A 3-player game theoretic model of a choice between two queueing systems with strategic managerial decision making

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EURO 2021 Athens

# About me



#### About me



THIS.

## Queues - Examples




## Queues - Examples





# Queues - Examples




# Queueing network structure



























## Steady state probabilities - Custom network


$$Q = \begin{pmatrix} (0,0) & (0,1) & (0,2) & (2,3) & (2,4) \\ -\lambda_1 - \lambda_2 & \lambda_1 + \lambda_2 & 0 & \dots & 0 & 0 \\ \mu & -\mu - \lambda_1 - \lambda_2 & \lambda_1 + \lambda_2 & \dots & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 2\mu & -2\mu - \lambda_1 - \lambda_2 & \dots & 0 & 0 \\ \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots & \vdots \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & \dots & -\lambda_1 - 3\mu & \lambda_1 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & \dots & 3\mu & -3\mu \end{pmatrix} \quad \begin{array}{c} (0,0) \\ (0,0) \\ (0,1) \\ (0,2) \\ (2,3) \\ (2,4) \end{array}$$




$$\frac{d\pi}{dt} = \pi Q = 0, \qquad \sum \pi_{(u,v)} = 1$$

$$\pi = \begin{bmatrix} \pi(0,0) \\ \pi(0,1) \\ \pi(0,2) \\ \vdots \\ \pi(2,3) \\ \pi(2,4) \end{bmatrix}$$

## Steady state probabilities - Comparison





## Performance Measures - Number of individuals



## Performance Measures - Number of individuals




$$L = \sum_{i=1}^{|\pi|} \pi_i (u_i + v_i)$$

$$L_1 = \sum_{i=1}^{|\pi|} \pi_i u_i$$

$$L_2 = \sum_{i=1}^{|\pi|} \pi_i v_i$$


## Performance Measures - Waiting time

$$W = \frac{\lambda_1 P_{L_1'}}{\lambda_2 P_{L_2'} + \lambda_1 P_{L_1'}} W^{(1)} + \frac{\lambda_2 P_{L_2'}}{\lambda_2 P_{L_2'} + \lambda_1 P_{L_1'}} W^{(2)}$$
(1)




## Performance Measures - Blocking time

$$B = \frac{\sum_{(u,v)\in S_A^{(2)}} \pi_{(u,v)} \ b(u,v)}{\sum_{(u,v)\in S_A^{(2)}} \pi_{(u,v)}}$$
(2)



## Performance Measures - Proportion within time


$$P(X < t) = \frac{\lambda_1 P_{L'_1}}{\lambda_2 P_{L'_2} + \lambda_1 P_{L'_1}} P(X^{(1)} < t) + \frac{\lambda_2 P_{L'_2}}{\lambda_2 P_{L'_2} + \lambda_1 P_{L'_1}} P(X^{(2)} < t)$$
(3)



## Game - Definition



# Game - Players



# Game - Strategies













 $p_A, p_B \in [0, 1]$  $p_A + p_B = 1$ 

$$T_A \in [1, N_A]$$


 $T_B \in [1, N_B]$ 

#### Game - Formulation


$$A = \begin{pmatrix} U_{1,1}^A & U_{1,2}^A & \dots & U_{1,N_B}^A \\ U_{2,1}^A & U_{2,2}^A & \dots & U_{2,N_B}^A \\ \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ U_{N_A,1}^A & U_{N_A,2}^A & \dots & U_{N_A,N_B}^A \end{pmatrix}, \quad B = \begin{pmatrix} U_{1,1}^B & U_{1,2}^B & \dots & U_{1,N_B}^B \\ U_{2,1}^B & U_{2,2}^B & \dots & U_{2,N_B}^B \\ \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ U_{N_A,1}^B & U_{N_A,2}^B & \dots & U_{N_A,N_B}^B \end{pmatrix}$$

$$R = \begin{pmatrix} p_{1,1} & p_{1,2} & \cdots & p_{1,N_B} \\ p_{2,1} & p_{2,2} & \cdots & p_{2,N_B} \\ \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ p_{N_A,1} & p_{N_A,2} & \cdots & p_{N_A,N_B} \end{pmatrix}$$

# Learning algorithms - Asymmetric replicator dynamics



# Learning algorithms - Asymmetric replicator dynamics



# Code / Test

```
test get probability of accepting example():
get probability of accepting(
                                                                                        all states - [
                                                                                           (0, 0),
           if is accepting state(
                                                                                           get probability of accepting(
                threshold=threshold.
                system capacity=system capacity,
                                                                                                threshold=2.
                                                                                                system_capacity=5,
                                                                                            [0.8, 0.85],
```

## GitHub repository

