



# Android Widevine on OP-TEE

David Brown






# Agenda

- **Motivations**
- How not to do it
- OP-TEE
- General solutions
- Overview of Widevine

ENGINEERS  
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WORKING  
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


# Motivation



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- Software playback
- Red arrow, bad!
- Creators sad, no HD





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


# How not to do it?

- Plaintext video passes through userspace
- Find exploit in player, or many other things
- Root makes it trivial to get
  
- Notice the key is also in userspace
- This is bad




# Can we do better?




# Can we do better?

- Less is accessible
- Plaintext still in userspace
- Creators still sad






# All plaintext in kernel?




# All plaintext in kernel?

- Better, no plaintext in userspace
- Key still there
- Kernel is vulnerable




# Key in kernel



# Key in kernel

- All key/plaintext now in kernel
- Content protected from userspace
- Kernel exploits possible
- Creators still sad



# OP-TEE

- ARM® TrustZone®
  - Trustable through boot into secure OS
  - Runs alongside Kernel
- GlobalPlatform TEE Specification
  - OP-TEE is our implementation
  - Allows trusted apps, and clients

# OP-TEE

Client

Client

Kernel

REE

TEE

OP-TEE OS

TA


TA

TA

TA




# DRM in TEE



# DRM in TEE

- Almost there, key is in TEE
- Plaintext video still available at end
- Providers **still** sad





# One more thing


- We need a weird buffer
  - Accessible to secure side
  - Not readable by unsecure (even kernel)
  - Accessible by HW decoder
- SMAF
  - Secure memory allocator
  - TEE can decode into this memory
  - HW can play it back
- It's tricky to get right, only certain HW should have access




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
# Keybox




# Keybox




# Content Key




# Content Key



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# Widevine

- CDM (content decryption module) for Android
- Specifics are for partners only
- Plugin based, we implement oemcrypto.so using our client lib and TA



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**connect**  
Las Vegas 2016

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# Status



- Working on HiKey board
- OP-TEE available for Android AOSP
- We have a liboemcrypto.so and TA for Widevine CDM
- Several security things missing
  - No trusted boot chain, TEE could be modified (HiKey issue)
  - SMAF not yet supported (patches in progress)  
<https://lkml.org/lkml/2016/9/7/133>
  - No HW video playback, buffers still need to be visible to software (HiKey work in progress)





# Thank You

#LAS16

For further information: [www.linaro.org](http://www.linaro.org)

LAS16 keynotes and videos on: [connect.linaro.org](http://connect.linaro.org)

