## Blue Team Level 1 Certification

- 7 Topics | 1 Quiz
- PA8) Phishing Response Challenge
  - 3 Topics | 1 Quiz

#### THREAT INTELLIGENCE DOMAIN

- TI1) Introduction to Threat Intelligence
  - 7 Topics
- TI2) Threat Actors & APTs
  - 6 Topics | 2 Quizzes
- TI3) Operational Threat Intelligence
  - 7 Topics | 1 Ouiz
- TI4) Tactical Threat Intelligence
  - 7 Topics | 1 Quiz

#### O TI5) Strategic Threat Intelligence

- 5 Topics | 1 Quiz
- O Section Introduction, Strategic Intelligence
- O Intelligence Sharing and Partnerships
- O IOC/TTP Gathering and Distribution
- O OSINT vs Paid-for Sources
- O Traffic Light Protocol (TLP)
- Activity) End of Section Review, Strategic
- TI6) Malware and Global Campaigns
  - 6 Topics | 1 Quiz

#### DIGITAL FORENSICS DOMAIN

- DF1) Introduction to Digital Forensics
  - 5 Topics
- DF2) Forensics Fundamentals
  - 10 Topics | 5 Quizzes
- OF3) Digital Evidence Collection
  - 8 Topics | 1 Quiz
- DF4) Windows Investigations
  - 3 Topics | 3 Quizzes
- O DF5) Linux Investigations
  - 4 Topics | 2 Quizzes
- DF6) Volatility
  - 3 Topics | 1 Ouiz
- O DF7) Autopsy
  - 4 Topics | 1 Quiz

#### SECURITY INFORMATION AND EVENT MANAGEMENT DOMAIN

- SI1) Introduction to SIEM
  - 7 Topics | 1 Quiz
- SI2) Logging
  - 6 Topics | 2 Quizzes
- SI3) Aggregation
- 2 Topics | 1 Ouiz
- O SI4) Correlation
- 6 Topics | 1 Quiz
- SI5) Using Splunk
  - 5 Topics | 2 Quizzes

# **IOC/TTP Gathering and Distribution**

Blue Team Level 1 Certification (Standard) > TI5) Strategic Threat Intelligence > IOC/TTP Gathe... IN PROGRESS



While the task of collecting and distributing indicators of compromise and TTPs can be complete by anyone, it makes sense for a strategic threat intelligence analyst to perform this duty, as they will regularly be in contact with information sharing partners and receive government-issued alerts from organizations such as NCCIC, US-Cert,

 $This task includes gathering IOCs \, regarding \, threat \, actors \, that \, are \, likely \, to \, target \, the \, organization, as \, trying \, to \, target \, the \, organization \, actors \, that \, are \, likely \, to \, target \, the \, organization \, actors \, that \, are \, likely \, to \, target \, the \, organization \, actors \, that \, are \, likely \, to \, target \, the \, organization \, actors \, that \, are \, likely \, to \, target \, the \, organization \, actors \, that \, are \, likely \, to \, target \, the \, organization \, actors \, that \, are \, likely \, to \, target \, the \, organization \, actors \, that \, are \, likely \, to \, target \, the \, organization \, actors \, that \, are \, likely \, to \, target \, the \, organization \, actors \, that \, are \, likely \, to \, target \, the \, organization \, actors \, that \, are \, likely \, to \, target \, the \, organization \, actors \, the \, target \, the \, organization \, actors \, the \, target \, the \, organization \, actors \, the \, target \, the \, organization \, actors \, the \, target \, target \, the \, target \, target \, the \, target \, t$ digest IOCs from every single cyberattack out there will generate a lot of noise and overwhelm defenders with alerts and false positives. If a threat actor is targeting banks and banking systems, the threat intelligence team at an aerospace company isn't going to be running the same equipment, and therefore is unlikely to encounter that specific threat agent.

 $IOCs\ that\ are\ gathered\ from\ threat\ intelligence\ vendors,\ government\ alerts,\ information\ sharing\ partners,\ and$ public sources are then passed down to tactical threat intelligence analysts, or the wider security team based on the information. We've created a diagram to help visualize this process.



### **EXAMPLE WALKTHROUGH**

The strategic threat intelligence analyst at Organisation A receives an email from an analyst at Organisation B, who are the strategic threat intelligence analyst at Organisation B, who are the strategic threat intelligence analyst at Organisation B, who are the strategic threat intelligence analyst at Organisation B, who are the strategic threat intelligence analyst at Organisation B, who are the strategic threat intelligence analyst at Organisation B, who are the strategic threat intelligence analyst at Organisation B, who are the strategic threat intelligence analyst at Organisation B, who are the strategic threat intelligence analyst at Organisation B, who are the strategic threat B and B andis in their industry-specific information sharing partnership (ISAC). Organisation B's analyst informs the strategic information of the strategic information oanalyst that they have just been hit by an APT who specifically targets the industry they operate in, and during  $\frac{1}{2}$ incident response, they collected IOCs including IP addresses that were used to scan and exploit systems at Org B. The strategic analyst then passes these IOCs to a factical threat analyst who performs threat exposure checks within the SIEM platform to see if the same IPs have scanned Org A recently based on perimeter firewall logs.

The strategic analyst also provides the wider security operations team with a situational awareness email, and the strategic analyst also provides the wider security operations team with a situational awareness email, and the strategic analyst also provides the wider security operations team with a situational awareness email, and the strategic analyst also provides the wider security operations team with a situational awareness email, and the strategic analyst also provides the wider security operations team with a situational awareness email, and the strategic analyst also provides the wider security operations team with a situational awareness email, and the strategic analysis of the strategic and the strategic analysis of the strainforming everyone that a similar organization has been hit by an APT, and that they may target Org A in the near future.





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