

Intro to Binary Exploitation

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Registers


- ▶ Stores integer data.
- ▶ Only 16 Registers.
- ▶ Many have special purposes.
- ▶ Not much room for program variables, data structures etc.

Register	Size
RAX	8 bytes
RBX	8 bytes
RCX	8 bytes
RDX	8 bytes
RBP	8 bytes
RSI	8 bytes
RDI	8 bytes
RSP	8 bytes
R8	8 bytes
R9	8 bytes
R10	8 bytes
R11	8 bytes
R12	8 bytes
R13	8 bytes
R14	8 bytes
R15	8 bytes

CPU


Memory

- ▶ Memory can be thought of as a big byte array.
- ▶ Pointers are just indexes into this array.
- ▶ Pointers are commonly referred to as "addresses".



Memory

- ▶ Memory stores 99% of variables.
- ▶ The actual machine code is stored in memory.
- ▶ The register RIP is a pointer into memory
- ▶ RIP keeps track of what instruction should be executed next.



Memory

- ▶ The registers RBP and RSP are pointers into memory
- ▶ RBP and RSP keep track of function local variables




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
Exploitation

Function Calls

- ▶ Each function call must keep track of its own local variables.
- ▶ These local variables are stored in a memory region called the program stack.
- ▶ Each function call is given a piece of the program stack called a stack frame.


Stack Frames

- ▶ Each function call is allocated some memory.
- ▶ The function call stores its local variables here.
- ▶ RBP and RSP keep track of the beginning and end of this region.



Stack

- ▶ The program stack is just a stack of stack frames
- ▶ RSP and RBP keep track of the top-most stack frame
- ▶ The bottom of the stack is at a very high address and it grows towards smaller addresses



Stack Metadata

- ▶ Metadata about the calling function is stored between stack frames.
- ▶ Tells us where the previous stack frame base was.
- ▶ Tells us where to return after this function is finished.




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Assembly

- ▶ For the purposes of binary exploitation we can ignore most assembly instructions
- ▶ We only really care about push, pop, call and ret
- ▶ These are the instructions that interact with the program stack

Push Instruction

- ▶ Pushes a register value onto the top of the stack.
- ▶ Decrements `rsp` by 8.
- ▶ Stores the value in `rax` into memory at `rsp`.

0

0x50

Machine Code

```
push rax
```

Assembly

Pop Instruction

- ▶ Pops the value at the top of the stack into a register.
- ▶ Load the value in memory at `rsp` into `rax`.
- ▶ Increment `rsp` by 8.

0

0x58


Machine Code

pop rax

Assembly

Call Instruction

- ▶ Calls a function and sets up stack frame metadata.
- ▶ Push rip onto stack
- ▶ Jump to call address



Machine Code

call <function>

Assembly

Ret Instruction

- ▶ Use the stack frame metadata to return from a function call.
- ▶ Pop into rip
- ▶ Continue execution at rip

0
0xC3

Machine Code

```
ret
```

Assembly

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Strings in C

- ▶ Strings in C are represented as arrays of characters.
- ▶ There is no bounds checking when accessing arrays.
- ▶ We can read and write out of array bounds in C.

Listing 1: x86-64 go.o

```
1 void user_input() {  
2     char x[50];  
3     gets(x);  
4 }
```

Vulnerable functions

Listing 2: Man Page For gets

```
1 Never use gets(). Because it is impossible to tell without
2 knowing the data in advance how many characters gets()
3 will read, and because gets() will continue to store
4 characters past the end of the buffer, it is extremely
5 dangerous to use. It has been used to break computer
6 security. Use fgets() instead.
```

Overwriting Sensitive Data

Listing 3: x86-64 go.o

```
1 user_input:
2     push rbp
3     mov rbp, rsp
4     sub rsp, 64
5     lea rax, [rbp-64]
6     mov rdi, rax
7     mov eax, 0
8     call gets
9     nop
10    leave
11    ret
```


Listing 4: x86-64 go.o

```
1 void user_input() {
2     char x[64];
3     gets(x);
4 }
```

Overwriting Sensitive Data

Listing 5: x86-64 go.o


```
1 user_input:
2     push rbp
3     mov rbp, rsp
4     sub rsp, 64
5     lea rax, [rbp-64]
6     mov rdi, rax
7     mov eax, 0
8     call gets
9     nop
10    leave
11    ret
```




Overwriting Sensitive Data

- ▶ Overwriting the return address allows us to redirect program execution.
- ▶ When the function returns, the program will jump to the address we write.

Stack Frame




Stack Frame



¹When overflowing the return address, we must put the bytes in backwards to account for endianness (... `x[63]` `Saved RBP` `0x32 0x06 0x40 0x00` ...)

Stack Frame

- ▶ Functions can also be chained together
- ▶ This is known as a ROP-chain
- ▶ function1 will be called, then function2, then function3



What to overwrite RIP to

- ▶ Easy problems have a "get flag" function
- ▶ Libc built-in functions like `system()` are useful
- ▶ ROP gadgets
- ▶ Jump straight to libc `system()` using an address leak
- ▶ Jump to onegadget in libc using an address leak

ROP Gadgets


- ▶ A short instruction sequence followed by a `ret` instruction
- ▶ Can be put into a ROP-chain the same way as a function
- ▶ Pop gadgets are useful for controlling registers

Listing 6: `pop rdi` gadget

```
1 pop rdi
2 ret
```

ROP Gadgets

- ▶ A short instruction sequence followed by a ret instruction
- ▶ Can be put into a ROP-chain the same way as a function
- ▶ This will call system() with an attacker controlled rdi



ROP Gageets

- ▶ Rop gadgets can be found using a tool called ROPGadget

Commands to Remember

Listing 7: Commands

```
1 objdump -d prog.o
2 gdb prog.o
3 (python3 -c "print('a'*20)"; cat -) | nc ctf.issc.io 9002
4 ROPGadget --binary pwnable
```
