


# Dynamic Analysis of PySock + Dropper


For this analysis, we will be skipping the part where the reverse shell lands on the victim's system.

One thing to note is that if you compile the python file on a Windows 7 machine then attempt to execute it on a Windows 10 machine, you will run into issues. But if you compile it on a Windows 10 machine then attempt to execute it on an older Windows machine, it will run successfully.

After a few seconds of executing the dropper.exe file, we get this popup. Looking at the further left-hand corner, we see a feather which tells us it isn't an actual Windows error message, moreso it's a message coded in to make the victim think the "software" didn't work & cause them to delete the software.




Looking at Procmon after running the dropper.exe file, we see a ton of events relating to file creation that the file executes. A few that stand out mention a system32 directory in %USERPROFILE%:



Time	Process Name	PID	Operation	Path	Result	Detail
10:18:...	dropper.exe	1792	CreateFile	C:\Users\conduct\AppData	SUCCESS	Desired Access: R...
10:18:...	dropper.exe	1792	CreateFile	C:\Users\conduct\AppData\Local\Temp	SUCCESS	Desired Access: R...
10:18:...	dropper.exe	1792	CreateFile	C:\Users\conduct\AppData\Local	SUCCESS	Desired Access: R...
10:18:...	dropper.exe	1792	CreateFile	C:\Users\conduct\AppData\Local\Tem...	SUCCESS	Desired Access: R...
10:18:...	dropper.exe	1792	CreateFile	C:\Users\conduct\AppData\Local\Temp...	SUCCESS	Desired Access: R...
10:18:...	dropper.exe	1792	CreateFile	C:\Users\conduct\AppData\Local\Temp...	SUCCESS	Desired Access: R...
10:18:...	dropper.exe	1792	CreateFile	C:\Users\conduct\AppData\Local\Temp...	SUCCESS	Desired Access: R...
10:18:...	dropper.exe	1792	CreateFile	C:\Users\conduct\AppData\Local\Temp...	SUCCESS	Desired Access: R...
10:18:...	dropper.exe	1792	CreateFile	C:\Users\conduct\AppData\Local\Temp...	SUCCESS	Desired Access: R...
10:18:...	dropper.exe	1792	CreateFile	C:\Users\conduct\AppData\Local\Temp...	SUCCESS	Desired Access: R...
10:18:...	dropper.exe	1792	CreateFile	C:\Users\conduct\system32	SUCCESS	Desired Access: R...
10:18:...	dropper.exe	1792	CreateFile	C:\Users	SUCCESS	Desired Access: R...
10:18:...	dropper.exe	1792	CreateFile	C:\	SUCCESS	Desired Access: R...
10:18:...	dropper.exe	1792	CreateFile	C:\Users\conduct	SUCCESS	Desired Access: R...
10:18:...	dropper.exe	1792	CreateFile	C:\Users	SUCCESS	Desired Access: R...
10:18:...	dropper.exe	1792	CreateFile	C:\Users\conduct\system32	SUCCESS	Desired Access: R...
10:18:...	dropper.exe	1792	CreateFile	C:\Users	SUCCESS	Desired Access: R...
10:18:...	dropper.exe	1792	CreateFile	C:\	SUCCESS	Desired Access: R...
10:18:...	dropper.exe	1792	CreateFile	C:\Users\conduct	SUCCESS	Desired Access: R...
10:18:...	dropper.exe	1792	CreateFile	C:\Users	SUCCESS	Desired Access: R...
10:18:...	dropper.exe	1792	CreateFile	C:\Users\conduct\AppData	SUCCESS	Desired Access: R...
10:18:...	dropper.exe	1792	CreateFile	C:\Users\conduct	SUCCESS	Desired Access: R...
10:18:...	dropper.exe	1792	CreateFile	C:\Users\conduct\AppData\Local	SUCCESS	Desired Access: R...
10:18:...	dropper.exe	1792	CreateFile	C:\Users\conduct\AppData	SUCCESS	Desired Access: R...
10:18:...	dropper.exe	1792	CreateFile	C:\Users\conduct\AppData\Local\Temp	SUCCESS	Desired Access: R...
10:18:...	dropper.exe	1792	CreateFile	C:\Users\conduct\AppData\Local	SUCCESS	Desired Access: R...
10:18:...	dropper.exe	1792	CreateFile	C:\Users\conduct\AppData\Local\Temp...	SUCCESS	Desired Access: R...
10:18:...	dropper.exe	1792	CreateFile	C:\Users\conduct\AppData\Local\Temp...	SUCCESS	Desired Access: R...


Showing 7,108 of 2,607,046 events (0.27%) Backed by virtual memory

After navigating into the %USERPROFILE%\system32 directory, we see some new entries:




The dropper.exe file drops an nmap folder as well as 3 files relating to nircmd.

If we go into the command line & execute the nircmd executable, we get a popup saying to go to a website for more info, upon doing that we see that nircmd is a command line utility that has many functions:



The nircmd.CHM file is like a man page, it shows all the functionality of the executable:



Looking at the process tree section of Procmon, we get a better view of the events occurring after executing the dropper.exe.

Process Tree			
<input type="checkbox"/> Only show processes still running at end of current trace <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Timelines cover displayed events only			
Process	Description	Image Path	Life Time
dropper.exe (828)		C:\Users\conduct...	
dropper.exe (1792)		C:\Users\conduct...	
cmd.exe (1736)	Windows Comma...	C:\Windows\syst...	
cmd.exe (1516)	Windows Comma...	C:\Windows\syst...	
schtasks.exe (1848)	Manages schedul...	C:\Windows\syst...	
cmd.exe (1772)	Windows Comma...	C:\Windows\syst...	
cmd.exe (1492)	Windows Comma...	C:\Windows\syst...	
attrib.exe (1576)	Attribute Utility	C:\Windows\syst...	
cmd.exe (1448)	Windows Comma...	C:\Windows\syst...	
powershell.exe (1276)	Windows PowerS...	C:\Windows\Syst...	
cmd.exe (1892)	Windows Comma...	C:\Windows\syst...	
cmd.exe (1872)	Windows Comma...	C:\Windows\syst...	
cmd.exe (1516)	Windows Comma...	C:\Windows\syst...	
powershell.exe (572)	Windows PowerS...	C:\Windows\Syst...	
cmd.exe (1492)	Windows Comma...	C:\Windows\syst...	
cmd.exe (2020)	Windows Comma...	C:\Windows\syst...	

As we can see, right after executing it, schtasks.exe is executed which tells us that a new task was scheduled. We also see attrib.exe being executed which is a program used to add attributes such as making a file read-only or hidden. And the last thing we see is powershell being executed on 2 separate occasions in this tree.

Going more in-depth into the scheduled task with process tree:

```

Description:  Manages scheduled tasks
Company:     Microsoft Corporation
Path:        C:\Windows\system32\schtasks.exe
Command:     SCHEDTASKS /CREATE /TN Win32start /SC MINUTE /TR C:\Users\conduct\AppData\Local\Temp\prompt.exe /ST 10:00
User:        conduct-PC\conduct
PID:         1848      Started:  6/24/2020 10:17:47 PM
                  Exited:    6/24/2020 10:17:47 PM

```

We can see the exact command used to create the task was:

```
SCHEDTASKS /CREATE /TN Win32start /SC MINUTE /TR C:\Users\conduct\AppData\TEMP\prompt.exe /ST 10:00
```

This creates a task named Win32start & schedules it to execute the prompt.exe file in TEMP every minute, starting at 10:00 AM.

Occasionally, the victim's machine will flash with a taskeng.exe command prompt, this is the scheduled task attempting to run.

```

taskeng.exe
Traceback (most recent call last):
  File "win.py", line 13, in <module>
    ConnectionRefusedError: [WinError 10061] No connection could be made because the target machine acti
[1940] Failed to execute script win

```

Here, we see that the task failed to run & errors out with a connection refused, hinting that the prompt.exe is attempting to connect back to the attacker.


Looking at the attrib.exe event, we see that prompt.exe acquires the read only (+r) and hidden (+h) attributes.

```

Description:  Attribute Utility
Company:     Microsoft Corporation
Path:        C:\Windows\system32\attrib.exe
Command:     attrib +r +h prompt.exe
User:        conduct-PC\conduct
PID:         1576      Started:  6/24/2020 10:17:47 PM
                  Exited:    6/24/2020 10:17:47 PM

```

I believe that adding the read only attribute prevents the user from deleting the file:



```

conduct-pc\conduct
C:\Windows\system32
AppData
Application Data
Contacts
Cookies
Desktop
Documents
Downloads
Favorites
Links
Local Settings
Music
My Documents
NTUSER.DAT
NTUSER.DAT{016888bd-6c6f-11de-8d1d-001e0bcde3ec}.TM.blf
NTUSER.DAT{016888bd-6c6f-11de-8d1d-001e0bcde3ec}.TMContainer0000000000000000
NTUSER.DAT{016888bd-6c6f-11de-8d1d-001e0bcde3ec}.TMContainer0000000000000000
NetHood
Pictures
PrintHood
Recent
Saved Games
Searches
SendTo
Start Menu
Templates

```

## Removal

Removing this malware is fairly straightforward.

- Remove the read-only & hidden attribute from prompt.exe

```

C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe
C:\Users\conduct\Desktop>attrib -h -r %TMP%\prompt.exe
C:\Users\conduct\Desktop>


```

- Delete prompt.exe. **NOTE:** If there is an active connection to the attacker, you won't be able to remove the prompt.exe file, you're going to have to kill the process then remove the file:

```

C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe
C:\Users\conduct\Desktop>del %TMP%\prompt.exe
C:\Users\conduct\AppData\Local\Temp\prompt.exe
Access is denied.
C:\Users\conduct\Desktop>

```



```

C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe
C:\Users\conduct>rm %TMP%\prompt.exe
C:\Users\conduct>

```

- Finally, remove teh dropper.exe file and you're Pysock free!