



Smart Contract Audit

FOR
MARSU

DATED : 29 MAY 23'



AUDIT SUMMARY

Project name – MARSU

Date: 29 May, 2023

Scope of Audit- Audit Ace was consulted to conduct the smart contract audit of the solidity source codes.

Audit Status: **Passed**

Issues Found

Status	Critical	High	Medium	Low	Suggestion
Open	0	0	0	0	0
Acknowledged	0	0	0	0	0
Resolved	0	1	0	0	0

USED TOOLS

Tools:

1. Manual Review: The code has undergone a line-by-line review by the **Ace** team.

2. ETH Test Network: All tests were conducted on the ETH Test network, and each test has a corresponding transaction attached to it. These tests can be found in the "Functional Tests" section of the report.

3. Slither: The code has undergone static analysis using Slither.

Testnet version:

The tests were performed using the contract deployed on the BSC Testnet, which can be found at the following address:

<https://testnet.bscscan.com/token/0x98ED8A59CA121DA7AB01633B963c3b8C22Ba1308>



Token Information

Name : Marsupilami Inu

Symbol : MARSU

Decimals: 9

Network: Binance smart chain

Token Type: BEP20

Token Address:

0x8FEA3bf0bcdD542EC884A72319cE420D04eE2040

Owner:

0x7320764F01B443Ed7Db15161E02650115AF5bb42
(at time of writing the audit)

Deployer: 0x7320764F01B443Ed7Db15161E02650115
AF5bb42



Token Information

Fees:

Buy Fees: 8%

Sell Fees: 8%

Transfer Fees: 8%

Fees Privilege: static fees

Ownership :

0x7320764F01B443Ed7Db15161E02650115AF5bb42

Minting: None

Max Tx Amount/ Max Wallet Amount: No

Blacklist: No

Other Privileges: - Initial distribution of the tokens

- excluding from fees

- including in fees

- enabling trades

- changing internal swap settings



AUDIT METHODOLOGY

The auditing process will follow a routine as special considerations by Auditace:

- Review of the specifications, sources, and instructions provided to Auditace to make sure the contract logic meets the intentions of the client without exposing the user's funds to risk.
 - Manual review of the entire codebase by our experts, which is the process of reading source code line-by-line in an attempt to identify potential vulnerabilities.
 - Specification comparison is the process of checking whether the code does what the specifications, sources, and instructions provided to Auditace describe.
 - Test coverage analysis determines whether the test cases are covering the code and how much code is exercised when we run the test cases.
 - Symbolic execution is analysing a program to determine what inputs cause each part of a program to execute.
 - Reviewing the codebase to improve maintainability, security, and control based on the established industry and academic practices.
-

VULNERABILITY CHECKLIST

- | | |
|------------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| ✓ Return values of low-level calls | ✓ Gasless Send |
| ✓ Private modifier | ✓ Using block.timestamp |
| ✓ Multiple Sends | ✓ Re-entrancy |
| ✓ Using Suicide | ✓ Tautology or contradiction |
| ✓ Gas Limitand Loops | ✓ Timestamp Dependence |
| ✓ Address hardcoded | ✓ Revert/require functions |
| ✓ Exception Disorder | ✓ Use of tx.origin |
| ✓ Using inline assembly | ✓ Integer overflow/underflow |
| ✓ Divide before multiply | ✓ Dangerous strict equalities |
| ✓ Missing Zero Address Validation | ✓ Using SHA3 |
| ✓ Compiler version not fixed | ✓ Using throw |
-

CLASSIFICATION OF RISK

Severity

Description

◆ Critical	These vulnerabilities could be exploited easily and can lead to asset loss, data loss, asset, or data manipulation. They should be fixed right away.
◆ High-Risk	A vulnerability that affects the desired outcome when using a contract, or provides the opportunity to use a contract in an unintended way.
◆ Medium-Risk	A vulnerability that could affect the desired outcome of executing the contract in a specific scenario.
◆ Low-Risk	A vulnerability that does not have a significant impact on possible scenarios for the use of the contract and is probably subjective.
◆ Gas Optimization / Suggestion	A vulnerability that has an informational character but is not affecting any of the code.


Findings

Severity

Found

◆ Critical	0
◆ High-Risk	1
◆ Medium-Risk	0
◆ Low-Risk	0
◆ Gas Optimization / Suggestions	0

INHERITANCE TREE





POINTS TO NOTE

- Fees are 0 (static)
 - Owner is not able to blacklist an arbitrary address.
 - Owner is not able to disable trades
 - Owner is not able to limit buy/sell/transfer/wallet amounts
 - Owner is not able to mint new tokens
-



CONTRACT ASSESMENT

Contract	Type	Bases			
└	**Function Name**	**Visibility**	**Mutability**	**Modifiers**	
IBEP20 Interface					
└	totalSupply	External	!	NO	!
└	balanceOf	External	!	NO	!
└	transfer	External	!	NO	!
└	allowance	External	!	NO	!
└	approve	External	!	NO	!
└	transferFrom	External	!	NO	!
Context Implementation					
└	_msgSender	Internal	🔒		
└	_msgData	Internal	🔒		
Ownable Implementation Context					
└	<Constructor>	Public	!	NO	!
└	owner	Public	!	NO	!
└	renounceOwnership	Public	!	onlyOwner	
└	transferOwnership	Public	!	onlyOwner	
└	_setOwner	Private	🔒		
IFactory Interface					
└	createPair	External	!	NO	!
IRouter Interface					
└	factory	External	!	NO	!
└	WETH	External	!	NO	!
└	addLiquidityETH	External	!	NO	!
└	swapExactTokensForETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens	External	!	NO	!
Address Library					
└	sendValue	Internal	🔒		
MARSU Implementation Context, IBEP20, Ownable					
└	<Constructor>	Public	!	NO	!
└	name	Public	!	NO	!
└	symbol	Public	!	NO	!
└	decimals	Public	!	NO	!
└	totalSupply	Public	!	NO	!
└	balanceOf	Public	!	NO	!
└	allowance	Public	!	NO	!
└	approve	Public	!	NO	!

CONTRACT ASSESMENT

		transferFrom		Public	!		●		NO	!	
		increaseAllowance		Public	!		●		NO	!	
		decreaseAllowance		Public	!		●		NO	!	
		transfer		Public	!		●		NO	!	
		isExcludedFromReward		Public	!				NO	!	
		reflectionFromToken		Public	!				NO	!	
		EnableTrading		External	!		●		onlyOwner		
		updatedecline		External	!		●		onlyOwner		
		tokenFromReflection		Public	!				NO	!	
		excludeFromReward		Public	!		●		onlyOwner		
		includeInReward		External	!		●		onlyOwner		
		excludeFromFee		Public	!		●		onlyOwner		
		includeInFee		Public	!		●		onlyOwner		
		isExcludedFromFee		Public	!				NO	!	
		_reflectRfi		Private	🔒		●				
		_takeLiquidity		Private	🔒		●				
		_takeMarketing		Private	🔒		●				
		_takeOps		Private	🔒		●				
		_takeDev		Private	🔒		●				
		_getValues		Private	🔒						
		_getTValues		Private	🔒						
		_getRValues1		Private	🔒						
		_getRValues2		Private	🔒						
		_getRate		Private	🔒						
		_getCurrentSupply		Private	🔒						
		_approve		Private	🔒		●				
		_transfer		Private	🔒		●				
		_tokenTransfer		Private	🔒		●				
		swapAndLiquify		Private	🔒		●		lockTheSwap		
		addLiquidity		Private	🔒		●				
		swapTokensForBNB		Private	🔒		●				
		bulkExcludeFromFee		External	!		●		onlyOwner		
		bulkIncludeInFee		External	!		●		onlyOwner		
		updateMarketingWallet		External	!		●		onlyOwner		
		updateDevWallet		External	!		●		onlyOwner		
		updateOpsWallet		External	!		●		onlyOwner		
		updateSwapTokensAtAmount		External	!		●		onlyOwner		
		updateSwapEnabled		External	!		●		onlyOwner		
		rescueBNB		External	!		●		onlyOwner		
		rescueAnyBEP20Tokens		Public	!		●		onlyOwner		
		<Receive Ether>		External	!		🟢		NO	!	



CONTRACT ASSESMENT

Legend

Symbol	Meaning
:	Function can modify state
\$	Function is payable



STATIC ANALYSIS

```
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#reentrancy-vulnerabilities-3
MARSU.includeInReward(address) (contracts/Token.sol#404-415) has costly operations inside a loop:
- _excluded.pop() (contracts/Token.sol#411)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#costly-operations-inside-a-loop
Context._msgData() (contracts/Token.sol#46-49) is never used and should be removed
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#dead-code
MARSU._rTotal (contracts/Token.sol#165) is set pre-construction with a non-constant function or state variable:
- (MAX - (MAX % _tTotal))
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#function-initializing-state
Pragma version^0.8.17 (contracts/Token.sol#7) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deploying with 0.6.12/0.7.6/0.8.16
solc-0.8.20 is not recommended for deployment
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#incorrect-versions-of-solidity
Low level call in Address.sendValue(address,uint256) (contracts/Token.sol#126-137):
- (success) = recipient.call{value: amount}() (contracts/Token.sol#132)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#low-level-calls
Function IRouter.WETH() (contracts/Token.sol#102) is not in mixedCase
Struct MARSU.valuesFromGetValues (contracts/Token.sol#202-216) is not in CapWords
Function MARSU.EnableTrading() (contracts/Token.sol#370-375) is not in mixedCase
Parameter MARSU.updatedDeadline(uint256)._deadline (contracts/Token.sol#377) is not in mixedCase
Parameter MARSU.updateSwapEnabled(bool)._enabled (contracts/Token.sol#796) is not in mixedCase
Parameter MARSU.rescueAnyBEP20Tokens(address,address,uint256)._tokenAddr (contracts/Token.sol#808) is not in mixedCase
Parameter MARSU.rescueAnyBEP20Tokens(address,address,uint256)._to (contracts/Token.sol#809) is not in mixedCase
Parameter MARSU.rescueAnyBEP20Tokens(address,address,uint256)._amount (contracts/Token.sol#810) is not in mixedCase
Constant MARSU._decimals (contracts/Token.sol#161) is not in UPPER_CASE_WITH_UNDERSCORES
Variable MARSU.genesis_block (contracts/Token.sol#169) is not in mixedCase
Constant MARSU._name (contracts/Token.sol#177) is not in UPPER_CASE_WITH_UNDERSCORES
Constant MARSU._symbol (contracts/Token.sol#178) is not in UPPER_CASE_WITH_UNDERSCORES
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#conformance-to-solidity-naming-conventions
Redundant expression "this (contracts/Token.sol#47)" inContext (contracts/Token.sol#41-50)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#redundant-statements
MARSU.updateSwapTokensAtAmount(uint256) (contracts/Token.sol#788-794) uses literals with too many digits:
- require(bool,string)(amount <= 42069000000000, Cannot set swap threshold amount higher than 1% of tokens) (contracts/Token.sol#789-792)
MARSU.slitherConstructorVariables() (contracts/Token.sol#140-820) uses literals with too many digits:
- _tTotal = 4206900000000000 * 10 ** _decimals (contracts/Token.sol#164)
MARSU.slitherConstructorVariables() (contracts/Token.sol#140-820) uses literals with too many digits:
- swapTokensAtAmount = 42069000000000 * 10 ** 9 (contracts/Token.sol#167)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#too-many-digits
MARSU._lastSell (contracts/Token.sol#156) is never used in MARSU (contracts/Token.sol#140-820)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#unused-state-variable
MARSU._tTotal (contracts/Token.sol#164) should be constant
MARSU._deadWallet (contracts/Token.sol#172) should be constant
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#state-variables-that-could-be-declared-constant
MARSU._pair (contracts/Token.sol#159) should be immutable
MARSU._router (contracts/Token.sol#158) should be immutable
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#state-variables-that-could-be-declared-immutable
```

Static Analysis

an static analysis of the code were performed using
slither. No issues were found



FUNCTIONAL TESTING

Router (PCS V2):

0xD99D1c33F9fC3444f8101754aBC46c52416550D1

1- Adding liquidity (passed):

<https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0xdfd4f148cc87e8f446915375c11cf3ff71a071cbbfd4f48b61a6bab80d8133a5>

2- Buying (0% tax) (passed):

<https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0x16ccb38c0b6a2fd0e7a5f4a9e4c52159ccd96ea8b773d562d765525ff28520ac>

3- Selling (0% tax) (passed):

<https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0x09948eed5f1f8cced7e2e508a1d9c7e4c808e10b9eef5f24a4fa7e07dfefb29d5>

4- Transferring 0% tax) (passed):

<https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0x7f9b6cb28089e717eddf834c1515c000c410440054f2ef9ae94d04dbc62f9c3f>

5- Buying when not excluded from fees (0-10% tax) (passed):

<https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0xfc30a4a5318d2b8bc425d22a7c7b06d1b9340bef81dfbb80089cbaf98bd9d6ae>

6- Selling when not excluded from fees (0-10% tax) (passed):

<https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0xc92f551a22aa9387aabe5d65f1c04f29d76f3d13ddb661fa7d7c05bcc6957d44>

7- Transferring when not excluded from fees (0-10% tax) (passed):

<https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0x9b5f0f3778e9c4e4518ce099cdcbbbfa0da23915a20394128f037b316087cec1>



FUNCTIONAL TESTING

8- Internal swap & rewards distribution (passed):

- BNB sent to marketing wallet
 - A portion of tokens burnt
 - A portion of tokens were added to liquidity
 - A portion of tokens swapped to BUSD and sent to dividend tracker
 - Dividend tracker distributed reward tokens (BUSD)
-

FUNCTIONAL TESTING

Centralization – Trades must be enabled

Severity: **High**

function: EnableTrading

Status: **Resolved (owned by safu dev)**

Overview:

The smart contract owner must enable trades for holders. If trading remain disabled, no one would be able to buy/sell/transfer tokens.

```
function EnableTrading() external onlyOwner {
    require(!tradingEnabled, "Cannot re-enable trading");
    tradingEnabled = true;
    swapEnabled = true;
    genesis_block = block.number;
}
```

Suggestion

To mitigate this centralization issue, we propose the following options:

1. Renounce Ownership: Consider relinquishing control of the smart contract by renouncing ownership. This would remove the ability for a single entity to manipulate the router, reducing centralization risks.
2. Multi-signature Wallet: Transfer ownership to a multi-signature wallet. This would require multiple approvals for any changes to the mainRouter, adding an additional layer of security and reducing the centralization risk.
3. Transfer ownership to a trusted and valid 3rd party in order to guarantee enabling of the trades



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