

Coalitional Game Theory: Definitions

Game Theory Course:
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Introduction



- Our focus is on what **groups of agents**, rather than individual agents, can achieve.
- Given a set of agents, a coalitional game defines how well each group (or *coalition*) of agents can do for itself.
- We are **not** concerned with:
 - how the agents make individual choices within a coalition;
 - how they coordinate;
- ...instead, we take the payoffs to a coalition as given.


Definition

- Transferable utility assumption:
 - payoffs may be redistributed among a coalition's members.
 - satisfied whenever payoffs are dispensed in a universal *currency*.
 - each coalition can be assigned a single value as its payoff.



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Definition (Coalitional game with transferable utility)

A **coalitional game with transferable utility** is a pair (N, v) , where

- N is a finite set of players, indexed by i ; and
- $v : 2^N \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ associates with each coalition $S \subseteq N$ a real-valued payoff $v(S)$ that the coalition's members can distribute among themselves. We assume that $v(\emptyset) = 0$.

Using Coalitional Game Theory




Questions we use coalitional game theory to answer:

1. Which coalition will form?
2. How should that coalition divide its payoff among its members?

The answer to (1) is often “the grand coalition” (all agents in N) though this can depend on having made the right choice about (2).

Analyzing coalitional games



1. Which coalition will form?

- we'll consider cases where the answer is **the grand coalition**
- makes sense for superadditive games

2. How should the coalition divide its payoff?

- in order to be **fair**
- in order to be **stable**