

Electronic Commerce Models HW2

1)

$$F_A(v) = \frac{v^2}{25}$$

$$F_B(v) = \frac{1 - \exp(-v)}{1 - \exp(-5)}$$

a) computer the v.v function

$$\phi_i = v_i - \left(\frac{1 - G_i(v_i)}{g_i(v_i)} \right)$$

$$g_i = G_i'$$

$$\phi_A(v) = v - \left[\frac{\left(1 - \frac{v^2}{25}\right)}{\frac{2v}{25}} \right] = v - \frac{25 - v^2}{2v} = \frac{3v}{2} - \frac{25}{2v}$$

$$\phi_B = v - \left(\frac{1 - \left(\frac{1 - \exp(-v)}{1 - \exp(-5)} \right)}{\frac{\exp(-v)}{1 - \exp(-5)}} \right)$$

$$t = 1 - \exp(-5)$$

$$\phi_B = v - \left(\frac{1 - \left(\frac{1 - \exp(-v)}{t} \right)}{\frac{\exp(-v)}{t}} \right) = v - \frac{\exp(-v) - \exp(-5)}{\exp(-v)}$$

$$\phi_B = v - 1 + \frac{\exp(-5)}{\exp(-v)} = v - 1 + \exp(-5) \exp(v)$$

b) Verify that the virtual value function is monotone non-decreasing

$$\phi_A(v) = \frac{3v}{2} - \frac{25}{2v}$$

$$\phi_A(v)' = \frac{3}{2} + \frac{25}{2v^2} \geq 0 \rightarrow \text{non decreasing}$$

$$\phi_B = v - 1 + \frac{\exp(-5)}{\exp(-v)}$$

$$\phi'_B = 1 + \exp(x - 5) \geq 0 \rightarrow \text{non decreasing}$$

c)

$$\begin{aligned}\phi_A(v) &= 0 = \frac{3v}{2} - \frac{25}{2v} \\ v &= \pm \sqrt{\frac{25}{3}} = \pm 5\sqrt{3} \frac{1}{3}\end{aligned}$$

Because $v \geq 0$

$$v = 5 \cdot \left(\frac{1}{\sqrt{3}}\right)$$

$$\begin{aligned}\phi_B &= 0 = v - 1 + \exp(x - 5) \\ v &= 1 - W\left(\frac{1}{e^4}\right) \rightarrow W \text{ Lambert function}\end{aligned}$$

2)

a) One item single player for a where the reserve price is

$$v_0 = 5 \cdot \left(\frac{1}{\sqrt{3}}\right)$$

$$E[\text{Revenue}] = \int_{v_0}^5 v \cdot \left[\frac{3v}{2} - \frac{25}{2v}\right] = \left[\frac{1}{2} \cdot x \cdot (x^2 - 25)\right]_{v_0}^5 \approx 24.056$$

b) One item single player for b where the reserve price is

$$v_0 = 1 - W\left(\frac{1}{e^4}\right) \approx 0.982 \rightarrow W \text{ Lambert function}$$

$$E[\text{Revenue}] = \int_{v_0}^5 v \cdot [v - 1 + \exp(x - 5)] = -\frac{v_0^2}{2} + v_0 - e^{v_0-5} + \frac{17}{2}$$

$$E[\text{Revenue}] = -\frac{0.982^2}{2} + 0.982 - e^{0.982-5} + \frac{17}{2} \approx 8.98$$

c)

1.4.2)

To prove that is strategy proof we need to prove

Monotonicity – if you have higher value you still get the item.

threshold payment – each player have a R/k payment he will have to pay.