Annual Review

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Game Theory - Syllabus

- Normal Form Games
- Mixed-Strategy Nash Equilibrium
- Alternate Solution Concepts
- Extensive-Form Games
- Repeated Games (TBC)
- Bayesian Games (TBC)
- Coalitional Games (TBC)

Normal Form Games



Normal Form Games



Normal Form Games



Normal Form Games



$$u_i = A_1 \times A_2 \times A_3 \times \cdots \times A_N$$

Rock-Paper-Scissors



$$\begin{bmatrix} (0,0) & (1,-1) & (-1,1) \\ (-1,1) & (0,0) & (1,-1) \\ (1,-1) & (-1,1) & (0,0) \end{bmatrix}$$

Nash Equilibrium

$$\begin{bmatrix} (3,3) & (0,5) \\ (5,0) & (1,1) \end{bmatrix}$$

Nash Equilibrium

$$\begin{array}{c} \mathrm{C} \longrightarrow \\ \mathrm{D} \longrightarrow \end{array} \begin{bmatrix} (3,-) & (0,-) \\ (5,-) & (1,-) \end{bmatrix}$$

Nash Equilibrium



Nash Equilibrium



Pareto Optimality

$$\begin{bmatrix} (3,3) & (0,5) \\ (5,0) & (1,1) \end{bmatrix}$$

$$\overbrace{(3,3),\ (0,5),\ (5,0),\ (1,1)}$$

Pareto Optimality

$$\begin{bmatrix} (3,3) & (0,5) \\ (5,0) & (1,1) \end{bmatrix}$$

$$\overbrace{(3,3),\ (0,5),\ (5,0),\ (1,1)}$$

$$(3,3) > (1,1)$$

Computing the Nash Equilibria

- Lemke-Howson Algorithm
- Support Enumeration
- Iterative removal of strictly dominated strategies

Iterative Removal of Strictly Dominated Strategies

$P1 \setminus P2$	L	C	R
U	$(3,0)$	$(2,1)$	$(0,0)$
M	$(1,1)$	$(1,1)$	$(5,0)$
D	$(0,1)$	$(4,2)$	$(0,1)$

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Perfect Information Extensive Form Games



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

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

Perfect Information Extensive Form Games



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

Perfect Information Extensive Form Games



Backwards Induction



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

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

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

Backwards Induction



Backwards Induction



Imperfect Information Extensive-form Games

PhD - Motivation



PhD - Motivation



PhD - Motivation



Hospital Formulation



Ambulance - Hospital Interface



Hospital - Markov Chain



Figure: C=4, T=3, N=5, M=2

State Probabilities



Waiting Times



Optimal patient distribution