MCP Wallet Security Audit Report

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1 Executive Summary

On 2025.04.03, the SlowMist security team received the TermiX team's security audit application for bsc-mcp wallet, developed the audit plan according to the agreement of both parties and the characteristics of the project, and finally issued the security audit report.

The SlowMist security team adopts the strategy of "white-box" to conduct a complete security test on the project in the way closest to the real attack.

The test method information:

Test method	Description
Black box testing	Conduct security tests from an attacker's perspective externally.
Grey box testing	Conduct security testing on code modules through the scripting tool, observing the internal running status, mining weaknesses.
White box testing	Based on the open source code, non-open source code, to detect whether there are vulnerabilities in programs such as nodes, SDK, etc.

The vulnerability severity level information:

Level	Description
Critical	Critical severity vulnerabilities will have a significant impact on the security of the project, and it is strongly recommended to fix the critical vulnerabilities.
High	High severity vulnerabilities will affect the normal operation of the project. It is strongly recommended to fix high-risk vulnerabilities.
Medium	Medium severity vulnerability will affect the operation of the project. It is recommended to fix medium-risk vulnerabilities.
Low	Low severity vulnerabilities may affect the operation of the project in certain scenarios. It is suggested that the project team should evaluate and consider whether these vulnerabilities need to be fixed.
Weakness	There are safety risks theoretically, but it is extremely difficult to reproduce in engineering.
Suggestion	There are better practices for coding or architecture.

2 Audit Methodology

The security audit process of SlowMist security team for wallet application includes two steps:

- The codes are scanned/tested for commonly known and more specific vulnerabilities using automated analysis tools.
- Manual audit of the codes for security issues. The wallet application is manually analyzed to look for any potential issues.

Note: Due to the early chaotic period of the MCP application service, there are many attack methods that are difficult to fix, and users need to check and identify the relevant risks on their own when using and accessing it. This part is not reflected in the audit, and you can refer to the following articles.

https://slowmist.medium.com/malicious-mcp-parsing-covert-poisoning-and-manipulation-in-the-mcp-system-c2f6c631d773

The following is a list of security audit items considered during an audit:

NO.	Audit Class	Audit Subclass
1	Configuration security	Environment variable configuration security audit
		Transport configuration security audit
		API configuration security audit
2	Permission security	MCP permissions detection
3	Authentication & Authorization security	Monitored access security audit
		Built-in Approval Workflows security audit
4	MCP lifecycle security	Initialization security audit
		Operation security audit
		Shutdown security audit
5	Transports security	STDIO/Streamable HTTP security audit
6	Context security	Prompt leaking security audit

NO.	Audit Class	Audit Subclass
		Prompt injection security audit
		Context pollution security audit
7	Sampling security	Sampling and Prompts dynamic workflows security audit
8	Business security	Business logic security audit
9	Components security	Third-party components security audit
10	API security	Input and Output security audit
		Transmission security audit
		Error handling security audit
		Resource control security audit
11	Log security	Log audit trails and monitoring security audit
12	Docking and deployment security	Docking and deployment security audit
13	Transfer security	Signature security audit
		Deposit/Transfer security audit
		Transaction broadcast security audit
14	Secret key security	Secret key generation security audit
		Secret key storage security audit
		Secret key usage security audit
		Secret key backup security audit
		Secret key destruction security audit
		Insecure entropy source security audit
		Cryptography security audit
15	User interaction security	WYSIWYS

NO.	Audit Class	Audit Subclass
		AML
		Anti-phishing
		Pre-execution
		Contact whitelisting
		Password complexity requirements

3 Project Overview

3.1 Project Introduction

Audit Version

https://github.com/TermiX-official/bsc-mcp

Audit Version 1 (hereinafter referred to as the old version)

commit: 966c6f172e2dd22e7a641a16c1933592e04d1333

Audit Version 2

commit: 920917349303ffdcdfe76c1b2f0464788d8c0459

Fixed Version

https://github.com/TermiX-official/bsc-mcp

commit: e4f2f85145307ed56c18ee911b8dc2241781879b

3.2 Vulnerability Information

The following is the status of the vulnerabilities found in this audit:

NO	Title	Category	Level	Status
N1	The storage method of wallet private keys is too fragile	Secret key storage security audit	High	Fixed
N2	The third-party interface returns information without verification and directly inserts the context	Input and Output security audit	Low	Acknowledged
N3	The pop-up did not display the specific transaction information	User interaction security	Suggestion	Acknowledged
N4	MCP interface authentication issue	Monitored access security audit	Suggestion	Acknowledged
N5	The account data was not cleared in time	Business logic security audit	High	Fixed
N6	Old version code: No authentication authorization for transfer	Built-in Approval Workflows security audit	High	Fixed
N7	Old version code: Store private key in plain text	Secret key storage security audit	High	Fixed
N8	Lack of anti-money laundering strategies	User interaction security	Suggestion	Acknowledged
N9	Lack of sensitive operation logging	Log audit trails and monitoring security audit	Suggestion	Acknowledged
N10	Lack of error handling for third-party interface returns	Error handling security audit	Low	Acknowledged
N11	Use osascript and powershell for password verification	MCP permissions detection	Information	Acknowledged
N12	Deployment information	Docking and deployment security audit	Information	Acknowledged

3.3 Vulnerability Summary

[N1] [High] The storage method of wallet private keys is too fragile

Category: Secret key storage security audit

Content

The MCP program uses a 6-digit password encryption key set during user initialization to encrypt the wallet private key, then performs a single-round SHA-256 hash on the 6-digit password as a verification comparison for re-entering the password in use, and finally saves the encrypted private key and the SHA-256 password to the .env file as environment variables.

Here are two problems: one is that the strength of a 6-digit password is far below the recommended minimum length of 8 digits; the other is that using a single SHA-256 algorithm to save password verification is extremely vulnerable to brute-force attacks. Based on the current computing power, it only takes a single 4090 graphics card a very short time to brute-force all possible 6-digit password combinations, and there are rainbow tables that can query corresponding passwords even faster.

```
.env
BSC_WALLET_PRIVATE_KEY=1197d6979[redacted]
BSC_RPC_URL=
WALLET_PASSWORD=ada68[redacted]
```

```
const algorithm = 'aes-256-cbc';

export function encrypt(text: string, secretKey: string): string {
    const key = crypto.createHash('sha256').update(secretKey).digest();
    const iv = crypto.randomBytes(16);
    const cipher = crypto.createCipheriv(algorithm, key, iv);
    let encrypted = cipher.update(text, 'utf8', 'hex');
    encrypted += cipher.final('hex');
    return iv.toString('hex') + ':' + encrypted;
}

export function decrypt(encrypted: string, secretKey: string): string {
    const [ivHex, encryptedText] = encrypted.split(':') as [string, string];
    const key = crypto.createHash('sha256').update(secretKey).digest();
    const decipher = crypto.createDecipheriv(algorithm, key, Buffer.from(ivHex, 'hex'));
    let decrypted = decipher.update(encryptedText, 'hex', 'utf8');
    decrypted += decipher.final('utf8');
    return decrypted;
}

export function hashPassword(password: string): string {
    return crypto.createHash("sha256").update(password).digest("hex");
}
```

Solution

It is recommended to use the scrypt encryption key, and use a random salt of ≥16 bytes, set N ≥ 2^17, r=8, p=1, and adjust N or p appropriately according to actual computing power. Alternatively, use the argon2id algorithm.

Status

Fixed; The project team is currently using passwords with 8 characters or more combined with bcrypt, which already has a certain level of strength, and it can be further strengthened to argon2id if conditions permit.

[N2] [Low] The third-party interface returns information without verification and directly inserts the context

Category: Input and Output security audit

Content

The MCP service does not strictly verify the format of the returned information when requesting third-party APIs. The MCP service will directly display the unfiltered API return data, and malicious third parties (or third parties attacked) may inject malicious prompt word or scripts through the returned content to carry out social engineering attacks,

data theft, or even privilege escalation.

Solution

It is recommended to use a type validation library to strictly validate the structure of the returned data, ensuring that the data returned by the interface matches the data type received as parameters, and to capture error information contained in the data returned by the interface, ensuring that all data returned by third-party APIs are within expectations and to avoid the direct injection of data returned by third-party interfaces into the context.

Status

Acknowledged

[N3] [Suggestion] The pop-up did not display the specific transaction information

Category: User interaction security

Content

When sending a transaction, the detailed content of the transaction is not displayed, making it difficult for users to distinguish whether the transaction data has been tampered with.



Solution

It is recommended to display more complete confirmation information for transactions sent, to facilitate users in making final confirmation, and to prevent man-in-the-middle attacks.

Status

Acknowledged

[N4] [Suggestion] MCP interface authentication issue

Category: Monitored access security audit

Content

The MCP interface is open in real-time locally. After the user enters the password, there is no need for a password if the transfer is initiated before the validity of MCP's verification expires. At this time, if the interface is called by another program, the transfer can be initiated directly without any verification.



Solution

It is recommended to perform verification for sensitive operations each time or to implement more stringent session management to prevent external malicious calls.

Status

Acknowledged

[N5] [High] The account data was not cleared in time

Category: Business logic security audit

Content

The code is intended to be that after entering the password, clicking "no" will not save the password, and the password needs to be verified every time the wallet's function is called. However, after selecting "no," the logic to clear the password is missing, causing the password to persist in memory even if it is entered only once, and subsequent signatures do not require password verification anymore.

- Code Location: src/config.ts

```
let account: PrivateKeyAccount | null = null;
export const getAccount = async () => {
    const BSC_WALLET_PRIVATE_KEY = process.env.BSC_WALLET_PRIVATE_KEY as Hex
    if (!BSC_WALLET_PRIVATE_KEY) {
        throw new Error("BSC_WALLET_PRIVATE_KEY is not defined");
    }
    if (account) {
        return account;
    }

    const {agreed, value: password} = await getPassword()
    if (!password) {
        throw new Error("You did not enter a password.");
    }

    const pk = decrypt(BSC_WALLET_PRIVATE_KEY, password)

    account = privateKeyToAccount(
        pk as Hex
    );
    if (agreed) {
        setTimeout(() => {
            account = null;
        }, 1000 * 60 * 60);
    }
    // forgot to clear the account information in the code
    return account;
};
```

Solution

It is recommended to immediately clear the account when the user does not select "agreed".

Status

Fixed

[N6] [High] Old version code: No authentication authorization for transfer

Category: Built-in Approval Workflows security audit

Content

Cross-MCP malicious call directly executes without any secondary verification



Solution

It is recommended that calls involving sensitive operations be approved after the user has authenticated and authorized.

Status

Fixed

[N7] [High] Old version code: Store private key in plain text

Category: Secret key storage security audit

Content

Directly write the wallet private key in plain text to the configuration file.

```
- macOS: `~/Library/Application Support/Claude/claude_desktop_config.json`
- Windows: `%APPDATA%\Claude\claude_desktop_config.json`
- Linux: `~/.config/Claude/claude_desktop_config.json`

Add the following configuration:

```json
{
    "mcpServers": {
        "bsc-mcp": {
            "command": "node",
            "args": [
                "/Users/Username/Desktop/bsc-mpc/build/index.js"
            ],
            "env": {
                "BSC_WALLET_PRIVATE_KEY": "BSC_WALLET_PRIVATE_KEY",
                "BSC_RPC_URL": "BSC_RPC_URL",
                "MORALIS_API_KEY": "MORALIS_API_KEY"
            },
            "disabled": false,
            "autoApprove": []
        }
    }
}
```
```

Solution

It is recommended to encrypt the wallet private key for storage, and can adopt schemes such as pbkdf2 bcrypt and scrypt to alleviate the problem of brute-force cracking.

Status

Fixed

[N8] [Suggestion] Lack of anti-money laundering strategies

Category: User interaction security

Content

The signature transfer in the wallet does not have AML (Anti-Money Laundering) related strategies, making it difficult for users to distinguish the target of the transfer and whether the interacting wallet address or contract is malicious. Users may inadvertently interact with sanctioned wallet addresses or contract addresses, leading to the contamination of their own wallets.

Solution

It is recommended to connect to the AML black address library of SlowMist, assist users in conducting anti-money laundering checks on the target address during the signature transfer, and try to avoid interactions between users and wallet addresses or contracts under sanctions.

Status

Acknowledged

[N9] [Suggestion] Lack of sensitive operation logging

Category: Log audit trails and monitoring security audit

Content

There is no logging of signature transfer and other operations of MCP service, which is not conducive to subsequent behavioral audits.

Solution

It is recommended that each interface call involving MCP services and the interaction with the local operating system should be logged in full, for subsequent review.

Status

Acknowledged

[N10] [Low] Lack of error handling for third-party interface returns

Category: Error handling security audit

Content

The error returned by the third-party interface is not handled and the error is directly returned to the context. This issue involves code from multiple places, but the content of the code is similar: all directly return error information to the context.

```
catch (error) {
                console.error("buy meme token failed:", error);
                const errorMessage =
                    error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error);
                return {
                    content: [
                        {
                            type: "text",
```

```
                            text: `Transaction failed: ${errorMessage}`,
                        },
                    ],
                    isError: true,
                };
            }
        }
```

Solution

It is recommended to handle the errors returned by third-party interfaces to avoid directly returning error information to the context, which may pollute the context.

Status

Acknowledged

[N11] [Information] Use osascript and powershell for password verification

Category: MCP permissions detection

Content

Using osascript and powershell for password verification requires interaction with the local operating system, which necessitates certain local operating system permissions and may also pose risks.

- Code Location: src/util.ts

```
export function showInputBoxWithTerms(isRetry?: boolean): Promise<InputResult> {

  let message = "Enter your Wallet Password:";
  if (isRetry) {
    message = "Wrong password, please try again:";
  }
  return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {

    switch (platform) {
      case 'darwin':
        // For macOS, we use AppleScript to show a dialog with both input and checkbox
        // The AppleScript is more complex but allows for a better UX
        if (isRetry) {
          message = "❌" + message
        }
        const appleScript = `
        tell application "System Events"
        set userPassword to ""
        set buttonPressed to ""
```

```
        repeat
            try
                set userInput to display dialog "${message}" default answer "" with
hidden answer buttons {"cancel", "confirm"} default button "confirm" with icon note
                set userPassword to text returned of userInput
                set buttonPressed to button returned of userInput

                if buttonPressed is "cancel" then
                    exit repeat
                end if

                if length of userPassword is 6 then
                    exit repeat
                end if

                display dialog "Password must be exactly 6 characters." buttons
{"confirm"} default button "confirm" with icon caution
            on error
                -- Handle any errors (like when user clicks the red close button)
                exit repeat
            end try
        end repeat

        if buttonPressed is not "cancel" then
            set agreeToTerms to button returned of (display dialog "🔒 You will stay
signed in for the next hour." buttons {"no", "yes"} default button "no" with icon
caution)
            return userPassword & "============" & agreeToTerms
        else
            return "canceled"
        end if
    end tell
        `;

        exec(`osascript -e '${appleScript}'`, (error, stdout, stderr) => {
          if (error) {
            // User cancelled
            if (error.code === 1 || error.code === 255) {
              resolve({ value: null, agreed: false });
            } else {
              reject(error);
            }
            return;
          }

          if (stdout.trim() === "canceled") {
              reject(new Error("Please enter the password before using 🔒"));
              return;
```

```
      }
      const [password, agree] = stdout.trim().split("============");
      resolve({
        value: password,
        agreed: agree === "yes"
      });
    });
    break;

  case 'win32':

    const winCommand = `
    Add-Type -AssemblyName System.Windows.Forms
    Add-Type -AssemblyName System.Drawing

    $form = New-Object System.Windows.Forms.Form
    $form.Text = 'wallet password'
    $form.Size = New-Object System.Drawing.Size(450,300)
    $form.StartPosition = 'CenterScreen'

    $label = New-Object System.Windows.Forms.Label
    $label.Location = New-Object System.Drawing.Point(10,20)
    $label.Size = New-Object System.Drawing.Size(380,40)
    $label.Text = '${message}'
    $form.Controls.Add($label)

    # User input label
    $userLabel = New-Object System.Windows.Forms.Label
    $userLabel.Location = New-Object System.Drawing.Point(10,70)
    $userLabel.Size = New-Object System.Drawing.Size(150,20)
    $userLabel.Text = 'Input Password:'
    $form.Controls.Add($userLabel)

    # User input textbox
    $passwordTextBox = New-Object System.Windows.Forms.TextBox
    $passwordTextBox.Location = New-Object System.Drawing.Point(160,70)
    $passwordTextBox.Size = New-Object System.Drawing.Size(250,20)
    $passwordTextBox.PasswordChar = '*'
    $form.Controls.Add($passwordTextBox)

    # Error message label
    $errorLabel = New-Object System.Windows.Forms.Label
    $errorLabel.Location = New-Object System.Drawing.Point(160,95)
    $errorLabel.Size = New-Object System.Drawing.Size(250,20)
    $errorLabel.ForeColor = [System.Drawing.Color]::Red
    $errorLabel.Text = ''
    $form.Controls.Add($errorLabel)

    $checkbox = New-Object System.Windows.Forms.CheckBox
```

```
        $checkbox.Location = New-Object System.Drawing.Point(10,130)
        $checkbox.Size = New-Object System.Drawing.Size(350,20)
        $checkbox.Text = 'You will stay signed in for the next hour.'
        $form.Controls.Add($checkbox)

        $button = New-Object System.Windows.Forms.Button
        $button.Location = New-Object System.Drawing.Point(175,190)
        $button.Size = New-Object System.Drawing.Size(100,30)
        $button.Text = 'Confirm'
        $button.Add_Click({
            # Validate password length
            if ($passwordTextBox.Text.Length -ne 6) {
                $errorLabel.Text = 'Password must be exactly 6 characters.'
            } else {
                $form.DialogResult = [System.Windows.Forms.DialogResult]::OK
                $form.Close()
            }
        })
        $form.Controls.Add($button)

        $form.AcceptButton = $button
        $form.Add_Shown({$form.Activate()})
        [void]$form.ShowDialog()

        if ($form.DialogResult -eq [System.Windows.Forms.DialogResult]::OK) {
            $result = @{
              agreed = $checkbox.Checked
              value = $passwordTextBox.Text
            }

            $jsonResult = ConvertTo-Json -InputObject $result
            Write-Output $jsonResult
        }
        exit 0
`


        const tempScriptPath = path.join('.', 'terms_form.ps1');
        fs.writeFileSync(tempScriptPath, winCommand);

        exec(`powershell -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File "${tempScriptPath}"`, (error,
stdout, stderr) => {
          fs.unlinkSync(tempScriptPath);

          if (error && error.code !== 1) {
            resolve({
              value: null,
              agreed: false
            });
            return;
```

```
            }
            if (!stdout) {
                reject(new Error("Please enter the password before using "));
                return;
            }
            const stdoutJSON = JSON.parse(stdout);
            resolve({
              value: stdoutJSON.value as string,
              agreed: stdoutJSON.agreed as boolean
            });
          });
          break;

        default:
          reject(new Error(`Unsupported platform and command-line input is not
available: ${platform}`));
      }
    });
```

Solution

It is recommended to change the password verification method, which can use one-time passwords such as Google Auth, and they will immediately expire after verification. At the same time, use the Docker deployment method to isolate the MCP service.

Status

Acknowledged

[N12] [Information] Deployment information

Category: Docking and deployment security audit

Content

The code has been open sourced on GitHub:

https://github.com/TermiX-official/bsc-mcp

and listed on NPM:

https://www.npmjs.com/package/bnbchain-mcp?activeTab=readme.

The default deployment method is to use stdio for communication locally.

Solution

It is recommended to deploy as much as possible using Docker to isolate the MCP service from the host

environment.

Status

Acknowledged

4 Audit Result

Audit Number	Audit Team	Audit Date	Audit Result
0X002504050001	SlowMist Security Team	2025.04.03 - 2025.04.05	Low Risk

Summary conclusion: The SlowMist security team use a manual and SlowMist team's analysis tool to audit the project, during the audit work we found 4 high risk, 2 low risk, 4 suggestion vulnerabilities. All high-risk issues have been fixed.

5 Statement

SlowMist issues this report with reference to the facts that have occurred or existed before the issuance of this report, and only assumes corresponding responsibility based on these.

For the facts that occurred or existed after the issuance, SlowMist is not able to judge the security status of this project, and is not responsible for them. The security audit analysis and other contents of this report are based on the documents and materials provided to SlowMist by the information provider till the date of the insurance report (referred to as "provided information"). SlowMist assumes: The information provided is not missing, tampered with, deleted or concealed. If the information provided is missing, tampered with, deleted, concealed, or inconsistent with the actual situation, the SlowMist shall not be liable for any loss or adverse effect resulting therefrom. SlowMist only conducts the agreed security audit on the security situation of the project and issues this report. SlowMist is not responsible for the background and other conditions of the project.

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