



# Smart Contract Audit

FOR

Hectic Turkey

DATED : 21 Feb, 2024



# AUDIT SUMMARY

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**Project name** – Hectic Turkey

**Date:** 21 Feb, 2024

**Scope of Audit-** Audit Ace was consulted to conduct the smart contract audit of the solidity source codes.

**Audit Status:** **Passed**

## Issues Found

Status	Critical	High	Medium	Low	Suggestion
Open	0	0	1	2	1
Acknowledged	0	0	0	0	0
Resolved	0	0	0	0	0

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# USED TOOLS

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## Tools:

### 1- Manual Review:

A line by line code review has been performed by audit ace team.

**2- BSC Test Network:** All tests were conducted on the BSC Test network, and each test has a corresponding transaction attached to it. These tests can be found in the "Functional Tests" section of the report.

### 3- Slither :

The code has undergone static analysis using Slither.

### Testnet version:

The tests were performed using the contract deployed on the BSC Testnet, which can be found at the following address:

<https://testnet.bscscan.com/address/0x610d36293d97cdb4a476770ebd48dd4a588242f4#code>

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# Token Information

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**Token Name :** Hectic Turkey

**Token Symbol:** HECT

**Decimals:** 18

**Token Supply:** 88000000000000

**Network:** Binance smart chain

**Token Type:** BEP-20

**Token Address:**

0xB38C9D498bab8DeEFA5fFE8E1d7ca000ef6c3362

**Checksum:**

H2032c616934aeb47e6039f76b20d321

**Owner:**

0x5Bc99FAB9243A41cAA80D676BbcE5dD923a9A121  
(at time of writing the audit)

**Deployer:**

0x5Bc99FAB9243A41cAA80D676BbcE5dD923a9A121

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# TOKEN OVERVIEW

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## **Fees:**

**Buy Tax: 10-25%**

**Sell Tax: 10-25%**

**Transfer Fee: 0-0%**

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**Fees Privilege: Owner**

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**Ownership: Owned**

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**Minting: None**

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**Max Tx Amount/ Max Wallet Amount: No**

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**Blacklist: No**

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# AUDIT METHODOLOGY

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The auditing process will follow a routine as special considerations by Auditace:


- Review of the specifications, sources, and instructions provided to Auditace to make sure the contract logic meets the intentions of the client without exposing the user's funds to risk.
  - Manual review of the entire codebase by our experts, which is the process of reading source code line-by-line in an attempt to identify potential vulnerabilities.
  - Specification comparison is the process of checking whether the code does what the specifications, sources, and instructions provided to Auditace describe.
  - Test coverage analysis determines whether the test cases are covering the code and how much code is exercised when we run the test cases.
  - Symbolic execution is analysing a program to determine what inputs cause each part of a program to execute.
  - Reviewing the codebase to improve maintainability, security, and control based on the established industry and academic practices.
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# VULNERABILITY CHECKLIST

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- |                                    |                               |
|------------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| ✓ Return values of low-level calls | ✓ Gasless Send                |
| ✓ Private modifier                 | ✓ Using block.timestamp       |
| ✓ Multiple Sends                   | ✓ Re-entrancy                 |
| ✓ Using Suicide                    | ✓ Tautology or contradiction  |
| ✓ Gas Limitand Loops               | ✓ Timestamp Dependence        |
| ✓ Address hardcoded                | ✓ Revert/require functions    |
| ✓ Exception Disorder               | ✓ Use of tx.origin            |
| ✓ Using inline assembly            | ✓ Integer overflow/underflow  |
| ✓ Divide before multiply           | ✓ Dangerous strict equalities |
| ✓ Missing Zero Address Validation  | ✓ Using SHA3                  |
| ✓ Compiler version not fixed       | ✓ Using throw                 |
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# INHERITANCE TREE







**A static analysis of the code was performed using Slither.**

**No issues were found.**

```
INFO:Detectors:
Reentrancy in ERC20_SWAPBack() (MecticTurkeyToken.sol#532-553):
  External calls:
    - address(TREASURY).transfer(TREASURYAmount) (MecticTurkeyToken.sol#547)
  External calls sending eth:
    - SWAPTwo(INITIAL_AVAILABLE_BNB) (MecticTurkeyToken.sol#535)
      - PancakeswapV2Router.swapExactETHForTokens(value: ethAmount)(0,path,address(0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000),block.timestamp + 3600) (MecticTurkeyToken.sol#578-583)
    - address(TREASURY).transfer(TREASURYAmount) (MecticTurkeyToken.sol#547)
  State variables written after the call(s):
    - TOTAL_ETH_VALUE_BURNED += AVAILABLE_BNB - (TREASURYAmount) (MecticTurkeyToken.sol#549)
  Event emitted after the call(s):
    - SwapBack(balance) (MecticTurkeyToken.sol#551)
Reference: https://github.com/cryptic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#reentrancy-vulnerabilities-4
ERC20_router.update(address,address,uint256) (MecticTurkeyToken.sol#479-516):
  External calls:
    - SWAPBack() (MecticTurkeyToken.sol#485)
      - address(TREASURY).transfer(TREASURYAmount) (MecticTurkeyToken.sol#549)
  External calls sending eth:
    - SWAPBack() (MecticTurkeyToken.sol#485)
      - PancakeswapV2Router.swapExactETHForTokens(value: ethAmount)(0,path,address(0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000),block.timestamp + 3600) (MecticTurkeyToken.sol#578-583)
      - address(TREASURY).transfer(TREASURYAmount) (MecticTurkeyToken.sol#547)
  State variables written after the call(s):
    - _balances[from] = fromBalance - value (MecticTurkeyToken.sol#496)
    - _balances[address(this)] += TAXAmount (MecticTurkeyToken.sol#509)
    - _balances[to] += amountAfterTax (MecticTurkeyToken.sol#511)
    - _totalSupply += value (MecticTurkeyToken.sol#509)
    - _totalSupply -= value (MecticTurkeyToken.sol#501)
  Event emitted after the call(s):
    - Transfer(from,address(this),TAXAmount) (MecticTurkeyToken.sol#518)
    - Transfer(from,to,amountAfterTax) (MecticTurkeyToken.sol#51a)
Reference: https://github.com/cryptic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#variable-names-too-similar
INFO:Detectors:
Variable IPancakeswapV2Router01.addLiquidity(address,address,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,address,uint256).amountADesired (MecticTurkeyToken.sol#208) is too similar to IPancakeswapV2Router01.addLiquidity(adress,address,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,address,uint256).amountBDesired (MecticTurkeyToken.sol#201)
Reference: https://github.com/cryptic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#variable-names-too-similar
INFO:Detectors:
MecticTurkeyToken.constructor() (MecticTurkeyToken.sol#658-668) uses literals with too many digits:
  - sampleDate(address(x),msg.sender,8888888888888888 * 10 ** 18) (MecticTurkeyToken.sol#659)
MecticTurkeyToken.slitherConstructorVariables() (MecticTurkeyToken.sol#658-668) uses literals with too many digits:
  - REM_TOKENS_FOR_SWAP = 1888888888888888 * 10 ** uint256(decimals()) (MecticTurkeyToken.sol#661)
Reference: https://github.com/cryptic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#too-many-digits
INFO:Detectors:
ERC20_router (MecticTurkeyToken.sol#338) should be constant
Reference: https://github.com/cryptic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#state-variables-that-could-be-declared-constant
INFO:Detectors:
ERC20_PancakeswapV2Pair (MecticTurkeyToken.sol#339) should be immutable
ERC20_PancakeswapV2Router (MecticTurkeyToken.sol#336) should be immutable
Reference: https://github.com/cryptic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#state-variables-that-could-be-declared-immutable
INFO:Slither:MecticTurkeyToken.sol analyzed (12 contracts with 93 detectors). 54 result(s) found
```



# FUNCTIONAL TESTING

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## 1- Approve (passed):

<https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0x8e101bd61346adcdbb6cce64345ab1a61a94b5826d53660ac225cf1b7af75bb8>

## 2- Set Fees (passed):

<https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0x826cc83818885f283d11a1289d59245f8812e2f2dd06f40bfcf26a820734f3aa>

## 3- Set Treasury Address (passed):

<https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0x61ff59cffb3f48b96df1b98f250cfd8b1ce65f34e5b91fcfef05e2a78e80ad9c>

## 4- Transfer (passed):

<https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0x88723f2e0adf52e60fa5197a8708b766d0d1b66e3b2d48df51c82972366e0de8>

## 5- Set Min Tokens for Swap (passed):

<https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0x63ca7d556acaec06a3d8a00d8da6bd2623cfceb3a630168befa11eece6760988>

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# POINTS TO NOTE

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- The owner can transfer ownership.
  - The owner can renounce ownership.
  - The owner can set swap back threshold amount not more than 25 ethers.
  - The owner can set treasury address.
  - The owner can set min token for swap not less than 1.
  - The owner can set buy/sell tax to not more than 25%.
  - The owner can save ETH.
-

# CLASSIFICATION OF RISK

## Severity

## Description

◆ Critical	These vulnerabilities could be exploited easily and can lead to asset loss, data loss, asset, or data manipulation. They should be fixed right away.
◆ High-Risk	A vulnerability that affects the desired outcome when using a contract, or provides the opportunity to use a contract in an unintended way.
◆ Medium-Risk	A vulnerability that could affect the desired outcome of executing the contract in a specific scenario.
◆ Low-Risk	A vulnerability that does not have a significant impact on possible scenarios for the use of the contract and is probably subjective.
◆ Gas Optimization /Suggestion	A vulnerability that has an informational character but is not affecting any of the code.

## Findings

### Severity

### Found

◆ Critical	0
◆ High-Risk	0
◆ Medium-Risk	1
◆ Low-Risk	2
◆ Gas Optimization / Suggestions	1

# MANUAL TESTING

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## Centralization – Missing Require Check

Severity: Medium

Function: setTreasuryAddress

Status: Open

### Overview:

The owner can set any arbitrary address excluding zero address as this is not recommended because if the owner will set the address to the contract address, then the Eth will not be sent to that address and the transaction will fail and this will lead to a potential honeypot in the contract.

```
function setTreasuryAddress(address _newTreasuryWallet) external onlyOwner {  
    require(_newTreasuryWallet != address(0), "Zero Wallets");  
    TREASURY = _newTreasuryWallet;  
}
```

**Suggestion:** It is recommended that the address should not be able to set as a contract address.

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# MANUAL TESTING

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## Centralization – Missing Events

Severity: Low

Function: Missing Events

Status: Open

### Overview:

They serve as a mechanism for emitting and recording data onto the blockchain, making it transparent and easily accessible.

```
function setSwapbackThreshold(uint256 _newThreshold) external onlyOwner {
    // Require the new threshold to be greater than or equal to a minimum value
    require(_newThreshold >= 1 ether && _newThreshold <= 25 ether , "Threshold
must be greater than 1 eth");
    SWAPBACK_THRESHOLD = _newThreshold;
}

function setTreasuryAddress(address _newTreasuryWallet) external onlyOwner {
    require(_newTreasuryWallet != address(0), "Zero Wallets");
    TREASURY = _newTreasuryWallet;
}

function setFees(uint256 _BUYTax, uint256 _SELLTax) external onlyOwner {
    require(
        _BUYTax >= MIN_FEE_RATE && _BUYTax <= MAX_FEE_RATE &&
        _SELLTax >= MIN_FEE_RATE && _SELLTax <= MAX_FEE_RATE,
        "MAX_FEE_RATE or MIN_FEE_RATE not matched"
    );

    BUYTax          = _BUYTax;
    SELLTax         = _SELLTax;
```

# MANUAL TESTING

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## Centralization – Local Variable Shadowing

Severity: Low

Function: Local Variable

Status: Open

### Overview:

```
function transfer(address to, uint256 value) public virtual returns (bool) {
    address owner = _msgSender();
    _transfer(owner, to, value);
    return true;
}

function allowance(address owner, address spender) public view virtual returns
(uint256) {
    return _allowances[owner][spender];
}

function approve(address spender, uint256 value) public virtual returns (bool) {
    address owner = _msgSender();
    _approve(owner, spender, value);
    return true;
}
```

**Suggestion:** Rename the local variable that shadows another component.

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# MANUAL TESTING

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## Optimization

Severity: Optimization

Subject: Remove unused code

Status: Open

### Overview:

Unused variables are allowed in Solidity, and they do not pose a direct security issue. It is the best practice though to avoid them.

```
function _msgData() internal view virtual returns (bytes calldata) {
    return msg.data;
}
modifier nonReentrant() {
    _nonReentrantBefore();
    _;
    _nonReentrantAfter();
}function _burn(address account, uint256 value) internal {
    if (account == address(0)) {
        revert ERC20InvalidSender(address(0));
    }
    _simpleUpdate(account, address(0), value);
}
```





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# ABOUT AUDITACE

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We specialize in providing thorough and reliable audits for Web3 projects. With a team of experienced professionals, we use cutting-edge technology and rigorous methodologies to evaluate the security and integrity of blockchain systems. We are committed to helping our clients ensure the safety and transparency of their digital assets and transactions.



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