

# DevSecOps What Why and How?

Anant Shrivastava @anantshri NotSoSecure Global Services





#### **About: Anant Shrivastava**

**Director NotSoSecure Global Services** 

Sysadmin / Development / Security

Project Owner: AndroidTamer, Codevigilant

Contributor: OWASP, null, G4H and more

https://anantshri.info (@anantshri on social platforms)

NotSoSecure Global Services (a Claranet group company)

Boutique Consulting firm specialized in training and consulting





#### Agenda

- What is DevSecOps?
- Why do we need DevSecOps?
- How do we do DevSecOps?
- Integrate Security in Pipeline
- Tools of Trade
- Sample Implementation
- Case Studies



#### Disclaimer


- I will be listing a lot of tools, It's not an exhaustive list
- I don't endorse or recommend any specific tool / vendor
- Every environment is different: Test and validate before implementing any ideas



#### What is DevSecOps?

#### Effort to strive for "Secure by Defai

- Integrate Security via tools
- Create Security as Code culture
- Promote cross skilling






### Why do we need DevSecOps?

- DevOps moves at rapid pace, traditional security just can't keep up
- With rapid pace of development and large scale of application devsecops makes it easier to manage
- DevSecOps allows for much smoother scaling of process
- Security as part of process is the only way to ensure safety




### Shifting Left saves cost & time





#### **Shifting Left saves cost & time**






#### How do we do DevSecOps?

- DevSecOps is Automation + Cultural Changes
- Integrate security into your DevOps Pipeline
- Enable cultural changes to embrace DevSecOps




## Injecting Sec in DevOps





## Sample Implementation

 A simplistic flow of DevSecOps Pipeline incorporating the stages mentioned earlier





### Tools of The Trade

**Threat Modelling Tools** 





ThreatSpec.

Microsoft Threat Modeling Tool

**Pre-Commit Hooks** 







Git Hound

**Software Composition Analysis** 





Retire.js

Static Analysis Security Testing (SAST)









**IDE Plugins** 



CAT.net







Secret Management



Keywhiz



Confidant



#### Tools of The Trade

**Vulnerability Management** 







**Dynamic Security Analysis** 











Infrastructure Scan











Compliance as Code







DevSec Hardening Framework

Docker Bench for Security

WAF









#### To be or Not to Be in Pipeline

- API / command line access
- Execution start to final output should be 15 minutes max
- Tools should be Containerized / scriptable
- Minimal licensing limitations (parallel scans or threads)
- Output format parsable / machine readable (no to stdout, yes to json / xml)
- Configurable to counter false negatives / false positives




#### Does Programming Language Matter

- Different programming languages need different tools for static analysis and software composition analysis
- Some tools support multiple languages like sonarqube
- Others are focused on one language



#### Language Specific Tools





### What about Cloud

- The Threat Landscape changes
  - Identity and Access Management
  - Billing Attacks





- Infrastructure as Code allows quick audit / linting
- Focus more on:
  - Security groups
  - Permissions to resources
  - Rouge /shadow admins
  - Forgotten resources (compromises / billing)






## Cloud Native Approach to Security

- Different Service Providers Approach Security Differently
- All of them provide some of the ingredient in-house
- Irrespective of Cloud provider some tools will still need to be sourced
  - Static Code Analysis Tool
  - Dynamic Code Analysis Tool
  - Software Composition Analysis
  - Vulnerability Management Tool



## AWS Cloud Native DevSecOps





# Cloud Native Dev[Sec]Ops

	Conventional Infra	AWS	Azure	GCP
Source Code Management	Bitbucket, Github, Gitlab etc	AWS CloudCommit	Azure Repos	Cloud Source Repositories
Infrastructure As a Code	Chef, Puppet, Ansible more	Amazon CloudFormation	Azure DevTest Labs	Cloud Code
CI/CD Server	Jenkins, Bamboo, Gitlab, Travis CI, Circleci more	AWS CodeBuild AWS CodeDeploy AWS CodePipeline	Azure Pipelines, Azure Test Plans	Cloud Build, Tekton
Artifactory Repository	jFrog Artifactory, Sonatype Nexus, more	Amazon S3	Azure Artifacts	Cloud Firestore
Stg/Prod Servers	VMWare, On-premises servers	EC2 ECS (Elastic Containers) EKS (Elastic Kubernetes)	Virtual Machines, Azure Lab Services, Azure Kubernetes Service (AKS)	Compute Engine, App Engine, Shielded VMs
Monitoring & Alert	Nagios, Graphite, Grafana	AWS CloudWatch	Azure Monitor, Network Watcher	Access Transparency
Firewall	Modsecurity	AWS Firewall Manager, AWS WAF	Azure Firewall	Application Gateway
DLP	MyDLP, OpenDLP	Amazon Macie	Azure Information Protection	Cloud Data Loss Prevention
Threat Detection	Snort, Kismet	Amazon GuardDuty	Azure Advanced Threat Protection	Event Threat Detection (beta)
Vulnerability Scanning	OpenVAS, Nessus	Amazon Inspector	Azure Security Center	Cloud Security Scanner
Secrets Management	Hashicorp Vault, Docker Secrets	AWS Secrets Manager	Azure Key Vault	Secrets management



#### **Cultural Aspect**

- Automation alone will not solve the problems
- Focus on collaboration and inclusive culture
- Encourage security mindset specially if it's outside sec team
- Build allies (security champions) in company
- Avoid Blame Game





#### **Security Champion**

- Bridge between Dev, Sec and Ops teams
- Build Security Champions
  - Single Person per team
  - Everyone provided with similar cross skilling opportunities
  - Incentivize other teams to collaborate with Sec team
    - Internal Bug bounties
    - Sponsor Interactions (Parties / get-togethers)
    - Sponsor cross skilling trainings for other teams



#### **Security Enablers**

#### People

- Build relationships between teams, don't isolate
- Identify, nurture security conscious individuals
- Empower Dev/ops to deliver better and faster and secure, instead of blocking.
- Focus on solutions instead of blaming

#### **Process**

- Involve security from get-go (design or ideation phase)
- Fix by priority, don't attempt to fix it all
- Security Controls must be programmable and automated wherever possible
- DevSecOps Feedback process must be smooth and governed


#### Technology

- Templatize scripts/tools per language/platform
- Adopt security to devops flow don't expect others to adopt security
- Keep an eye out for simpler and better options and be pragmatic to test and use new tools



## Generic Case Study







#### Case Studies – Fannie Mae

#### **DevSecOps** @ Fannie Mae – The Strategy



Integrate with Culture

- Run as ONE (Security + DevOps as a singled purpose team)
- Training development teams to develop Secure code
  - OWASP Brown Bags and On Demand Training Courses
  - Secure Code Examples in GIT REPO show how to write secure code
- · Empowering Developers/ Engaging Business Partners
  - Verification of Fortify "Clean Scans"
  - Periodic "To-the-Right" Application Static and Dynamic Tests



Make Security Easy

- Tracking security issues in the same systems developers are using
  - Integrated Fortify with SonarQube
  - Integrated Fortify with SSC
  - Application Security Issues Defect Tracking (Jira)
- Integrating preventive security controls/tools in the development phase
  - HP-Secure Assist
  - Find Security Bugs
  - Sonatype IQ Plugin



Automate Everything

- Automating as many security tests as possible to run alongside other tests
  - Integrating SAST tools (HP-SA, Find Bugs, Find Security Bugs, Fortify)
  - o Future> Use DAST tool
- Detecting when applications are relying on libraries that have known vulnerabilities
  - Integrating Sonatype with fortify to detect third party libraries that have known vulnerabilities



#### Case Studies – Fannie Mae

600.00

400.00

#### **DevSecOps** @ Fannie Mae – The Results


#### **Delivering the Promise**

- Average days to close a vulnerability improved by 74%
- Automated code quality scanning shows overall security code scores has increased by 10%
- More than 60% of application teams are performing security tests before release
- Critically vulnerable open source components (CVE 7.5+) downloaded has decreased from 18% to 6.25%
- ~ 55% of technical debt and security defects identified as a result of periodic testing have been dispositioned
- ~ 77% of older technical debt and security defects have been remediated, have a remediation plan in place, or have been addressed through managed retirements of assets

# Average Days to Close a Security Vulnerability 1400.00 1200.00 800.00




### Case Studies - ABN Amro





### Case Studies - ABN Amro




# blackhat Negative Case Studies

- > 0
- bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/7-percent-of-all-amazon-s3-servers-are-exposed-explaining-recent-surge-of-data-leaks/
- Top defense contractor Booz Allen Hamilton leaks 60,000 files, including employee security credentials and passwords to a US government system.
- Verizon partner leaks personal records of over 14 million Verizon customers, in placing sames, addresses, account details, and for some victims account PINs.
- An AWS S3 server leaked the personal details of WWE fans who registered on the company's sites. 3,065,805 users were exposed.
- Another AWS S3 bucket leaked the personal details of ever N 8 million American voters. The database contained information from three data mining companies known to be associated with the Republican Party.
- Another S3 database left exposed only validable personal details of job applications that had Top Secret government clearance.
- Dow Jones, the parent company in he Wall Street Journal, leaked the personal details of 2.2 million customers.
- Omaha-based voting mac(ii) et im Election Systems & Software (ES&S) left a database exposed online that contained the personal records of 1.8 million bicago voters.
- Security researchers discovered a Verizon AWS S3 bucket containing over 100 MB of data about the company's internal system named Distributed Vision Services (DVS), used for billing operations.
- An auto-tracking company leaked over a half of a million records with logins/passwords, emails, VIN (vehicle identification number),
   IMEI numbers of GPS devices and other data that is collected on their devices, customers and auto dealerships.

Prevention: Continuous monitoring and review of cloud assets and config

# blackhat is it Enough?

- Rite of passage by periodic pen test and continuous bug bounty
- It's not just important to get feedback but to also action on them
- Risk Acceptance Documentation should be the worst case scenario not your first bet



# blackhat References

- https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-17/thursday/us-17-Lackey-Practical%20Tips-for-Defending
   g-Web-Applications-in-the-Age-of-DevOps.pdf
- https://www.sonatype.com/hubfs/2018%20State%20of%20the%20Software%20Supply%20
   Chain%20Report.pdf
- https://snyk.io/opensourcesecurity-2019/
- https://www.veracode.com/state-of-software-security-report

# blackhat Key Takeaways

- Security is everyone responsibility
- Embrace security as an integral part of the process, use feedback to refine the process
- DevSecOps is not a one size fit all: your mileage will vary



#### blackhat Questions and Discussion

Questions feedback devsecops@notsosecure.com