
# Influence-Based Fair Selection for Sample-Discriminative Backdoor Attacks

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


# Contributions

- > A meaningful observation. We reveal that the unfair backdoor sample selection leads to significant performance degradation on ASR under a small value of the manipulation strength.
- > A novel selection strategy for backdoor attacks. We propose a novel backdoor attack method based on influence-based fair selection that provides data-efficient influence computation and fair backdoor sample selection.
- **Superior performances**. We conduct comprehensive experiments on four benchmarks to validate the superiority of the proposed attack method.


# **Observation and Motivations**

**An example** of different manipulation strength  $\epsilon$  in backdoor attack



A smaller value of  $\epsilon$  is preferred since it enhances stealth!

#### **Experimental Observation** on variance of class-level ASR



As the value of  $\epsilon$  decreases, the number of selected samples in each category becomes more imbalanced, leading to a greater variance in class-level ASR.

# **Preliminaries**

### **Influence Functions:**

 $z_i$ : A training point

 $z_i$ : A test point sampled from Q


$$egin{aligned} \phi_{ij} &= \phi(oldsymbol{z}_i, oldsymbol{z}_j \sim Q) \ & riangleq rac{d\ell_j(\hat{ heta}_\delta)}{d\delta} \Big|_{\delta=0} = -
abla_{ heta}\ell(oldsymbol{z}_j, \hat{ heta})^ op H_{\hat{ heta}}^{-1} 
abla_{ heta}\ell(oldsymbol{z}_i, \hat{ heta}) \ & H_{\hat{ heta}} &= rac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n 
abla_{ heta}^2 \ell(oldsymbol{z}_i, \hat{ heta}) \end{aligned}$$

Calculating the impact of training samples with a trigger on the backdoored test risk contributes to find the backdoor samples.

## A Toy Model

**Settings:** binary classification task (5000 positive and negative points); each sample is with 768 dimension; three-layer fully-connected network; construct backdoor sample with setting last 20 dimensions to zero;

**Computing influence score** of backdoor sample on the test (backdoor) risk




Backdooring the sample in *Group 1* (the group closest to the class prototype) probably causes a bigger value of influence, contributing to reduce the backdoored test risk.

Infecting samples closed to class prototype achieves better ASR!

# Methodology

## Framework: Influence-based Fair poison sample Selection (IFS)



## Step1: Data-efficient influence computation

$$egin{aligned} \phi_{i,D_{ ext{val}}'} &pprox -rac{1}{U} \sum
olimits_{u=1}^{U} 
abla_{ heta} \ell(oldsymbol{z}_{u}',\hat{ heta})^{ op} H_{\hat{ heta}}^{-1} 
abla_{ heta} \ell(oldsymbol{z}_{i},\hat{ heta}) \end{aligned} \ &= - \Big[ 
abla_{ heta} rac{1}{U} \sum
olimits_{u=1}^{U} \ell(oldsymbol{z}_{u}',\hat{ heta}) \Big]^{ op} H_{\hat{ heta}}^{-1} 
abla_{ heta} \ell(oldsymbol{z}_{i},\hat{ heta}) \end{aligned}$$

A subset  $D'_{val}$  is calculated for efficient influence computation.

#### **Step2: Influence-based fair sample selection**

 $D_M \leftarrow \{(\boldsymbol{x}_i, \boldsymbol{y}_i) | \phi_i > \tau^c\}_{i \in ||G_1^c||}, \, \forall \, c \in [C]$ 


Select same number of backdoor samples across varying classes.

**Step3: Model retraining until covergence** 


## **Experiments**

## **Quantitative Results**

1) Different manipulation strengths  $\epsilon$ 




## 2) Different backdoor rates r




Our proposed backdoor sample selection strategy is superior.

# **More Analyses**



**Great performance** on varying blackbox settings.



Well solve the issue of variance on ASR.