



Smart Contract Audit

FOR

Zilla CEO

DATED : 08 Mar 23'



AUDIT SUMMARY

Project name – Zilla CEO

Date: 08 March, 2023

Scope of Audit- Audit Ace was consulted to conduct the smart contract audit of the solidity source codes.

Audit Status: **Passed**

Issues Found

Status	Critical	High	Medium	Low	Suggestion
Open	0	0	0	1	0
Acknowledged	0	0	0	0	0
Resolved	0	0	0	0	0



USED TOOLS

Tools:

1- Manual Review:

a line by line code review has been performed by audit ace team.

2- BSC Test Network:

all tests were done on BSC Test network, each test has its transaction has attached to it.

3- Slither : Static Analysis

Testnet Link: all tests were done using this contract, tests are done on BSC Testnet

<https://testnet.bscscan.com/address/0x0180de28E6e75a6C949B92640Cb4deFE5758Ee1C>



Token Information

Token Name : Zilla CEO

Token Symbol: Zilla CEO

Decimals: 9

Token Supply: 420,000,000,000,000,000

Token Address:

0xDcc4a0a67111E377D838D2e21975a940e0d1f229

Checksum:

3a7257b9a75f50d8180bd5da74744c64cf25a385

Owner:

0x239c867B63e81d818aF9606E2eB75E6D16DaB5e9
(at time of writing the audit)



TOKEN OVERVIEW

Fees:

Buy Fees: 10%

Sell Fees: 10%

Transfer Fees: 10%

Fees Privilege: None

Ownership : Owned

Minting: No mint function

Max Tx Amount/ Max Wallet Amount: No

Blacklist: No

Other Privileges: including and excluding from fees
and rewards

AUDIT METHODOLOGY

The auditing process will follow a routine as special considerations by Auditace:

- Review of the specifications, sources, and instructions provided to Auditace to make sure the contract logic meets the intentions of the client without exposing the user's funds to risk.
 - Manual review of the entire codebase by our experts, which is the process of reading source code line-by-line in an attempt to identify potential vulnerabilities.
 - Specification comparison is the process of checking whether the code does what the specifications, sources, and instructions provided to Auditace describe.
 - Test coverage analysis determines whether the test cases are covering the code and how much code is exercised when we run the test cases.
 - Symbolic execution is analysing a program to determine what inputs cause each part of a program to execute.
 - Reviewing the codebase to improve maintainability, security, and control based on the established industry and academic practices.
-

VULNERABILITY CHECKLIST

- | | |
|--|---|
|  Return values of low-level calls |  Gasless Send |
|  Private modifier |  Using block.timestamp |
|  Multiple Sends |  Re-entrancy |
|  Using Suicide |  Tautology or contradiction |
|  Gas Limitand Loops |  Timestamp Dependence |
|  Address hardcoded |  Revert/require functions |
|  Exception Disorder |  Use of tx.origin |
|  Using inline assembly |  Integer overflow/underflow |
|  Divide before multiply |  Dangerous strict equalities |
|  Missing Zero Address Validation |  Using SHA3 |
|  Compiler version not fixed |  Using throw |
-



CLASSIFICATION OF RISK

Severity

Description

◆ Critical

These vulnerabilities could be exploited easily and can lead to asset loss, data loss, asset, or data manipulation. They should be fixed right away.

◆ High-Risk

A vulnerability that affects the desired outcome when using a contract, or provides the opportunity to use a contract in an unintended way.

◆ Medium-Risk

A vulnerability that could affect the desired outcome of executing the contract in a specific scenario.

◆ Low-Risk

A vulnerability that does not have a significant impact on possible scenarios for the use of the contract and is probably subjective.

◆ Gas Optimization /Suggestion

A vulnerability that has an informational character but is not affecting any of the code.

Findings

Severity

Found

◆ Critical

0

◆ High-Risk

0

◆ Medium-Risk

0


◆ Low-Risk

1

◆ Gas Optimization / Suggestions

0

INHERITANCE TREE






POINTS TO NOTE

- **Owner is not able to change fees (10% for buy/sell/transfers static)**
 - **Owner is not able to set max buy/sell/transfer/hold amount**
 - **Owner is not able to blacklist an arbitrary wallet**
 - **Owner is not able to disable trades**
 - **Owner is not able to mint new tokens**
-





























TOKEN DISTRIBUTION

It should be noted that the owner currently holds 100% of the total supply. However, information about the distribution of these tokens is not available, and it is recommended that investors exercise caution when considering this aspect.




Contract	Type	Bases			
:-----: :-----: :-----: :-----: :-----:					
↳	**Function Name**	**Visibility**	**Mutability**	**Modifiers**	
IBEP20 Interface					
↳	totalSupply	External	!	NO!	
↳	balanceOf	External	!	NO!	
↳	transfer	External	!	⊗ NO!	
↳	allowance	External	!	NO!	
↳	approve	External	!	⊗ NO!	
↳	transferFrom	External	!	⊗ NO!	
Context Implementation					
↳	_msgSender	Internal	🔒		
↳	_msgData	Internal	🔒		
Ownable Implementation Context					
↳	<Constructor>	Public	!	⊗ NO!	
↳	owner	Public	!	NO!	
↳	renounceOwnership	Public	!	⊗ onlyOwner	
↳	_setOwner	Private	🔒	⊗	
IFactory Interface					
↳	createPair	External	!	⊗ NO!	
IRouter Interface					
↳	factory	External	!	NO!	
↳	WETH	External	!	NO!	
↳	addLiquidityETH	External	!	📄 NO!	
↳	swapExactTokensForETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens	External	!	⊗ NO!	
Address Library					
↳	sendValue	Internal	🔒	⊗	
ZillaCEO Implementation Context, IBEP20, Ownable					
↳	<Constructor>	Public	!	⊗ NO!	
↳	name	Public	!	NO!	
↳	symbol	Public	!	NO!	
↳	decimals	Public	!	NO!	
↳	totalSupply	Public	!	NO!	
↳	balanceOf	Public	!	NO!	
↳	allowance	Public	!	NO!	
↳	approve	Public	!	⊗ NO!	
↳	transferFrom	Public	!	⊗ NO!	

CONTRACT ASSESMENT

	increaseAllowance	Public !		NO!
	decreaseAllowance	Public !		NO!
	transfer	Public !		NO!
	isExcludedFromReward	Public !		NO!
	reflectionFromToken	Public !		NO!
	tokenFromReflection	Public !		NO!
	excludeFromReward	Public !		onlyOwner
	includeInReward	External !		onlyOwner
	excludeFromFee	Public !		onlyOwner
	includeInFee	Public !		onlyOwner
	isExcludedFromFee	Public !		NO!
	_reflectRfi	Private 		
	_takeMarketing	Private 		
	_getValues	Private 		
	_getTValues	Private 		
	_getRValues	Private 		
	_getRate	Private 		
	_getCurrentSupply	Private 		
	_approve	Private 		
	_transfer	Private 		
	_tokenTransfer	Private 		
	swapAndLiquify	Private 		lockTheSwap
	swapTokensForBNB	Private 		
	bulkExcludeFee	External !		onlyOwner
	<Receive Ether>	External !		NO!

| Symbol | Meaning |

|:-----:|-----|

|  | Function can modify state |

|  | Function is payable |



STATIC ANALYSIS

```
Reentrancy in ZillaCEO.transferFrom(address,address,uint256) (contracts/Token.sol#250-265):
  External calls:
    - _transfer(sender,recipient,amount) (contracts/Token.sol#255)
      - (success) = recipient.call{value: amount}() (contracts/Token.sol#123)
      - router.swapExactTokensForETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens(tokenAmount,0,path,address(this),block.timestamp) (contracts/Token.sol#535-541)
      - address(marketingWallet).sendValue(deltaBalance) (contracts/Token.sol#522)
  External calls sending eth:
    - _transfer(sender,recipient,amount) (contracts/Token.sol#255)
      - (success) = recipient.call{value: amount}() (contracts/Token.sol#123)
  Event emitted after the call(s):
    - Approval(owner,spender,amount) (contracts/Token.sol#460)
      - approve(sender,msgSender(),currentAllowance - amount) (contracts/Token.sol#262)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#reentrancy-vulnerabilities-3

ZillaCEO.includeInReward(address) (contracts/Token.sol#340-351) has costly operations inside a loop:
  - _excluded.pop() (contracts/Token.sol#347)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#costly-operations-inside-a-loop

Context.msgData() (contracts/Token.sol#45-48) is never used and should be removed
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#dead-code

ZillaCEO._rTotal (contracts/Token.sol#151) is set pre-construction with a non-constant function or state variable:
  - (MAX - (MAX % _tTotal))
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#function-initializing-state

Pragma version^0.8.17 (contracts/Token.sol#6) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deploying with 0.6.12/0.7.6/0.8.16
solc-0.8.18 is not recommended for deployment
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#incorrect-versions-of-solidity

Low level call in Address.sendValue(address,uint256) (contracts/Token.sol#117-128):
  - (success) = recipient.call{value: amount}() (contracts/Token.sol#123)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#low-level-calls

Function IRouter.WETH() (contracts/Token.sol#93) is not in mixedCase
Struct ZillaCEO.valuesFromGetValues (contracts/Token.sol#175-183) is not in CapWords
Constant ZillaCEO.decimals (contracts/Token.sol#147) is not in UPPER_CASE_WITH_UNDERSCORES
Constant ZillaCEO.name (contracts/Token.sol#158) is not in UPPER_CASE_WITH_UNDERSCORES
Constant ZillaCEO._symbol (contracts/Token.sol#159) is not in UPPER_CASE_WITH_UNDERSCORES
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#conformance-to-solidity-naming-conventions

Redundant expression "this (contracts/Token.sol#46)" inContext (contracts/Token.sol#40-49)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#redundant-statements

ZillaCEO._tTotal (contracts/Token.sol#150) should be constant
ZillaCEO.deadWallet (contracts/Token.sol#155) should be constant
ZillaCEO.marketingWallet (contracts/Token.sol#156) should be constant
ZillaCEO.swapTokensAtAmount (contracts/Token.sol#153) should be constant
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#state-variables-that-could-be-declared-constant

ZillaCEO.pair (contracts/Token.sol#145) should be immutable
ZillaCEO.router (contracts/Token.sol#144) should be immutable
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#state-variables-that-could-be-declared-immutable
```

Result => A static analysis of contract's source code has been performed using slither,

No major issues were found in the output



FUNCTIONAL TESTING

Router (PCS V2):

0xD99D1c33F9fC3444f8101754aBC46c52416550D1

All the functionalities have been tested, no issues were found

1- Adding liquidity (passed):

<https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0x7805ee918a5edbff5134b0f9b4f3f7c7246ede15f1be54790247a579314a3cc6>

2- Buying when excluded (0% tax) (passed):

<https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0xa00f47b996c79176b57dee224dd32ee94ceb3ee170e0f4c5a1b34531bc2be637>

3- Selling when excluded (0% tax) (passed):

<https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0xabc20a485c0db23322a61b35287e842de00778a0f477790da18a093a071fb044>

4- Transferring when excluded (0% tax) (passed):

<https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0xc97ca9648140b810829957f576edd16bcb336dd660f01596242f6b5cc6c2736e>



FUNCTIONAL TESTING

5- Buying when not excluded (10% tax) (passed):

<https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0x6ad4292c0edf55d28c98583db94fe17e63b6f03b265d30468fd94ac5ba203965>

6- Selling when not excluded (10% tax) (passed):

<https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0x20ab52dff1ca77f2e23855637079ad1b877565452b14b6eb427f55515d9aab06>

7- Transferring when when transfer without fee disabled (10% tax) (passed):

<https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0xf4186b205837493bde4e2f4f470622a81cb533008f47abf525897d8267e9db28>

8-Internal swap (passed):

marketing wallet received ETH

<https://testnet.bscscan.com/address/0xa419f416d3f9647f19ee59ae6540d94ff81b1d68#internaltx>

MANUAL TESTING

Low Risk Issue

Issue: **no transferOwnership Function**

Type : Logical

Function: ---

Line: 42-69

Severity: **Low**

Overview: the contract does not have a **transferOwnership** function, which means that the ownership of the contract cannot be transferred to another address. This can be a problem if the original owner loses control of their private keys or if they are no longer able to manage the contract for any reason

Recommendations

To address the issue identified in this audit, we recommend the following:

1. Implement a **TransferOwnership** Function The contract should be updated to include a transferOwnership function that allows the current owner to transfer ownership of the contract to another address. This function should include proper access control to prevent unauthorized transfers of ownership.



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