


A 3-player game theoretic model of a choice  
between two queueing systems with strategic  
managerial decision making

# Queues - Examples




# Queues - Examples





# Queues - Examples





## Queueing network structure





# Markov Chain - Custom network



# Markov Chain - Custom network





# Markov Chain - Custom network









# Markov Chain - Custom network





# Markov Chain - Custom network





# Markov Chain - Custom network





# Markov Chain - Custom network





# Markov Chain - Custom network



# Markov Chain - Custom network



# Markov Chain - Custom network




# Game - Definition







## Game - Players



## Game - Strategies




$$p_A, p_B \in [0, 1]$$

$$T_A \in [1, N_A]$$

$$T_B \in [1, N_B]$$

$$p_A + p_B = 1$$





# Game - Formulation



$$A = \begin{pmatrix} U_{1,1}^A & U_{1,2}^A & \cdots & U_{1,N_B}^A \\ U_{2,1}^A & U_{2,2}^A & \cdots & U_{2,N_B}^A \\ \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ U_{N_A,1}^A & U_{N_A,2}^A & \cdots & U_{N_A,N_B}^A \end{pmatrix}, \quad B = \begin{pmatrix} U_{1,1}^B & U_{1,2}^B & \cdots & U_{1,N_B}^B \\ U_{2,1}^B & U_{2,2}^B & \cdots & U_{2,N_B}^B \\ \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ U_{N_A,1}^B & U_{N_A,2}^B & \cdots & U_{N_A,N_B}^B \end{pmatrix}$$





$$R = \begin{pmatrix} p_{1,1} & p_{1,2} & \cdots & p_{1,N_B} \\ p_{2,1} & p_{2,2} & \cdots & p_{2,N_B} \\ \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ p_{N_A,1} & p_{N_A,2} & \cdots & p_{N_A,N_B} \end{pmatrix}$$

# Learning algorithms - Asymmetric replicator dynamics



“Inefficiencies can be learned  
and emerged naturally in an  
interactive system”

# Learning algorithms - Asymmetric replicator dynamics




“Targeted incentivisation of behaviours can help escape learned inefficiencies”

Ethnography?



# Potential future model



# Interfaces and transfers study

1. Ambulance Control Centre
  - ▶ Patients are translated into objects of practise for EMS workers
2. Emergency Medical Services
  - ▶ Organising logic (clinical, patient, collaborative)
  - ▶ Patients are translated into an object of practise for ED workers
3. Emergency Department
  - ▶ Sense making process to determine care trajectory
  - ▶ Clinical logics (treatment, care)
  - ▶ Management logics (resource utilisation, targets)