
Closing Remarks

Yu Zhang

Harbin Institute of Technology

Cryptography, Autumn, 2020

Syllabus [in Chinese]



One more thing, we will read comics [xkcd:177]

I'M SURE YOU'VE HEARD ALL ABOUT THIS SORDID AFFAIR IN THOSE GOSSIPY CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTOCOL SPECS WITH THOSE BUSYBODIES SCHNEIER AND RIVEST, ALWAYS TAKING ALICE'S SIDE, ALWAYS LABELING ME THE ATTACKER.



YES, IT'S TRUE, I BROKE BOB'S PRIVATE KEY AND EXTRACTED THE TEXT OF HER MESSAGES. BUT DOES ANYONE REALIZE HOW MUCH IT HURT?



HE SAID IT WAS NOTHING, BUT EVERYTHING FROM THE PUBLIC-KEY AUTHENTICATED SIGNATURES ON THE FILES TO THE LIPSTICK HEART SMEARED PLAINTEXT ATTACK. BUT I ON THE DISK SCREAMED "ALICE."



I DIDN'T WANT TO BELIEVE. OF COURSE ON SOME LEVEL 1 REALIZED IT WAS A KNOWN-COULDN'T ADMIT IT UNTIL I SAW FOR MYSELF



SO BEFORE YOU SO QUICKLY LABEL ME A THIRD PARTY TO THE COMM-UNICATION JUST REMEMBER: I LOVED HIM FIRST. WE HAD SOMETHING AND SHE / TORE IT AWAY. SHE'S THE ATTACKER, NOT ME.

NOT EVE.

Provable Security

- A proof of security never proves security in an absolute sense, it relates security to an unproven assumption that some computational problem is hard.
- The quality of a security reduction should not be ignored it matters how tight it is, and how strong the underlying assumption is.
- A security reduction only proves something in a particular model specifying what the adversary has access to and can do.

Crypto Pitfalls

Crypto deceptively simple

■ Why does it so often fail?


Important to distinguish various issues:


- 1 Bad cryptography/implementations/design, etc.
- 2 Good cryptography can be 'circumvented' by adversaries operating 'outside the model'
- 3 Even the best cryptography only shifts the weakest point of failure to elsewhere in your system
- 4 Systems are complex: key management; social engineering; insider attacks

Avoid the first; be aware of 2-4.

Bad Implementation Example: Heartbleed

HOW THE HEARTBLEED BUG WORKS:





Crypto is difficult to get right

- Must be implemented correctly
- Must be integrated from the beginning, not added on "after the fact"
- Need expertise; "a little knowledge can be a dangerous thing"
- Can't be secured by Q/A, only (at best) through penetration testing and dedicated review of the code by security experts

General Recommendation

- Use only standardized algorithms and protocols
- No security through obscurity!
- Use primitives for their intended purpose
- Don't implement your own crypto
- If your system cannot use "off-the-shelf" crypto components, re-think your system
- If you really need something new, have it designed and/or evaluated by an expert
- Don't use the same key for multiple purposes
- Use good random-number generation

Crypto Libraries

- Use existing, high-level crypto libraries: cryptlib, NaCl, Google's Keyczar, Mozilla's NSS, OpenSSL
- Avoid low-level libraries (like JCE, crypto++, GnuPG, OpenPGP) - too much possibility of mis-use
- Avoid writing your own low-level crypto

Beware of Snake Oil

Snake Oil: bogus commercial cryptographic products.


- **Secret system**: security through obscurity
- Technobabble: since cryptography is complicated
- Unbreakable: a sure sign of snake oil
- One-time pads: a flawed implementation
- Unsubstantiated "bit" claims: key lengths are not directly comparable

What cryptography can and can't do

"No one can guarantee 100% security. But we can work toward 100% risk acceptance. ... Strong cryptography can withstand targeted attacks up to a point—the point at which it becomes easier to get the information some other way. ... The good news about cryptography is that we already have the algorithms and protocols we need to secure our systems. The bad news is that that was the easy part; implementing the protocols successfully requires considerable expertise. ... Security is different from any other design requirement, because functionality does not equal quality."

- By Bruce Schneier 1997

Rubber-hose Cryptanalysis



A Good Wish

"No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks."

- Article 12 Universal Declaration of Human Rights

Grades

■ Composition:

Homework: $4 \times 5 = 20\%$ (Homework $1 \sim 5$)

Final Exam: 80%

Extra: 5% for outstanding homework (Homework $1\sim6$)

- How to score high:
 - Read the textbook IMC
 - Do homework by yourself
 - No Plagiarism! Otherwise, -10 point penalty each time.