



# Stochastic Games

Game Theory Course:  
Jackson, Leyton-Brown & Shoham

# Stochastic Games

## Introduction




- What if we didn't always repeat back to the same stage game?
- A stochastic game is a generalization of **repeated games**
  - agents repeatedly play games from a set of normal-form games
  - the game played at any iteration depends on the previous game played and on the actions taken by all agents in that game


# Stochastic Games

## Visualization

Repeated Game



Stochastic Game



An informal visualization of the difference between repeated and stochastic games.

cooperative payoff utility Bayesian Normal-form auctions Game Theory Online Nash equilibrium class players strategies zero-sum probability tragedy of the commons repeated indifferent rational random action

# Stochastic Games

## Formal Definition

### Definition

A **stochastic game** is a tuple  $(Q, N, A, P, R)$ , where

- $Q$  is a finite set of states,
- $N$  is a finite set of  $n$  players,
- $A = A_1 \times \dots \times A_n$ , where  $A_i$  is a finite set of actions available to player  $i$ ,
- $P : Q \times A \times Q \rightarrow [0, 1]$  is the transition probability function;  $P(q, a, \hat{q})$  is the probability of transitioning from state  $q$  to state  $\hat{q}$  after joint action  $a$ , and
- $R = r_1, \dots, r_n$ , where  $r_i : Q \times A \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$  is a real-valued payoff function for player  $i$ .



Game Theory

Bayesian Normal-form auctions

equilibrium

class players

rational

math

Online

probability

zero-sum

strategies

predator

Nash equilibria

tragedy of the commons

repeated

indifferent

paradox

cooperative

payoff

utility

social

behavior

free

risky

choice

reputation

maximizes

paper

Extensive-form

random

action

game

status

theory

# strategies rigorous analysis zero-sum probability **Online**

## Analysis



- limit average reward
- future discount reward