MSI - Microsoft Windows Installer Elevation of Privilege


Summary: The Microsoft Windows Installer permits under some circumstances to a "standard user" an arbitrary permissions and content overwrite with SYSTEM privileges.

(Microsoft Windows Installer: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/msi/windows-installer-portal)

Products affected: Windows 10 Enterprise (1903) with latest security update (2019 November patch) and probably also other versions (not tested). Windows 10 Enterprise - INSIDER PREVIEW (Fast ring) 10.0.19033 - Build 19033

Description:

It is possible and allowed by "Windows Installer service" to install a MSI package as "standard user". I have noticed, in my research, that when a "standard user" installs a MSI package, the "Windows Installer service" triggers some operations with SYSTEM privileges. (see image below from Procmon)




Going forward with my research I found that, after a package is installed on the system, a "standard user" could force a repair of the product with "/f" command line parameter.

In our case, for example, command "msiexec /qn /fa foo.msi" triggers the repair operation .

With this command I've seen a couple of interesting operations came out that caught my attention.

As SYSTEM, the "Windows Installer service" try to set the permissions of the package files that are going to be reinstalled.

After that, it read and writes the content of the package files (stored within msi package). See image below from Procmon.



As we can see, the first time "Windows Installer service" tries to open one the files impersonating the "standard user" but as a result it gets a "PRIVILEGE NOT HELD", then, after that, it closes the file and reopens it as SYSTEM without impersonating! Afterward it continues to set the permissions of the file as SYSTEM and writes its content.

This is clearly a point of possible exploitation! In order to obtain the desired a result, a "race condition" has to be successfully exploited. The "race condition" is going to occur between the moment when "Windows Installer service" closes the file as "standard user" and reopens it as SYSTEM just before it writes the DACLs and the content.

Now that the logical workflow seems a little bit clear (I hope), I'll try to describe the steps executed by the exploit.

First of all: I've built a MSI package (foo.msi) that can be installed also as a "standard user"; this means that MSI service will install all files in C:\Users\[USER]\AppData\Local . In our particular case, I've built this MSI package which installs only the file "foo.txt" into C:\Users\[USER]\AppData\Local\fakemsi\ directory (C# VS2017 project will also be sent with this report).

In order to make the MSI package installable by "standard user", I've run against it the following command:

"C:\Program Files (x86)\Windows Kits\10\bin\10.0.17763.0\x86\MsiInfo.exe"


"C:\temp2\Setup1\Setup1\Debug\foo.msi" -w 10

(MsiInfo belongs to WDK, so watch out for your version

REF: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/msi/msiinfo-exe)

These are the steps that the exploit performs:

- Before exploits removes temporary old directories used for junctions.
- Create an empty directory C:\Users\[USER]\foomsi
- Create empty directory C:\Users\[USER]\AppData\Local\fakemsi; this is the directory that MSI package will
 create in order to save "foo.txt" file
- Create a junctions from C:\Users\[USER]\AppData\Local\fakemsi to C:\Users\[USER]\foomsi (MSI service will not delete it) so later we can abuse of this junction to gain privileges. That's a trickie part.
- Create a sort of symbolic link in "\RPC Control" object namespace. This link will be named "foo.txt" and it points to the file we want to own (c:\windows\win.ini in this case)
- Remove the msi package (even if it doesn't exist): command "msiexec /qn /i foo.msi"
- Install the msi package: command "msiexec /qn /i foo.msi"
- Start thread to win the race condition and just after milliseconds triggers Window Installer service with command "msiexec /qn /fa foo.msi" in order to exploit "setSecurity" operation and win the race.
- Thread starts watching for C:\Users\[USER]\AppData\Local\fakemsi\foo.txt existance
- As soon as C:\Users\[USER]\AppData\Local\fakemsi\foo.txt has been renamed by MSI service, and it does not exist anymore, the exploit will set a reparse point (a junction) from C:\Users\[USER]\AppData\Local\fakemsi\ to "\RPC Control"
- At this point, MSI service creates again C:\Users\[USER]\AppData\Local\fakemsi\foo.txt, and it will REPARSE to "\RPC Control" where there is "foo.txt" file that is a link pointing to the target file, in this way it's going to exploit setSecurity operation (we'll gain file content overwrite too). That's the core of the race condition (and of the exploit) that we'll try to win; matters of milliseconds
- Below a screenshot (from procmon) of a successful exploitation. I have marked all the importation operations that can be observed:
 - 1) MSI service executes "CreateFile" successfully impersonating "normal" user.
 - 2) Exploit sets mountpoint from C:\Users\[USER]\AppData\Local\fakemsi\ to "\RPC Control"
 - 3) MSI service does a REPARSE to target file (C:\windows\win.ini in this case) and executes "CreateFile" successfully as SYSTEM user
 - 4) MSI service sets security DACL as SYSTEM; it gives FULL CONTROL to the "normal" user to the target file.
 - 5) MSI service writes content read from "foo.txt" file inside foo.msi package.



This exploit can overwrite DACL of files that are fully owned by SYSTEM.

Most of the times, in my tests, the exploit works at first time... If it doesn't work at the first time, try to re-run again, it should be work.

I have provided a full working PoC:

- Pay attention, all files in "bin_MsiExploit" need to stay on the same directory. (please read readme.txt inside zipped file)

All the source code needed:

- exploit source code VS 2017 C++ (src MsiExploit directory)
- msi package source code VS 2017 C# already provided in previous emails

Screens shots:

Successfully exploitation on Windows 10 Enterprise Insider Preview (Fast ring) 10.0.19033

Conclusions:

I think that bug stands behind an incorrect impersonated operation when it comes to write the DACLs. nu11secur1ty: More info, https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/secauthz/dacls-and-aces

Best Regards,
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Best Regards,
Ventsislav Varbanovski (@nu11secur1ty).

Status of the vulnerability: (https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-0683)

Credit:

Many thanks of Christian Danieli (@padovah4ck) Developer

Many thanks of Ventsislav Varbanovski (@nu11secur1ty) Debug and test on Visual Studio 2019 C++