A 3-player game theoretic model of a choice between two queueing systems with strategic managerial decision making

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EURO 2021 Athens

# About me



#### About me




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- ► Shone R, Knight VA, Williams JE. Comparisons between observable and unobservable M/M/1 queues with respect to optimal customer behaviour
- Kerner Y, Shmuel-Bittner O. Strategic behaviour and optimization in a hybrid M/M/1 queue with retrials.
- ► Gai Y, Liu H, Krishnamachari B. A packet dropping mechanism for efficient operation of M/M/1 queues with selfish users.








- ► Knight V, Harper P. The Impact of Choice on Public Services.
- Wang X, Song C, Zhuang J. Simulating a multi-stage screening network: A queueing theory and game theory application.




# Queueing network structure



























# Steady state probabilities - Custom network

$$Q = \begin{pmatrix} (0,0) & (0,1) & (0,2) & (2,3) & (2,4) \\ -\lambda_1 - \lambda_2 & \lambda_1 + \lambda_2 & 0 & \dots & 0 & 0 \\ \mu & -\mu - \lambda_1 - \lambda_2 & \lambda_1 + \lambda_2 & \dots & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 2\mu & -2\mu - \lambda_1 - \lambda_2 & \dots & 0 & 0 \\ \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots & \vdots \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & \dots & -\lambda_1 - 3\mu & \lambda_1 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & \dots & 3\mu & -3\mu \end{pmatrix} \quad \begin{array}{c} (0,0) \\ (0,0) \\ (0,1) \\ (0,2) \\ (2,3) \\ (2,4) \end{array}$$



$$\frac{d\pi}{dt} = \pi Q = 0, \qquad \sum_{(u,v)} \pi_{(u,v)} = 1$$

$$\pi = \begin{bmatrix} \pi(0,0) \\ \pi(0,1) \\ \pi(0,2) \\ \vdots \end{bmatrix}$$

# Steady state probabilities - Comparison

0.200

0.150


0.125


0.100

0.075

0.050

0.025





## Performance Measures - Number of individuals



# Performance Measures - Number of individuals

$$(u_i, v_i) \longrightarrow \pi(u_i, v_i)$$

$$L = \sum_{i=1}^{|\pi|} \pi_i (u_i + v_i)$$

$$L_1 = \sum_{i=1}^{|\pi|} \pi_i v_i$$

$$L_2 = \sum_{i=1}^{|\pi|} \pi_i u_i$$

$$W = \frac{\lambda_1 P_{L'_1}}{\lambda_2 P_{L'_2} + \lambda_1 P_{L'_1}} W^{(1)} + \frac{\lambda_2 P_{L'_2}}{\lambda_2 P_{L'_2} + \lambda_1 P_{L'_1}} W^{(2)}$$

$$W^{(1)} = \frac{\sum_{(u,v) \in S_A^{(1)}} \frac{1}{C\mu} \times (v - C + 1) \times \pi(u,v)}{\sum_{(u,v) \in S_A^{(1)}} \pi(u,v)}$$

$$W^{(2)} = \frac{\sum_{\substack{(u,v) \in S_A^{(2)} \\ \min(v,T) \ge C}} \frac{1}{C\mu} \times (\min(v+1,T)-C) \times \pi(u,v)}{\sum_{\substack{(u,v) \in S_A^{(2)} \\ \mu}} \pi(u,v)}$$

$$W^{(1)} = \frac{\sum_{(u,v) \in S_A^{(1)}} w^{(1)}(u,v) \pi_{(u,v)}}{\sum_{(u,v) \in S_A^{(1)}} \pi_{(u,v)}}, \quad W^{(2)} = \frac{\sum_{(u,v) \in S_A^{(2)}} w^{(2)}(u,v) \pi_{(u,v)}}{\sum_{(u,v) \in S_A^{(2)}} \pi_{(u,v)}}$$

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$$S_{\mathcal{A}}^{(1)} = \{(u, v) \in S \mid v < N\}, \quad S_{\mathcal{A}}^{(2)} = \begin{cases} \{(u, v) \in S \mid u < M\} & \text{if } T \leq N \\ \{(u, v) \in S \mid v < N\} & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

$$W^{(1)} = \frac{\sum_{(u,v) \in S_A^{(1)}} w^{(1)}(u,v) \pi_{(u,v)}}{\sum_{(u,v) \in S_A^{(1)}} \pi_{(u,v)}}, \quad W^{(2)} = \frac{\sum_{(u,v) \in S_A^{(2)}} w^{(2)}(u,v) \pi_{(u,v)}}{\sum_{(u,v) \in S_A^{(2)}} \pi_{(u,v)}}$$

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$$S_W = \{(u,v) \in S \mid v > C\}$$

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$$S_W = \{(u,v) \in S \mid v > C\}$$

$$c^{(1)}(u,v) = \begin{cases} 0, & \text{if } u>0 \text{ and } v=T\\ \frac{1}{\min(v,C)\mu}, & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}, \quad c^{(2)}(u,v) = \begin{cases} 0, & \text{if } u>0\\ \frac{1}{\min(v,C)\mu}, & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

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$$\begin{split} S_A^{(1)} &= \{(u,v) \in S \mid v < N\}, \quad S_A^{(2)} = \begin{cases} \{(u,v) \in S \mid u < M\} & \text{if } T \leq N \\ \{(u,v) \in S \mid v < N\} & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \\ S_W &= \{(u,v) \in S \mid v > C\} \\ \\ c^{(1)}(u,v) &= \begin{cases} 0, & \text{if } u > 0 \text{ and } v = T \\ \frac{1}{\min(v,C)\mu}, & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}, \quad c^{(2)}(u,v) &= \begin{cases} 0, & \text{if } u > 0 \\ \frac{1}{\min(v,C)\mu}, & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \\ \\ w^{(i)}(u,v) &= \begin{cases} 0, & \text{if } (u,v) \notin S_w \\ c^{(i)}(u,v) + w^{(i)}(u-1,v), & \text{if } u > 0 \text{ and } v = T \\ c^{(i)}(u,v) + w^{(i)}(u,v-1), & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \end{split}$$

$$B = \frac{\sum_{(u,v) \in S_A^{(2)}} \pi_{(u,v)} \ b(u,v)}{\sum_{(u,v) \in S_A^{(2)}} \pi_{(u,v)}}$$

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$$b(u,v) = \begin{cases} 0, & \text{if } (u,v) \notin \mathcal{S}_b \\ c(u,v) + b(u-1,v), & \text{if } v = N = T \\ c(u,v) + b(u,v-1), & \text{if } v = N \neq T \\ c(u,v) + \rho_{\mathcal{S}}(u,v)b(u-1,v) + \rho_{\mathcal{A}}(u,v)b(u,v+1), & \text{if } u > 0 \text{ and } \\ v = T \\ c(u,v) + \rho_{\mathcal{S}}(u,v)b(u,v-1) + \rho_{\mathcal{A}}(u,v)b(u,v+1), & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

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 if  $(u,v) \notin S_b$  
$$c(u,v) + b(u-1,v), \qquad \text{if } v = N = T$$
 
$$c(u,v) + b(u,v-1), \qquad \text{if } v = N \neq T$$
 
$$c(u,v) + \rho_s(u,v)b(u-1,v) + \rho_a(u,v)b(u,v+1), \qquad \text{if } u > 0 \text{ and } v = T$$
 
$$c(u,v) + \rho_s(u,v)b(u,v-1) + \rho_a(u,v)b(u,v+1), \qquad \text{otherwise}$$
 
$$S_b = \{(u,v) \in S \mid u > 0\}$$

$$B = \frac{\sum_{(u,v) \in S_A^{(2)}} \pi_{(u,v)} \ b(u,v)}{\sum_{(u,v) \in S_A^{(2)}} \pi_{(u,v)}}$$
 if  $(u,v) \notin S_b$  if  $(u,v) \notin S_b$  if  $v = N = T$   $v = N$   $v = N$  otherwise

$$B = \frac{\sum_{(u,v) \in S_A^{(2)}} \pi_{(u,v)} \ b(u,v)}{\sum_{(u,v) \in S_A^{(2)}} \pi_{(u,v)}}$$

$$b(u,v) = \begin{cases} 0, & \text{if } (u,v) \notin S_b \\ c(u,v) + b(u-1,v), & \text{if } v = N = T \\ c(u,v) + b(u,v-1), & \text{if } v = N \neq T \\ c(u,v) + \rho_s(u,v)b(u-1,v) + \rho_a(u,v)b(u,v+1), & \text{if } u > 0 \text{ and } \\ v = T \\ c(u,v) + \rho_s(u,v)b(u,v-1) + \rho_a(u,v)b(u,v+1), & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

$$S_b = \{(u,v) \in S \mid u > 0\}$$

$$c(u,v) = \begin{cases} \frac{1}{\min(v,C)\mu}, & \text{if } v = N \\ \frac{1}{\lambda_1 + \min(v,C)\mu}, & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

$$\rho_s(u,v) = \frac{\lambda_1}{\lambda_1 + \min(v,C)\mu}, \qquad \rho_a(u,v) = \frac{\lambda_1}{\lambda_1 + \min(v,C)\mu}$$

# Performance Measures - Proportion within time

$$P(X < t) = \frac{\lambda_1 P_{L'_1}}{\lambda_2 P_{L'_2} + \lambda_1 P_{L'_1}} P(X^{(1)} < t) + \frac{\lambda_2 P_{L'_2}}{\lambda_2 P_{L'_2} + \lambda_1 P_{L'_1}} P(X^{(2)} < t)$$

$$P(X^{(1)} < t) = \frac{\sum_{(u,v) \in S_A^{(1)}} P(X_{(u,v)}^{(1)} < t) \pi_{u,v}}{\sum_{(u,v) \in S_A^{(1)}} \pi_{u,v}}$$

$$P(X^{(2)} < t) = \frac{\sum_{(u,v) \in S_A^{(2)}} P(X_{(u,v)}^{(2)} < t) \pi_{u,v}}{\sum_{(u,v) \in S_A^{(2)}} \pi_{u,v}}$$

#### Performance Measures - Proportion within time

$$P(X^{(i)} < t) = \frac{\sum_{(u,v) \in S_A^{(i)}} P(X_{u,v}^{(i)} < t) \pi_{u,v}}{\sum_{(u,v) \in S_A^{(i)}} \pi_{u,v}}, \quad \text{for } i = \{1,2\}$$

#### Performance Measures - Proportion within time

$$P(X^{(i)} < t) = \frac{\sum_{(u,v) \in S_A^{(i)}} P(X_{u,v}^{(i)} < t) \pi_{u,v}}{\sum_{(u,v) \in S_A^{(i)}} \pi_{u,v}}, \quad \text{for } i = \{1,2\}$$

$$P(X_{(u,v)}^{(1)} < t) = \begin{cases} 1 - \sum_{i=0}^{v-1} \frac{1}{i!} e^{-\mu t} (\mu t)^i, & \text{if } C = 1 \text{ and } v > 1 \\ 1 - (\mu C)^{v-C} \mu \sum_{k=1}^{|\vec{r}|} \sum_{l=1}^{r_k} \frac{\psi_{k,l}(-\lambda_k) t^{r_k-l} e^{-\lambda_k t}}{(r_k-l)!(l-1)!}, & \text{if } C > 1 \text{ and } v > C \\ & \text{where } \vec{r} = (v-C,1) \text{ and } \vec{\lambda} = (C\mu,\mu) \\ 1 - e^{-\mu t}, & \text{if } v \leq C \end{cases}$$

$$P(X_{(u,v)}^{(2)} < t) = \begin{cases} 1 - \sum_{i=0}^{\min(v,T)-1} \frac{1}{i!} e^{-\mu t} (\mu t)^i, & \text{if } C = 1 \text{ and } v, T > 1 \\ 1 - \mu(\mu C)^{\min(v,T)-C} \times \sum_{k=1}^{|\vec{r}|} \sum_{l=1}^{r_k} \frac{\Psi_{k,l}(-\lambda_k) t^{r_k-l} e^{-\lambda_k t}}{(r_k-l)!(l-1)!}, & \text{if } C > 1 \text{ and } v, T > C \\ \text{where } \vec{r} = (\min(v,T)-C,1) \text{ and } \vec{\lambda} = (C\mu,\mu) \\ 1 - e^{-\mu t}, & \text{if } v \leq C \text{ or } T \leq C \end{cases}$$


#### Performance Measures - Proportion within time

$$P(X^{(i)} < t) = \frac{\sum_{(u,v) \in S_A^{(i)}} P(X_{u,v}^{(i)} < t) \pi_{u,v}}{\sum_{(u,v) \in S_A^{(i)}} \pi_{u,v}}, \quad \text{for } i = \{1,2\}$$

$$X_{(u,v)}^{(1)} \sim \begin{cases} \mathsf{Erlang}(v,\mu), & \text{if } C = 1 \text{ and } v > 1 \\ \mathsf{Hypo}\left(\left[v - C, 1\right], \left[C\mu, \mu\right]\right), & \text{if } C > 1 \text{ and } v > C \\ \mathsf{Erlang}(1,\mu), & \text{if } v \leq C \end{cases}$$

$$X_{(u,v)}^{(2)} \sim \begin{cases} \mathsf{Erlang}(\min(v,T),\mu), & \text{if } C = 1 \text{ and } v,T > 1 \\ \mathsf{Hypo}\left(\left[\min(v,T) - C,1\right],\left[C\mu,\mu\right]\right), & \text{if } C > 1 \text{ and } v,T > C \\ \mathsf{Erlang}(1,\mu), & \text{if } v \leq C \text{ or } T \leq C \end{cases}$$


# Comparisons



#### Game - Definition



# Game - Players



# Game - Strategies














 $p_A, p_B \in [0, 1]$  $p_A + p_B = 1$ 

 $T_A \in [1, N_A]$ 

 $T_B \in [1, N_B]$ 

#### Game - Formulation



$$A = \begin{pmatrix} U_{1,1}^A & U_{1,2}^A & \dots & U_{1,N_B}^A \\ U_{2,1}^A & U_{2,2}^A & \dots & U_{2,N_B}^A \\ \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ U_{N_A,1}^A & U_{N_A,2}^A & \dots & U_{N_A,N_B}^A \end{pmatrix}, \quad B = \begin{pmatrix} U_{1,1}^B & U_{1,2}^B & \dots & U_{1,N_B}^B \\ U_{2,1}^B & U_{2,2}^B & \dots & U_{2,N_B}^B \\ \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ U_{N_A,1}^B & U_{N_A,2}^B & \dots & U_{N_A,N_B}^B \end{pmatrix}$$

$$R = \begin{pmatrix} p_{1,1} & p_{1,2} & \dots & p_{1,N_B} \\ p_{2,1} & p_{2,2} & \dots & p_{2,N_B} \\ \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ p_{N_A,1} & p_{N_A,2} & \dots & p_{N_A,N_B} \end{pmatrix}$$

#### Solution concepts in games

$$A \in \mathbb{R}^{m \times n}, \qquad B \in \mathbb{R}^{m \times n}$$

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$$A \in \mathbb{R}^{m \times n}$$
,  $B \in \mathbb{R}^{m \times n}$ 

$$\frac{dx}{dt_i} = x_i((f_x)_i - \phi_x), \quad \text{for all } i$$

$$\frac{dy}{dt_i} = y_i((f_y)_i - \phi_y), \quad \text{for all } i$$

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$$\frac{dy}{dt_i} = y_i((f_y)_i - \phi_y), \quad \text{for all } i$$

- ► Fudenberg, Drew, et al. The theory of learning in games. Vol. 2. MIT press, 1998.
- Elvio, Accinelli and Carrera, Edgar. 2011. Evolutionarily Stable Strategies and Replicator Dynamics in Asymmetric Two-Population Games. 10.1007/978-3-642-11456-4\_3.

## Inefficiency measure


$$PoA = \frac{\max_{s \in E} Cost(s)}{\min_{s \in S} Cost(S)}$$

#### Inefficiency measure

$$PoA = \frac{\max_{s \in E} Cost(s)}{\min_{s \in S} Cost(S)}$$

$$PoA_A(s_r) = \frac{Cost(s_r)}{\min_{s \in S} Cost(S)}, \qquad PoA_B(s_c) = \frac{Cost(s_c)}{\min_{s \in S} Cost(S)}$$

## Learning algorithms - Asymmetric replicator dynamics



# "Inefficiencies can be learned and emerge naturally"

## Learning algorithms - Asymmetric replicator dynamics



# "Targeted incentivisation of

"Targeted incentivisation of behaviours can help escape

learned inefficiencies"

#### Thank you!

"Inefficiencies can be learned and emerge naturally"

"Targeted incentivisation of behaviours can help escape learned inefficiencies"

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  - © @11michalis11

https://github.com/11michalis11/AmbulanceDecisionGame