East Asians' Social Heterogeneity: Differences in Norms among Chinese, Japanese, and Korean Negotiators

Sujin Lee, Jeanne Brett, and Ji Hyearn Park

East Asian cultures are widely held to be fairly homogeneous in that they highly value harmonious social relationships. We propose, however, that the focus (dyadic versus group) and the nature (emotional versus instrumental) of social relations vary among the Chinese, Japanese, and Korean cultures in ways that have important implications for the negotiation tactics typically employed by managers from these three cultures. Our data are from a web survey administered to three hundred eighty-eight managers from China, Japan, and South Korea. In this article, we discuss how the differences in the focus and the nature of business relationships in China, Japan, and Korea are manifested in the different norms for negotiation tactics endorsed by managers from these three countries.

Key words: negotiation, dyadic negotiation, multi-party negotiation, international business negotiation, culture, East Asian, cultural norms, social relationships.

Sujin Lee is the EWon assistant professor of organizational behavior in the department of management science and the graduate school of innovation and technology management at KAIST in Daejeon, Republic of Korea. Her e-mail address is sujinlee@kaist.ac.kr.

Jeanne Brett is the DeWitt W. Buchanan, Jr., Distinguished Professor of Dispute Resolution and Organizations and director of the Dispute Resolution Research Center at the Kellogg School of Management at Northwestern University in Evanston, IL. Her e-mail address is jmbrett@kellogg.northwestern.edu.

Ji Hyearn Park graduated from Harvard College in 2012 with concentrations in economics and psychology. Her e-mail address is jhpark2@post.harvard.edu.

10.1111/j.1571-9979.2012.00350.x

Cultural psychologists (e.g., Nisbett 2003) and negotiation scholars (e.g., Adair and Brett 2005) have tended to treat East Asia as a homogeneous region. On the one hand, this is understandable because the Chinese, Japanese, and Korean cultures have all been influenced by Confucian philosophy, which emphasizes hierarchical social structures and the preeminence of the family. Furthermore, all three cultures share values of social order, hierarchical respect, collectivism, and thriftiness (Bond 1991). As we will show, however, the intensity of the Confucianist influence varies among these three cultures, as does the manner in which Confucian values are manifest in these nations' political, economic, and social ideologies. We propose that just as people from these cultures speak related but completely different languages, that within the East Asian region, negotiators recognize the same norms or standards for appropriate behavior in negotiation, but they differ in their level of endorsement of these norms.

Specifically, we propose that although all the East Asian cultures value social relationships, the focus of social relations (dyad versus group) and the nature of those relations (emotional versus instrumental) vary systematically among these three cultures and that this variation accounts for intercultural variations in norms regarding negotiation tactics. For example, in China, dyadic instrumental relationships dominate social interactions among business partners. In Japan, business partnerships are subservient to loyalty to groups or organizations. In Korea, business relationships are likely to be emotion-based in dyadic relationships (Leung and Tjosvold 1998). We have based our predictions that we would find intercultural differences concerning norms for negotiation tactics on the historical context of self-construal and social relations within each country.

We begin by laying out the differences in cultural profile and historical context among China, Japan, and Korea. In doing so, we explain how the differences in cultural context enables a systematic categorization of each country's social relationships into dyadic versus group and instrumental versus emotional. Next, we explain why we expect that cultural differences in self-construal and social relationships will manifest themselves in parallel differences in the endorsement of specific norms for negotiation tactics among managers from the three countries. Then, we analyze survey data from a sample of managers from each country who are actively engaged in their country's economic sector and experienced in business negotiations.

Cultural Background: Social Relationships in China, Japan, and Korea

Cultural differences in social relationships among East Asian countries are reflected in differences in self-construal. Self-construal comprises a person's multidimensional and dynamic knowledge about him or herself in relation to the rest of the world and vice versa (Markus and Wurf 1987). Self-

construals influence how we process information about ourselves and others, affecting our perceptions, memories, attributions, and inferences (Markus, Smith, and Moreland 1985; Fiske and Taylor 1991), emotion and affect regulation (Cross and Madson 1997), and motivation and self-regulation (Carver and Scheier 1981). For example, people set goals to be consistent with their self-construals, engage in behaviors to accomplish those goals, and evaluate their performance against those goals (Carver and Scheier 1981).

Individuals have access to multiple self-construals (Fiske and Taylor 1991). Having an independent self-construal means seeing oneself as an autonomous and agentic entity. An interdependent self-construal, on the other hand, can take two distinct forms: relational and collective (Brewer and Gardner 1996; Brewer and Chen 2007; Ramirez-Marin and Brett 2011; Lee et al. 2012). A *relational* self-construal refers to the extent to which people regard themselves as connected to other individuals in dyadic relationships; a *collective* self-construal refers to the self in relation to a group or collective. A collective self-construal emphasizes group affiliation and in-group norms defined by collectives (Tajfel and Turner 1979; Triandis 1989; Kashima and Hardie 2000).

Some self-construals are more central, elaborate, and important than others (Gelfand, Nishii, and Raver 2006). Culture appears to be one factor that makes independent versus interdependent self-construals seem more personally relevant (Markus and Kitayama 1991). Our predictions about differences in social relationships among negotiators in China, Japan, and Korea turn on the distinction in cultural psychology between the relational and the collective self. We note, however, that both a relational and a collective self-construal are interdependent, meaning that they are socially conferred on the actor by the other in the relationship or others in the collective (Leung and van de Vijver 2008).

China

Social relationships in the Chinese culture are more dyad-based than group-based. Specifically, the most fundamental of the principles governing social relationships in China is the indigenous concept of mutual trust or *guanxi* (Yeung and Tung 1996). *Guanxi* refers to a mutually beneficial relationship between individuals. It implies an unlimited exchange of favors even in environments in which social exchange is supposed to be neutral and unbiased (Pye 1982). In all forms of *guanxi* relationships, dyads, not groups, form the most fundamental unit of social interaction. Research has shown that *guanxi* is independent from shared group identity and strongly associated with a strictly dyadic sentiment (Chen and Chen 2004). The Chinese are very particular about with whom they wish to build a *guanxi* relationship, and there are substantial barriers to entering a strong *guanxi* relationship, especially for outsiders (Child and Möllering 2003).

When considering the Chinese cultural context, the dominance of dyadic social relationships does not mean that the Chinese are more individualistic than collectivistic, compared with countries that emphasize collective or group-based relationships, such as Japan. Interestingly, a meta-analysis of multiple studies of cultural attitudes toward individualism and collectivism found that the Chinese were the only culture that showed fewer individualistic and more collectivistic orientations than, surprisingly, Americans of European descent (Oyserman, Coon, and Kemmelmeier 2002).

The *guanxi* relationship can be as, or more, utilitarian and instrumental, than emotional. The closely tied bond in *guanxi* is formed by the twin principles of reciprocity (Chan 1998; Chen and Chen 2004) and giving and protecting *face*, defined as a form of dignity or respect given to others in social interactions (Ting-Toomey et al. 1991). Because *face* is socially conferred, Chinese people consider *face* to be an important factor in social relationships. They are careful not only to protect their own *face* but also not to cause others to lose *face*. They give and protect *face* by reciprocating favors. Thus, the moral commitment behind the concept of *guanxi* is that a person should willingly return favor for favor. Those who refuse to engage in this social practice violate the other party's trust, and in doing so lose *face* — one of the biggest dishonors in the Chinese culture (Alston 1989). Once *guanxi* has been threatened due to a violation of the norm of reciprocity, the basis for trust in the relationship has been lost.

The tradition of this reciprocal social system can be observed in the famous Chinese historical novel, *Romance of the Three Kingdoms* by Luo Guanzhong (2002). In the book, the skillful administration of *guanxi* facilitates the main protagonist Liu Bei's rise to the position of emperor. When Liu Bei is in dire need of a military strategist, he makes three visits to show respect and build trust before he can recruit Zhuge Liang, described as the most accomplished strategist of the era. Once the initial trust barrier has been overcome, Liu Bei and Zhuge Liang form a strong *guanxi* relationship, which greatly contributes to Liu Bei's future success.

Japan

Among East Asians, the Japanese display a unique emphasis on social harmony, which derives from loyalty and commitment to the groups or organizations of which one is a member. The Japanese strongly identify with affiliated groups and are attracted to the social rewards conferred on them by their groups (Bowman 1984). The emphasis that the Japanese place on group consensus, loyalty, and dedication to one's group or organization is captured in the concept of *wa*. *Wa* means to seek mutual cooperation for a unified group goal, and it implies sacrificing one's personal and selfish goals to do so. Because a strong sense of group membership is fundamental to Japanese people's self-perception, it is only natural

for them to value collective benefits over individual gains (Alston 1989). Confirming this idea, one study showed that Japanese participants were more likely to make concessions and sacrifice individual goals and interests for their group in conflict management situations than were the Chinese and Koreans participants (Kim et al. 2007).

The importance of loyalty to one's designated group can be traced back to the *Tokugawa* period of Japanese history. At that time, a strict hierarchy of classes was established under a military government, and the social system was characterized by absolute loyalty to the *Shogun*, the political leader. This military-based chain of command hierarchy is echoed today in the hierarchical structure of Japanese companies, which also emphasize loyalty to the company (Kim et al. 2007). Whereas the promise of lifetime employment in return for this loyalty is becoming less common than in the past (Ohbuchi 1998), what has not seemed to change is the dedication shown by Japanese managers and employees to achieving company goals (Moran et al. 1994).

Indeed, *wa* is a concept that emphasizes compliance, submissiveness, and rigid group conformity, which works against establishing unique dyadic relationships. The kind of submissiveness associated with *wa* is different from the kind required in a hierarchical dyadic relationship. Whereas a hierarchical dyadic relationship simply requires the less powerful person to submit to the relatively more powerful one, Japanese *wa* establishes an ultimate power vested in the organization that rules over all members within the group. The submissiveness that the Japanese *wa* requires is the willingness to subordinate one's individual identity in favor of the shared uniformity of the group (Akhtar 2009).

The strong sense of group loyalty and selflessness displayed by the Japanese when their affiliated group's interest is at stake does not, however, mean that the Japanese are not individualistic in other settings. While individual Japanese people will rank group interest above their individual interests, their behavior may be less self-sacrificing when the interest of their affiliated group is not at stake. For instance, some research has shown that Japanese subjects were more likely to sacrifice individual goals for the group than the mainland Chinese and South Koreans (Kim et al. 2007), but in another study, the Japanese displayed more individualistic cultural norms than did Hong Kong Chinese and South Koreans regarding reward allocations between individuals (Kim et al. 2010).

These observations may seem contradictory at first, but a closer analysis suggests how the Japanese can both be group-oriented and individualistic. Historically, the strictly linear military hierarchy in Japan created a cultural context in which individuals were expected to subordinate themselves to the *group*, but it did not necessarily condition them to sacrifice themselves to other *individuals* — even other individuals within the group. So, by extension, we might expect a Japanese employee to sacrifice

leisure hours to bring more profits to the company, but not to make the same sacrifice for a miserable colleague who is swamped with work. Japanese employees would be more likely to help a colleague when helping him or her would result in helping the company than they would be to help that colleague to relieve his or her stress. Thus, the Japanese are more likely to show individualistic tendencies when the interest of an affiliated group is not at stake (Kim et al. 2010).

Korea

South Korea is one of the most collectivist countries in the world (Hofstede 1991), but its culture also displays individualistic tendencies. The rapid and vast economic, social, and political changes that South Korea has undergone in recent decades may help explain the development of a culture that merges Eastern collectivism and Western individualism (Cho and Park 1998). The key social concept in the Korean business setting is *inhwa*, which has its roots in Confucianism. *Inhwa* is similar to Japanese *wa* in that it also stresses the value of harmony. The term, however, does not describe a comparable commitment to group loyalty. Instead, in Korea, harmony is embedded in dyadic relationships between, for example, subordinates and superiors, not group relationships between employees and the organization (De Mente 1988).

Although *inhwa* encourages enduring, dyadic relationships between individuals, it is clearly distinguishable from the Chinese concept *guanxi*. G*uanxi* is characterized by the symbiotic nature of a mutual, favor-exchanging, or instrumental relationship, whereas *inhwa* focuses on the emotional aspect of the relationship. A successful *guanxi* relationship in the Chinese culture is maintained by firmly establishing dyadic reciprocity, that is, saving the other person's *face*. In contrast, a successful *inhwa* relationship in the Korean culture is achieved through respecting one's own and the other person's *kibun*, which roughly translates to feelings or emotional state. For example, Koreans are unlikely to react negatively to unfair treatment from the organization so long as that unfair treatment is not directed to them by their superior (Kim and Leung 2007). To the extent that Koreans value a dyadic relationship in which their own emotional state is respected by the other party, Koreans tend to display more individualistic tendencies than do citizens of other collectivist East Asian cultures (Cho and Park 1998).

This Korean individualistic tendency does not contradict the idea that Koreans are generally more collectivistic than the Japanese (Kim et al. 2010). That is, the individualism-collectivism measured by Tae-Yeol Kim and his colleagues (2010) was based on how one relates to a group of *colleagues*, not to one's workgroup as a whole. Koreans' individualistic tendencies are fundamentally different from those of the Japanese. Whereas the Japanese place their emphasis on their affiliated group, Koreans place

Table One
Conceptual Model

Country	Social Concept	Self-Construal	Individualistic Versus Collectivistic	Emotional Versus Instrumental
China	*Guanxi*	Relational (Dyad)	Conditionally collectivistic: Purveying collectivistic tendencies only within an established *guanxi* relationship (whether interpersonal or organizational)	Instrumental
Japan	*Wa*	Collective (Group)	Individualistic (interpersonal): Individualistic toward interpersonal relationships but collective toward organizations	Instrumental
Korea	*Inhwa*	Relational (Dyad)	Individualistic (organizational): Individualistic toward organizations but not toward interpersonal relationships	Emotional

their emphasis on their emotional ties with others. For example, a Korean employee would be more likely to refuse sacrificing leisure hours for the collective good of the company than would a Japanese employee, but may be more willing to make a personal offer to help a peer than a Japanese employee.

Summary

Although China, Japan, and Korea share similar cultural roots in Confucianism and similar cultural values such as interdependence and social harmony, each culture places a different emphasis on the nature and function of social relationships. For the Chinese, *guanxi* emphasizes the dyadic relationship but with a primarily instrumental rather than emotional focus. Therefore, in China, a high-performing and professional boss who is arrogant and rude may be preferred to a much more collegial but

lower-performing boss whose actions could have a negative impact on the individual employee's material circumstances. In the context of the Japanese concept of *wa*, subordinates are more likely to accept the behavior of a boss who is an asset to the organization as a whole regardless of their evaluation of him or her as a person because *wa* emphasizes the group. The Korean concept of *inhwa* should make Korean employees more accepting of a perfectly likeable boss whose performance may negatively affect the organization (and diminish the material benefits to them) than they would be of a boss who performs well but whose personality is unbearable.

Table One summarizes our model, specifying the links between social concept (based on the history of Confucianism), self-construal, individualism and collectivism, and the relationship focus of the three cultures. Given these differences in social relationships, we propose that the Chinese, the Japanese, and the Koreans will endorse norms concerning distributive and integrative negotiation tactics differentially.

Negotiation Strategy, Tactics, and Norms in China, Japan, and Korea

Negotiation theory commonly identifies two strategies or sets of goal-directed behavior (Walton and McKersie 1965). *Distributive strategy* consists of behaviors (called tactics in negotiation theory) that negotiators use to help them claim value or to realize individual gains. Distributive tactics include offers (typically single issue) and substantiation (Weingart et al. 1990). Offers are actions intended to close the gap between negotiators' positions (Weingart et al. 2007). Substantiation includes all different kinds of attempts to influence the counterpart to make concessions, including, but not limited to, justifications of offers, threats, and appeals to sympathy.

Integrative strategy consists of behaviors (tactics) that negotiators use to help them create value or realize joint gains (Weingart et al. 1990; Weingart et al. 2007). Integrative tactics revolve around information exchange about interests and priorities via asking questions and receiving answers (Pruitt and Lewis 1975; Weingart et al. 1990). Once information about interests and priorities is collected, negotiators bundle it into multiple-issue offers that reflect trade-offs (Adair and Brett 2005).

Culture can have broad effects on the strategies and tactics negotiators use. For example, Wendi Adair and Jeanne Brett (2005) found that negotiators from "low-context cultures" in which communication is more explicit and the words or the surface of a message clearly contain meaning (Hall 1976), such as the United States, Germany, Sweden, and Israel, reciprocated questions and answers throughout their negotiations significantly more frequently than did negotiators from "high-context cultures" in which communication is more indirect and subtle meaning is embedded behind the expressed words (Hall 1976), such as Japan, Thailand, Russia, and Hong Kong. In contrast, negotiators from high-context cultures opened their

negotiations by reciprocating offers significantly more frequently than did negotiators from low-context cultures. The latter only caught up to the high-context culture negotiators' use of offers in the fourth quarter of the negotiation.

Our study takes a closer look at culture and negotiation strategy by proposing that there are differences in the endorsement of norms for negotiation tactics within a group of cultures that have traditionally been similarly characterized as high-context and interdependent: China, Japan, and Korea (Hall 1976; Markus and Kitayama 1991). We propose hypotheses for norms concerning distributive and integrative negotiation tactics.

Distributive Norms

Negotiators use distributive tactics to claim value or to "win" the negotiation and cause the other negotiator to "lose." We expect that Chinese and Korean negotiators are less likely to endorse distributive tactics than Japanese negotiators for the following reasons. First, the concept of *guanxi* in Chinese culture promotes mutual benefits in long-term, interpersonal relationships through the reciprocal exchange of favors and concerns for giving and saving *face*. The use of distributive tactics focused on claiming value and defeating the other party could interfere with the process of giving and saving *face* for the Chinese. Similarly, because the Korean concept of *inhwa* is to ground interpersonal relationships in the business setting in emotional exchanges, Koreans, we predict, would also be less likely to endorse distributive tactics, which could possibly hurt the other party's feelings (*kibun*).

In contrast to China and Korea, where norms for social interaction are more strongly based on the relationships between individuals, the Japanese culture emphasizes the collective interaction between individuals and their groups or organizations. That is, the Japanese value harmony within their groups or organizations, rather than between individuals (Leung and Tjosvold 1998). And the Japanese are more likely to display individualistic behavior when considering reward allocations between individuals than Koreans and Hong Kong Chinese (Kim et al. 2010). Thus, compared with the Chinese or Koreans, we predict that Japanese negotiators would be more likely to feel comfortable claiming value and maximizing their own gains in negotiations, with less concern for the other party, and thus more likely to endorse the use of distributive tactics with a counterpart.

Indeed, research has shown that Japanese managers used power-based tactics in negotiation (Brett and Okumura 1998; Adair, Okumura, and Brett 2001; Adair et al. 2004) and conflict resolution (Tinsley 1998) more frequently than did American and other Western-culture managers. Distributive tactics are highly normative in negotiation in Japan (Brett et al. 1998). Thus, our first hypothesis (Hypothesis One) is:

Hypothesis One: Japanese negotiators will be more likely than Chinese and Korean negotiators to endorse the distributive tactic norm.

Integrative Norms

Negotiators use integrative tactics to create mutual gains in negotiations, usually via questions and answers (Walton and McKersie 1965; Weingart et al. 1990). Although the Japanese value and use power-based strategies in negotiation (Adair, Okumura, and Brett 2001; Adair et al. 2004) and conflict resolution (Tinsley 1998), they also generate integrative agreements (Brett and Okumura 1998; Adair, Weingart, and Brett 2007). One explanation for this seeming contradiction is that Japanese negotiators read the subtext of offer patterns (Adair, Weingart, and Brett 2007; Brett 2007). That is, they reach integrative agreements, but not using the Western low-context approach of engaging in questions and answers, but by making inferences drawn from the Eastern high-context approach of engaging in offers and counteroffers. Another explanation is that because in Japanese culture the power difference between parties signals how one should behave in the social interaction, Japanese negotiators may engage in asking and sharing information to get to know each other and figure out which party is more or less powerful. The Japanese negotiators' information exchange would originate from their power-based motivation for distributive negotiation; nevertheless, it may unintentionally help Japanese negotiators keep exchanging information, and by doing so, they may keep searching for more and more integrative agreement. That is, Japanese negotiators would endorse both distributive and integrative tactics (Brett et al. 1998).

In Western culture, negotiators tend to discuss their interests using questions and answers (Brett et al. 1998; Tinsley and Brett 2001) and to synthesize multiple interests using multiple-issue offers (Adair and Brett 2005) to reach integrative outcomes (Brett 2007). As discussed previously, Koreans tend to display more individualistic characteristics because of their concern for emotions — their own and others'. If the strategic link between individualistic orientation and use of integrative tactics identified in the West holds for Koreans, then Korean negotiators should endorse integrative tactics as normative. Thus, we expect both Japanese and Korean negotiators to endorse integrative tactics, although the reason behind their endorsement of the norm may differ.

We expect the Chinese to be the least likely of the East Asian cultures to endorse integrative norms in negotiations. Norms for integrative tactics rely on information sharing in negotiation. Although all the three East Asian cultures value *face*, the Chinese are *relatively more* concerned with saving one's own and others' *face* than are the Japanese or Koreans. One might expect that if *face* dynamics are more important for the Chinese than the Japanese or Koreans, and the endorsement of integrative tactics is

associated with realizing joint gains, then the Chinese should endorse integrative tactics more than the other groups.

The Chinese, however, are unlikely to endorse mutually beneficial, integrative behaviors unless the *guanxi* relationship is already established. Using integrative tactics, with their strong emphasis on information sharing, risks disclosing one's true motives. Without trust, self-disclosure is risky (Chen and Chen 2004), but without self-disclosure, negotiators will not gain the insight that they need into the other party's interests and priorities to negotiate a mutually beneficial relationship. In addition, because many negotiators lie (Lewicki and Robinson 1998), they face the risk that their counterpart may not be truthful but that catching the counterpart in a lie could cause that party to lose *face*. Chinese negotiators can avoid this risk, a loss of *face*, by avoiding sharing information — the central tactic of integrative negotiation strategy. For the Chinese, circumspect speaking is a skillful way to give or save *face* (Ting-Toomey 1999). Indeed, Chinese negotiators' lack of enthusiasm for integrative tactics may be functional, with one study showing that information-exchange-oriented behaviors negatively influenced Chinese negotiators' profits (Graham et al. 1988).

Our first hypothesis predicted that distributive tactics would be less normative in China than in Japan. We expect that Chinese negotiators are likely to endorse neither distributive nor integrative tactics. Integrative tactics are likely to be less normative in China than Japan or Korea, and our second hypothesis (Hypothesis Two) is:

> *Hypothesis Two:* Chinese negotiators will be less likely to endorse the integrative tactic norm than Japanese and Korean negotiators.

Methodology

Participants and Procedures

Managers from the People's Republic of China, Japan, and South Korea completed a web survey prior to attending an executive education course in negotiations in their native country. This sample, therefore, in no way reflects the norms of a random sample of cultural members, but rather of a sample of managers from each national culture who were sufficiently interested in negotiations to attend the course. All cultures were represented by managers whose national citizenship and cultural identity coincided and who were actively engaged in the economic sectors of their respective country.

The Chinese sample comprised 148 people (26 percent were women) with an average age of thirty-six and with average of twelve years of work experience. The Japanese group comprised ninety-five managers (all were men) with an average age of thirty-three and with an average of thirteen

years of work experience. The Korean sample comprised 145 managers (24 percent were women) whose average age was thirty-seven years and with an average work experience of twelve years.

The years of work experience were very close for all three groups, as was the gender composition of the Chinese and Korean samples. The age differences between the three groups were statistically significant; thus, we controlled for age in all analyses. Because the Japanese sample included no female participants, we were unable to control for gender when testing our hypotheses. In the analysis of the Chinese and the Korean data only, however, hypothesis-testing results remained unchanged when we controlled for gender. Note, too, some missing data on demographic characteristics accounts for different degrees of freedom.

Measures

The survey was originally written in English. Bilingual research assistants translated and back-translated the Chinese, Japanese, and Korean surveys. We asked participants to describe the extent to which distributive and integrative tactics were normative in their culture, using a five-point Likert-type scale ranging from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (5).

We used Jeanne Brett and her colleagues' (1998) items for measuring norms for integrative and distributive tactics. Participants responded to the question of "In negotiation it is appropriate to. . . ." The tactics we used to measure norms for distributive negotiation included bluffing, asking for sympathy from the counterpart, displaying frustration, arguing to support positions, making a counteroffer, and making offers below or demanding offers above your reservation price. The tactics we used to measure integrative norms included sharing information both proactively and in response to the counterpart's sharing information, trying to build a relationship with the counterpart, trying to satisfy the counterpart's needs, and giving the counterpart opportunities to save *face*. Participants gave higher scores to those tactics they considered appropriate.

Analyses

We factor analyzed the distributive and integrative tactics within each of the three groups to see if the constructs were distinct and to determine if the factor structure was equivalent across the three cultures. We used principle-component analysis and varimax rotation. We found a four-factor solution: four factors accounted for 60 percent of the total variance in the Chinese sample, 86 percent of the total variance in the Japanese sample, and 60 percent of the total variance in the Korean sample.

Specifically, three related tactics were correlated highly in all three groups: arguing to support your positions, making a counteroffer, and making or demanding offers below and above the reservation price. We categorized these three actions as *rational influence* tactics.

Table Two
Correlations of All Variables among Chinese Negotiators

Variable	1	2	3	4
1. Age	—			
2. Rational influence	–0.20*	—		
3. Emotional appeal	0.03	0.00	—	
4. Information sharing	0.07	0.04	–0.23**	—
5. Relationship building	–0.15+	0.12	0.23**	0.00

+$p < 0.10$; *$p < 0.05$; **$p < 0.01$.

Table Three
Correlations of All Variables among Japanese Negotiators

Variable	1	2	3	4
1. Age	—			
2. Rational influence	–0.07	—		
3. Emotional appeal	–0.18+	0.22*	—	
4. Information sharing	–0.06	–0.12	0.10	—
5. Relationship building	0.13	–0.03	–0.12	0.40**

+$p < 0.10$; *$p < 0.05$; **$p < 0.01$.

Table Four
Correlations of All Variables among Korean Negotiators

Variable	1	2	3	4
1. Age	—			
2. Rational influence	0.06	—		
3. Emotional appeal	–0.18+	0.17*	—	
4. Information sharing	0.22**	0.14	–0.09	—
5. Relationship building	0.12	0.09	0.06	0.31**

+$p < 0.10$; *$p < 0.05$; **$p < 0.01$.

We categorized three other tactics that were correlated highly across groups as tactics based on *emotional appeals*: bluff, ask for sympathy, and display frustration.

We grouped the integrative norms into two categories also. One included two items focused on *information sharing* that were correlated

Table Five
Negotiation Norms Endorsed by East Asian Negotiators

Negotiation Tactics	China	Japan	Korea	$F(2, 378)$	P contrasts
	1	2	3		
	M (SD)	M (SD)	M (SD)		
Distributive norms					
Rational influence	3.26 (0.67)	3.79 (0.51)	3.82 (0.47)	42.63	1.2**
					1.3**
					2.3
Emotional appeal	2.84 (0.73)	2.98 (0.64)	2.60 (0.74)	8.21	1.2
					1.3**
					2.3**
Integrative norms					
Information sharing	3.44 (0.79)	3.90 (0.76)	3.68 (0.67)	12.40	1.2**
					1.3**
					2.3*
Relationship building	3.68 (0.51)	3.82 (0.58)	3.96 (0.45)	10.46	1.2*
					1.3**
					2.3+

$+p < 0.10$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{**}p < 0.01$.
SD, standard deviation.

highly across all three cultures: share information proactively and share information when the counterpart shares information. The last group of items that were correlated highly across all three cultures was focused on *relationship building*: try to build a relationship with the counterpart, satisfy the counterpart's needs, and allow the counterpart to save *face*.

Because one dimension only had two items that were correlated highly across all three cultures, we could not perform a multi-sample confirmatory factor analysis, which requires more than two items in each category. The correlations among the four groupings of negotiation tactics are shown in Tables Two through Four.

Results

Table Five shows the results indicating cultural differences in norms for negotiation tactics. Figures One through Four illustrate the average scores of Chinese, Japanese, and Korean negotiators on norms for negotiation tactics.

We predicted that Japanese negotiators would be more likely to endorse the use of distributive tactics than would Chinese and Korean

Figure One
Rational-Influence Distributive Tactics Endorsed by East Asian Negotiators



negotiators (Hypothesis One) and that Chinese negotiators would be less likely to endorse the integrative tactic norm than Japanese and Korean negotiators (Hypothesis Two). We tested our hypotheses using analysis of covariances (ANCOVAs) covarying age.

Rational-Influence Distributive Tactics

Chinese managers were less likely than either Japanese or Korean managers to endorse norms for rational influence (see Table Five and Figure One). Planned contrasts showed that the differences between Chinese managers and both Japanese and Korean managers were significant, but the difference between Japanese and Korean managers was not significant. In sum, our data partially support Hypothesis One: Chinese managers were less likely to endorse rational-influence distributive tactics than were Japanese and Korean managers.

Emotional-Appeal Distributive Tactics

A different pattern emerged with respect to norms for emotional appeals. Korean managers were less likely to endorse the norms for emotional-appeal tactics than were either Chinese or Japanese managers (see

Figure Two
Emotional-Appeal Distributive Tactics Endorsed by East Asian Negotiators



Table Five and Figure Two). Planned contrasts showed that the differences between Korean and both Chinese and Japanese managers were significant, but the difference between Chinese and Japanese managers was not significant. Thus, Hypothesis One was partially supported with respect to emotional appeals.

Information-Sharing Integrative Tactics

Chinese managers were least likely to endorse the norm for information sharing (see Table Five and Figure Three). Planned contrasts showed that the differences between all three groups was significant, with the norm for information sharing in negotiation most strongly endorsed by Japanese managers, followed by Korean managers, and least strongly endorsed by Chinese managers. Hypothesis Two was thus supported when it comes to information sharing.

Relationship-Building Integrative Tactics

Similar to the information-sharing tactics, both Japanese and Korean managers were more likely to endorse relationship-building tactics than were the Chinese managers (see Table Five and Figure Four). Planned contrasts

Figure Three
Information-Sharing Integrative Tactics Endorsed by East Asian Negotiators



showed that the difference between Korean and Chinese managers and between Japanese and Chinese managers was significant, and that the difference between Japanese and Korean managers was marginally significant. To summarize, Chinese managers were less likely to endorse relationship building tactics than were the Japanese and Korean managers. Thus, Hypothesis Two was confirmed with respect to relationship building.

Discussion

In this study, we drew upon existing studies of social relationships in China, Japan, and Korea to generate hypotheses about negotiation norms. The pattern of results reflects differences among Chinese, Japanese, and Korean cultures' relative focus on relationships with individuals (based on relational self-construal) versus relationships with groups (based on collective self-construal) and their emphasis on the instrumental versus the emotional nature of social relationships. We found using web survey data from managers experienced in business negotiations that Japanese managers were most likely to endorse both distributive and integrative negotiation tactics, Korean managers were least likely to endorse emotional-appeal distributive tactics and more likely to endorse integrative tactics, and that

Figure Four
Relationship-Building Integrative Tactics Endorsed by East Asian Negotiators



Chinese managers were least likely to endorse rational-influence distributive tactics and integrative tactics. Our results help refine our understanding of multicultural negotiation and could have important implications for those negotiating with managers from these cultures.

Negotiation Norms in China, Japan, and Korea

In China, integrative tactics were least normative, which was consistent with our prediction. The *guanxi* relationships among Chinese negotiators typically will be different depending on whether the negotiator has a personal relationship with the counterpart (e.g., friend, acquaintance, and acquaintance of an acquaintance) or not. The Chinese are less likely to endorse mutually beneficial, integrative behaviors unless the *guanxi* relationship is already established. Traditionally, substantial initial barriers prevent establishing the *guanxi* relationships between parties, especially if the counterpart is from outside of their *guanxi* network. This tendency may explain why Chinese managers were least likely to endorse integrative tactics for relationship building with the counterpart in East Asia. It seems reasonable that if Chinese negotiators do not think of the counterpart as a member of their *guanxi* network, they would be less likely to care about his or her well-being; thus, we would expect relationship building with the

counterpart to be less normative in China than it would be in the other East Asian cultures.

The Chinese were less likely to endorse distributive tactics in the rational influence category, which was consistent with our hypothesis. Because the Chinese social relationship is instrumental, and based on mutually beneficial relationships between trusted favor-exchange partners rather than on emotional attachments, the Chinese managers can be expected to focus on trying to build instrumental relationships based on trust with the other party; thus we would not expect them to overly exaggerate their positions.

Inconsistent with our hypothesis, however, the Chinese were more likely to endorse emotional-appeal distributive tactics. In a non-*guanxi* situation, the Chinese may not worry about *face* and thus think emotional appeals are acceptable.

Supporting our prediction, the Japanese endorsed both distributive and integrative tactics. In particular, Japanese managers were more likely to endorse the norms for information sharing and relationship building than were Chinese managers. This finding is consistent with previous research results demonstrating that Japanese negotiators typically realized higher joint gains than did Chinese negotiators (Brett 2007). Japanese negotiators' endorsement of norms for both distributive and integrative tactics is likely to be reflected in actual negotiation behavior, as they have been documented to use offers and rational persuasion more than U.S. negotiators, but nevertheless negotiate equivalent joint gains (Adair, Okumura, and Brett 2001; Adair, Weingart, and Brett 2007).

Korean negotiators were the least likely of the three groups to endorse the distributive norm for emotional appeals, which was consistent with our prediction, and were most likely to endorse the distributive norm for rational influence, which was inconsistent with our prediction. The survey statements we used to test support of emotional-appeal distributive tactics involved the use of emotions in a *negative* way to influence the other party. That Koreans refrain from doing this seems consistent with our theory that Koreans focus on building positive emotional relationships with others. Koreans consider one's own and another's *kibun* or state of emotion to be important in social interactions, and this may lead to individualistic social behaviors designed to maintain or improve those emotional states. Thus, motivated by individualistic concerns, Korean managers appear willing to use distributive tactics in terms of rational influence to maximize individual gains, but not to use emotional appeals that might hurt the other party's feelings.

Contributions

This study contributes insights to our understanding of culture and negotiation in the East Asian context. Our findings challenge the general assumption that East Asian cultures are homogeneous with respect

to interdependence. Rather, we found a significant cultural difference between dyadic versus group-oriented social relationships.

Further, our study illuminates the importance of understanding the difference between social relationships based on instrumental versus emotional ties. Cultural psychologists are engaged in ongoing discussions about cultural differences in independent, relational, and collective self-construal (Brewer and Chen 2007). The distinction between *relational* versus *collective* self-construal parallels the distinction we have drawn between a focus on the dyad (relational) versus the group (collective) in social relationships. Our study adds to this literature by combining these constructs in a new and interesting fashion. For example, we suggest that it is both the relational and the emotional aspects of social relations that account for the negotiation norms of Korean managers and that it is both the relational and the instrumental aspects of social relations that account for the norms of Chinese managers.

Norms are important factors that can predict which tactics negotiators will feel most comfortable employing in a negotiation. When negotiators use culturally normative behaviors, they may be able to communicate more effectively, which can enhance information exchange and the potential for finding mutually beneficial joint gains (Adair, Okumura, and Brett 2001; Adair, Weingart, and Brett 2007). This is particularly relevant because the East Asian cultures we studied are "tight" societies that impose strong social norms and sanction deviation from those norms (Gelfand, Nishii, and Raver 2006). Thus, in these cultures, negotiators are particularly likely to use culturally dominant norms to construct negotiation strategy.

Practical Implications for Those Negotiating in East Asia

This study allows negotiators from around the world to benchmark their own norms for social relationships and negotiation strategy and tactics norms against the views of managers from China, Japan, and Korea. Previous researchers have categorized China, Japan, and Korea as "high-context" cultures (Hall 1976; Adair and Brett 2005). Our results show, however, that even within high-context cultures, attitudes toward different negotiation tactics will be varied and nuanced.

Specifically, understanding that

- Korean managers are more likely to endorse distributive rational influence norms as well as the integrative norms for information sharing and relationship building,
- Japanese managers are more likely to endorse both distributive and integrative tactics, and
- Chinese managers eschew integrative negotiations and that strategy's requirement to share information and build relationships, and instead are comfortable using emotional-appeal distributive tactics

should help those negotiators from other cultures who are preparing to negotiate in East Asia.

The ability to anticipate one's counterpart's culturally normative behaviors can be critical for inter-cultural negotiation success (Lee, Adair, and Seo 2011). Negotiators who lack accurate knowledge of the counterpart's culturally normative behavior may form inaccurate interpretations of his or her behavior, which can precipitate the strategic mismatches that arise all too commonly in inter-cultural negotiations (Lee 2005; Adair, Taylor, and Tinsley 2009; Kern et al. 2012). Global negotiators will benefit from knowledge of regional differences, knowledge that does not assume that a Korean partner in an upcoming negotiation will behave similarly to a Japanese partner in a previous negotiation just because both are East Asians. Our study suggests that global negotiators should guard against over-generalizing prior experience in one East Asian culture to future experience in other East Asian cultures.

Limitations and Future Research

Like all studies, this one has its strengths and its limitations. The subjects — managers actively engaged in the economic activity of three East Asian cultures who engage regularly in real-life negotiations, not just simulations — are certainly a strength. Norms, of course, are just one factor affecting the use of tactics. Individual differences (e.g., social motives) and contextual factors (e.g., power) can also influence strategy-in-use. As we noted earlier, however, in culturally "tight" societies (Gelfand, Nishii, and Raver 2006) such as those studied here, norms can be expected to have a strong influence on negotiators' strategies.

We did not specifically ask participants in our study to consider intra-cultural settings when responding to the question of "In negotiation it is appropriate. . . ." Research on descriptive norms (Shteynberg, Gelfand, and Kim 2009; Zou et al. 2009) suggests that future research on norms in negotiation should consider specifically framing norm questions culturally, for example, using the statement: "When negotiating *in China*, it is appropriate to. . . ."

Future research could also examine the extent to which behavioral differences in strategy-in-use reflect the pattern of normative differences that we have identified in this study. The results of this study suggest some interesting hypotheses for such future research. For example, how do Koreans actually *use* both rational-influence tactics and relationship-building tactics? Is the tactical switching dynamic or are early phases using one strategic approach followed by use of a different strategic approach in later phases? Exactly how Japanese negotiators balance their emphasis on distributive tactics and their ability to negotiate joint gains would be another interesting area for future research. Finally, the Chinese use of negotiation tactics has been little researched. Jeanne Brett (2007) reported

that the Chinese understand the value of information in negotiation, but they do not want to engage in information sharing. This quandary suggests an additional topic for future research.

Future studies might compare the negotiation norms of managers from the three East Asian cultures studied here to the norms of North American managers. Previous research has found that East Asians are less individualistic than Westerners (Heine et al. 1999; Gelfand et al. 2002), but much previous cross-cultural research has used the Japanese as a representative sample and proxy of East Asian culture (e.g., Brett and Okumura 1998; Adair, Okumura, and Brett 2001; Adair, Weingart, and Brett 2007).

Conclusion

Although widely accepted research has found that East Asian cultures are homogeneous in their value for preserving social relationships, our study shows that this is an oversimplification. By deconstructing regional homogeneity into national differences with respect to the focus of social relationships (the relational versus the collective) and the nature of social ties (instrumental versus emotional), we proposed and found the differential endorsement of negotiation norms in China, Japan, and Korea. Our research contributes to the further development of theories of cross-cultural negotiation and provides insights for negotiators who wish to extend their reach from one East Asian culture to another.

NOTE

The authors thank Raina Dong, Eun Jin Jung, Young Soo Kang, MinJee Kang, Tetsushi Okumura, and Eunbin Whang for their valuable assistance with this project. This article was presented at the annual conference of the International Association for Conflict Management in June 2010.

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