



AuditAce

FROM INCEPTION TO SUCCESS

NFT AUDIT

**Smart Contract
Audit Report**



ABOUT AUDITACE

Audit Ace is built, to combat financial fraud in the cryptocurrency industry, a growing security firm that provides audits, Smart contract creation, and end-to-end solutions to all crypto-related queries.

Website - <https://auditace.tech/>

Telegram - https://t.me/Audit_Ace

Twitter - https://twitter.com/auditace_

Github - <https://github.com/Audit-Ace>



Overview

AUDITACE team has performed a line-by-line manual analysis and automated review of smart contracts. Smart contracts were analyzed mainly for common contract vulnerabilities, exploits, and manipulation hacks.

Audit Result: **Passed with medium risk**

Audit Date: January 13, 2023

KYC :Not Done till date of Audit

Audit Team: TEAM AUDITACE



Disclaimer

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Used Tools

Manual Review -Manual Review – Forge (Foundry)

Audit Scope:

- NFTBox.sol
- NFTClaim.sol





Token Summary

Parameter Result

| | |
|-------------------|--|
| Proxy Address | 0xb4eEBB3a9Ee0DaA14303CAbc09301adE70Ceb742 |
| Token Type | BEP 20 |
| Contract Checksum | 3a02f2284fd482886e2fd54898fea3001b3b246c3f7f3a6b1ce321437aeb91b4 |
| Decimals | - |
| Proxy | Yes |
| Platform | Binance Smart Chain |
| Compiler | v0.8.2+commit.661d1103 |
| Contract Name | - |
| Symbol | - |
| License Type | - |
| Language | Solidity |

AUDIT METHODOLOGY

The auditing process will follow a routine as special considerations by Auditace:

- Review of the specifications, sources, and instructions provided to Auditace to make sure the contract logic meets the intentions of the client without exposing the user's funds to risk.
 - Manual review of the entire codebase by our experts, which is the process of reading source code line-by-line in an attempt to identify potential vulnerabilities.
 - Specification comparison is the process of checking whether the code does what the specifications, sources, and instructions provided to Auditace describe.
 - Test coverage analysis determines whether the test cases are covering the code and how much code is exercised when we run the test cases.
 - Symbolic execution is analysing a program to determine what inputs cause each part of a program to execute.
 - Reviewing the codebase to improve maintainability, security, and control based on the established industry and academic practices.
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Issues Checking Status

| No | Issue Description | Checking Status |
|----|---|-----------------|
| 1 | Compiler warnings. | Passed |
| 2 | Race conditions and Reentrancy. Cross-function race conditions. | Passed |
| 3 | Possible delays in data delivery. | Passed |
| 4 | Oracle calls. | Passed |
| 5 | Front running. | Passed |
| 6 | Timestamp dependence. | Passed |
| 7 | Integer Overflow and Underflow. | Passed |
| 8 | DoS with Revert. | Passed |
| 9 | DoS with block gas limit. | Passed |
| 10 | Methods execution permissions. | Passed |
| 11 | Design Logic. | Passed |
| 12 | Cross-function race conditions. | Passed |
| 13 | Safe Zeppelin module. | Passed |
| 14 | Malicious Event log. | Passed |
| 15 | Scoping and Declarations. | Passed |
| 16 | Fallback function security. | Passed |
| 17 | Arithmetic accuracy. | Passed |




SWC ATTACK TEST

| SWC ID | Description | Test Result |
|---------|--------------------------------------|-------------|
| SWC-100 | Function Visibility | Passed |
| SWC-101 | Integer Overflow and Underflow | Passed |
| SWC-102 | Outdated Compiler Version | Passed |
| SWC-103 | Floating Pragma | Passed |
| SWC-104 | Unchecked Call Return Value | Passed |
| SWC-105 | Unprotected Ether Withdrawal | Passed |
| SWC-106 | Unprotected SELFDESTRUCT Instruction | Passed |
| SWC-107 | Re-entrancy | Passed |
| SWC-108 | State Variable Default Visibility | Passed |
| SWC-109 | Uninitialized Storage Pointer | Passed |
| SWC-110 | Assert Violation | Passed |
| SWC-111 | Use of Deprecated Solidity Functions | Passed |
| SWC-112 | Delegate Call to Untrusted Callee | Passed |
| SWC-113 | DoS with Failed Call | Passed |
| SWC-114 | Transaction Order Dependence | Passed |
| SWC-115 | Authorization through tx.origin | Passed |
| SWC-116 | Block values as a proxy for time | Passed |



| SWC ID | Description | Test Result |
|---------|---|-------------|
| SWC-117 | Signature Malleability | Passed |
| SWC-118 | Incorrect Constructor Name | Passed |
| SWC-119 | Shadowing State Variables | Passed |
| SWC-120 | Weak Sources of Randomness from Chain Attributes | Passed |
| SWC-121 | Missing Protection against Signature Replay Attacks | Passed |
| SWC-122 | Lack of Proper Signature Verification | Passed |
| SWC-123 | Requirement Violation | Passed |
| SWC-124 | Write to Arbitrary Storage Location | Passed |
| SWC-125 | Incorrect Inheritance Order | Passed |
| SWC-126 | Insufficient Gas Grieving | Passed |
| SWC-127 | Arbitrary Jump with Function Type Variable | Passed |
| SWC-128 | DoS With Block Gas Limit | Passed |
| SWC-129 | Typographical Error | Passed |
| SWC-130 | Right-To-Left-Override control character (U+202E) | Passed |
| SWC-131 | Presence of unused variables | Passed |
| SWC-132 | Unexpected Ether balance | Passed |
| SWC-133 | Hash Collisions with Multiple Variable Length Arguments | Passed |
| SWC-134 | Unencrypted Private Data On-Chain | Passed |

Inheritance Tree



Summary

- NFTBuy: minting random NFTs (each one with different chance) by providing mint fee as nftToken
 - NFTClaim: claiming NFTs if whitelisted by owner
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Classification of Risks

Severity

Description

| | |
|--|---|
| ◆ High-Risk | A vulnerability that affects the desired outcome when using a contract, or provides the opportunity to use a contract in an unintended way. |
| ◆ Medium-Risk | A vulnerability that could affect the desired outcome of executing the contract in a specific scenario. |
| ◆ Low-Risk | A vulnerability that does not have a significant impact on possible scenarios for the use of the contract and is probably subjective. |
| ◆ Gas Optimization / Suggestion | A vulnerability that has an informational character but is not affecting any of the code. |

Findings

Severity

Found

| | |
|---|----------|
| ◆ High-Risk | 2 |
| ◆ Medium-Risk | 1 |
| ◆ Low-Risk | 0 |
| ◆ Gas Optimization / Suggestions | 4 |

MANUAL AUDIT

HIGH RISK FINDINGS

Centralization - : approving proxy : NFTBuy contract requires buyer to approve proxy contract with the amount of mint fee tokens, if proxy contract is approved with more than necessary amount of tokens, then a malicious owner is able to upgrade the implementation contract and spend users nft token funds.

Recommendation:

make sure to approve proxy contract only with necessary amounts

Centralization : upgradeable contracts: contracts are upgradeable, meaning that new implementations may be totally different than what is audited here, this may open up new security risks (like the one described in previous issue)



MANUAL AUDIT

MEDIUM RISK FINDINGS

Centralization - lastSeed variable is never changed (always zero) , this can increase the possibility of predicting seeds

Suggestions - set lastSeed to latest calculated seed,





MANUAL AUDIT

Gas Optimizations

- set this variables as constant: PERCENT_DEVIDER
- use external keyword instead of public for setter functions
- redundant variable typeBox (its always 1)

Suggestions

- use up to 3 indexed arguments in events

