



Smart Contract Audit

FOR
VPW

DATED : 9 June 23'

HIGH RISK FINDING

Centralization – Trades must be enabled

Severity: **High**

function: EnableTrading

Status: Resolved (owned by safu developer)

Overview:

The smart contract owner must enable trades for holders. If trading remain disabled, no one would be able to buy/sell/transfer tokens.

```
function enableTrading() external onlyOwner {  
    require(!tradingEnabled, "Trading is already enabled");  
    tradingEnabled = true;  
    providingLiquidity = true;  
    genesis_block = block.number;  
}
```

Suggestion

To mitigate this centralization issue, we propose the following options:

1. Renounce Ownership: Consider relinquishing control of the smart contract by renouncing ownership. This would remove the ability for a single entity to manipulate the router, reducing centralization risks.
2. Multi-signature Wallet: Transfer ownership to a multi-signature wallet. This would require multiple approvals for any changes to the mainRouter, adding an additional layer of security and reducing the centralization risk.
3. Transfer ownership to a trusted and valid 3rd party in order to guarantee enabling of the trades



AUDIT SUMMARY

Project name – VPW

Date: 9 June, 2023

Scope of Audit- Audit Ace was consulted to conduct the smart contract audit of the solidity source codes.

Audit Status: Passed

Issues Found

Status	Critical	High	Medium	Low	Suggestion
Open	0	0	0	0	0
Acknowledged	0	0	0	0	0
Resolved	0	1	0	0	0

USED TOOLS

Tools:

1- Manual Review:

A line by line code review has been performed by audit ace team.

2- BSC Test Network: All tests were conducted on the BSC Test network, and each test has a corresponding transaction attached to it. These tests can be found in the "Functional Tests" section of the report.

3- Slither :

The code has undergone static analysis using Slither.

Testnet version:

Contract has been tested on binance smart chain testnet which can be found in below link:

<https://testnet.bscscan.com/token/0x812d58fa4be6bcb3a3e08cb0c4f0bfb9c4b3b51f#code>



Token Information

Token Name : Virtual Peradox World

Token Symbol: VPW

Decimals: 18

Token Supply: 599,000,000

Token Address:

0x7BB224B336ECa8f5FfBf45bD460eFc61f018F962

Checksum:

5970ffc8793efd442c45649650ac16c09e7ca8c4

Owner:

0x7BB224B336ECa8f5FfBf45bD460eFc61f018F962

Deployer:

0x7BB224B336ECa8f5FfBf45bD460eFc61f018F962



TOKEN OVERVIEW

Fees:

Buy Fees: 1%

Sell Fees: 1%

Transfer Fees: 1%

Fees Privilege: None

Ownership: Owned

Minting: None

Max Tx Amount/ Max Wallet Amount: Yes

Blacklist: No

Other Privileges: - initial distribution of tokens
- including or excluding from fees
- changing swap threshold



AUDIT METHODOLOGY

The auditing process will follow a routine as special considerations by Auditace:

- Review of the specifications, sources, and instructions provided to Auditace to make sure the contract logic meets the intentions of the client without exposing the user's funds to risk.
 - Manual review of the entire codebase by our experts, which is the process of reading source code line-by-line in an attempt to identify potential vulnerabilities.
 - Specification comparison is the process of checking whether the code does what the specifications, sources, and instructions provided to Auditace describe.
 - Test coverage analysis determines whether the test cases are covering the code and how much code is exercised when we run the test cases.
 - Symbolic execution is analysing a program to determine what inputs cause each part of a program to execute.
 - Reviewing the codebase to improve maintainability, security, and control based on the established industry and academic practices.
-



VULNERABILITY CHECKLIST

- | | |
|------------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| ✓ Return values of low-level calls | ✓ Gasless Send |
| ✓ Private modifier | ✓ Using block.timestamp |
| ✓ Multiple Sends | ✓ Re-entrancy |
| ✓ Using Suicide | ✓ Tautology or contradiction |
| ✓ Gas Limitand Loops | ✓ Timestamp Dependence |
| ✓ Address hardcoded | ✓ Revert/require functions |
| ✓ Exception Disorder | ✓ Use of tx.origin |
| ✓ Using inline assembly | ✓ Integer overflow/underflow |
| ✓ Divide before multiply | ✓ Dangerous strict equalities |
| ✓ Missing Zero Address Validation | ✓ Using SHA3 |
| ✓ Compiler version not fixed | ✓ Using throw |
-

CLASSIFICATION OF RISK

Severity

Description

◆ Critical

These vulnerabilities could be exploited easily and can lead to asset loss, data loss, asset, or data manipulation. They should be fixed right away.

◆ High-Risk

A vulnerability that affects the desired outcome when using a contract, or provides the opportunity to use a contract in an unintended way.

◆ Medium-Risk

A vulnerability that could affect the desired outcome of executing the contract in a specific scenario.

◆ Low-Risk

A vulnerability that does not have a significant impact on possible scenarios for the use of the contract and is probably subjective.

◆ Gas Optimization /Suggestion

A vulnerability that has an informational character but is not affecting any of the code.

Findings

Severity

Found

◆ Critical

0

◆ High-Risk

1

◆ Medium-Risk

0


◆ Low-Risk

0

◆ Gas Optimization / Suggestions

0

INHERITANCE TREE



POINTS TO NOTE

- owner is not able to set change buy/sell/transfer fees (1% static)
 - owner is not able to blacklist an arbitrary wallet
 - owner is not able to set limit for buy/sell/transfer/holding amounts
 - owner is not able to mint new tokens
 - owner is not able to disable trades
 - owner can exclude/include an address from fees
 - owner can change internal swap threshold
 - owner can enable/disable internal swap (l.e marketing and development BNB not trades)
 - owner can claim stuck tokens
 - owner can transfer ownership
 - owner can renounce ownership
-



```

Contract | Type | Bases | | |
|:-----:|:-----:|:-----:|:-----:|:-----:|
| L | **Function Name** | **Visibility** | **Mutability** | **Modifiers** |
|||||
| **Context** | Implementation | |||
| L | _msgSender | Internal 🔒 | | |
| L | _msgData | Internal 🔒 | | |
|||||
| **IERC20** | Interface | |||
| L | totalSupply | External ! | | NO ! |
| L | balanceOf | External ! | | NO ! |
| L | transfer | External ! | 🔒 | NO ! |
| L | allowance | External ! | | NO ! |
| L | approve | External ! | 🔒 | NO ! |
| L | transferFrom | External ! | 🔒 | NO ! |
|||||
| **IERC20Metadata** | Interface | IERC20 |||
| L | name | External ! | | NO ! |
| L | symbol | External ! | | NO ! |
| L | decimals | External ! | | NO ! |
|||||
| **ERC20** | Implementation | Context, IERC20, IERC20Metadata |||
| L | <Constructor> | Public ! | 🔒 | NO ! |
| L | name | Public ! | | NO ! |
| L | symbol | Public ! | | NO ! |
| L | decimals | Public ! | | NO ! |
| L | totalSupply | Public ! | | NO ! |
| L | balanceOf | Public ! | | NO ! |
| L | transfer | Public ! | 🔒 | NO ! |
| L | allowance | Public ! | | NO ! |
| L | approve | Public ! | 🔒 | NO ! |
| L | transferFrom | Public ! | 🔒 | NO ! |
| L | increaseAllowance | Public ! | 🔒 | NO ! |
| L | decreaseAllowance | Public ! | 🔒 | NO ! |
| L | _transfer | Internal 🔒 | 🔒 | |
| L | _tokengeneration | Internal 🔒 | 🔒 | |
| L | _burn | Internal 🔒 | 🔒 | |
| L | _approve | Internal 🔒 | 🔒 | |
| L | _beforeTokenTransfer | Internal 🔒 | 🔒 | |
|||||
| **Address** | Library | |||
| L | sendValue | Internal 🔒 | 🔒 | |

```

CONTRACT ASSESMENT

```

||||| |
| **Ownable** | Implementation | Context | | |
|  | <Constructor> | Public ! |  | NO ! |
|  | owner | Public ! |  | NO ! |
|  | renounceOwnership | Public ! |  | onlyOwner |
|  | transferOwnership | Public ! |  | onlyOwner |
|  | _setOwner | Private  |  |  |
|||||
| **IFactory** | Interface | | |
|  | createPair | External ! |  | NO ! |
|||||
| **IRouter** | Interface | | |
|  | factory | External ! |  | NO ! |
|  | WETH | External ! |  | NO ! |
|  | addLiquidityETH | External ! |  | NO ! |
|  | swapExactTokensForETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens | External ! |  | NO ! |
|||||
| **VPW** | Implementation | ERC20, Ownable | | |
|  | <Constructor> | Public ! |  | ERC20 |
|  | approve | Public ! |  | NO ! |
|  | transferFrom | Public ! |  | NO ! |
|  | increaseAllowance | Public ! |  | NO ! |
|  | decreaseAllowance | Public ! |  | NO ! |
|  | transfer | Public ! |  | NO ! |
|  | _transfer | Internal  |  |  |
|  | handle_fees | Private  |  | mutexLock |
|  | swapTokensForETH | Private  |  |  |
|  | addLiquidity | Private  |  |  |
|  | updateLiquidityProvide | External ! |  | onlyOwner |
|  | updateLiquidityTreshhold | External ! |  | onlyOwner |
|  | enableTrading | External ! |  | onlyOwner |
|  | updatedeadline | External ! |  | onlyOwner |
|  | updateMarketingWallet | External ! |  | onlyOwner |
|  | updateDevWallet | External ! |  | onlyOwner |
|  | updateExemptFee | External ! |  | onlyOwner |
|  | bulkExemptFee | External ! |  | onlyOwner |
|  | rescueBNB | External ! |  | NO ! |
|  | rescueBEP20 | External ! |  | NO ! |
|  | <Receive Ether> | External ! |  | NO ! |

```




CONTRACT ASSESMENT

Legend

Symbol	Meaning
--------	---------

:-----:	-----
---------	-------

	Function can modify state
---	---------------------------

	Function is payable
---	---------------------

STATIC ANALYSIS

```
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#reentrancy-vulnerabilities-3

Context.msgData() (contracts/Token.sol#14-17) is never used and should be removed
ERC20.burn(address,uint256) (contracts/Token.sol#278-289) is never used and should be removed
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#dead-code

VPW.TotalBuyFee (contracts/Token.sol#430-431) is set pre-construction with a non-constant function or state variable:
- (buytaxes.marketing + buytaxes.nativeTax + buytaxes.dev + buytaxes.liquidity) / buytaxes.denominator
VPW.TotalSellFee (contracts/Token.sol#432-433) is set pre-construction with a non-constant function or state variable:
- (sellTaxes.marketing + sellTaxes.nativeTax + sellTaxes.dev + sellTaxes.liquidity) / sellTaxes.denominator
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#function-initializing-state

Pragma version^0.8.17 (contracts/Token.sol#7) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deploying with 0.6.12/0.7.6/0.8.16
solc-0.8.20 is not recommended for deployment
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#incorrect-versions-of-solidity

Low level call in Address.sendValue(address,uint256) (contracts/Token.sol#330-335):
- (success) = recipient.call{value: amount}() (contracts/Token.sol#333)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#low-level-calls

Variable ERC20._balances (contracts/Token.sol#56) is not in mixedCase
Variable ERC20._allowances (contracts/Token.sol#58) is not in mixedCase
Function IRouter.WETH() (contracts/Token.sol#379) is not in mixedCase
Function VPW.handle_fees(uint256,VPW.Taxes) (contracts/Token.sol#551-588) is not in mixedCase
Parameter VPW.updateLiquidityTreshhold(uint256).new_amount (contracts/Token.sol#617) is not in mixedCase
Parameter VPW.updatedeadline(uint256).deadline (contracts/Token.sol#628) is not in mixedCase
Parameter VPW.updateMarketingWallet(address).newWallet (contracts/Token.sol#633) is not in mixedCase
Parameter VPW.updateDevWallet(address).newWallet (contracts/Token.sol#637) is not in mixedCase
Parameter VPW.updateExemptFee(address,bool).address (contracts/Token.sol#641) is not in mixedCase
Variable VPW.genesis_block (contracts/Token.sol#411) is not in mixedCase
Constant VPW.deadWallet (contracts/Token.sol#417) is not in UPPER_CASE_WITH_UNDERSCORES
Variable VPW.TotalBuyFee (contracts/Token.sol#430-431) is not in mixedCase
Variable VPW.TotalSellFee (contracts/Token.sol#432-433) is not in mixedCase
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#conformance-to-solidity-naming-conventions

Redundant expression "this (contracts/Token.sol#15)" inContext (contracts/Token.sol#9-18)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#redundant-statements

VPW.launchtax (contracts/Token.sol#413) should be constant
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#state-variables-that-could-be-declared-constant

VPW.TotalBuyFee (contracts/Token.sol#430-431) should be immutable
VPW.TotalSellFee (contracts/Token.sol#432-433) should be immutable
VPW.pair (contracts/Token.sol#403) should be immutable
VPW.router (contracts/Token.sol#402) should be immutable
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#state-variables-that-could-be-declared-immutable
```

Result => A static analysis of contract's source code has been performed using slither,

No major issues were found in the output



FUNCTIONAL TESTING

1- Adding liquidity (passed):

<https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0x394541469f999a97fb96c473ba491f816505d9318bc7746d127b7f09fe719d58>

2- Buying when excluded from fees (0% tax) (passed):

<https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0x20f30746694fa8400dd6363107595299380905b28283ac6935aaf24717414270>

3- Selling when excluded from fees (0% tax) (passed):

<https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0xd1dd73342317657ef18704ea748ec673e316b0c13c38f90473cb83bfcbeaf5aa>

4- Transferring when excluded from fees (0% tax) (passed):

<https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0x85bd3ece6124eaf14a3744c53f8830dee8bf17c2c8f92f50fa1d41b9e64fe9ee>

5- Buying when not excluded from fees (1% tax) (passed):

<https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0x28d750cde7ed8c2f4925512c3173a15e73594a3c143ff6fd5ed763bbab2de499>

6- Selling when not excluded from fees (1% tax) (passed):

<https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0xa47e15f16212f5dedca2535f26ce533cd356fa80e745b17a60887e5f7a73f686>



FUNCTIONAL TESTING

7- Transferring when not excluded from fees (1% tax) (passed):

<https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0x805ab4627f41a31d024d1e275d218b3abe40cdabd0b80e2a97dcc85a912fc334>

8- Development and marketing BNB (Internal swap) (passed):

<https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0x7374161405ddee4de1a357efd392f982418e03161cee3f3a9edf9690ab236ea9>

FUNCTIONAL TESTING

Centralization – Trades must be enabled

Severity: **High**

function: EnableTrading

Status: Resolved (owned by safu developer)

Overview:

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Suggestion

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3. Transfer ownership to a trusted and valid 3rd party in order to guarantee enabling of the trades



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