A 3-player game theoretic model of a choice between two queueing systems with strategic managerial decision making

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EURO 2021 Athens

About me



About me




THIS.





- ► Shone R, Knight VA, Williams JE. Comparisons between observable and unobservable M/M/1 queues with respect to optimal customer behaviour
- Kerner Y, Shmuel-Bittner O. Strategic behaviour and optimization in a hybrid M/M/1 queue with retrials.
- ► Gai Y, Liu H, Krishnamachari B. A packet dropping mechanism for efficient operation of M/M/1 queues with selfish users.








- ► Knight V, Harper P. The Impact of Choice on Public Services.
- Wang X, Song C, Zhuang J. Simulating a multi-stage screening network: A queueing theory and game theory application.




Queueing network structure



























Steady state probabilities - Custom network


$$Q = \begin{pmatrix} (0,0) & (0,1) & (0,2) & (2,3) & (2,4) \\ -\lambda_1 - \lambda_2 & \lambda_1 + \lambda_2 & 0 & \dots & 0 & 0 \\ \mu & -\mu - \lambda_1 - \lambda_2 & \lambda_1 + \lambda_2 & \dots & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 2\mu & -2\mu - \lambda_1 - \lambda_2 & \dots & 0 & 0 \\ \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots & \vdots \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & \dots & -\lambda_1 - 3\mu & \lambda_1 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & \dots & 3\mu & -3\mu \end{pmatrix} \quad \begin{array}{c} (0,0) \\ (0,0) \\ (0,1) \\ (0,2) \\ (2,3) \\ (2,4) \end{array}$$




$$\frac{d\pi}{dt} = \pi Q = 0, \qquad \sum_{(u,v)} \pi_{(u,v)} = 1$$

$$\pi = \begin{bmatrix} \pi(0,0) \\ \pi(0,1) \\ \pi(0,2) \\ \vdots \end{bmatrix}$$

Steady state probabilities - Comparison





Performance Measures - Number of individuals



Performance Measures - Number of individuals

$$(u_i, v_i) \longrightarrow \pi(u_i, v_i)$$

$$L = \sum_{i=1}^{|\pi|} \pi_i (u_i + v_i)$$

$$L_1 = \sum_{i=1}^{|\pi|} \pi_i v_i$$

$$L_2 = \sum_{i=1}^{|\pi|} \pi_i u_i$$

$$W = \frac{\lambda_1 P_{L'_1}}{\lambda_2 P_{L'_2} + \lambda_1 P_{L'_1}} W^{(1)} + \frac{\lambda_2 P_{L'_2}}{\lambda_2 P_{L'_2} + \lambda_1 P_{L'_1}} W^{(2)}$$

$$W^{(1)} = \frac{\sum_{(u,v) \in S_A^{(1)}} \frac{1}{C\mu} \times (v - C + 1) \times \pi(u,v)}{\sum_{(u,v) \in S_A^{(1)}} \pi(u,v)}$$

$$W^{(2)} = \frac{\sum_{\substack{(u,v) \in S_A^{(2)} \\ \min(v,T) \ge C}} \frac{1}{C\mu} \times (\min(v+1,T)-C) \times \pi(u,v)}{\sum_{\substack{(u,v) \in S_A^{(2)} \\ \mu}} \pi(u,v)}$$

$$W^{(1)} = \frac{\sum_{(u,v) \in S_A^{(1)}} w^{(1)}(u,v) \pi_{(u,v)}}{\sum_{(u,v) \in S_A^{(1)}} \pi_{(u,v)}}, \quad W^{(2)} = \frac{\sum_{(u,v) \in S_A^{(2)}} w^{(2)}(u,v) \pi_{(u,v)}}{\sum_{(u,v) \in S_A^{(2)}} \pi_{(u,v)}}$$

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$$S_{\mathcal{A}}^{(1)} = \{(u, v) \in S \mid v < N\}, \quad S_{\mathcal{A}}^{(2)} = \begin{cases} \{(u, v) \in S \mid u < M\} & \text{if } T \leq N \\ \{(u, v) \in S \mid v < N\} & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

$$W^{(1)} = \frac{\sum_{(u,v) \in S_A^{(1)}} w^{(1)}(u,v) \pi_{(u,v)}}{\sum_{(u,v) \in S_A^{(1)}} \pi_{(u,v)}}, \quad W^{(2)} = \frac{\sum_{(u,v) \in S_A^{(2)}} w^{(2)}(u,v) \pi_{(u,v)}}{\sum_{(u,v) \in S_A^{(2)}} \pi_{(u,v)}}$$

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$$S_W = \{(u,v) \in S \mid v > C\}$$

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$$S_W = \{(u,v) \in S \mid v > C\}$$

$$c^{(1)}(u,v) = \begin{cases} 0, & \text{if } u>0 \text{ and } v=T\\ \frac{1}{\min(v,C)\mu}, & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}, \quad c^{(2)}(u,v) = \begin{cases} 0, & \text{if } u>0\\ \frac{1}{\min(v,C)\mu}, & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

$$W^{(1)} = \frac{\sum_{(u,v) \in S_A^{(1)}} w^{(1)}(u,v) \pi_{(u,v)}}{\sum_{(u,v) \in S_A^{(1)}} \pi_{(u,v)}}, \quad W^{(2)} = \frac{\sum_{(u,v) \in S_A^{(2)}} w^{(2)}(u,v) \pi_{(u,v)}}{\sum_{(u,v) \in S_A^{(2)}} \pi_{(u,v)}}$$

$$\begin{split} S_A^{(1)} &= \{(u,v) \in S \mid v < N\}, \quad S_A^{(2)} = \begin{cases} \{(u,v) \in S \mid u < M\} & \text{if } T \leq N \\ \{(u,v) \in S \mid v < N\} & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \\ S_W &= \{(u,v) \in S \mid v > C\} \\ \\ c^{(1)}(u,v) &= \begin{cases} 0, & \text{if } u > 0 \text{ and } v = T \\ \frac{1}{\min(v,C)\mu}, & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}, \quad c^{(2)}(u,v) &= \begin{cases} 0, & \text{if } u > 0 \\ \frac{1}{\min(v,C)\mu}, & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \\ \\ w^{(i)}(u,v) &= \begin{cases} 0, & \text{if } (u,v) \notin S_w \\ c^{(i)}(u,v) + w^{(i)}(u-1,v), & \text{if } u > 0 \text{ and } v = T \\ c^{(i)}(u,v) + w^{(i)}(u,v-1), & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \end{split}$$

$$B = \frac{\sum_{(u,v) \in S_A^{(2)}} \pi_{(u,v)} \ b(u,v)}{\sum_{(u,v) \in S_A^{(2)}} \pi_{(u,v)}}$$

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$$b(u,v) = \begin{cases} 0, & \text{if } (u,v) \notin \mathcal{S}_b \\ c(u,v) + b(u-1,v), & \text{if } v = N = T \\ c(u,v) + b(u,v-1), & \text{if } v = N \neq T \\ c(u,v) + \rho_{\mathcal{S}}(u,v)b(u-1,v) + \rho_{\mathcal{A}}(u,v)b(u,v+1), & \text{if } u > 0 \text{ and } \\ v = T \\ c(u,v) + \rho_{\mathcal{S}}(u,v)b(u,v-1) + \rho_{\mathcal{A}}(u,v)b(u,v+1), & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

$$B = \frac{\sum_{(u,v) \in S_A^{(2)}} \pi_{(u,v)} \ b(u,v)}{\sum_{(u,v) \in S_A^{(2)}} \pi_{(u,v)}}$$
 if $(u,v) \notin S_b$
$$c(u,v) + b(u-1,v), \qquad \text{if } v = N = T$$

$$c(u,v) + b(u,v-1), \qquad \text{if } v = N \neq T$$

$$c(u,v) + \rho_s(u,v)b(u-1,v) + \rho_a(u,v)b(u,v+1), \qquad \text{if } u > 0 \text{ and } v = T$$

$$c(u,v) + \rho_s(u,v)b(u,v-1) + \rho_a(u,v)b(u,v+1), \qquad \text{otherwise}$$

$$S_b = \{(u,v) \in S \mid u > 0\}$$

$$B = \frac{\sum_{(u,v) \in S_A^{(2)}} \pi_{(u,v)} \ b(u,v)}{\sum_{(u,v) \in S_A^{(2)}} \pi_{(u,v)}}$$
 if $(u,v) \notin S_b$ if $(u,v) \notin S_b$ if $v = N = T$ $v = N$ $v = N$ otherwise

$$B = \frac{\sum_{(u,v) \in S_A^{(2)}} \pi_{(u,v)} \ b(u,v)}{\sum_{(u,v) \in S_A^{(2)}} \pi_{(u,v)}}$$

$$b(u,v) = \begin{cases} 0, & \text{if } (u,v) \notin S_b \\ c(u,v) + b(u-1,v), & \text{if } v = N = T \\ c(u,v) + b(u,v-1), & \text{if } v = N \neq T \\ c(u,v) + \rho_s(u,v)b(u-1,v) + \rho_a(u,v)b(u,v+1), & \text{if } u > 0 \text{ and } \\ v = T \\ c(u,v) + \rho_s(u,v)b(u,v-1) + \rho_a(u,v)b(u,v+1), & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

$$S_b = \{(u,v) \in S \mid u > 0\}$$

$$c(u,v) = \begin{cases} \frac{1}{\min(v,C)\mu}, & \text{if } v = N \\ \frac{1}{\lambda_1 + \min(v,C)\mu}, & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

$$\rho_s(u,v) = \frac{\lambda_1}{\lambda_1 + \min(v,C)\mu}, \qquad \rho_a(u,v) = \frac{\lambda_1}{\lambda_1 + \min(v,C)\mu}$$

Performance Measures - Proportion within time

$$P(X < t) = \frac{\lambda_1 P_{L'_1}}{\lambda_2 P_{L'_2} + \lambda_1 P_{L'_1}} P(X^{(1)} < t) + \frac{\lambda_2 P_{L'_2}}{\lambda_2 P_{L'_2} + \lambda_1 P_{L'_1}} P(X^{(2)} < t)$$

$$P(X^{(1)} < t) = \frac{\sum_{(u,v) \in S_A^{(1)}} P(X_{(u,v)}^{(1)} < t) \pi_{u,v}}{\sum_{(u,v) \in S_A^{(1)}} \pi_{u,v}}$$

$$P(X^{(2)} < t) = \frac{\sum_{(u,v) \in S_A^{(2)}} P(X_{(u,v)}^{(2)} < t) \pi_{u,v}}{\sum_{(u,v) \in S_A^{(2)}} \pi_{u,v}}$$

Performance Measures - Proportion within time

$$P(X^{(i)} < t) = \frac{\sum_{(u,v) \in S_A^{(i)}} P(X_{u,v}^{(i)} < t) \pi_{u,v}}{\sum_{(u,v) \in S_A^{(i)}} \pi_{u,v}}, \quad \text{for } i = \{1,2\}$$

Performance Measures - Proportion within time

$$P(X^{(i)} < t) = \frac{\sum_{(u,v) \in S_A^{(i)}} P(X_{u,v}^{(i)} < t) \pi_{u,v}}{\sum_{(u,v) \in S_A^{(i)}} \pi_{u,v}}, \quad \text{for } i = \{1,2\}$$

$$P(X_{(u,v)}^{(1)} < t) = \begin{cases} 1 - \sum_{i=0}^{v-1} \frac{1}{i!} e^{-\mu t} (\mu t)^i, & \text{if } C = 1 \text{ and } v > 1 \\ 1 - (\mu C)^{v-C} \mu \sum_{k=1}^{|\vec{r}|} \sum_{l=1}^{r_k} \frac{\psi_{k,l}(-\lambda_k) t^{r_k-l} e^{-\lambda_k t}}{(r_k-l)!(l-1)!}, & \text{if } C > 1 \text{ and } v > C \\ & \text{where } \vec{r} = (v-C,1) \text{ and } \vec{\lambda} = (C\mu,\mu) \\ 1 - e^{-\mu t}, & \text{if } v \leq C \end{cases}$$

$$P(X_{(u,v)}^{(2)} < t) = \begin{cases} 1 - \sum_{i=0}^{\min(v,T)-1} \frac{1}{i!} e^{-\mu t} (\mu t)^i, & \text{if } C = 1 \text{ and } v, T > 1 \\ 1 - \mu(\mu C)^{\min(v,T)-C} \times \sum_{k=1}^{|\vec{r}|} \sum_{l=1}^{r_k} \frac{\Psi_{k,l}(-\lambda_k) t^{r_k-l} e^{-\lambda_k t}}{(r_k-l)!(l-1)!}, & \text{if } C > 1 \text{ and } v, T > C \\ \text{where } \vec{r} = (\min(v,T)-C,1) \text{ and } \vec{\lambda} = (C\mu,\mu) \\ 1 - e^{-\mu t}, & \text{if } v \leq C \text{ or } T \leq C \end{cases}$$


Performance Measures - Proportion within time

$$P(X^{(i)} < t) = \frac{\sum_{(u,v) \in S_A^{(i)}} P(X_{u,v}^{(i)} < t) \pi_{u,v}}{\sum_{(u,v) \in S_A^{(i)}} \pi_{u,v}}, \quad \text{for } i = \{1,2\}$$

$$X_{(u,v)}^{(1)} \sim \begin{cases} \mathsf{Erlang}(v,\mu), & \text{if } C = 1 \text{ and } v > 1 \\ \mathsf{Hypo}\left(\left[v - C, 1\right], \left[C\mu, \mu\right]\right), & \text{if } C > 1 \text{ and } v > C \\ \mathsf{Erlang}(1,\mu), & \text{if } v \leq C \end{cases}$$

$$X_{(u,v)}^{(2)} \sim \begin{cases} \mathsf{Erlang}(\min(v,T),\mu), & \text{if } C = 1 \text{ and } v,T > 1 \\ \mathsf{Hypo}\left(\left[\min(v,T) - C,1\right],\left[C\mu,\mu\right]\right), & \text{if } C > 1 \text{ and } v,T > C \\ \mathsf{Erlang}(1,\mu), & \text{if } v \leq C \text{ or } T \leq C \end{cases}$$


Comparisons



Game - Definition



Game - Players



Game - Strategies














 $p_A, p_B \in [0, 1]$ $p_A + p_B = 1$

 $T_A \in [1, N_A]$

 $T_B \in [1, N_B]$

Game - Formulation



$$A = \begin{pmatrix} U_{1,1}^A & U_{1,2}^A & \dots & U_{1,N_B}^A \\ U_{2,1}^A & U_{2,2}^A & \dots & U_{2,N_B}^A \\ \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ U_{N_A,1}^A & U_{N_A,2}^A & \dots & U_{N_A,N_B}^A \end{pmatrix}, \quad B = \begin{pmatrix} U_{1,1}^B & U_{1,2}^B & \dots & U_{1,N_B}^B \\ U_{2,1}^B & U_{2,2}^B & \dots & U_{2,N_B}^B \\ \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ U_{N_A,1}^B & U_{N_A,2}^B & \dots & U_{N_A,N_B}^B \end{pmatrix}$$

$$R = \begin{pmatrix} p_{1,1} & p_{1,2} & \dots & p_{1,N_B} \\ p_{2,1} & p_{2,2} & \dots & p_{2,N_B} \\ \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ p_{N_A,1} & p_{N_A,2} & \dots & p_{N_A,N_B} \end{pmatrix}$$

Solution concepts in games

$$A \in \mathbb{R}^{m \times n}, \qquad B \in \mathbb{R}^{m \times n}$$

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$$A \in \mathbb{R}^{m \times n}$$
, $B \in \mathbb{R}^{m \times n}$

$$\frac{dx}{dt_i} = x_i((f_x)_i - \phi_x), \quad \text{for all } i$$

$$\frac{dy}{dt_i} = y_i((f_y)_i - \phi_y), \quad \text{for all } i$$

Solution concepts in games

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$$\frac{dy}{dt_i} = y_i((f_y)_i - \phi_y), \quad \text{for all } i$$

- ► Fudenberg, Drew, et al. The theory of learning in games. Vol. 2. MIT press, 1998.
- Elvio, Accinelli and Carrera, Edgar. 2011. Evolutionarily Stable Strategies and Replicator Dynamics in Asymmetric Two-Population Games. 10.1007/978-3-642-11456-4_3.

Inefficiency measure


$$PoA = \frac{\max_{s \in E} Cost(s)}{\min_{s \in S} Cost(S)}$$

Inefficiency measure

$$PoA = \frac{\max_{s \in E} Cost(s)}{\min_{s \in S} Cost(S)}$$

$$PoA_A(s_r) = \frac{Cost(s_r)}{\min_{s \in S} Cost(S)}, \qquad PoA_B(s_c) = \frac{Cost(s_c)}{\min_{s \in S} Cost(S)}$$

Learning algorithms - Asymmetric replicator dynamics



"Inefficiencies can be learned and emerge naturally"

Learning algorithms - Asymmetric replicator dynamics



"Targeted incentivisation of

"Targeted incentivisation of behaviours can help escape

learned inefficiencies"

Thank you!

"Inefficiencies can be learned and emerge naturally"

"Targeted incentivisation of behaviours can help escape learned inefficiencies"

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https://github.com/11michalis11/AmbulanceDecisionGame