
# MALWARE INVESTIGATION LAB STEPHEN MENSAH


# SCREENSHOTS FROM THE LAB SERENETRINITY

Following TCP stream. Everything is encrypted.




# Analyzing the beaconing behavior of the Malware






## **Orangeworm**


# Same encryption algorithm and destination port but different source ports




## The protocol conversation panel – 192.168.99.52 and 32.221.46 had highest number of packets



# Conversations between two endpoints




# Beaconing behavior of the orange worm




## **Backoff**


## **Threat Assessment View**




# Ladder Diagram to view the conversations between the host and the C2 server




# Following and analyzing an HTTP stream. Identified a malicious user-agent string




# A summary of the conversations that were captured



# The beaconing behavior of the Backoff malware



# Summary of update requests to and responses from the C2 server



#### **SILENTTRINITY**

## **Threat Simulation**

To investigate and analyze for silenttrinity malware, I will create customized alerts that would send notifications as soon as a condition is triggered. The said malware uses a command-and-control server to communicate consistently with its hosts. As such, I will monitor the communications that existed between two IP addresses. the IP address 10.0.0.65 established a 3-way handshake with the host 157.230.93.100. Consistent communication took place after a successful handshake from different ports on 10.0.0.65 to the same port on 157.230.93.100 (port 8443). By using the graph, I will monitor the interval at which these two nodes communicated. I realized that both addresses communicated at regular intervals and exchanged almost the same number of packets every 5 seconds. Using the ladder diagram, I identified that a total of 1432 packets were exchanged between these, the highest on the chart. I tried following the communications with the "Follow Stream" and "Follow TLS" tools; however, they were encrypted. Malware steals sensitive information by using encryption and compression to reduce file sizes to avoid network transfer threshold alerts and evade detection. As such, I will equally analyze all packets within a day of the event to scout for patterns and potential actions executed by the malware. Due to the nature of this malware, I will assign a high criticality level. I will use the graphs and protocol ladder views to follow communications. A postincident report will be written to document the event and the company's threat intel and attack signatures will be updated.

# 2. Business Impact

The silenttrinity malware can be used to steal sensitive information from a network. Short-term risks include information theft, the stolen information can be used by attackers to commit fraud, and possible ransomware attacks. Long-term risks are legal actions and data protection compliance issues with Compliance Authorities, tarnish business reputation, huge financial loss, and loss of customer trust.

## 3. Remediation

The network will be monitored in real-time to detect any uncommon data flow. Intrusion Prevention Systems utilize deep reinforcement learning will be employed to detect new silenttrinity malware variants, educate employees on safe online practices, block any IP address with consistent communications to an external address on port 8443, and monitor for any suspicious file.

## **ORANGEWORM**

## **Threat Simulation**

The first step to take is to create a network alert to notify you when suspicious activity is detected. After the notification, I will start analyzing packets captured within 4 days before the alert was triggered and the activities within 24 hours after the event. By filtering the packets, I will analyze all packets that are associated with the C2 server. I will then monitor for any uncommon communications that will exist between two IP addresses. From the packet capture, multiple communications were discovered from address 35.221.46.24 to different hosts. However, there was consistent communication between the said address on port 443 and the address 192.168.99.52 on different ports. From the capture, it was evident that close to the same number of packets was communicated at different but regular time intervals. This behavior deviates from normal user actions. it could represent structured communication between the C2 and its compromised hosts since both parties need to be in regular touch for matching orders or commands. Using the Zeek Logs panel, I discovered that all the packets that were communicated between 35.221.46.24 and 192.168.99.52 have the same orig ip bytes (payload byte) of 1449 bytes. Having different packets with the same payload size indicates suspicious or programmed activity. Orangeworm can create backdoors and targets critical infrastructure such as hospitals to steal information. Due to this, I will assign a high criticality level. I used the Zeek logs and graph panel to analyze the packets. A detailed report will be written on the incident and threat intel will be updated.

## 2. Business Impacts

Orangeworm malware can be used to steal sensitive information, create backdoors for future exploitation, and launch ransomware attacks with the stolen information. The business can incur huge financial losses from ransomware, face legal battles, and deal with compliance issues.

## 3. Remediation

The network must be monitored and analyzed in real-time for anomalies, advanced Intrusion Prevention Systems must be deployed, and efficient and trusted antivirus should be installed. In addition

#### **Backoff**

## **Threat Simulation**

To address the backoff malware, I will first create an alert to send a notification to the security team as soon as an abnormal traffic flow or activity is detected on the network. I will then analyze all network traffic within a 120-hour timeframe. This will help investigate potential pre-alert malware activities. The network traffic will be refined by filtering with IP addresses to determine any strong and consistent connections between two hosts and look out for any jitters that could be introduced by the malware authors to avoid detection. After that, I will apply additional filters to search for packets that may contain executable files (.exe) with the hex signature "4D 5A" which may have been downloaded by users. From the packet capture, it was evident that the host 192.168.99.55 sent packets from different ports to the IP address 157.245.128.27 on port 80, a total of 1331 packets were communicated at regular intervals within an hour. By using the graph dashboard, I will be able to monitor the rate at which the communication was done and the jitter rate to be able to determine if the behavior is normal or unusual – it was abnormal in this case. Since Backoff uses HTTP GET requests, I will use the "follow HTTP stream" panel to analyze the HTTP packets to search for any malicious user-agent strings. I identified a user-agent string "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; rv:24.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/24.0" – which a malicious agent that is used by the Backoff malware. I will draft a report on this event and update the company's incident response plan. I will equally update our threat intel and signatures. The threat assessment panel indicated that there were 126 packets with high severity. As such, I will assign a high criticality level to this malware. The dashboards to be used are the threat assessment panel, zeek logs, follow stream, and ladder diagram.

## **Business Impact**

The malware is used to steal sensitive user information. Short-term impacts are potential ransomware attacks and financial loss. The reputation of the business could be destroyed, and the company can be battling legal and PCI compliance issues in the long term.

## Remediation

To address this incident, it is important to constantly monitor the network for any suspicious behavior. In addition, implement ACLs to restrict access to the network - only allowed ports will be able to communicate with my network, block all unnecessary ports and services, ensure end-to-end encryption

on every system, employ data exfiltration systems, and implement MFA to restrict access to the company's remote desktops.

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