WCTF 2020 Challenge: Spaceless Spacing

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Initial Step: What is the challenge?

Connect to 3.137.154.50:4242

We know there is a challenge on some port.

This is all we know.

Initial Step: What is the challenge speaking?

Initial Step: What is the challenge speaking?

Random binary data, what is this?

Google!

Initial Step: What is the challenge speaking?

Google reveals this is HTTP/2.0

Initial Step: How do we speak to it?

```
$ curl 3.137.154.50:4242/
```

curl: (1) Received HTTP/0.9 when not allowed

Initial Step: How do we speak to it?

```
$ curl --http2 3.137.154.50:4242/
```

curl: (1) Received HTTP/0.9 when not allowed

Initial Step: How do we speak to it?

```
$ curl --http2-prior-knowledge 3.137.154.50:4242/
#!/usr/bin/env python

import os
import time

from flask import Flask
...
```

The Challenge

```
@app.route("/<secret>")
def check_secret(secret):
    if len(secret) != len(SECRET):
        return "SPACELESS SPACING!"
    for a, b in zip(secret, SECRET):
        if a == " ":
            continue
    elif a != b:
        return "INCORRECT!"
    else:
        time.sleep(PLANCK_TIME)
    if " " in secret:
        return "INCORRECT!"
    return "CORRECT!"
```

The Challenge: Test

```
$ curl --http2-prior-knowledge 3.137.154.50:4242/test
```

SPACELESS SPACING!%


The Challenge: Bruteforce Flag Size

```
$ curl --http2-prior-knowledge 3.137.154.50:4242/a
SPACELESS SPACING!%
$ curl --http2-prior-knowledge 3.137.154.50:4242/ab
SPACELESS SPACING!%
$ curl --http2-prior-knowledge 3.137.154.50:4242/abc
SPACELESS SPACING!%
$ curl --http2-prior-knowledge 3.137.154.50:4242/abcd
SPACELESS SPACING!%
$ curl --http2-prior-knowledge 3.137.154.50:4242/abcde
SPACELESS SPACING!%
$ curl --http2-prior-knowledge 3.137.154.50:4242/abcdef
SPACELESS SPACING!%
$ curl --http2-prior-knowledge 3.137.154.50:4242/abcdefg
SPACELESS SPACING!%
$ curl --http2-prior-knowledge 3.137.154.50:4242/abcdefgh
SPACELESS SPACING!%
$ curl --http2-prior-knowledge 3.137.154.50:4242/abcdefghi
SPACELESS SPACING!%
$ curl --http2-prior-knowledge 3.137.154.50:4242/abcdefghij
INCORRECT!%
```


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HTTP/2.0



HTTP/2.0: Multiplexing



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Timeless Timing Attacks



Timeless Timing Attacks: Exploiting Concurrency to Leak Secrets over Remote Connections

Tom Van Goethem, imec-DistriNet, KU Leuven; Christina Pöpper, New York University Abu Dhabi; Wouter Joosen, imec-DistriNet, KU Leuven; Mathy Vanhoef, New York University Abu Dhabi

https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity20/presentation/van-goethem

This paper is included in the Proceedings of the 29th USENIX Security Symposium.


August 12-14, 2020 978-1-939133-17-5



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```

HTTP/2.0: Multiplexing



The Solution

Make several simultaneous requests for:

- Some known wrong character (*)
- Some guessed character (A)

Measure frequency of which came back first vs second

The Solution

Make several simultaneous requests for:

- Some known wrong character (*)
- Some guessed character (B)

Measure frequency of which came back first vs second

The Solution

Make several simultaneous requests for:

- Some known wrong character (*)
- Some guessed character (C)

Measure frequency of which came back first vs second