal{A}, \text{GenRSA}}(n)$ :

- 1 Run  $\text{GenRSA}(1^n)$  to obtain  $(N, e, d)$ .
- 2 Choose  $y \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_N^*$ .
- 3  $\mathcal{A}$  is given  $N, e, y$ , and outputs  $x \in \mathbb{Z}_N^*$ .
- 4  $\text{RSAinv}_{\mathcal{A}, \text{GenRSA}}(n) = 1$  if  $x^e \equiv y \pmod{N}$ , and 0 otherwise.

## Definition 7

**RSA problem is hard relative to GenRSA** if  $\forall$  PPT algorithms  $\mathcal{A}$ ,  $\exists \text{ negl}$  such that

$$\Pr[\text{RSAinv}_{\mathcal{A}, \text{GenRSA}}(n) = 1] \leq \text{negl}(n).$$

# Constructing Trap-Door Permutations

## Construction 8

Define a family of permutations with GenRSA:

- Gen: on input  $1^n$ , run  $\text{GenRSA}(1^n)$  to obtain  $(N, e, d)$  and output  $I = \langle N, e \rangle$ ,  $\text{td} = d$ , Set  $\mathcal{D}_I = \mathcal{D}_{\text{td}} = \mathbb{Z}_N^*$ .
- Samp: on input  $I$ , choose a random element  $x$  of  $\mathbb{Z}_N^*$ .
- $f_I(x) = [x^e \bmod N]$ .
- deterministic **inverting algorithm**  $\text{Inv}_{\text{td}}(y) = [y^d \bmod N]$ .

Reduce the RSA problem to the inverting problem.

1 RSA Problem

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# Recall “Textbook RSA”

## Construction 9

- Gen: on input  $1^n$  run  $\text{GenRSA}(1^n)$  to obtain  $N, e, d$ .  
 $pk = \langle N, e \rangle$  and  $sk = \langle N, d \rangle$ .
- Enc: on input  $pk$  and  $m \in \mathbb{Z}_N^*$ ,  $c := [m^e \bmod N]$ .
- Dec: on input  $sk$  and  $m \in \mathbb{Z}_N^*$ ,  $m := [c^d \bmod N]$ .

## Insecurity

Since the “textbook RSA” is deterministic, it is insecure with respect to any of the definitions of security we have proposed.

# Attacks on “Textbook RSA” with a small $e$

**Small  $e$  and small  $m$  make modular arithmetic useless.**

- If  $e = 3$  and  $m < N^{1/3}$ , then  $c = m^3$  and  $m = \underline{\hspace{1cm}} ?$
- In the hybrid encryption, 1024-bit RSA with 128-bit DES.

**A general attack when small  $e$  is used:**

- $e = 3$ , the same message  $m$  is sent to 3 different parties.
- $c_1 = [m^3 \bmod N_1]$ ,  $c_2 = [m^3 \bmod N_2]$ ,  $c_3 = [m^3 \bmod N_3]$ .
- $N_1, N_2, N_3$  are coprime, and  $N^* = N_1 N_2 N_3$ ,  $\exists$  unique  $\hat{c} < N^*$ :  
 $\hat{c} \equiv c_1 \pmod{N_1}$ ,  $\hat{c} \equiv c_2 \pmod{N_2}$ ,  $\hat{c} \equiv c_3 \pmod{N_3}$ .
- With Chinese Remainder Theory<sup>3</sup>,  $\hat{c} \equiv m^3 \pmod{N^*}$ . Since  $m^3 < N^*$ ,  $m = \hat{c}^{1/3}$ .

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<sup>3</sup> $N = pq$  where  $\gcd(p, q) = 1$ .  $\mathbb{Z}_N \simeq \mathbb{Z}_p \times \mathbb{Z}_q$  and  $\mathbb{Z}_N^* \simeq \mathbb{Z}_p^* \times \mathbb{Z}_q^*$ .

# A Quadratic Improvement in Recovering $m$

If  $1 \leq m < \mathcal{L} = 2^\ell$ , there is an attack that recovers  $m$  in time  $\sqrt{\mathcal{L}}$ .

$$\text{Idea : } c \equiv m^e = (r \cdot s)^e = r^e \cdot s^e \pmod{N}$$

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**Algorithm 4:** An attack on textbook RSA encryption

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**input** : Public key  $\langle N, e \rangle$ ; ciphertext  $c$ ; parameter  $\ell$

**output:**  $m < 2^\ell$  such that  $m^e \equiv c \pmod{N}$

```
1 set  $T := 2^{\alpha\ell}$                 /*  $\frac{1}{2} < \text{constant } \alpha < 1$  */
2 for  $r = 1$  to  $T$  do  $x_r := [c/r^e \bmod N]$ 
3 sort the pairs  $\{(r, x_r)\}_{r=1}^T$  by  $x_r$ 
4 for  $s = 1$  to  $T$  do
5   |   if  $[s^e \bmod N] \stackrel{?}{=} x_r$  for some  $r$  then
6   |   |   return  $[r \cdot s \bmod N]$ 
7 return fail
```

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# Common Modulus Attacks

**Common Modulus Attacks:** the same modulus  $N$ .

**Case I:** for multiple users with their own secret keys.  
Each user can find  $\phi(N)$  with his own  $e, d$ , then find others'  $d$ .

**Case II:** for the same message encrypted with two public keys.  
Assume  $\gcd(e_1, e_2) = 1$ ,  $c_1 \equiv m^{e_1} \pmod{N}$  and  $c_2 \equiv m^{e_2} \pmod{N}$ .  
 $\exists X, Y$  such that  $Xe_1 + Ye_2 = 1^4$ .

$$c_1^X \cdot c_2^Y \equiv m^{Xe_1} m^{Ye_2} \equiv m^1 \pmod{N}.$$

## An example of common modulus attack

$N = 15, e_1 = 3, e_2 = 5, c_1 = 8, c_2 = 2, m = ?$

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<sup>4</sup>Bézout's lemma

# CCA in “Textbook RSA” Encryption

## Recovering the message with CCA

$\mathcal{A}$  choose a random  $r \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_N^*$  and compute  $c' = [r^e \cdot c \bmod N]$ , and get  $m'$  with CCA. Then  $m = ?$

## Doubling the bid at an auction

The ciphertext of an bid is  $c = [m^e \bmod N]$ .  $c' = [2^e c \bmod N]$ .

$$(c')^d \equiv ?$$



**1** RSA Problem

**2** Attacks against “Textbook RSA” Encryption

**3** RSA Encryption in Practice

# RSA Implementation Issues

- **Encoding binary strings as elements of  $\mathbb{Z}_N^*$ :**  $\ell = \|N\|$ . Any binary string  $m$  of length  $\ell - 1$  can be viewed as an element of  $\mathbb{Z}_N$ . Although  $m$  may not be in  $\mathbb{Z}_N^*$ , RSA still works.
- **Choice of  $e$ :** Either  $e = 3$  or a small  $d$  are bad choices. Recommended value:  $e = 65537 = 2^{16} + 1$
- **Using the Chinese remainder theorem:** to speed up the decryption.

$$[c^d \bmod N] \leftrightarrow ([c^d \bmod p], [c^d \bmod q]).$$

Assume that exponentiation modulo a  $v$ -bit integer takes  $v^3$  operations. RSA decryption takes  $(2n)^3 = 8n^3$ , whereas using CRT takes  $2n^3$ .

# Padded RSA

**Idea:** add randomness to improve security.

## Construction 10

Let  $\ell$  be a function with  $\ell(n) \leq 2n - 2$  for all  $n$ .


- Gen: on input  $1^n$ , run  $\text{GenRSA}(1^n)$  to obtain  $(N, e, d)$ . Output  $pk = \langle N, e \rangle$ , and  $sk = \langle N, d \rangle$ .
- Enc: on input  $m \in \{0, 1\}^{\ell(n)}$ , choose a random string  $r \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{\|N\| - \ell(n) - 1}$ . Output  $c := [(r \| m)^e \bmod N]$ .
- Dec: compute  $\hat{m} := [c^d \bmod N]$ , and output the  $\ell(n)$  low-order bits of  $\hat{m}$ .

$\ell$  should neither be too large ( $r$  is too short in theory) nor be too small ( $m$  is too short in practice).

## Theorem 11

If the RSA problem is hard relative to  $\text{GenRSA}$ , then Construction with  $\ell(n) = \mathcal{O}(\log n)$  is CPA-secure.

**Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding (OAEP):** encode  $m$  of length  $n/2$  as  $s||t$  of length  $2n$ .  $G, H$  are **Random Oracles**.



**Q: How to decipher?**


RSA-OAEP is CCA-secure in Random Oracle model. <sup>5</sup> [RFC 3447]

CPA: To learn  $r$ , attacker has to learn  $s$  from  $(s||t)^e$

CCA: Effective decryption query is disabled by checking "00...0" in the plaintext before the response

<sup>5</sup>It may not be secure when RO is instantiated.

# OAEP Improvements



**OAEP+**:  $\forall$  trap-door permutation  $F$ , F-OAEP+ is CCA-secure.


**SAEP+**: RSA ( $e=3$ ) is a trap-door permutation, RSA-SAEP+ is CCA-secure.

$W, G, H$  are Random Oracles.

# Implementation Attacks on RSA

## Simplified CCA on PKCS1 v1.5 in HTTPS [Bleichenbacher]

Server tells if the MSB of plaintext (Version Number) = '1' for a given ciphertext. Attacker sends  $c' = (2^r)^e \cdot c$ . If receiving *Yes*, then  $(r + 1)$ -th  $MSB(m) = ?$



**Defense:** treating incorrectly formatted message blocks in a manner indistinguishable from correctly formatted blocks. See [RFC 5246]

# Implementation Attacks on RSA (Cont.)

**Timing attack:** [Kocher et al. 1997] The time it takes to compute  $c^d$  can expose  $d$ . (require a high-resolution clock)

**Power attack:** [Kocher et al. 1999] The power consumption of a smartcard while it is computing  $c^d$  can expose  $d$ .

**Defense: Blinding** by choosing a random  $r$  and deciphering  $r^e \cdot c$ .

**Key generation trouble** (in OpenSSL RSA key generation):

Same  $p$  will be generated by multiple devices (due to poor entropy at startup), but different  $q$  (due to additional randomness).

**Q:**  $N_1, N_2$  from different devices,  $\gcd(N_1, N_2) = ?$

Experiment result: factor 0.4% of public HTTPS keys.

# Faults Attack on RSA

**Faults attack:** A computer error during  $c^d \bmod N$  can expose  $d$ .

Using Chinese Remainder Theory to speed up the decryption:

$$[c^d \bmod N] \leftrightarrow ([m_p \equiv c^d \pmod{p}], [m_q \equiv c^d \pmod{q}]).$$

**Suppose error occurs when computing  $m_q$ , but no error in  $m_p$ .**

Then output  $m' \equiv c^d \pmod{p}$ ,  $m' \not\equiv c^d \pmod{q}$ .

So  $(m')^e \equiv c \pmod{p}$ ,  $(m')^e \not\equiv c \pmod{q}$ .

$$\text{gcd}((m')^e - c, N) = ?$$

**Defense:** check output. (but 10% slowdown)



- RSA, “textbook RSA”, padded RSA, PKCS
- small  $e$ , common modulus attacks, CCA, implementation/faults attack