Annual Review

Michalis Panayides


2020-06-10


Game Theory - Syllabus




- ► Normal Form Games
- ► Mixed-Strategy Nash Equilibrium
- ► Alternate Solution Concepts
- ► Extensive-Form Games
- ► Repeated Games (TBC)
- ► Bayesian Games (TBC)
- ► Coalitional Games (TBC)










$$u_i = A_1 \times A_2 \times A_3 \times \cdots \times A_N \to \mathbb{R}$$


Rock-Paper-Scissors



$$\begin{array}{ccc} & C & D \\ C & [(3,3) & (0,5)] \\ D & (5,0) & (1,1) \end{array}$$

$$\begin{array}{ccc}
\mathsf{C} & \longrightarrow & \begin{bmatrix} (3,-) & (0,-) \\ (\underline{5},-) & (\underline{1},-) \end{bmatrix}
\end{array}$$

$$\begin{bmatrix}
(-,3) & (-,\underline{5}) \\
(-,0) & (-,\underline{1})
\end{bmatrix}$$



Pareto Optimality

$$\begin{bmatrix}
(3,3) & (0,5) \\
(5,0) & (1,1)
\end{bmatrix}$$

$$(3,3), (0,5), (5,0), (1,1)$$

Pareto Optimality

$$\begin{bmatrix}
(3,3) & (0,5) \\
(5,0) & (1,1)
\end{bmatrix}$$

$$(3,3), (0,5), (5,0), (1,1)$$

(3,3) > (1,1)

Computing the Nash Equilibria

- ► Lemke-Howson Algorithm
- ► Support Enumeration
- ► Iterative removal of strictly dominated strategies

$$\begin{array}{ccccc} P1 \setminus P2 & L & C \\ U & (3,0) & (2,1) \\ M & (1,1) & (1,1) \\ D & (0,1) & (4,2) \end{array}$$

$$\begin{array}{ccccc} P1 \setminus P2 & L & C \\ U & (\underline{3},0) & (\underline{2},1) \\ M & (1,1) & (1,1) \\ D & (0,1) & (4,2) \end{array}$$

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
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
$$\begin{array}{ccc} P1 \setminus P2 & C \\ U & (2,1) \\ D & (4,2) \end{array}$$


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
$$\begin{array}{ccc} P1 \setminus P2 & C \\ D & (4,2) \end{array}$$




































Imperfect Information Extensive-form Games



Imperfect Information Extensive-form Games



PhD - Motivation





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


PhD - Motivation






Ambulance - Hospital Interface



Hospital Formulation



Hospital - Markov Chain






Figure: C=4, T=3, N=5, M=2


State Probabilities



Waiting Times



Optimal patient distribution



Future Plans

- ► Performance Measures
- ► Game theoretic interface