



# Smart Contract Audit

FOR  
AI EXCHANGE TOKEN

DATED : 22 Feb, 2024



# AUDIT SUMMARY

**Project name – AI EXCHANGE TOKEN**

**Date:** 22 Feb, 2024

**Scope of Audit-** Audit Ace was consulted to conduct the smart contract audit of the solidity source codes.

**Audit Status:** **Passed**

## Issues Found

Status	Critical	High	Medium	Low	Suggestion
Open	0	0	1	0	0
Acknowledged	0	0	0	0	0
Resolved	0	0	0	0	0

# USED TOOLS

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## Tools:

### 1- Manual Review:

A line by line code review has been performed by audit ace team.

**2- BSC Test Network:** All tests were conducted on the BSC Test network, and each test has a corresponding transaction attached to it. These tests can be found in the "Functional Tests" section of the report.

### 3- Slither :

The code has undergone static analysis using Slither.

### Testnet version:

The tests were performed using the contract deployed on the BSC Testnet, which can be found at the following address:

<https://testnet.bscscan.com/address/0xf47baa67de5204ca64b8b5dd4f4daf4fa87b0367#code>

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# Token Information

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**Token Name :** AI EXCHANGE TOKEN

**Token Symbol:** AIX

**Decimals:** 18

**Token Supply:** 10000000000

**Network:** Binance smart chain

**Token Type:** BEP-20

**Token Address:**

0x4a99C2b605Fc87acEE2dc3f61587c176F47b199F

**Checksum:**

A2032c616934aeb47e6039f76b20d322

**Owner:**

0x854a5919db5B5FDD60B748C2B23f9A88841D4c9D  
(at time of writing the audit)

**Deployer:**

0x854a5919db5B5FDD60B748C2B23f9A88841D4c9D

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# TOKEN OVERVIEW

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**Fees:**

**Buy Tax: 25%**

**Sell Tax: 25%**

**Transfer Fee: 25%**

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**Fees Privilege: Owner**

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**Ownership: Owned**

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**Minting: None**

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**Max Tx Amount/ Max Wallet Amount: No**

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**Blacklist: No**

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# AUDIT METHODOLOGY

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The auditing process will follow a routine as special considerations by Auditace:

- Review of the specifications, sources, and instructions provided to Auditace to make sure the contract logic meets the intentions of the client without exposing the user's funds to risk.
  - Manual review of the entire codebase by our experts, which is the process of reading source code line-by-line in an attempt to identify potential vulnerabilities.
  - Specification comparison is the process of checking whether the code does what the specifications, sources, and instructions provided to Auditace describe.
  - Test coverage analysis determines whether the test cases are covering the code and how much code is exercised when we run the test cases.
  - Symbolic execution is analysing a program to determine what inputs cause each part of a program to execute.
  - Reviewing the codebase to improve maintainability, security, and control based on the established industry and academic practices.
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
# VULNERABILITY CHECKLIST

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- |                                    |                               |
|------------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| ✓ Return values of low-level calls | ✓ <b>Gasless Send</b>         |
| ✓ Private modifier                 | ✓ Using block.timestamp       |
| ✓ Multiple Sends                   | ✓ Re-entrancy                 |
| ✓ Using Suicide                    | ✓ Tautology or contradiction  |
| ✓ Gas Limitand Loops               | ✓ Timestamp Dependence        |
| ✓ Address hardcoded                | ✓ Revert/require functions    |
| ✓ Exception Disorder               | ✓ Use of tx.origin            |
| ✓ Using inline assembly            | ✓ Integer overflow/underflow  |
| ✓ Divide before multiply           | ✓ Dangerous strict equalities |
| ✓ Missing Zero Address Validation  | ✓ Using SHA3                  |
| ✓ Compiler version not fixed       | ✓ Using throw                 |
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# INHERITANCE TREE

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# STATIC ANALYSIS

A static analysis of the code was performed using Slither.  
No issues were found.

```
INFO:Detectors:
AI_EXCHANGE_TOKEN._transfer(address,address,uint256) (AI_EXCHANGE_TOKEN.sol#163-234) uses a Boolean constant improperly:
- false || _developmentPending > 0 || _marketingPending > 0 (AI_EXCHANGE_TOKEN.sol#202)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#misuse-of-a-boolean-constant
INFO:Detectors:
AI_EXCHANGE_TOKEN._transfer(address,address,uint256) (AI_EXCHANGE_TOKEN.sol#163-234) performs a multiplication on the result of a division:
- fees = amount * totalFees[txType] / 10000 (AI_EXCHANGE_TOKEN.sol#182)
- _developmentPending += fees * developmentFees[txType] / totalFees[txType] (AI_EXCHANGE_TOKEN.sol#185)
AI_EXCHANGE_TOKEN._transfer(address,address,uint256) (AI_EXCHANGE_TOKEN.sol#163-234) performs a multiplication on the result of a division:
- fees = amount * totalFees[txType] / 10000 (AI_EXCHANGE_TOKEN.sol#182)
- _marketingPending += fees * marketingFees[txType] / totalFees[txType] (AI_EXCHANGE_TOKEN.sol#187)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#divide-before-multiply
INFO:Detectors:
Ownable2Step.transferOwnership(address).newOwner (Ownable2Step.sol#35) lacks a zero-check on :
- _pendingOwner = newOwner (Ownable2Step.sol#36)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#missing-zero-address-validation
INFO:Detectors:
Reentrancy in AI_EXCHANGE_TOKEN._updateRouterV2(address) (AI_EXCHANGE_TOKEN.sol#236-243):
  External calls:
  - pairV2 = IUniswapV2Factory(routerV2.factory()).createPair(address(this),routerV2.WETH()) (AI_EXCHANGE_TOKEN.sol#238)
  State variables written after the call(s):
  - _setAMMPair(pairV2,true) (AI_EXCHANGE_TOKEN.sol#240)
  - AMMPairs[pair] = isPair (AI_EXCHANGE_TOKEN.sol#252)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#reentrancy-vulnerabilities-2
INFO:Detectors:
Reentrancy in AI_EXCHANGE_TOKEN._transfer(address,address,uint256) (AI_EXCHANGE_TOKEN.sol#163-234):
  External calls:
  - _swapTokensForCoin(token2Swap) (AI_EXCHANGE_TOKEN.sol#206)
  - routerV2.swapExactTokensForETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens(tokenAmount,0,path,address(this),block.timestamp) (AI_EXCHANGE_TOKEN.sol#99)
  External calls sending eth:
  - success = address(developmentAddress).send(developmentPortion) (AI_EXCHANGE_TOKEN.sol#211)
  Event emitted after the call(s):
  - developmentFeeSent(developmentAddress,developmentPortion) (AI_EXCHANGE_TOKEN.sol#213)
Reentrancy in AI_EXCHANGE_TOKEN._transfer(address,address,uint256) (AI_EXCHANGE_TOKEN.sol#163-234):
  External calls:
  - _swapTokensForCoin(token2Swap) (AI_EXCHANGE_TOKEN.sol#206)
  - routerV2.swapExactTokensForETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens(tokenAmount,0,path,address(this),block.timestamp) (AI_EXCHANGE_TOKEN.sol#99)
  External calls sending eth:
  - success = address(developmentAddress).send(developmentPortion) (AI_EXCHANGE_TOKEN.sol#211)
  - success = address(marketingAddress).send(marketingPortion) (AI_EXCHANGE_TOKEN.sol#220)
  Event emitted after the call(s):
  - Transfer(from,to,amount) (ERC20.sol#237)
  - super._transfer(from,to,amount) (AI_EXCHANGE_TOKEN.sol#232)
  - marketingFeeSent(marketingAddress,marketingPortion) (AI_EXCHANGE_TOKEN.sol#222)
Reentrancy in AI_EXCHANGE_TOKEN._updateRouterV2(address) (AI_EXCHANGE_TOKEN.sol#236-243):
  External calls:
  - pairV2 = IUniswapV2Factory(routerV2.factory()).createPair(address(this),routerV2.WETH()) (AI_EXCHANGE_TOKEN.sol#238)
  Event emitted after the call(s):
  - AMMPairsUpdated(pair,isPair) (AI_EXCHANGE_TOKEN.sol#257)
```





# FUNCTIONAL TESTING

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## 1- Approve (passed):

<https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0xdeeb45fc729c0923c3d806cba25c38f4f52cb095d9f736109dae159de4aeacfc>

## 2- Development Address Setup (passed):

<https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0xa02dd2a8f6f32831916dee5868df9d60d7f5e5c942572ce9d9d29d191492362a>

## 3- Development Fees Setup (passed):

<https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0xc714166f743adf4928509854bd97215c22483acf1f2d7f097ef67735882b60bd>

## 4- Marketing Address Setup (passed):

<https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0x5b23565c8440f85846f9e4d514cf410122b1ce58f6f4f245013efbb0f3ca3c08>

## 5- Marketing Fees Setup (passed):

<https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0xa3581324e9a2046dd68b0eb4ee5ec65b1ace5d334784085fe70ac2d971eaf2a2>

## 6- Transfer (passed):

<https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0x9cdc8a7152ce079be035f51a8a7aadb78f4a719fc212f1ca25a72937b392406>

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# POINTS TO NOTE

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- The owner can transfer ownership.
  - The owner can renounce ownership.
  - The owner can set developmentAddress/marketingAddress.
  - The owner can set buy/sell/transfer fees to not more than 25%.
  - The owner can exclude address from fees.
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# CLASSIFICATION OF RISK

## Severity

## Description

◆ Critical	These vulnerabilities could be exploited easily and can lead to asset loss, data loss, asset, or data manipulation. They should be fixed right away.
◆ High-Risk	A vulnerability that affects the desired outcome when using a contract, or provides the opportunity to use a contract in an unintended way.
◆ Medium-Risk	A vulnerability that could affect the desired outcome of executing the contract in a specific scenario.
◆ Low-Risk	A vulnerability that does not have a significant impact on possible scenarios for the use of the contract and is probably subjective.
◆ Gas Optimization /Suggestion	A vulnerability that has an informational character but is not affecting any of the code.

## Findings

### Severity

### Found

◆ Critical	0
◆ High-Risk	0
◆ Medium-Risk	1
◆ Low-Risk	0
◆ Gas Optimization / Suggestions	0

# MANUAL TESTING

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## Centralization – Missing Require Check

Severity: Medium

Function:

developmentAddressSetup/marketingAddressSetup

Status: Open

### Overview:

The owner can set any arbitrary address excluding zero address as this is not recommended because if the owner will set the address to the contract address, then the Eth will not be sent to that address and the transaction will fail and this will lead to a potential honeypot in the contract.

```
function developmentAddressSetup(address _newAddress) public onlyOwner {
    require(_newAddress != address(0), "TaxesDefaultRouterWallet: Wallet tax
recipient cannot be a 0x0 address");

    developmentAddress = _newAddress;
    excludeFromFees(_newAddress, true);

    emit developmentAddressUpdated(_newAddress);
}
function marketingAddressSetup(address _newAddress) public onlyOwner {
    require(_newAddress != address(0), "TaxesDefaultRouterWallet: Wallet tax
recipient cannot be a 0x0 address");

    marketingAddress = _newAddress;
    excludeFromFees(_newAddress, true);

    emit marketingAddressUpdated(_newAddress);
}
```

**Suggestion:** It is recommended that the address should not be able to set as a contract address.

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# DISCLAIMER

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# ABOUT AUDITACE

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We specialize in providing thorough and reliable audits for Web3 projects. With a team of experienced professionals, we use cutting-edge technology and rigorous methodologies to evaluate the security and integrity of blockchain systems. We are committed to helping our clients ensure the safety and transparency of their digital assets and transactions.



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