



Smart Contract Audit

FOR
MBC\$

DATED : 9 June 23'

HIGH RISK FINDINGS

Logical – Setting tax wallet to

0x00

Severity: **High**

function: updateTaxWallet

Status: **Acknowledged**

Overview:

Setting the tax wallet to the null address (0x00) may lead to the disruption of sale transactions when the "rescueSwap" feature is active. Specifically, accumulated fees, which should be transferred to the tax wallet, would fail to be processed since the null address is not a valid recipient. Consequently, the entire sale transaction would be reverted due to this internal swap failure.

```
function updateTaxWallet(address newTaxWallet) external onlyOwner {
    taxWallet = newTaxWallet;
    emit TaxWalletUpdated(newTaxWallet, taxWallet);
}

function swapBack() private {
    uint256 contractBalance = balanceOf(address(this));

    if (rescueSwap) {
        if (contractBalance > 0) {
            super._transfer(address(this), taxWallet, contractBalance);
        }
        return;
    }
    ///rest of the code
}
```

Suggestion

Prevent the tax wallet from being set to the null address by introducing a requirement check within the updateTaxWallet function. A modified version of the function would look like this:

```
function updateTaxWallet(address newTaxWallet) external onlyOwner {
    require(newTaxWallet != address(0), "can not set tax wallet to address 0");
    taxWallet = newTaxWallet;
    emit TaxWalletUpdated(newTaxWallet, taxWallet);
}
```

Alleviation from Owner

Since this is an edge-case scenario that can only occur if the owner of the contract sets the tax wallet address to the null-address, at the same time as the owner has enabled rescueSwap, we don't see this as an issue. We will never change the tax wallet address (which is already hardcoded into the contract).

After the contract has been renounced the tax wallet cannot be changed, and the issue is no longer relevant.

HIGH RISK FINDINGS

Logical – fees are not resetted

Severity: **High**

function: swapBack

Status: **Acknowledged**

Overview:

Currently, the variables **tokensForLiquidity** and **tokensForTax** represent the amount of tokens accumulated for each type of tax. However, the swapBack function fails to reset these two variables to zero after sending the contract token balance to the tax wallet.

While the owner can manually reset these variables to zero using the resetTaxAmount function, a failure to perform this action could cause an internal swap to revert. This would occur when the rescueSwap flag is set to false and an attempt is made to swap more tokens to BNB than what the contract has.

```
function resetTaxAmount() public onlyOwner {
    tokensForLiquidity = 0;
    tokensForTax = 0;
}

function swapBack() private {
    uint256 contractBalance = balanceOf(address(this));

    if (rescueSwap) {
        if (contractBalance > 0) {
            super._transfer(address(this), taxWallet, contractBalance);
        }
        return;
    }
    ///rest of the code
}
```

Suggestion

Ensure that tokensForLiquidity and tokensForTax are reset to zero in the swapBack function. A modified version of the function is as follows:

```
function swapBack() private {
    uint256 contractBalance = balanceOf(address(this));

    if (rescueSwap) {
        if (contractBalance > 0) {
            super._transfer(address(this), taxWallet, contractBalance);
        }
        tokensForLiquidity = 0;
        tokensForTax = 0;
        return;
    }
    ///rest of the code
}
```



HIGH RISK FINDINGS

Alleviation from Owner

The function rescueSwap is a feature that should "only be used to disable `swapback` and send tax in form of tokens".

This is not something we have any plans of doing within the first week of trading. After the contract is renounced, this will no longer be possible to activate.

We will never activate rescueSwap.



AUDIT SUMMARY

Project name – MBC\$

Date: 9 June, 2023

Scope of Audit- Audit Ace was consulted to conduct the smart contract audit of the solidity source codes.

Audit Status: **Passed With High Risk**

Issues Found

Status	Critical	High	Medium	Low	Suggestion
Open	0	0	0	0	0
Acknowledged	0	2	1	0	0
Resolved	0	0	0	0	0

USED TOOLS

Tools:

1- Manual Review:

A line by line code review has been performed by audit ace team.

2- BSC Test Network: All tests were conducted on the BSC Test network, and each test has a corresponding transaction attached to it. These tests can be found in the "Functional Tests" section of the report.

3- Slither :

The code has undergone static analysis using Slither.

Testnet version:

The tests were performed using the contract deployed on the BSC Testnet, which can be found at the following address:

<https://testnet.bscscan.com/token/0x43A6eF91394C399F765aF5e2D1b9539C07CF7ede>



Token Information

Token Name : MemeMillionaires_\$BoysClub\$

Token Symbol: MBC\$

Decimals: 9

Token Supply: 1,000,000,000,000

Token Address:

0x0304C6A7fAe5438b5E74d53e5289B9059E13cDd1

Checksum:

b0534ddce337345588aa005e78ff6b65a1887a13

Owner:

0xc00F8C36d18753360204Eed31B5b72115c66A413

Deployer:

0xc00F8C36d18753360204Eed31B5b72115c66A413



TOKEN OVERVIEW

Fees:

Buy Fees: 0-10%

Sell Fees: 0-10%

Transfer Fees: 0-10%

Fees Privilege: Owner

Ownership: 0xfFbAeEa4cD5D3aD2c93EFfa5C8eC76aa949cC042

Minting: none

Max Tx Amount/ Max Wallet Amount: No

Blacklist: No

Other Privileges: - initial distribution of tokens

- including or excluding from fees

- changing swap threshold

- changing fees



AUDIT METHODOLOGY

The auditing process will follow a routine as special considerations by Auditace:

- Review of the specifications, sources, and instructions provided to Auditace to make sure the contract logic meets the intentions of the client without exposing the user's funds to risk.
 - Manual review of the entire codebase by our experts, which is the process of reading source code line-by-line in an attempt to identify potential vulnerabilities.
 - Specification comparison is the process of checking whether the code does what the specifications, sources, and instructions provided to Auditace describe.
 - Test coverage analysis determines whether the test cases are covering the code and how much code is exercised when we run the test cases.
 - Symbolic execution is analysing a program to determine what inputs cause each part of a program to execute.
 - Reviewing the codebase to improve maintainability, security, and control based on the established industry and academic practices.
-



VULNERABILITY CHECKLIST

- | | |
|------------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| ✓ Return values of low-level calls | ✓ Gasless Send |
| ✓ Private modifier | ✓ Using block.timestamp |
| ✓ Multiple Sends | ✓ Re-entrancy |
| ✓ Using Suicide | ✓ Tautology or contradiction |
| ✓ Gas Limitand Loops | ✓ Timestamp Dependence |
| ✓ Address hardcoded | ✓ Revert/require functions |
| ✓ Exception Disorder | ✓ Use of tx.origin |
| ✓ Using inline assembly | ✓ Integer overflow/underflow |
| ✓ Divide before multiply | ✓ Dangerous strict equalities |
| ✓ Missing Zero Address Validation | ✓ Using SHA3 |
| ✓ Compiler version not fixed | ✓ Using throw |
-



CLASSIFICATION OF RISK

Severity

Description

◆ Critical

These vulnerabilities could be exploited easily and can lead to asset loss, data loss, asset, or data manipulation. They should be fixed right away.

◆ High-Risk

A vulnerability that affects the desired outcome when using a contract, or provides the opportunity to use a contract in an unintended way.

◆ Medium-Risk

A vulnerability that could affect the desired outcome of executing the contract in a specific scenario.

◆ Low-Risk

A vulnerability that does not have a significant impact on possible scenarios for the use of the contract and is probably subjective.

◆ Gas Optimization /Suggestion

A vulnerability that has an informational character but is not affecting any of the code.

Findings

Severity

Found

◆ Critical

0

◆ High-Risk

2

◆ Medium-Risk

1


◆ Low-Risk

0

◆ Gas Optimization / Suggestions

0

INHERITANCE TREE



POINTS TO NOTE

- owner is able to change fees in range of 0-10% for buy/sell/transfer transactions.
 - owner is not able to blacklist an arbitrary wallet
 - owner is not able to set limit for buy/sell/transfer/holding amounts
 - owner is not able to mint new tokens
 - owner is not able to disable trades
 - owner must enable trades manually
-



CONTRACT ASSESMENT

Contract	Type	Bases			
└──	**Function Name**	**Visibility**	**Mutability**	**Modifiers**	
IUniswapV2Factory Interface					
└──	feeTo	External !		NO !	
└──	feeToSetter	External !		NO !	
└──	getPair	External !		NO !	
└──	allPairs	External !		NO !	
└──	allPairsLength	External !		NO !	
└──	createPair	External !		⦿	NO !
└──	setFeeTo	External !		⦿	NO !
└──	setFeeToSetter	External !		⦿	NO !
IUniswapV2Router01 Interface					
└──	factory	External !		NO !	
└──	WETH	External !		NO !	
└──	addLiquidity	External !		⦿	NO !
└──	addLiquidityETH	External !		⦿	NO !
└──	removeLiquidity	External !		⦿	NO !
└──	removeLiquidityETH	External !		⦿	NO !
└──	removeLiquidityWithPermit	External !		⦿	NO !
└──	removeLiquidityETHWithPermit	External !		⦿	NO !
└──	swapExactTokensForTokens	External !		⦿	NO !
└──	swapTokensForExactTokens	External !		⦿	NO !
└──	swapExactETHForTokens	External !		⦿	NO !
└──	swapTokensForExactETH	External !		⦿	NO !
└──	swapExactTokensForETH	External !		⦿	NO !
└──	swapETHForExactTokens	External !		⦿	NO !
└──	quote	External !		NO !	
└──	getAmountOut	External !		NO !	
└──	getAmountIn	External !		NO !	
└──	getAmountsOut	External !		NO !	
└──	getAmountsIn	External !		NO !	
IUniswapV2Router02 Interface IUniswapV2Router01					
└──	removeLiquidityETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens	External !		⦿	NO !
└──	removeLiquidityETHWithPermitSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens	External !		⦿	NO !
└──	swapExactTokensForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens	External !		⦿	NO !
└──	swapExactETHForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens	External !		⦿	NO !
└──	swapExactTokensForETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens	External !		⦿	NO !

CONTRACT ASSESMENT

```

| **MemeMillionaires_BoysClub** | Implementation | ERC20, Ownable | | |
| ^ | <Constructor> | Public ! | ● | ERC20 |
| ^ | <Receive Ether> | External ! | ☐ | NO ! |
| ^ | enableTrading | External ! | ● | onlyOwner |
| ^ | airdropToWallets | External ! | ● | onlyOwner |
| ^ | decimals | Public ! | | NO ! |
| ^ | updateSwapEnabled | External ! | ● | onlyOwner |
| ^ | updateRescueSwap | External ! | ● | onlyOwner |
| ^ | updateBuyFees | External ! | ● | onlyOwner |
| ^ | updateSellFees | External ! | ● | onlyOwner |
| ^ | updateTransferFees | External ! | ● | onlyOwner |
| ^ | excludeFromFees | Public ! | ● | onlyOwner |
| ^ | setAutomatedMarketMakerPair | External ! | ● | onlyOwner |
| ^ | _setAutomatedMarketMakerPair | Private ☒ | ● | |
| ^ | updateTaxWallet | External ! | ● | onlyOwner |
| ^ | isExcludedFromFees | External ! | | NO ! |
| ^ | _transfer | Internal ☒ | ● | |
| ^ | swapTokensForEth | Private ☒ | ● | |
| ^ | addLiquidity | Private ☒ | ● | |
| ^ | resetTaxAmount | Public ! | ● | onlyOwner |
| ^ | swapBack | Private ☒ | ● | |

```

Legend

```

| Symbol | Meaning |
|:-----:|-----|
| ● | Function can modify state |
| ☐ | Function is payable |

```




STATIC ANALYSIS

```
MemeMillionaires_BoysClub.transfer(address,address,uint256) (contracts/Token.sol#1094-1160) has costly operations inside a loop:
- tokensForLiquidity += fees * buyLiquidityFee / buyTotalFees (contracts/Token.sol#1141)
MemeMillionaires_BoysClub.transfer(address,address,uint256) (contracts/Token.sol#1094-1160) has costly operations inside a loop:
- tokensForTax += fees * buyTaxFee / buyTotalFees (contracts/Token.sol#1142)
MemeMillionaires_BoysClub.transfer(address,address,uint256) (contracts/Token.sol#1094-1160) has costly operations inside a loop:
- tokensForLiquidity += fees * transferLiquidityFee / transferTotalFees (contracts/Token.sol#1147)
MemeMillionaires_BoysClub.transfer(address,address,uint256) (contracts/Token.sol#1094-1160) has costly operations inside a loop:
- tokensForTax += fees * transferTaxFee / transferTotalFees (contracts/Token.sol#1148)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#costly-operations-inside-a-loop

Context.msgData() (contracts/Token.sol#210-212) is never used and should be removed
ERC20.burn(address,uint256) (contracts/Token.sol#608-624) is never used and should be removed
SafeMath.add(uint256,uint256) (contracts/Token.sol#81-83) is never used and should be removed
SafeMath.div(uint256,uint256,string) (contracts/Token.sol#175-180) is never used and should be removed
SafeMath.mod(uint256,uint256) (contracts/Token.sol#139-141) is never used and should be removed
SafeMath.mod(uint256,uint256,string) (contracts/Token.sol#197-202) is never used and should be removed
SafeMath.sub(uint256,uint256,string) (contracts/Token.sol#156-161) is never used and should be removed
SafeMath.tryAdd(uint256,uint256) (contracts/Token.sol#10-16) is never used and should be removed
SafeMath.tryDiv(uint256,uint256) (contracts/Token.sol#52-57) is never used and should be removed
SafeMath.tryMod(uint256,uint256) (contracts/Token.sol#64-69) is never used and should be removed
SafeMath.tryMul(uint256,uint256) (contracts/Token.sol#35-45) is never used and should be removed
SafeMath.trySub(uint256,uint256) (contracts/Token.sol#23-28) is never used and should be removed
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#dead-code

Pragma version^0.8.17 (contracts/Token.sol#2) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deploying with 0.6.12/0.7.6/0.8.16
solc-0.8.20 is not recommended for deployment
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#incorrect-versions-of-solidity

Low level call in MemeMillionaires_BoysClub.swapBack() (contracts/Token.sol#1200-1239):
- (success,None) = address(taxWallet).call(value: address(this).balance)() (contracts/Token.sol#1238)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#low-level-calls

Function IUniswapV2Router01.METH() (contracts/Token.sol#716) is not in mixedCase
Contract MemeMillionaires_BoysClub (contracts/Token.sol#886-1240) is not in CapWords
Parameter MemeMillionaires_BoysClub.updateBuyFees(uint256,uint256)._taxFee (contracts/Token.sol#1047) is not in mixedCase
Parameter MemeMillionaires_BoysClub.updateBuyFees(uint256,uint256)._liquidityFee (contracts/Token.sol#1047) is not in mixedCase
Parameter MemeMillionaires_BoysClub.updateSellFees(uint256,uint256)._taxFee (contracts/Token.sol#1054) is not in mixedCase
Parameter MemeMillionaires_BoysClub.updateSellFees(uint256,uint256)._liquidityFee (contracts/Token.sol#1054) is not in mixedCase
Parameter MemeMillionaires_BoysClub.updateTransferFees(uint256,uint256)._taxFee (contracts/Token.sol#1061) is not in mixedCase
Parameter MemeMillionaires_BoysClub.updateTransferFees(uint256,uint256)._liquidityFee (contracts/Token.sol#1061) is not in mixedCase
Constant MemeMillionaires_BoysClub.deadAddress (contracts/Token.sol#891) is not in UPPER_CASE_WITH_UNDERSCORES
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#conformance-to-solidity-naming-conventions

Variable IUniswapV2Router01.addLiquidity(address,address,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,address,uint256).amountADesired (contracts/Token.sol#721) is too similar to IUniswapV2Router01.addLiquidity(address,address,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,address,uint256).amountBDesired (contracts/Token.sol#722)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#variable-names-too-similar

MemeMillionaires_BoysClub.constructor() (contracts/Token.sol#943-1007) uses literals with too many digits:
- totalSupply = 1000000000000 * 1e18 (contracts/Token.sol#948)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#too-many-digits

MemeMillionaires_BoysClub.decimals (contracts/Token.sol#897) should be immutable
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#state-variables-that-could-be-declared-immutable
```

Result => A static analysis of contract's source code has been performed using slither,

No major issues were found in the output



FUNCTIONAL TESTING

1- Adding liquidity (passed):

<https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0x4dd7acc32dafe5b4fe15abc45ad8870abe6e8ada1e486ec58767be94bf2288f1>

2- Buying when excluded from fees (0% tax) (passed):

<https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0xc25198c384ac2178fe0bc933f9b08a48fd11f8eee7785a25c0021efc2fee464f>

3- Selling when excluded from fees (0% tax) (passed):

<https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0xdda48122b2058b9916793ccfd7ddad0a101c272fbb5ef005bf71782352dc6723>

4- Transferring when excluded from fees (0% tax) (passed):

<https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0x72a1e30409c97afe7eb6613a8aab99c98beab68ebabc4f57a790b470a58598a4>

5- Buying when not excluded from fees (0-10% tax) (passed):

<https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0x8e7ba4f5141ebbc04671aaa4a4adadb bcf57f2cabeffde2088781afea39903e0>

6- Selling when not excluded from fees (0-10% tax) (passed):

<https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0xb75dc46f3464c4ff1ce2f294855de08eb022cc4200a3ee7f6ac3d5830ead51af>



FUNCTIONAL TESTING

7- Transferring when not excluded from fees (0-10% tax) (passed):

<https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0xa8fece385caafbfbef285265b7cc2e072f0afd367aac038f7b46a5efa7018cd9>

8- Internal swap (passed):

- Tax converted to BNB and sent to tax wallet
- Tax converted to BNB and added to liquidity pool along with an equivalent (in value) number of tokens

<https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0xa8fece385caafbfbef285265b7cc2e072f0afd367aac038f7b46a5efa7018cd9>

9- Rescue tax (passed):

a feature that directly sends all collected fees to tax wallet instead of swapping those tokens for BNB.

<https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0x11ad9227d17a98a25f2c27f20277613958c0d84698b4e1474cb4161635d86ecc>

MANUAL TESTING

Logical – Setting tax wallet to

0x00

Severity: **High**

function: updateTaxWallet

Status: **Acknowledged**

Overview:

Setting the tax wallet to the null address (0x00) may lead to the disruption of sale transactions when the "rescueSwap" feature is active. Specifically, accumulated fees, which should be transferred to the tax wallet, would fail to be processed since the null address is not a valid recipient. Consequently, the entire sale transaction would be reverted due to this internal swap failure.

```
function updateTaxWallet(address newTaxWallet) external onlyOwner {
    taxWallet = newTaxWallet;
    emit TaxWalletUpdated(newTaxWallet, taxWallet);
}

function swapBack() private {
    uint256 contractBalance = balanceOf(address(this));

    if (rescueSwap) {
        if (contractBalance > 0) {
            super._transfer(address(this), taxWallet, contractBalance);
        }
        return;
    }
    ///rest of the code
}
```

Suggestion

Prevent the tax wallet from being set to the null address by introducing a requirement check within the updateTaxWallet function. A modified version of the function would look like this:

```
function updateTaxWallet(address newTaxWallet) external onlyOwner {
    require(newTaxWallet != address(0), "can not set tax wallet to address 0");
    taxWallet = newTaxWallet;
    emit TaxWalletUpdated(newTaxWallet, taxWallet);
}
```

Alleviation from Owner

Since this is an edge-case-scenario that can only occur if the owner of the contract sets the tax wallet address to the null-address, at the same time as the owner has enabled rescueSwap, we don't see this as an issue. We will never change the tax wallet address (which is already hardcoded into the contract).

After the contract has been renounced the tax wallet cannot be changed, and the issue is no longer relevant.

MANUAL TESTING

Logical – fees are not resetted

Severity: **High**

function: swapBack

Status: **Acknowledged**

Overview:

Currently, the variables **tokensForLiquidity** and **tokensForTax** represent the amount of tokens accumulated for each type of tax. However, the swapBack function fails to reset these two variables to zero after sending the contract token balance to the tax wallet.

While the owner can manually reset these variables to zero using the resetTaxAmount function, a failure to perform this action could cause an internal swap to revert. This would occur when the rescueSwap flag is set to false and an attempt is made to swap more tokens to BNB than what the contract has.

```
function resetTaxAmount() public onlyOwner {
    tokensForLiquidity = 0;
    tokensForTax = 0;
}

function swapBack() private {
    uint256 contractBalance = balanceOf(address(this));

    if (rescueSwap) {
        if (contractBalance > 0) {
            super._transfer(address(this), taxWallet, contractBalance);
        }
        return;
    }
    ///rest of the code
}
```

Suggestion

Ensure that tokensForLiquidity and tokensForTax are reset to zero in the swapBack function. A modified version of the function is as follows:

```
function swapBack() private {
    uint256 contractBalance = balanceOf(address(this));

    if (rescueSwap) {
        if (contractBalance > 0) {
            super._transfer(address(this), taxWallet, contractBalance);
        }
        tokensForLiquidity = 0;
        tokensForTax = 0;
        return;
    }
    ///rest of the code
}
```



MANUAL TESTING

Alleviation from Owner

The function rescueSwap is a feature that should "only be used to disable `swapback` and send tax in form of tokens".

This is not something we have any plans of doing within the first week of trading. After the contract is renounced, this will no longer be possible to activate.

We will never activate rescueSwap.

MANUAL TESTING

Logical – Stuck ETH and Tokens

Severity: **Medium**

Status: **Acknowledged**

Overview:

This contract can receive both ETH and all types of ERC20 tokens. However, there are currently no functions available to withdraw these stuck tokens or ETH. This could result in assets being permanently locked within the contract.

Suggestion

Recommendation: To resolve this issue, implement withdrawal functions for both ETH and ERC20 tokens. This will allow the contract owner to recover any assets mistakenly sent to the contract address. Here is an example of how such functions might look:

javascript

```
// For ERC20 Tokens
function withdrawTokens(address _tokenContract) external onlyOwner {
    require(_tokenContract != address(this), "can not withdraw native tokens");
    ERC20 token = ERC20(_tokenContract);
    uint256 balance = token.balanceOf(address(this));
    token.transfer(owner, balance);
    emit WithdrawalTokens(owner, balance);
}

// For ETH
function withdrawETH(uint256 amount) external onlyOwner {
    require(amount <= address(this).balance, "Not enough ETH balance");
    payable(owner).transfer(amount);
    emit WithdrawalETH(owner, amount);
}
```

In these functions, `onlyOwner` is a modifier to ensure only the contract owner can execute these functions, preventing unauthorized withdrawals. The `WithdrawalTokens` and `WithdrawalETH` events are emitted after the successful transfer of tokens or ETH to provide transparency and trackability.

Alleviation from Owner

Since we are renouncing the contract, we would not be able to release any stuck tokens after the time of renouncement. It would only bring more frustration to a user, if the withdraw function was there, but it could not be called, as we would not have the ownership and rights to execute admin functions on the contract.



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