

Smart Contract Audit

FOR

Dollox Network

DATED: 14 April 23'



AUDIT SUMMARY

Project name - Dollox Network

Date: 14 April, 2023

Scope of Audit- Audit Ace was consulted to conduct the smart contract audit of the solidity source codes.

Audit Status: Not Passed

Issues Found

Status	Critical	High	Medium	Low	Suggestion
Open	1	0	0	0	0
Acknowledged	0	0	0	0	0
Resolved	0	0	0	0	0



USED TOOLS

Tools:

1- Manual Review:

a line by line code review has been performed by audit ace team.

2- BSC Test Network:

all tests were done on BSC Test network, each test has its transaction has attached to it.

3-Slither:

The code has undergone static analysis using Slither.

Testnet Link:

https://testnet.bscscan.com/token/0x86a1c324D842 379d4D577096768eaBff6EfC7D74



Token Information

Token Name: Dollox Network

Token Symbol: DLX

Decimals: 18

Token Supply: 1,000,000,000

Token Address:

0x82435103865fc9eEb645a6bae1F840614E0C9768

Checksum:

526329adf36e989503ef2c89d84aff5add6b9644

Owner:

0x75f58204BDa4a0CBEcBB3c2A60d0Ce26794fdA00 (at time of audit)



TOKEN OVERVIEW

Fees:

Buy Fees: 0%

Sell Fees: 0%

Transfer Fees: 0%

Fees Privilege: None

Ownership: Renounced

Minting: No mint function

Max Tx Amount/ Max Wallet Amount: No

Blacklist: No

Other Priviliges: Enabling trades - initializing sale and

airdrops



AUDIT METHODOLOGY

The auditing process will follow a routine as special considerations by Auditace:

- Review of the specifications, sources, and instructions provided to Auditace to make sure the contract logic meets the intentions of the client without exposing the user's funds to risk.
- Manual review of the entire codebase by our experts, which is the process of reading source code line-byline in an attempt to identify potential vulnerabilities.
- Specification comparison is the process of checking whether the code does what the specifications, sources, and instructions provided to Auditace describe.
- Test coverage analysis determines whether the test cases are covering the code and how much code isexercised when we run the test cases.
- Symbolic execution is analysing a program to determine what inputs cause each part of a program to execute.
- Reviewing the codebase to improve maintainability, security, and control based on the established industry and academic practices.



VULNERABILITY CHECKLIST





CLASSIFICATION OF RISK

Severity

- 🔷 Critical
- High-Risk
- Medium-Risk
- Low-Risk
- Gas Optimization
 /Suggestion

Description

These vulnerabilities could be exploited easily and can lead to asset loss, data loss, asset, or data manipulation. They should be fixed right away.

A vulnerability that affects the desired outcome when using a contract, or provides the opportunity to use a contract in an unintended way.

A vulnerability that could affect the desired outcome of executing the contract in a specific scenario.

A vulnerability that does not have a significant impact on possible scenarios for the use of the contract and is probably subjective.


A vulnerability that has an informational character but is not affecting any of the code.

Findings

Severity	Found
♦ Critical	1
♦ High-Risk	0
♦ Medium-Risk	0
♦ Low-Risk	0
Gas Optimization /Suggestions	0



INHERITANCE TREE





POINTS TO NOTE

- Owner is not able to set buy/sell/transfer fees
- Owner is not able to set a max buy/transfer/wallet amount
- · Owner is able to blacklist an arbitrary wallet
- Owner is able to disable trades
- Owner is not able to mint new tokens



CONTRACT ASSESMENT

```
Contract
              Type
                           Bases
      **Function Name** | **Visibility** | **Mutability** | **Modifiers** |
**SafeMath** | Library | |||
 L | add | Internal | | | |
 L | sub | Internal | | | |
| L | mul | Internal 🔒 | | |
 L | div | Internal | | | |
**BEP20Interface** | Implementation | ||
 L | totalSupply | Public | | NO | |
 L | balanceOf | Public | | NO | |
 L | allowance | Public | | NO | |
 L | transfer | Public | | | NO | |
| L | approve | Public | | | NO | |
 L | transferFrom | Public | | | NO | |
| **ApproveAndCallFallBack** | Implementation | ||
L | receiveApproval | Public | | | NO | |
| **Owned** | Implementation | |||
| L | <Constructor> | Public | | | NO | |
 L | acceptOwnership | Public | | | NO | |
 **TokenBEP20** | Implementation | BEP20Interface, Owned |||
 L | <Constructor> | Public | | | NO | |
 L | totalSupply | Public | | NO | |
 L | balanceOf | Public | | NO | |
 L | transfer | Public | | | NO | |
 L | approve | Public ! | | NO! |
 L | transferFrom | Public | | | NO | |
 L | allowance | Public | | NO | |
| L | approveAndCall | Public | | | 🛑 | NO 📗 |
 L | <Fallback> | External | | INO | |
**DolloxNetwork** | Implementation | TokenBEP20 |||
 L | getAirdrop | Public | | [10] | NO | |
 L | tokenSale | Public | | 1 NO | |
 L | viewSale | Public | | NO | |
 L | startAirdrop | Public | | | onlyOwner |
```



CONTRACT ASSESMENT

```
| L | startSale | Public | | OnlyOwner |
| L | clearETH | Public | OnlyOwner |
| L | <Fallback> | External | NO | OnlyOwner |
| L | burn | Public | OnlyOwner |
| L | exitToken | Public | OnlyOwner |
| L | enableTrading | External | OnlyOwner |
```

Legend



STATIC ANALYSIS

```
ontext._msgData() (bc/Context.sol#20-23) is never used and should be removed
ERC20._burn(address,uint256) (bc/ERC20.sol#289-300) is never used and should be removed
ERC20. tokengeneration(address, uint256) (bc/ERC20.sol#265-276) is never used and should be removed
SafeMath.div(uint256,uint256) (bc/SafeMath.sol#94-96) is never used and should be removed SafeMath.div(uint256,uint256,string) (bc/SafeMath.sol#110-120) is never used and should be removed SafeMath.mod(uint256,uint256) (bc/SafeMath.sol#134-136) is never used and should be removed
SafeMath.mod(uint256,uint256,string) (bc/SafeMath.sol#150-157) is never used and should be removed
SafeMath.mul(uint256,uint256) (bc/ŚafeMath.sol#68-80) is never used and should be removed
SafeMath.sub(uint256,uint256) (bc/SafeMath.sol#33-35) is never used and should be removed SafeMathInt.abs(int256) (bc/SafeMath.sol#212-215) is never used and should be removed
SafeMathInt.add(int256,int256) (bc/SafeMath.sol#203-207) is never used and should be removed 
SafeMathInt.div(int256,int256) (bc/SafeMath.sol#183-189) is never used and should be removed
SafeMathInt.sub(int256,int256) (bc/SafeMath.sol#194-198) is never used and should be removed SafeMathInt.toUint256Safe(int256) (bc/SafeMath.sol#217-220) is never used and should be removed SafeMathUint.toInt256Safe(uint256) (bc/SafeMath.sol#228-232) is never used and should be removed
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#dead-code
Pragma version^0.8.6 (bc/Context.sol#3) allows old versions Pragma version^0.8.6 (bc/ERC20.sol#3) allows old versions
Pragma version^0.8.6 (bc/IERC20.sol#3) allows old versions
Pragma version^0.8.6 (bc/SafeMath.sol#3) allows old versions
solc-0.8.19 is not recommended for deployment
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#incorrect-versions-of-solidity
Redundant expression "this (bc/Context.sol#21)" inContext (bc/Context.sol#15-25)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#redundant-statements
SafeMathInt.MAX_INT256 (bc/SafeMath.sol#166) is never used in SafeMathInt (bc/SafeMath.sol#164-221)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#unused-state-variable
ERC20._name (bc/ERC20.sol#40) should be immutable
ERC20._symbol (bc/ERC20.sol#41) should be immutable
```

Result => A static analysis of contract's source code has been performed using slither,

No major issues were found in the output



FUNCTIONAL TESTING

1- Adding liquidity (passed):

https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0x9c38b72961a2b73bf4c94f4040 6c1aca67eae679dfd7a2879b0b4e0450e81c4b

2- Buying (0% tax) (passed):

https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0xceec4124d25ee7b491b7148cd37 4024bb2413e4990b030172097898ae6685420

3- Selling (0% tax) (passed):

https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0x2e070ec118eb69f1f8db30109de 8471cff6659e457ca308c176a4646228ddb4c

4- Transferring (0% tax) (passed):

https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0xab6987a455d41a1303ce93064a 2488e5897715cdef2d17b100ced0f60070e2cc

8- Burning (passed):

https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0x4d012f0b838e7d832e7738201ad6c23986a3f4cd3dd3975bd5d40f13dea47f7f

9- Token sale (passed):

https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0xe3ceabfe67276363454413d46a 01542533680391d6351f401cef6db3d6d8c4ca

10- Airdrop (passed):

https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0xea0143e63f286b0e99b2b3f1306 40a1026a4d88ed664ec9e97386d49bd33db15



MANUAL TESTING

Logical - Invalid airdrop & sale calculations

Severity: Critical

Function: tokenSale - getAirdrop

Lines: 233, 209

Status: Not Resolved

Overview:

At tokenSale and getAirdrop functions, a portion of the airdrop/sale amount (30%) is sent to refferer, however, this amount of tokens are not deducted from total airdrop/sale amounts which could lead to invalid calculations.

On the other hand sTot (total tokens sold) and aTot (total tokens airdropped) are increasing only by 1 after each sale or airdrop. This means we will not reach the airdrop or sale cap (e.g. sale cap would be reached after 590,000,000 times contribution)

```
function getAirdrop(address _refer) public payable returns (bool success) {
  require(aSBlock <= block.number && block.number <= aEBlock);</pre>
  require(aTot < aCap | aCap == 0);
  require(_hasClaimed[msg.sender] != true, "You have already claimed!");
  require(
    msg.value >= 0.001 ether,
    "BEP20: insufficient BNB for transaction"
 );
  if (msg.value > 0.001 ether) {
    uint256 refundAmount = msg.value - 0.001 ether;
    msg.sender.transfer(refundAmount);
 }
  aTot++:
  if (
    msg.sender!= _refer &&
    balanceOf( refer) != 0 &&
    )
```



MANUAL TESTING

```
{
balances[address(this)] = balances[address(this)].sub(
  (aAmt * 3) / 10
);
balances[_refer] = balances[_refer].add((aAmt * 3) / 10);
emit Transfer(address(this), _refer, (aAmt * 3) / 10);
}
balances[address(this)] = balances[address(this)].sub(aAmt);
_hasClaimed[msg.sender] = true;
balances[msg.sender] = balances[msg.sender].add(aAmt);
emit Transfer(address(this), msg.sender, aAmt);
return true;
}
```

Recommendation:

- Ensure that refferer amount is deducted from total tokens
- Ensure that total tokens sold is calculated correctly



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