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Encore: Lightweight Measurement of Web Censorship with Cross-Origin Requests

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Abstract

Despite the pervasiveness of Internet censorship, we have scant data on its extent, mechanisms, and evolution. Measuring censorship is challenging: it requires continual measurement of reachability to many target sites from diverse vantage points. Amassing suitable vantage points for longitudinal measurement is difficult; existing systems have achieved only small, short-lived deployments. We observe, however, that most Internet users access content via Web browsers, and the very nature of Web site design allows browsers to make requests to domains with different origins than the main Web page. We present Encore, a system that harnesses cross-origin requests to measure Web filtering from a diverse set of vantage points without requiring users to install custom software, enabling longitudinal measurements from many vantage points. We explain how Encore induces Web clients to perform cross-origin requests that measure Web filtering, design a distributed platform for scheduling and collecting these measurements, show the feasibility of a global-scale deployment with a pilot study and an analysis of potentially censored Web content, identify several cases of filtering in six

months of measurements, and discuss ethical concerns that would arise with widespread deployment.

Categories and Subject Descriptors

• **Networks** → **Network measurement**; *Web protocol security* • **Social and professional topics** → **Technology and censorship**

Keywords

Web censorship; Network measurement; Web security

1 Introduction

Internet censorship is pervasive: by some estimates, nearly 60 countries restrict Internet communication in some way [35]. As more citizens in countries with historically repressive governments gain Internet access, government controls are likely to increase. Collecting pervasive, longitudinal measurements that capture the evolving nature and extent of Internet censorship is more important than ever.

Researchers, activists, and citizens aim to understand what, where, when, and how governments and organizations implement Internet censorship. This knowledge can shed light on government censorship policies and guide the development of new circumvention techniques. Although drastic actions such as introducing country-wide outages (as has occurred in Libya, Syria, and Egypt) are eminently observable, the most common forms of Internet censorship are more subtle and challenging to measure. Censorship typically targets specific domains, URLs, keywords, or content; varies over time in response to changing social or political conditions (*e.g.*, a national election); and can be indistinguishable from application errors or poor performance (*e.g.*, high delay or packet

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loss). Detecting more nuanced forms of censorship requires frequent measurement from many varied vantage points.

Unfortunately, consistently and reliably gathering these types of measurements is extremely difficult. Perhaps the biggest obstacle entails obtaining access to a diverse, globally distributed set of vantage points, particularly in the regions most likely to experience censorship. Achieving widespread deployment in these locations often requires surmounting language and cultural barriers and convincing users to install measurement software. Although researchers have begun to develop custom tools to measure filtering (e.g., OONI [15,38], Centinel [8]), widespread deployment remains a challenge. Instead, researchers have resorted to informal data collection (e.g., user reports [23]) or collection from a small number of non-representative vantage points (e.g., PlanetLab nodes [42], hosts on virtual private networks, or even one-off deployments of single vantage points) that might not observe the same filtering that typical users experience.

This paper takes an alternate approach: rather than ask each user to deploy custom censorship measurement software, we use existing features of the Web to induce unmodified browsers to measure Web censorship. Many users access the Internet with a Web browser, so inducing these browsers to perform censorship measurements will enable us to collect data from a larger, more diverse, and more representative set of vantage points than is possible with custom censorship measurement tools.

Our system, Encore, uses Web browsers on nearly every Internet-connected device as potential vantage points for collecting data about what, where, and when Web filtering occurs. Encore relies on a relatively small number of Web site operators (*webmasters*) to install a one-line embedded script that attempts to retrieve content from third-party Web sites using cross-origin requests [6,40]. The Encore script induces every visitor of these modified pages to request an object from a URL that Encore wishes to test for filtering. Although same-origin policies in browsers prohibit many kinds of requests (e.g., to thwart cross-site request forgery), we demonstrate that the cross-origin requests that browsers *do* allow are sufficient to collect information and draw conclusions about Web filtering. A major contribution of our work is to show that meaningful conclusions about Web filtering can be drawn from the side channels that exist in cross-origin requests.

Encore's simplicity comes at the cost of significant limitations on the types of measurements it can collect and the conclusions we can draw from its measurements. First, Encore's measurements must operate within the constraints of the cross-origin requests that Web browsers permit. For example, the `img` HTML directive yields the most conclusive feedback about whether an object fails to load, but it can only be used to test images, not general URLs. This limitation means that while it may be useful for detecting (say) the filtering of an entire DNS domain, it cannot test the reachability of specific (non-image) URLs. Encore's design must recognize which cross-origin requests browsers permit and use com-

binations of these requests to draw inferences with higher confidence. Second, because Encore requires webmasters to augment their existing Web pages, Encore must be easy to install and incur minimal performance overhead on the Web sites where it is deployed. Finally, great care is required when measuring censorship because accessing sensitive sites may endanger users in repressive countries. Our research focuses on Encore's design and implementation, and is not a measurement study *per se*.

Encore can detect *whether* certain URLs are filtered, but it cannot determine *how* they are filtered. Subtle forms of filtering (e.g., degrading performance by introducing latency or packet loss) are difficult to detect, and detecting content manipulation (e.g., replacing a Web page with a block page, or substituting content) using Encore is nearly impossible. Thus, Encore may complement other censorship measurement systems, which can perform detailed analysis but face much higher deployment hurdles. Ultimately, neither Encore nor other censorship analysis tools can determine human motivations behind filtering, or even whether filtering was intentional; they only provide data to policy experts who make such judgments.

2 Related Work

We summarize existing censorship measurement techniques and previous studies of Internet censorship; other policy reports of Internet censorship (which can ultimately seed our measurements); and other efforts to perform measurements from clients using advertisements or embedded images. Although we broadly survey Internet censorship practices, Encore focuses on Web filtering.

Censorship measurement tools. The prevailing mode for measuring Internet censorship is to develop custom measurement software and identify users who are willing to either install the software or otherwise host a measurement device that runs the software. Existing measurement tools include OONI [15], Centinel [8], and CensMon [42]. Both OONI and Centinel can be deployed on end hosts. These tools perform much more detailed analysis of *how* censors implement blocking, but to date both have seen only limited deployment, likely because they require recruitment of users who are willing to install and maintain the measurement software. CensMon was only deployed for a brief period on PlanetLab, a global network of servers hosted in academic networks; such measurements are unlikely to be representative, as residential and mobile broadband networks can face much different censorship practices than academic and research networks [32,46]. At this point, we are not aware of any censorship measurement system that continuously collects measurements from a global set of vantage points; this is the gap that Encore aims to fill.

Censorship measurement studies. Several researchers have performed "first look" studies of censorship in various countries such as Pakistan [32], Iran [1], and China [10,11,47]. Zittrain *et al.*'s study of censorship in China [47] performed

Web requests to hundreds of thousands of sites, but did so from only a handful of dialup modems that the authors deployed. Crandall [11], Clayton [10], and Ensafi [14] exploit symmetric behavior of the Chinese firewall to measure it from clients outside China; such measurements are easier to collect than Encore, but the technique does not work in all countries. The studies of censorship in Iran and Pakistan were more limited: the Iran study apparently performed measurements from a single vantage point for only two months [1], and the Pakistan study performed measurements from only five test networks over about two months [32]. Each of these studies offers a useful snapshot into a country's filtering practices at a particular point in time, but data collection is neither widespread nor continuous. The OpenNet Initiative has conducted the only long-term study to date, but its data collection is sporadic, making it difficult to compare filtering practices across countries and time [35].

Sources of block lists. Some policy organizations publish reports concerning censorship practices around the world. For example, the Open Network Initiative routinely publishes qualitative reports based on measurements from a limited number of vantage points, with scant insight into how censorship evolves over short timescales or what exactly is being filtered [36, 37]. Other projects such as Herdict [23], GreatFire [19], and Filbaan [16] maintain lists of domains that may be blocked. Herdict compiles reports from users about domains that are blocked from a certain location; such reports lack independent verification. GreatFire monitors reachability of domains and services from a site behind China's censorship firewall; it also maintains historical measurement results. Each tool offers limited information driven by user-initiated reporting or measurements, yet these services and reports can serve as initial lists of URLs to test using Encore.

Cross-origin requests for client measurement. Bortz *et al.* use timing information from cross-site requests to infer various information, such as whether a user is logged into a particular site or whether a user has previously visited a Web page [5]. Karir *et al.* use embedded Javascript with cross-origin requests to measure IPv6 reachability and performance from large numbers of clients [29]; the use of embedded cross-origin requests to obtain large number of clients is similar to Encore's design. Other systems have used cross-origin requests to third parties to determine information such as network latency between a client and some other Internet destination [20, 33]. In particular, Casado and Freedman quantified the prevalence of clients behind NATs and proxies by delivering measurement code to clients in a manner very similar to Encore [7]. Puppetnets exploits weaknesses in browser security to coerce browsers to unwittingly participate in denial-of-service attacks [30]. These tools use similar techniques as Encore, but they primarily aim to measure network performance or past user behavior based on the timing of successful cross-origin requests. They do not infer reachability of domains, IP addresses, or URLs based on the success (or lack thereof) of cross-origin requests.

3 Background

We discuss Web filtering and threats that may interfere with attempts to measure it. We also explain cross-origin requests.

3.1 Threat Model

To implement Web filtering, smaller countries often have centralized traffic filters on a national backbone; larger countries require each ISP to implement a censorship policy; some countries, like China, do both [46]. Web filtering typically takes place when the client performs an initial DNS lookup (at which point the DNS request may result in blocking or redirection), when the client attempts to establish a TCP connection to the Web server hosting the content (at which point packets may be dropped or the connection may be reset), or in response to a specific HTTP request or response (at which point the censor may reset the TCP connection, drop HTTP requests, or redirect the client to a block page).

Our goal is to observe instances of Web filtering and report them to a central authority (*e.g.*, researchers) for analysis. We assume an adversary that can reject, block, or modify any stage of a Web connection in order to filter Web access for subsets of clients, although we assume the adversary uses a blacklist and is unwilling to filter all Web traffic, or even significant fractions of all Web traffic. This adversary influences Encore's design in three ways: (1) the main goal of Encore is to measure this adversary's Web filtering behavior; (2) the adversary may attempt to filter clients' access to Encore itself, thereby preventing them from collecting or contributing measurements; and (3) the adversary may attempt to distort Encore's filtering measurements by allowing measurement traffic but denying other access to the same site. This paper considers all three aspects of the adversary.

3.2 Cross-Origin Requests

Web browsers' *same-origin policies* restrict how a Web page from one origin can interact with resources from another; an *origin* is defined as the protocol, port, and DNS domain ("host") [40]. In general, sites can send information to another origin using links, redirects, and form submissions, but they cannot receive data from another origin; in particular, browsers restrict cross-origin reads from scripts to prevent attacks such as cross-site request forgery. However, cross-origin *embedding* is typically allowed and can leak some read access. The cornerstone of Encore's design is to use information leaked by cross-origin embedding to determine whether a client can successfully load objects from another origin.

Various mechanisms allow Web pages to embed remote resources using HTTP requests across origins; some forms of cross-origin embedding are not subject to the same types of security checks as other cross-origin reads. Examples of resources that can be embedded include simple markup of images or other media (*e.g.*, ``), remote scripts (*e.g.*, `<script>`), remote stylesheets (*e.g.*, `<link rel="stylesheet" href="...">`), embedded objects and applets (*e.g.*, `<embed src="...">`),




Figure 1: *Encore induces browsers to collect Web filtering measurements by bundling measurement tasks inside pages served by an origin Web site.*

and document embedded frames such as iframes (e.g., `<iframe>`). Each of these remote resources has different restrictions on how the origin page can load them and hence leak different levels of information. For example, images embedded with the `img` tag trigger an `onload` event if the browser successfully retrieves and renders the image, and an `onerror` event otherwise. The ability for the origin page to see these events allows the origin page to infer whether the cross-origin request succeeded.

Although cross-origin embedding of media provides the most explicit feedback to the origin about whether the page load succeeded, other embedded references can still provide more limited information, through timing of `onload` invocation or introspection on a Web page’s style. Additionally, browsers have different security policies and vulnerabilities; for example, we discovered that the Chrome browser allows an origin site to load any cross-origin object via the `script` tag, which allows us to conduct a much more liberal set of measurements from Chrome. One challenge in designing Encore is determining whether (and how) various embedded object references can help infer information about whether an object was retrieved successfully.

4 Measuring Filtering with Encore

This section explains how Encore measures Web filtering using cross-origin requests.

4.1 Overview

Figure 1 illustrates how Encore measures Web filtering. The process involves three parties: a Web client that acts as our measurement vantage point; a measurement target, which is a server that hosts a Web resource that we suspect is filtered; and an origin Web server, which serves a Web page to the Web client instructing the client how to collect measurements. In each page it serves, the origin includes a *measurement task*, which is a small measurement collection program that attempt to access potentially filtered Web resources (e.g., Web pages, image files) from the target and determine whether such accesses were successful. The client runs this measurement task after downloading and rendering the page. The greatest

challenge is coping with browsers’ limited APIs for conducting network measurements, particularly when accessing these resources requires issuing cross-origin requests.

The scope of Web filtering varies in granularity from individual URLs (e.g., a specific news article or blog post) to entire domains. Detecting Web filtering is difficult regardless of granularity. On one hand, detection becomes more difficult with increasing specificity. When specific Web resources are filtered (as opposed to, say, entire domains), there are fewer ways to detect it. Detecting filtering of entire domains is relatively straightforward because we have the flexibility to test for such filtering simply by checking accessibility of a small number of resources hosted on that domain. In contrast, detecting filtering of a single URL essentially requires an attempt to access that exact URL. Resource embedding only works with some types of resources, which further restricts the Web resources we can test and exacerbates the difficulty of detecting very specific instances of filtering.

On the other hand, inferring broad filtering is difficult because Encore can only observe the accessibility of individual Web resources, and such observations are binary (i.e., whether or not the resource was reachable). Any conclusions we draw about the scope of Web filtering must be inferred from measurements of individual resources. We take a first-order glimpse at such inferences in Section 4.3 and present a filtering detection algorithm in Section 7.

4.2 Measurement tasks

Measurement tasks are small, self-contained HTML and JavaScript snippets that attempt to load a Web resource from a measurement target. Encore’s measurement tasks must satisfy four requirements: First, they must be able to successfully load a cross-origin resource in locations without Web filtering. Tasks cannot use `XMLHttpRequest` (i.e., AJAX requests), which is the most convenient way to issue cross-origin requests, because default Cross-origin Resource Sharing settings prevent such requests from loading cross-origin resources from nearly all domains. Instead, we induce cross-origin requests by embedding images, style sheets, and scripts across domains, which browsers typically allow.

Second, they must provide feedback about whether or not loading a cross-origin resource was successful. Several convenient mechanisms for loading arbitrary cross-origin requests (e.g., the `iframe` tag) lack a clear way to detect when resources fail to load, and are hence unsuitable for measurement tasks.

Third, tasks must not compromise the security of the page running the task. Tasks face both client- and server-side security threats. On the client side, because Encore detects Web filtering by *embedding* content from other origins (rather than simply requesting it, as would be possible with an AJAX request), such embedding can pose a threat as the browser renders or otherwise evaluates the resource after downloading it. In some cases, rendering or evaluating the resources is always innocuous (e.g., image files); in other cases (e.g., JavaScripts), Encore must carefully sandbox the embedded

content to prevent it from affecting other aspects of Web browsing. Requesting almost any Web object changes server state, and measurement tasks must take these possible side effects into account. In some cases, the server simply logs that the request happened, but in others, the server might insert rows into a database, mutate cookies, change a user's account settings, etc. Although it is often impossible to predict such state changes, measurement tasks should try to only test URLs without obvious server side-effects.

Finally, measurement tasks must not significantly affect perceived performance, appearance, or network usage.

Below is an example of a simple measurement task that instructs the Web client to load an image hosted by a measurement target `censored.com`:

```

```

This task meets the four requirements because it (1) requests an image from a remote measurement target using the `img` tag, which is allowed by browser security policy; (2) detects whether the browser successfully loaded the image by listening for the `onload` and `onerror` events; (3) trivially maintains security by not executing any code from resources served by the measurement target; and (4) preserves performance and appearance by only loading a very small icon (typically 16×16 pixels) and hiding it using the `display: none` style rule. Appendix A presents a longer example of a measurement task.

4.3 Inferring Web filtering

A measurement task provides a binary indication of whether a particular resource failed to load, thus implying filtering of that specific resource. From collections of these measurements, we can draw more general conclusions about the scope of filtering, beyond individual resources (*e.g.*, whether an entire domain is filtered, whether an entire portion of a Web site is filtered, whether certain keywords are filtered). We must do so with little additional information about the filtering mechanism. This section describes how we design sets of measurement tasks to make these inferences.

There are several ways to test accessibility of cross-origin Web resources; unfortunately, none of them work across all types of filtering, all Web browsers, and all target sites. Instead, we tailor measurement tasks to each measurement target and Web client. Detecting Web filtering gets harder as the scope of filtering becomes more specific, so we start with techniques for detecting broad-scale filtering and work toward more specific filtering schemes. Table 1 summarizes the measurement tasks we discuss in this section.

4.3.1 Filtering of entire domains

Encore performs collections of measurement tasks that help infer that a censor is filtering an entire domain. It is prohibitively expensive to check accessibility of *every* URL

hosted on a given domain. Instead, we assume that if several *auxiliary* resources hosted on a domain (*e.g.*, images, style sheets) are inaccessible, then the entire domain is probably inaccessible. Our intuition is that rather than filtering many supporting resources, an adversary will more likely filter the entire domain (or at least an entire section of a site). Fortunately, detecting filtering of some auxiliary resources is straightforward because pages often embed them even across origins.

Images. Web pages commonly embed images, even across origins. Such embedding is essential for enabling Web services like online advertising and content distribution networks to serve content across many domains.

Encore attempts to load and display an image file from a remote origin by embedding it using the `` tag. Conveniently, all major browsers invoke an `onload` event after the browser fetches and renders the image, and invoke `onerror` if either of those steps fails; the requirement to successfully render the image means that this mechanism only works for images files and cannot decide the accessibility of non-image content. Downloading and rendering an image does not affect user-perceived performance if the image is small (*e.g.*, an icon), and measurement tasks can easily hide images from view. This technique only works if the remote origin hosts a small image that we can embed.

Style sheets. Web pages also commonly load style sheets across origins. For example, sites often load common style sheets (*e.g.*, Bootstrap [4]) from a CDN to boost performance and increase cache efficiency.

Encore attempts to load a style sheet using the `<style src=...>` tag and detects success by verifying that the browser applied the style specified by the sheet. For example, if the sheet specifies that the font color for `<p>` tags is blue, then the task creates a `<p>` tag and checks whether its color is blue using `getComputedStyle`. To prevent the sheet's style rules from colliding with those of the parent Web page, we load the sheet inside an `iframe`. Although some browsers are vulnerable to cross-site scripting attacks when loading style sheets, these issues have been fixed in all newer browsers [26]. Style sheets are generally small and load quickly, resulting in negligible performance overhead.

4.3.2 Filtering of specific Web pages

Governments sometimes filter one or two Web pages (*e.g.*, blog posts) but leave the remainder of a domain intact, including resources embedded by the filtered pages [32]. Detecting this type of filtering is more difficult because there is less flexibility in the set of resources that Encore can use for measurement tasks: it must test accessibility of the Web page in question and cannot generally determine whether the page is filtered based on the accessibility of other (possibly related) resources. Testing filtering of Web pages, as opposed to individual resources, is significantly more expensive, complicated, and prone to security vulnerabilities because such testing often involves fetching not only the page itself, but also fetching

| Mechanism | Summary | Limitations |
|---------------|---|--|
| Images | Render an image. Browser fires <code>onload</code> if successful. | Only small images (e.g., ≤ 1 KB). |
| Style sheets | Load a style sheet and test its effects. | Only non-empty style sheets. |
| Inline frames | Load a Web page in an <code>iframe</code> , then load an image embedded on that page. Cached images render quickly, implying the page was not filtered. | Only pages with cacheable images. Only small pages (e.g., ≤ 100 KB). Only pages without side effects. |
| Scripts | Load and evaluate a resource as a script. Chrome fires <code>onload</code> iff it fetched the resource with HTTP 200 status. | Only with Chrome. Only with strict MIME type checking. |

Table 1: Measurement tasks use several mechanisms to discover whether Web resources are filtered. We empirically evaluate parameters for images and inline frames in Section 6.

all of that page’s referenced objects and rendering everything. This means we must be very careful in selecting pages to test. Many pages are simply too expensive or open too many vulnerabilities to test. Section 5 discusses the infrastructure and decision process we use to decide whether a Web page is suitable for testing.

We present two mechanisms for testing Web filtering of Web pages, and the limitations of each mechanism:

Inline frames. A Web page can include any other Web page inside itself using the `iframe` tag, even across origins. However, browsers place strict communication barriers between the inline page and the embedding page for security, and provide no explicit notification about whether an inline frame loaded successfully.

Instead, the task infers whether the resource loaded successfully by observing timing. It first attempts to load the page in an `iframe`; then, after that `iframe` finishes load, the task records how long it takes to download and render an image that was embedded on that page. If rendering this image is fast (e.g., less than a few milliseconds) we assume that the image was cached from the previous fetch and therefore the Web page loaded successfully. This approach only works with pages that embed objects that will be cached by the browser and are unlikely to have been cached from a prior visit to another Web page; for example, common images like the Facebook’s “thumbs up” icon appear on many pages and may be in the browser cache even if the `iframe` failed to load. This approach can be expensive because it requires downloading and rendering entire Web pages. Additionally, pages can detect when they are rendered in an inline frame and may block such embedding.

Scripts. Web pages often embed scripts across origins, similarly to how they embed style sheets. For example, many pages embed jQuery and other JavaScript libraries from a content distribution network or some other third-party host [28].

The Chrome browser handles script embedding in a way that lets us gauge accessibility of *non-script* resources from a remote origin. Chrome invokes an `onload` event if it can fetch the resource (i.e., with an HTTP 200 OK response), regardless of whether the resource is valid JavaScript. In particular, Chrome respects the `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff` header, which servers use to instruct browsers to




Figure 2: An example of observing Web filtering with Encore. The origin Web page includes Encore’s measurement script, which the coordinator decides should test filtering of `censored.com` by attempting to fetch an image. The request for this image fails so the client notifies the collection server.

prohibit execution of scripts with an invalid MIME type [2]. Other browsers are not so forgiving, so we use this task type on Chrome only. This technique is convenient, but it raises security concerns because other browsers may attempt to execute the fetched object as JavaScript. Section 5 describes how we make this decision.

5 Encore Measurement System

This section presents Encore, a distributed platform for measuring Web filtering. Encore selects targets to test for Web filtering (§ 5.1), generates measurement tasks to measure those targets (§ 5.2), schedules tasks to run on Web clients (§ 5.3), delivers these tasks to clients for execution (§ 5.4), collects the results of each task (§ 5.5), and draws conclusions concerning filtering practices based on the collective outcomes of these tests using the inference techniques from Section 4.

Figure 2 shows an example of how Encore induces a client to collect measurements of Web filtering. The client visits a Web site `http://example.com`, whose webmaster has volunteered to host Encore. This origin page references a

measurement task hosted on a coordination server; the client downloads the measurement task, which in turn instructs the client to attempt to load a resource (e.g., an image) from a measurement target `censored.com`. This request is filtered, so the client informs a collection server of this filtering. The remainder of this section explains how the origin Web server, coordination server, and collection server work together to induce and collect Web filtering measurements.

5.1 Sources of measurement targets

Encore requires a set of potentially filtered Web sites and resources to test for Web filtering. This list can contain either specific URLs if Encore is testing the reachability of a specific page; or a *URL pattern* denoting sets of URLs (e.g., an entire domain name or URL prefix) to test the reachability of a domain or a portion of a Web site. A small list of likely filtered targets is most useful during initial stages of deployment when clients of only a few moderately popular Web sites will likely be contributing measurements. As adoption increases, a broader set of targets can increase breadth of measurements. We explore how to obtain lists in both scenarios.

During initial deployment, Encore relies on third parties to provide lists of URLs to test for Web filtering. Several organizations maintain such lists. Some sites rely on per-country experts to curate URLs (e.g., GreatFire for China [19], Filbaan for Iran [16]), while others crowdsource list creation and let anyone contribute reports of Web censorship (e.g., Herdict [23]). Our evaluation in Section 6 uses a list of several hundred “high value” URLs curated by Herdict and its partners. Curating accurate and appropriate lists of potentially censored URLs is beyond the scope of this paper and an active research area.

If we deploy Encore to many geographically distributed Web clients and build a large, accurate Web index, we could instead use Encore clients to verify accessibility of the entire Web index, which would avoid the need for specialized lists of measurement targets by instead testing the entire Web. Regardless of whether Encore curates a small list of high-value measurement targets or simply extracts URLs from a large Web index, these URLs and URL patterns serve as input for Encore’s next stage.

5.2 Generating measurement tasks

Measurement task generation is a three-step procedure that transforms URL patterns from the list of measurement targets into a set of measurement tasks that can determine whether the resources denoted by those URL patterns are filtered for a client. This procedure happens prior to interaction with clients (e.g., once per day). Figure 3 summarizes the process. First, the *Pattern Expander* transforms each URL pattern into a set of URLs by searching for URLs on the Web that match the pattern. Second, the *Target Fetcher* collects detailed information about each URL by loading and rendering it in a real Web browser and recording its behavior in an HTTP Archive (HAR) file [22]. Finally, the *Task Generator* examines each HAR file to determine which of Encore’s measurement task

types, if any, can measure each resource and generates measurement tasks for that subset of resources.

The Pattern Expander searches for URLs that match each URL pattern. This step identifies a set of URLs that can all indicate reachability of a single resource; for example, all URLs with the prefix `http://foo.com/` are candidates for detecting filtering of the `foo.com` domain. Some patterns are trivial (i.e., they match a single URL) and require no work. The rest require discovering URLs that match the pattern. We currently expand URL patterns to a sample of up to 50 URLs by scraping site-specific results (i.e., using the *site:* search operator) from a popular search engine. In the future, Encore could use its own Web crawler to explore each pattern.

After expanding URL patterns into a larger set of URLs, the Target Fetcher renders each URL in a Web browser and records a HAR file, which documents the set of resources that a browser downloads while rendering a URL, timing information for each operation, and the HTTP headers of each request and response, among other metadata. We use the PhantomJS [39] headless browser hosted on servers at Georgia Tech. To the best of our knowledge, Georgia Tech does not filter Web requests, especially to the set of URLs we consider in this paper.

Finally, the Task Generator analyzes each HAR file to determine which subset of resources is suitable for measuring using one of the types of measurement tasks from Table 1. It examines timing and network usage of each resource to decide whether a resource is small enough to load from an origin server without significantly affecting user experience, then inspects content type and caching headers to determine whether a resource matches one of the measurement tasks. The Task Generator is particularly conservative when considering inline frames because loading full Web pages can severely impact performance and user experience (e.g., by playing music or videos). Our prototype implementation excludes pages that load flash applets, videos, or any other large objects totaling more than 100 KB, and requires manual verification of pages before deployment; a future implementation could apply stricter controls. Refer back to Section 4 for more information on the requirements for each type of measurement task. Section 6.1 further explores network overhead of measurement tasks.

5.3 Scheduling measurement tasks

After generating measurement tasks, the coordination server must decide which task to schedule on each client. Task scheduling serves two purposes. First, it enables clients to run measurements that meet their restrictions. For example, we should only schedule the script task type from Table 1 on clients running Chrome. In other cases, we may wish to schedule additional tasks on clients that remain idle on an origin Web page for a long time. Second, intelligent task scheduling enables Encore to move beyond analyzing individual measurements and draw conclusions by comparing measurements between clients, countries, and ISPs. For ex-



Figure 3: Encore transforms a list of URL patterns to a set of measurement tasks in three steps. A URL pattern denotes a set of URL (e.g., all URLs on a domain). A HAR is an HTTP Archive [22].

ample, a single client in Pakistan could report failure to access a URL for a variety of reasons other than Web filtering (e.g., high client system load, transient DNS failure, WiFi unreliability). However, if 100 clients measure the same URL within 60 seconds of each other and the only clients that report failure are 10 clients in Pakistan, then we can draw much stronger conclusions about the presence of Web filtering.

5.4 Delivering measurement tasks

After scheduling measurement tasks for execution, Encore must deliver tasks to these clients, who subsequently run them and issue cross-origin requests for potentially filtered Web resources. To collect a significant number of useful Web filtering measurements, Encore requires a large client population that is likely to experience a diversity of Web filtering. Previous censorship measurement efforts require researchers to recruit vantage points individually and instruct them to install custom software, which presents a significant deployment barrier [15, 35]. In contrast, Encore recruits a relatively small number of webmasters and piggybacks on their sites’ existing Web traffic, instantly enlisting nearly *all* of these sites’ visitors as measurement collection agents.

A webmaster can enable Encore in several ways. The simplest method is to add a single `<iframe>` tag that directs clients to load an external JavaScript directly from the coordination server. The coordination server generates a measurement task specific to the client on-the-fly. This method is attractive because it requires no server-side modifications, aside from a single tag; incurs little server overhead (i.e., only the extra time and space required to transmit that single line); and allows the coordination server to tailor measurement tasks to individual clients in real time. Unfortunately, this method is also easiest for censors to fingerprint and disrupt: a censor can simply block access to the coordination server, which inflicts no collateral damage. Section 8 discusses ways to make task delivery more robust to blocking, while Section 6.3 discusses incentives for webmasters to include Encore on their sites in the first place.

Rather than recruit webmasters ourselves, we have explored the possibility of purchasing online advertisements and delivering Encore measurement tasks inside them. This idea is attractive because online advertising networks already have established agreements with webmasters to display content (i.e., by paying webmasters to display ads.) Ad networks even allow advertisers to target ads to specific users, which Encore could leverage to measure censorship in specific countries. Unfortunately for us, this idea works poorly in practice because most ad networks prevent advertisements from running custom JavaScript and loading resources from remote

origins, with good reason; only a few niche ad networks are capable of hosting Encore. Even if more networks could serve Encore measurement tasks, they may not take kindly to perceived misuse of their service, especially if it leads to network filtering and subsequent loss of revenue in countries wishing to suppress Encore’s measurements.

5.5 Collecting measurement results

After clients run a measurement task, they submit the result of the task for analysis. Clients submit the result of task (i.e., whether the client could successfully load the cross-origin resource), related timing information (i.e., how long it took to load the resource), and the task’s measurement ID. The process of submitting results is similar to the process that clients use to obtain measurement tasks. In the absence of interference from the adversary, clients submit results by issuing an AJAX request containing the results directly to our collection server. Section 8 discusses other ways to submit results if the adversary filters access to the collection server.

6 Feasibility of Encore Deployment

We evaluate the feasibility of deploying Encore based on early experience with a prototype implementation and analysis of potential measurement targets.

6.1 Are sites amenable to Encore’s tasks?

This section investigates whether real Web sites host resources that Encore’s measurement tasks can use to measure filtering. We evaluate the feasibility of using Encore to measure filtering of both entire domain names and individual URLs. To measure filtering practices, we use a list of domains and URLs that are “high value” for censorship measurement according to Herdict and its partners [24]; most sites are either perceived as likely filtering targets in many countries (e.g., because they are affiliated with human rights and press freedom organizations) or would cause substantial disruption if filtered (e.g., social media like Twitter and YouTube). This list contains over 200 URL patterns, of which only 178 were online when we performed our feasibility analysis in February 2014.

We collect data for this set of experiments by running the first two stages of the pipeline in Figure 3, which uses the Pattern Expander to generate a list of 6,548 URLs from the 178 URL patterns in our list, then collect HAR files for each URL using the Target Fetcher. We then send these HAR files to a modified version of the Task Generator that emits statistics about sizes of accepted resources and pages.

Filtering of entire domains. We explore whether Encore can measure filtering of each of the 178 domains on the list




Figure 4: Distribution of the number of images hosted by each of the 178 domains tested, for images that are at most 1 KB, at most 5 KB, and any size. Over 60% of domains host images that could be delivered to clients inside a single packet, and a third of domains have hundreds of such images to choose from.

we generated as described above. Recall from Section 4.3 that we can use either images or style sheets to observe Web filtering of an entire domain; for simplicity, this analysis only considers images, although style sheets work similarly. We can measure a domain using this technique if (1) it contains images that can be embedded by an origin site and (2) those images are small enough not to significantly affect user experience. We explore both of these requirements for the 178 domains in our list. Because our implementation expands URL patterns using the top 50 search results for that pattern, we will be analyzing a sample of at most 50 URLs per domain. Most of these domains have more than 50 pages, so our results are a lower bound of the amenability of Encore to collect censorship measurements from each domain.

Figure 4 plots the distribution of the number of images that each domain hosts. 70% of domains embed at least one image, and almost all such images are less than 5 KB. Nearly as many domains embed images that fit within a single packet, and a third of domains have hundreds of such images. Even if we conservatively restrict measurement tasks to load images less than 1 KB, Encore can measure Web filtering of over half of the domains.

Filtering of specific Web pages. We explore how often Encore can measure filtering of individual URLs by loading a Web page in an iframe and verifying that the browser cached embedded resources from that page. We can use this mechanism to measure filtering of pages that (1) do not incur too much network overhead when loading in a hidden iframe and (2) embed cacheable images.

We first study the expected network overhead from loading sites in an iframe. Figure 5 plots the distribution of page sizes for each URL, where the page size is the sum of sizes of all resources a page loads and is a rough lower bound on the network overhead that would be incurred by loading each page in a hidden iframe (protocol negotiation and inefficiencies add further overhead). Page sizes are distributed relatively evenly between 0–2 MB with a very long tail. Our prototype only permits measurement tasks to load pages smaller than




Figure 5: Distribution of page sizes, computed as the sum of sizes of all objects loaded by a page. This indicates the network overhead each page would incur if a measurement task loaded it in a hidden iframe. Over half of pages load at least half a megabyte of objects.




Figure 6: Distribution of the number of cacheable images loaded by pages that require at most 100 KB of traffic to load, pages that incur at most 500 KB of traffic, and all pages. Perhaps unsurprisingly, smaller pages contain fewer (cacheable) images. Over 70% of all pages cache at least one image and half of all pages cache five or more images; these numbers drop considerably when excluding pages greater than 100 KB.

100 KB, although future implementations might tune this bound to a client’s performance and preferences.

We then evaluate whether these sites embed content that can be retrieved with cross-origin requests. Figure 6 shows the distribution of the number of cacheable images per URL for pages that are at most 100 KB, at most 500 KB, and any size. Nearly 70% of pages embed at least one cacheable image and half of pages cache five or more images, but these numbers drop significantly when restricting page sizes. Only 30% of pages that are at most 100 KB embed at least one cacheable image.

Encore can measure filtering of upwards of 50% of domains depending on the sizes of images, but fewer than 10% of URLs when we limit pages to 100 KB. This finding supports our earlier observation in Section 4.3 that detecting the filtering of individual Web resources may be significantly more difficult than detecting the filtering of entire domains.

6.2 Who performs Encore measurements?

Encore requires clients to visit the Web sites that are hosting Encore scripts. The demographics of clients who perform Encore measurements is closely related those who visit a

participating Web site. To evaluate whether a typical Web site will receive measurements from enough locations, we examined demographic data collected by Google Analytics for the home page of a professor in February 2014 [17].

The site saw 1,171 visits during course of the month. Most visitors were from the United States, but we saw more than 10 users from 10 other countries, and 16% of visitors reside in countries with well-known Web filtering policies (India, China, Pakistan, the UK, and South Korea), indicating that dispatching measurement tasks to sites such as academic Web pages may yield measurements from a variety of representative locations. Of these visitors, 999 attempted to run a measurement task; we confirmed nearly all of the rest to be automated traffic from our campus' security scanner. We also found that 45% of visitors remained on the page for longer than 10 seconds, which is more than sufficient time to execute at least one measurement task and report its results. The 35% of visitors who remained for longer than a minute could easily run multiple measurement tasks.

Our small pilot deployment of Encore is representative of the sites where we can expect Encore to be deployed in the short term. Although adoption of Encore by even a single high-traffic Web site would entirely eclipse measurements collected by these small university deployments, grassroots recruitment remains necessary: Encore relies on a variety of origin sites to deter an adversary from simply blocking access to all origins to suppress our measurement collection.

6.3 Will webmasters install Encore?

Encore cannot directly target specific demographics for measurement collection—the measurements that we collect arise from the set of users who happen to visit a Web site that has installed an Encore script. If the sites that host Encore are globally popular (*e.g.*, Google), then Encore can achieve an extremely widespread sampling of users; on the other hand, if the sites are only popular in particular regions, the resulting measurements will be limited to those regions.

Recruiting webmasters to include Encore's measurement scripts should be feasible. First, installing Encore on a Web site incurs little cost. Serving these scripts to clients adds minimal network overhead; our prototype adds only 100 bytes to each origin page and requires no additional requests or connections between the client and the origin server. Measurements themselves have little effect on the Web page's perceived performance because they run asynchronously after the page has loaded and rendered. However, they do incur some network overhead to clients when loading cross-origin resources, which may be undesirable to users with bandwidth caps or slow, shared network connections.

Second, we see two strong incentives for webmasters to participate in Encore. Many webmasters may support Encore simply out of greater interest in measuring Web filtering and encouraging transparency of government censorship. The grassroots success of similar online freedom projects (*e.g.*, Tor [12]) in recruiting volunteers to host relays and bridges suggests that such a population does exist. For further in-

centive, we could institute a reciprocity agreement for webmasters: in exchange for installing our measurement scripts, webmasters could add their own site to Encore's list of targets and receive notification about their site's availability from Encore's client population.

7 Measurements

We confirm the soundness of Encore's measurement tasks with both controlled experiments and by comparing our ability to confirm cases of Web filtering with independent reports of filtering from other research studies. We have implemented and released every component of Encore described in Section 5 and have collected seven months of measurements from May 2014 through January 2015.

To date, at least 17 volunteers have deployed Encore on their sites, although the true number is probably much higher; $\frac{3}{4}$ of measurements come from sites that elect to strip the `Referer`: header when sending results. We recorded 141,626 measurements from 88,260 distinct IPs in 170 countries, with China, India, the United Kingdom, and Brazil reporting at least 1,000 measurements, and more than 100 measurements from Egypt, South Korea, Iran, Pakistan, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia. These countries practice some form of Web filtering. We use a standard IP geolocation database to determine client locations [31]. Clients ran a variety of Web browsers and operating systems.

7.1 Are measurement tasks sound?

To confirm the soundness of Encore's measurements, we built a Web censorship testbed, which has DNS, firewall, and Web server configurations that emulate seven varieties of DNS, IP, and HTTP filtering. For three months, we instructed approximately 30% of clients to measure resources hosted by the testbed (or unfiltered control resources) using the four task types from Table 1. For example, we verified that the *images* task type detects DNS blocking by attempting to load an image from an invalid domain and observing that the task reports filtering; we verified that the same task successfully loads an unfiltered image.

Verification is straightforward for the image, style sheet, and script task types because they give explicit binary feedback about whether a resource successfully loaded. Encore collected 8,573 measurements for these task types; after excluding erroneously contributed measurements (*e.g.*, from Web crawlers), there were no true positives and few false positives. For example, clients in India, a country with notoriously unreliable network connectivity, contributed to a 5% false positive rate for images.

Verifying soundness of the inline frame task type requires more care because it infers existence of filtering from the time taken to load resources. Figure 7 compares the time taken to load an uncached versus cached single pixel image from 1,099 globally distributed Encore clients. Cached images normally load within a few tens of milliseconds, whereas most clients take at least 50 ms longer to load the same image




Figure 7: Comparison between load times for cached and uncached images from 1,099 Encore clients. Cached images typically load within tens of milliseconds, whereas uncached usually take at least 50 ms longer to load, indicated by the bold red line. We use this difference to infer filtering.

uncached. The few clients with little difference between cached and uncached load time were located on the same local network as the server. Difference in load time will be more pronounced for larger images and with greater latency between clients and content.

In both cases, false positives highlight (1) that distinguishing Web filtering from other kinds of network problems is difficult and (2) the importance of collecting many measurements before drawing strong conclusions about Web filtering. We now develop a filtering detection algorithm that addresses both concerns.

7.2 Does Encore detect Web filtering?

We instructed the remaining 70% of clients to measure resources suspected of filtering, with the goal of independently verifying Web filtering reported in prior work. Because measuring Web filtering may place some users at risk, we only measured Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter. These sites pose little additional risk to users because browsers already routinely contact them via cross-origin requests without user consent (e.g., the Facebook “thumbs up” button, embedded YouTube videos and Twitter feeds). Expanding our measurements to less popular sites would require extra care, as we discuss in the next section.

We aimed to detect resources that are consistently inaccessible from one region, yet still accessible from others. For this purpose, we measure filtering of entire domains, using the image task type. This is challenging because measurement tasks may fail for reasons other than filtering: clients may experience intermittent network connectivity problems, browsers may incorrectly execute measurement tasks, sites may themselves go offline, and so on. We use a statistical hypothesis test to distinguish such sporadic or localized measurement failures from more consistent failures that might indicate Web filtering. We model each measurement success as a Bernoulli random variable with parameter $p = 0.7$; we assume that, in the absence of filtering, clients should successfully load resources at least 70% of the time. Although this assumption is conservative, it captures our desire to eliminate false positives, which can easily drown out true positives when detecting rare events like Web filtering. For each resource

and region, we count both the total number of measurements n_r and the number of successful measurements x_r and run a one-sided hypothesis test for a binomial distribution; we consider a resource as filtered in region r if x_r fails this test at 0.05 significance (i.e., $\Pr[\text{Binomial}(n_r, p) \leq x_r] \leq 0.05$) yet does not fail the same test in other regions.

Applying this technique on preliminary measurements confirms well-known censorship of `youtube.com` in Pakistan, Iran, and China [18], and of `twitter.com` and `facebook.com` in China and Iran. Although our detection algorithm works well on preliminary data, possible enhancements include dynamically tuning model parameters to account for differing false positive rates in each country and accounting for potential confounding factors like user behavior differences between browsers and ISPs [3].

8 Ethics and Security

This section discusses barriers to Encore’s widespread deployment, from the ethics of collecting measurements from unsuspecting Web users to the potential for attackers to block, disrupt, or tamper with client measurements or collection infrastructure.

Which resources are safe to measure? Encore induces clients to request URLs that might be incriminating in some countries and circumstances. In particular, the most interesting URLs to measure may be those most likely to get users into trouble for measuring them. Curating a list of target URLs requires striking a balance between ubiquitous yet uninteresting URLs (e.g., online advertisers, Google Analytics, Facebook) and obscure URLs that governments are likely to censor (e.g., human rights groups). Although our work does not prescribe a specific use case, we recognize that deploying a tool like Encore engenders risks that we need to better understand.

Balancing the benefit and risk of measuring filtering with Encore is difficult. This paper has made the benefit clear: Encore enables researchers to collect new data about filtering from a diversity of vantage points that was previously prohibitively expensive to obtain and coordinate. Ongoing efforts to measure Web filtering would benefit from Encore’s diversity and systematic rigor [8, 15, 35]. The risk that Encore poses are far more nebulous: laws against accessing filtered content vary from country to country, and may be effectively unenforceable given the ease with which sites (like Encore) can request cross-origin resources without consent; there is no ground truth about the legal and safety risks posed by collecting network measurements.

Striking this balance between benefit and risk raises ethical questions that researchers in computer science rarely face and that conventional ethical standards do not address. As such, our understanding of the ethical implications of collecting measurements using Encore has evolved, and the set of measurements we collect and report on has likewise changed to reflect our understanding. Table 2 highlights a few key milestones in Encore’s deployment, which has culminated

| Date | Event |
|---------------------------------|---|
| February 2014 and prior | Informal discussions with Georgia Tech IRB conclude that Encore (and similar work) is not human subjects research and does not merit formal IRB review. |
| March 13, 2014 – March 24, 2014 | Encore begins collecting measurements from real users using a list of over 300 URLs. We're unsure of the exact date when collection began because of data loss. |
| March 18, 2014 | We begin discussing Encore's ethics with a researcher at the Oxford Internet Institute. |
| April 2, 2014 | To combat data sparsity, we configure Encore to only measure favicons [43]. The URLs we removed were a subset of those we crawled from §5.2. |
| May 5, 2014 | Out of ethical concern, we restrict Encore to measure favicons on only a few sites. |
| May 7, 2014 | Submission to IMC 2014, which includes results derived from our March 13 URL list. |
| September 17, 2014 | Georgia Tech IRB officially declines to review Encore. We requested this review in response to skeptical feedback from IMC. |
| September 25, 2014 | Submission to NSDI 2015, using our URL list on April 2. |
| January 30, 2015 | Submission to SIGCOMM 2015, using our URL list on May 5. |
| February 6, 2015 | Princeton IRB reaffirms that Encore is not human subjects research. We sought this review at the request of the SIGCOMM PC chairs after Nick Feamster moved to Princeton. |

Table 2: Timeline of Encore measurement collection, ethics discussions, and paper submissions. As our understanding of Encore's ethical implications evolved, we increasingly restricted the set of measurements we collect and report. See <http://encore.noise.gatech.edu/urls.html> for information on how the set of URLs that Encore measures has evolved over time.

in the set of measurements we report on in this paper. The Institutional Review Boards (IRBs) at both Georgia Tech and Princeton declined to formally review Encore because it does not collect or analyze Personally Identifiable Information (PII) and is not human subjects research [9]. Yet, Encore is clearly capable of exposing its users to some level of risk. Because we do not understand the risks that a tool like Encore presents, we have focused most of our research efforts on developing the measurement technology, not on reporting results from the measurements that we gather. Other censorship measurement tools have and will continue to face similar ethical questions, and we believe that our role as researchers is to lead a responsible dialogue in the context of these emerging tools.

As part of this ongoing dialogue, we hope that the community will develop ethical norms that are grounded in theory, applicable in practice, and informed by experts. To this end, we have discussed Encore with ethics experts at the Oxford Internet Institute, the Berkman Center, and Citizen Lab, and our follow on work examines broader ethical concerns of censorship measurement [27]. We have also been working with the organizers of the SIGCOMM NS Ethics workshop [34], which we helped solicit, to ensure that its attendees will gain experience applying principled ethical frameworks to networking and systems research, a process we hope will result in more informed and grounded discussions of ethics in our community.

Schechter [41] surveyed people about the ethics of various research studies, including Encore, and found that most people felt that unconstrained use of Encore would be highly unethical. However, as the report acknowledges, the survey didn't elaborate on the inherent risks of browsing *any* Web page, the potential benefits of research like Encore, the risks

of alternative means of measuring censorship, or low-risk deployment modes.

Encore underscores the need for stricter cross-origin security policy [45]. Our work exploits existing weaknesses, and if these policies could endanger users then strengthening those policies is clearly a problem worthy of further research.

Why not informed consent? The question of whether to obtain informed consent is more complicated than it might first appear. Informed consent is not always appropriate, given that in disciplines where experimental protocols for human subjects research are well-established, there are classes of experiments that can still be conducted ethically without it, such as when obtaining consent is either prohibitive or impractical and there is little appreciable risk of harm to the subject.

Researchers and engineers who have performed large-scale network measurements can appreciate that obtaining consent of any kind is typically impractical. For Encore, it would require apprising a user about nuanced technical concepts, such as cross-origin requests and how Web trackers work—and doing so across language barriers, no less. Such burdens would dramatically reduce the scale and scope of measurements, relegating us to the already extremely dangerous status quo of activists and researchers who put themselves into harm's way to study censorship. Even if we could somehow obtain consent at scale, informed consent does not *ever* decrease risk to users; it only alleviates researchers from some responsibility for that risk, and may even increase risk to users by removing any traces of plausible deniability.

We believe researchers should instead focus on reducing risk to uninformed users, as we have done with repeated iteration after consultation with ethics experts. It is generally accepted that users already have little control over or knowledge of much of the traffic that their Web browsers and devices generate (a point raised by Princeton's office of

research integrity and assurance), which already gives users reasonable cover. By analogy, the prevalence of malware and third-party trackers itself lends credibility to the argument that a user cannot reasonably control the traffic that their devices send. The more widespread measurements like Encore become, the less risky they are for users.

Filtering access to Encore infrastructure. Clients can only use Encore if they can fetch a measurement task. If the domain (or URL) that hosts measurement tasks is itself blocked, clients will not be able to execute measurements. Once a client retrieves a measurement task, subsequent requests appear as ordinary cross-origin requests; as a result, the main concern is ensuring that clients can retrieve measurement tasks in the first place.

The server that dispatches tasks could be replicated across many domains to make it more difficult for a censor to block Encore by censoring a single domain. Clients could contact the coordination server indirectly via an intermediary or create mirrors of the coordination server in shared hosting environments (*e.g.*, Amazon AWS), thereby increasing the collateral damage of blocking a mirror. Going further, webmasters could contact the coordination server on behalf of clients (*e.g.*, with a WordPress plugin or Django package) by querying the coordination server and including the returned measurement task directly in the page it serves to the client; to increase scalability and decrease latency, servers could cache several tasks in advance. Similarly, collection of the results could be distributed across servers hosted in different domains, to ensure that collection is not blocked.

There are limits to Encore’s ability to withstand such attacks. Because it runs entirely within a Web browser, Encore cannot leverage stronger security tools like Tor to anonymously report measurements [12, 44].

Detecting and interfering with Encore measurements. Blocking Encore based on the contents of measurement tasks (*e.g.*, via deep packet inspection) should be difficult, because we can easily disguise tasks’ code using JavaScript obfuscation or detection evasion techniques [13, 25]. Identifying task behavior is equally difficult because it appears merely as requests to load a cross-origin object—something many Web sites do under normal operation. If a single client performs a *sequence* of cross-origin requests that appear unrelated to the content of the host site, a censor may recognize the sequence as unusual and either block the subsequent reports or otherwise attempt to distort the results. We expect such interference to be relatively difficult, however, since a censor would first have to identify a sequence of requests as a measurement attempt and interpose on subsequent requests to interfere with the reports. Although such interference is plausible, censors do not generally interfere with measurements today, so we leave this consideration to future work.

Attackers may attempt to submit poisoned measurement results to alter the conclusions that Encore draws about censorship. We could try to employ reputation systems to

thwart such attacks, although it would be practically impossible to completely prevent such poisoning from untrusted clients [21].

9 Conclusion

Despite the importance of measuring the extent and nature of Internet censorship, doing so is difficult because it requires deploying a large number of geographically diverse vantage points, and recruiting volunteers for such a deployment is a significant deployment hurdle. This paper presents an alternate approach: rather than requiring users to install custom measurement software, we take advantage of the fact that users’ Web browsers can perform certain types of cross-origin requests, which we can harness to induce measurements of reachability to arbitrary third-party domains. Although only a limited amount of information about the success of these requests leaks across domains, even a small amount of leakage turns out to be enough to permit inferences about the reachability of higher-level Web resources, including both entire domains and specific URLs.

Encore shifts the deployment burden from clients to webmasters. We have designed Encore so that deployment is simple (in many cases, webmasters only add one line to the main Web page source). We also point out that many webmasters are typically interested in monitoring the reachability of their sites from various client geographies and networks in any case, so deployment incentives are well-aligned.

Although the types of measurements Encore can perform may be more definitive than tools that rely on informal user reports (*e.g.*, Herdict), Encore may draw far fewer conclusions about the scope and methods of censorship than tools that measure censorship methods in detail (*e.g.*, OONI, Centinel). Ultimately, censorship measurement is a complex, moving target, and no single measurement method or tool can paint a complete picture. What is sorely missing from the existing set of measurement tools, however, is a way to characterize censorship practices in broad strokes, based on a sizeable and continuous set of client measurements. By filling this important hole in our understanding, Encore can help bridge the gap between diverse yet inconclusive user reports and detailed yet narrow or short-term fine-grained measurements.

The prospect of using Encore to collect measurements from unsuspecting users has already stirred controversy within the networking community and prompted a wider dialogue on ethics of network measurement [34]. Forthcoming guidelines for ethical measurement will hopefully help determine whether we can deploy Encore more widely. Our work is beneficial regardless: If wider deployment is appropriate, this paper has explained how Encore could yield valuable insight on Web censorship at a previously unattainable scale; if ethical concerns make further deployment infeasible, our work is evidence that attackers could use tools like Encore to place users in harm’s way and that perhaps cross-origin security policy should be strengthened to prevent such attacks.

A Example of a measurement task

This is a complete example of JavaScript code that runs in a client's Web browser to measure Web filtering using cross-origin embedding of a hidden image. It uses jQuery [28]. The coordination server minifies and obfuscates the source code before sending it to a client.

See <http://goo.gl/18GU0R> for a simple demo of Encore's cross-origin request mechanism.

```
var M = Object();

// A measurement ID is a unique identifier
// linking all submissions of a measurement.
M.measurementId = ... // a UUID.
// This function embeds an image from a remote
// origin, hides it, and sets up callbacks to
// detect success or failure to load the image.
M.measure = function() {
    var img = $('<img>');
    img.attr('src', '//target/image.png');
    img.style('display', 'none');
    img.on('load', M.sendSuccess);
    img.on('error', M.sendFailure);
    img.appendTo('html');
}
// This function submits a result using
// a cross-origin AJAX request. The server
// must allow such cross-origin submissions.
M.submitToCollector = function(state) {
    $.ajax({
        url: "//collector/submit" +
            "?cmh-id=" + this.measurementId +
            "&cmh-result=" + state,
    });
}
M.sendSuccess = function() {
    M.submitToCollector("success");
}
M.sendFailure = function() {
    M.submitToCollector("failure");
}

// Submit to the server as soon as the client
// loads the page, regardless of the
// measurement result. This indicates which
// clients attempted to run the measurement,
// even if they don't submit a final result.
M.submitToCollector("init");
// Run the measurement when the page loads.
$(M.measure);
```

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