

## Online Appendix Material

### **Pride amid Prejudice: The Impact of LGBT+ Rights Activism in a Socially Conservative Society**

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## Ethical Conduct of Field Research

Concerns about a lack of clear disciplinary standards for ethical conduct of human subject research have been raised for some time (Wood 2006; Ford et al. 2007; Fujii 2012; Campbell 2017; Cronin-Furman and Lake 2018). The *American Political Science Association* has recently drafted guidelines on best practices based on recommendations from the Ad Hoc Committee on the Protection of Human Subjects<sup>1</sup>. Our research adheres to those guidelines. First, we obtained IRB approval before initiating our study. The human subjects research in this article was reviewed and approved by High Point University's Institutional Review Board (protocol numbers: 201906-826 and 202008-957). During the study, we collected no personally identifying information on participants. All participants received a consent form, provided by the survey research firm conducting the study (Ipsos d.o.o.), but we requested a signature waiver to protect privacy and anonymity in the data collection process. The consent form states that respondents may refuse to answer questions and may stop participating at any time in the study. Second, we did not offer any financial incentives to participate in the study that might have exerted pressure on respondents. Third, our enumerators were experienced professionals who conducted interviews in Bosnia and trained according to AAPOR best practices. Fourth, we did not encourage individuals to engage in risky protest or counter-protest behavior or enumerators to insert themselves into ongoing protest or counter-protest movements to conduct interviews. Additionally, the consent form we shared with the organizers who we anonymously interviewed provided all the same protections, as well as third party resources (see 'Description and Summaries of Fieldwork Interviews' in this Appendix). In summary, we took our ethical responsibilities seriously in the conduct of this research project.


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<sup>1</sup> <https://www.apsanet.org/Portals/54/governance/Report%20of%20The%20APSA%20Ad-Hoc%20Human%20Subjects%20Committee.pdf?ver=2019-08-19-160205-157>

## Sarajevo Pride Route Map and City Municipalities



“The march will begin in front of the ‘Eternal Flame’ monument, continue down the **Marsala Tita Street**, through the Hastahana Park, and end at the Bosnia and Herzegovina Square, in front of the building of the Parliament of BiH.”

[https://www.google.com/url?sa=i&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.pulse.ba%2Findex.php%2Fpulse-news%2F2016-sarajevo-pride-parade-route-announced&psig=AOvVaw0dJ8WbG3XfhK9C5Zp1\\_oSZ&ust=1590095026711000&source=images&cd=vfe&ved=0CAIQjRxqFwoTCKjf59-rw-kCFQAAAAAdAAAAABAD](https://www.google.com/url?sa=i&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.pulse.ba%2Findex.php%2Fpulse-news%2F2016-sarajevo-pride-parade-route-announced&psig=AOvVaw0dJ8WbG3XfhK9C5Zp1_oSZ&ust=1590095026711000&source=images&cd=vfe&ved=0CAIQjRxqFwoTCKjf59-rw-kCFQAAAAAdAAAAABAD)

### Sampling Locations in Sarajevo by Municipality

Online Panel Sample		N	%
NOVI GRAD	SARAJEVO	245	39.52
CENTAR	SARAJEVO	151	24.35
STARI GRAD	SARAJEVO	60	9.68
NOVO	SARAJEVO	164	26.45
N		620	
Nationwide Sample		N	%
NOVI GRAD	SARAJEVO	56	32.94
CENTAR	SARAJEVO	65	38.24
STARI GRAD	SARAJEVO	34	20
NOVO	SARAJEVO	15	8.82
N		170	

Note: Sarajevo city consists of 4 municipalities. There are other municipalities in the greater metropolitan area of Sarajevo canton and Eastern Sarajevo in Republika Srpska. The Pride took place in Sarajevo Centar Municipality.

## Appendix 1: Survey Question Wording and Coding

<b>[Contact with LGBT+ People Variable]</b> Have you ever met someone who identified themselves to you as homosexual? (Definitely yes, Probably yes, Probably no, Definitely no)	
<b>[Feeling Close to LGBT+ People Variable]</b> How close do you feel to homosexual people? 0 (Not close at all) – 10 (Extremely close)	
<b>[Support for LGBT+ Rights Variable]</b> Please say to what extent you agree or disagree with the following statement. Gay men and lesbians should be free to live their own life as they wish. 0 (Strongly disagree) – 10 (Strongly agree)	
<b>[Heard of Prides Variable]</b> Have you heard about gay pride marches before? (Yes, No)	
<b>[Awareness of Sarajevo Pride Variable]</b> To the best of your knowledge, before today, has Sarajevo ever hosted a gay pride march? (Definitely yes, Probably yes, Probably no, Definitely no)	
<b>[Support for Sarajevo Pride Variable]</b> Do you support or oppose Sarajevo having a gay pride march? (Strongly support, Somewhat support, Somewhat oppose, Strongly oppose)	
How religious do you consider yourself? (Very religious, Somewhat religious, Not religious)	
<i>Randomized Group A (half of respondents)</i>	
<b>[Willingness to Attend Pride Variable]</b>	
<i>Suppose a gay rights activist asked you to attend the gay pride march. How likely are you to attend a gay pride march in order to march in support of gay pride? 0 (Definitely no) - 10 (Definitely yes)</i>	How likely are you to attend a gay pride march in order to march in support of gay pride? 0 (Definitely no) - 10 (Definitely yes)
<i>Randomized Group A (half of respondents)</i>	
<i>Randomized Group B</i>	
<b>[Willingness to Protest Pride Variable]</b>	
<i>Suppose an anti-gay activist asked you to protest the gay pride march. How likely are you to attend a gay pride march in order to protest the gay pride? 0 (Definitely no) - 10 (Definitely yes)</i>	How likely are you to attend a gay pride march in order to protest the gay pride? 0 (Definitely no) - 10 (Definitely yes)
<b>[European Union Membership Support Variable]</b> If a referendum on European Union membership was held tomorrow, would you vote for Bosnia to join the EU or remain independent? EU membership, Remain independent	
<b>[Resource Allocation Dictator Game]</b> Imagine you have to allocate 1000 KM between two organizations, one is working to support gay pride events in Sarajevo, the other is working to rally protesters in opposition to these events. How much would you contribute to the following two organizations? Organization A supports gay pride events _____ Organization B opposes gay pride events _____	
<b>Contact with LGBT+ Victims Variable]</b>	

Have you ever known anyone in Bosnia who was harassed, threatened, or physically assaulted because people suspected that they were homosexual? (Definitely yes, Probably yes, Probably no, Definitely no)

**[Ethnonationalism Variable is a Composite of these Three Measures]<sup>2</sup>**

In general, do you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable, or very unfavorable view of the following?

- o Bosniaks [very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable, or very unfavorable]
- o Bosnian Croats [very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable, or very unfavorable]
- o Bosnian Serbs [very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable, or very unfavorable]

**[Religiosity Variable]**

How religious do you consider yourself? 1 = Not religious, 2 = Somewhat religious, 3 = Very religious

**[Education]** 11-point self-reported scale:

[Without school or with 1-3 classes of primary school, 4-7 classes of primary school, Finished primary school, Vocational school (1 or 2 years), Vocational school (3 years), 4 years vocational school, Secondary school, High school, Finished university, Master's degree, Doctor's degree]

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<sup>2</sup> We take the difference in how favorable respondents report their feelings of their ethnic in-group compared to other outgroups in Bosnia. A positive score on the index indicates that subjects rated their in-group more favorably than out-groups: 0 indicates the same rating, and negative scores (which are rare) indicate rating out-groups more favorably than one's in-group.

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Summary Statistics for the full dataset, nationwide and panel

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Variable	N	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Support for Sarajevo Pride	2,430	1.77	1.01	1	4
Support for LGBT+ Rights	2,547	4.11	3.91	0	10
Contact with LGBT+ People	2,608	1.79	1.15	1	4
Feeling Close to LGBT+ People	2,607	1.69	2.86	0	10
Contact with LGBT+ victims	2,557	1.56	0.88	1	4
Heard of Prides	2,634	0.82	0.38	0	1
Awareness of Sarajevo Pride	2,426	2.26	1.20	1	4
Willingness to Attend Pride	2,560	1.77	2.61	0	10
Willingness to Protest Pride	2,518	2.27	3.11	0	10
Resource Allocation (Dictator Game)	2,685	244.90	340.55	0	1000
Age	2,685	43.54	16.03	18	93
Education	2,671	6.27	2.13	1	11
Ethnonationalism	2,647	0.50	0.50	0	1
Bosniak Favorability	2,410	1.93	0.95	1	4
Croat Favorability	2,353	2.23	0.91	1	4
Serb Favorability	2,369	2.14	0.99	1	4
European Union Membership Support	2,685	0.77	0.42	0	1
Religiosity	2,621	2.15	0.62	1	3
Men	2,685	0.44	0.50	0	1
Unemployed	2,685	0.19	0.39	0	1
Rural	2,685	1.39	0.49	1	2
Croat	2,685	0.09	0.28	0	1
Serb	2,685	0.25	0.43	0	1
Bosniak	2,685	0.55	0.50	0	1

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Summary Statistics for the nationwide dataset

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Variable	N	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Support for Sarajevo Pride	1,851	1.53	0.81	1	4
Support for LGBT+ Rights	1,945	3.04	3.42	0	10
Contact with LGBT+ People	1,994	1.43	0.86	1	4
Feeling Close to LGBT+ People	2,000	0.84	1.95	0	10
Contact with LGBT+ Victims	1,966	1.39	0.72	1	4
Heard of Prides in general	2,016	0.78	0.42	0	1
Awareness of Sarajevo Pride	1,832	2.30	1.16	1	4
Willingness to Attend Pride	1,956	1.65	2.40	0	10
Willingness to Protest Pride	1,931	2.59	3.15	0	10
Resource Allocation (Dictator Game)	2,065	148.55	257.6	0	1000
Age	2,065	45.73	16.51	18	93
Education	2,054	5.72	1.94	1	11
Ethnonationalism	2,031	0.54	0.50	0	1
Bosniak Favorability	1,901	2.00	0.97	1	4
Croat Favorability	1,862	2.27	0.90	1	4
Serb Favorability	1,883	2.12	1.00	1	4
European Union Membership Support	2,065	0.76	0.43	0	1
Religious	2,017	2.20	0.59	1	3
Men	2,065	0.48	0.50	0	1
Unemployed	2,065	0.21	0.41	0	1
Rural	2,065	1.49	0.50	1	2
Croat	2,065	0.10	0.29	0	1
Serb	2,065	0.32	0.47	0	1
Bosniak	2,065	0.54	0.50	0	1

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Summary Statistics for the online panel dataset

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Variable	N	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Support for Sarajevo Pride	579	2.53	1.19	1	4
Support for LGBT+ Rights	602	7.58	3.34	0	10
Contact with LGBT+ People	614	2.95	1.19	1	4
Feeling Close to LGBT+ People	607	4.50	3.51	0	10
Contact with LGBT+ Victims	591	2.10	1.12	1	4
Heard of Pride	618	0.98	0.13	0	1
Awareness of Sarajevo Pride	594	2.16	1.31	1	4
Willingness to Attend Pride	604	2.14	3.19	0	10
Willingness to Protest Pride	587	1.22	2.74	0	10
Resource Allocation (Dictator Game)	620	565.80	383.82	0	1000
Age	620	36.27	11.70	18	70
Education	617	8.12	1.64	2	11
Ethnocentrism	616	0.37	0.48	0	1
Bosniak Favorability	509	1.69	0.87	1	4
Croat Favorability	491	2.08	0.95	1	4
Serb Favorability	486	2.20	0.98	1	4
European Union Membership Support	620	0.80	0.40	0	1
Religious	604	1.99	0.70	1	3
Men	620	0.31	0.46	0	1
Unemployed	620	0.11	0.32	0	1
Rural	620	1.07	0.25	1	2
Croat	620	0.07	0.25	0	1
Serb	620	0.01	0.12	0	1
Bosniak	620	0.60	0.49	0	1

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### Index of LGBT+ Contact and Support

In the manuscript and in some online Appendix tables, we generate an index of LGBT+ contact and support using items Contact with LGBT+ People, Feeling Close to LGBT+ People, Support for LGBT+ Rights, and Contact with LGBT+ Victims variable from above. The average interim covariance of the scale is 2.17 and Cronbach alpha = 0.67. Factor analysis, below, indicates that responses to these items align on a single dimension, suggesting that they are capturing a latent variable of LGBT+ contact and support. We include models using both the index or independent controls for each item as a robustness check in many subsequent appendix models.

#### Factor Analysis of LGBT+ contact, support Index

Factor	Eigenvalue	Difference	Proportion	Cumulative
Factor1	1.89	1.89	1.19	1.19
Factor2	0.00	0.13	0.00	1.20
Factor3	-0.13	0.05	-0.08	1.11
Factor4	-0.18	.	-0.11	1.00



N = 2393


LR test: independent vs. saturated:  $\chi^2(6) = 2978.11$  Prob> $\chi^2 = 0.0000$

#### Factor loadings (pattern matrix) and unique variances


Variable	Factor 1	Uniqueness
Support for LGBT+ Rights	0.61	0.63
Contact with LGBT+ People	0.76	0.42
Feeling Close to LGBT+ People	0.78	0.39
Contact with LGBT+ Victims	0.59	0.65

Manuscript Figure 1 Alternative Frequency Distributions





Note: includes all Sarajevo respondents (panel + nationwide)  
(Sarajevo N = 737, Outside Sarajevo N = 1693)



Note: includes Sarajevo respondents from the panel only  
(Sarajevo N = 579, Outside Sarajevo N = 1851)

## Robustness Checks for Manuscript Table 2

### Nationwide + Sarajevo Online Panel

Alongside the online panel, there were 170 respondents from the city of Sarajevo from the same municipalities as the online panel. Below we pool those respondents with those from the online panel.

Appendix Table 1. Effect of the Pride March on Support for LGBT+ Activism (Panel + Sarajevo nationwide)

VARIABLES	(1) Support for Sarajevo Pride	(2) Support for Sarajevo Pride	(3) Support for Sarajevo Pride
Treatment	-0.0241 (0.0448)	-0.0241 (0.0379)	-0.0241 (0.0499)
Sarajevo	0.714*** (0.0594)	0.714*** (0.0696)	0.714*** (0.144)
Treatment x Sarajevo	0.294*** (0.0817)	0.294*** (0.0954)	0.294*** (0.0814)
Constant	1.516*** (0.0315)	1.516*** (0.0274)	1.516*** (0.0438)
Standard Errors	Standard	Robust	Clustered
Observations	2,430	2,430	2,430
R-squared	0.164	0.164	0.164
adj. r2	0.163	0.163	0.163

Standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Next, we report results when we exclude the 170 Sarajevo respondents from the nationwide sample. Pride effects remain strong and significant.

Appendix Table 2. Effect of the Pride March on Support for LGBT+ Activism (Panel - Sarajevo nationwide)

VARIABLES	Support for Sarajevo Pride	Support for Sarajevo Pride	Support for Sarajevo Pride
Treatment	-0.0241 (0.0438)	-0.0241 (0.0379)	-0.0241 (0.0499)
Sarajevo	0.892*** (0.0655)	0.892*** (0.0797)	0.892*** (0.0940)
Treatment x Sarajevo	0.230*** (0.0877)	0.230** (0.106)	0.230*** (0.0532)
Constant	1.516*** (0.0308)	1.516*** (0.0274)	1.516*** (0.0438)
Standard Errors	Standard	Robust	Clustered
Observations	2,272	2,272	2,272
R-squared	0.199	0.199	0.199
adj. r2	0.198	0.198	0.198

Standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Next, we report our results when using ordered probit estimation instead of OLS for the combined nationwide + online panel groups.

Appendix Table 3. Effect of the Pride March on Support for LGBT+ Activism (Ordered Probit)

VARIABLES	Support for Sarajevo Pride	Support for Sarajevo Pride	Support for Sarajevo Pride
Treatment	-0.00493 (0.0559)	-0.00493 (0.0541)	-0.00493 (0.0667)
Sarajevo	0.946*** (0.0807)	0.946*** (0.0841)	0.946*** (0.0820)
Treatment x Sarajevo	0.214** (0.107)	0.214* (0.112)	0.214*** (0.0686)
Cut Point One	0.383*** (0.0400)	0.383*** (0.0397)	0.383*** (0.0634)
Cut Point Two	1.037*** (0.0432)	1.037*** (0.0425)	1.037*** (0.0787)
Cut Point Three	1.731*** (0.0517)	1.731*** (0.0507)	1.731*** (0.0972)
Standard Errors	Standard	Robust	Clustered
Observations	2,430	2,430	2,430

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1



Next, we report our results when using ordered probit estimation instead of OLS for the combined nationwide + online panel + 170 Sarajevo nationwide respondents.

Appendix Table 4. Effect of the Pride March on Support for LGBT+ Activism (Panel + Sarajevo nationwide, Ordered Probit)

Variables	Support for Sarajevo Pride	Support for Sarajevo Pride	Support for Sarajevo Pride
Treatment	-0.0199 (0.0588)	-0.0199 (0.0561)	-0.0199 (0.0722)
Sarajevo	0.796*** (0.0734)	0.796*** (0.0764)	0.796*** (0.154)
Treatment x Sarajevo	0.295*** (0.100)	0.295*** (0.104)	0.295*** (0.0994)
Constant cut1	0.415*** (0.0421)	0.415*** (0.0413)	0.415*** (0.0675)
Constant cut2	1.064*** (0.0452)	1.064*** (0.0435)	1.064*** (0.0701)
Constant cut3	1.748*** (0.0534)	1.748*** (0.0504)	1.748*** (0.0872)
Standard Errors	Standard	Robust	Clustered
Observations	2,430	2,430	2,430
adj. r2	0.0649	0.0649	0.0649

Standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Note: Pools 170 Sarajevo residents from nationwide survey with online panel

Next, we report our results when using ordered probit estimation instead of OLS for the combined nationwide + online panel excluding the 170 Sarajevo nationwide respondents.

Appendix Table 5. Effect of the Pride March on Support for LGBT+ Activism (Panel - Sarajevo nationwide)


VARIABLES	(1) Support for Sarajevo Pride	(2) Support for Sarajevo Pride	(3) Support for Sarajevo Pride
Treatment	-0.0205 (0.0588)	-0.0205 (0.0565)	-0.0205 (0.0727)
Sarajevo	0.982*** (0.0819)	0.982*** (0.0854)	0.982*** (0.0986)
Treatment x Sarajevo	0.231** (0.109)	0.231** (0.114)	0.231*** (0.0746)
Constant cut1	0.409*** (0.0422)	0.409*** (0.0416)	0.409*** (0.0679)
Constant cut2	1.069*** (0.0457)	1.069*** (0.0443)	1.069*** (0.0723)
Constant cut3	1.782*** (0.0550)	1.782*** (0.0527)	1.782*** (0.0853)
	Standard	Robust	Clustered
Observations	2,272	2,272	2,272
adj. r2	0.0782	0.0782	0.0782

Standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Note: Omits 170 Sarajevo residents from nationwide.

Appendix Figure 1: Probability of Strongly Supporting Sarajevo Pride



Note: Estimates exclude the January 2019 wave of the online panel.

### Sarajevo Panel Sample

Next, we examine Pride effects when excluding the nationwide sample, focusing on the panel results only. First, we report results of parametric tests of significance for Pride effects in the online Sarajevo panel.

Appendix Table 6. Effect of the Pride March on Support for LGBT+ Activism (T-tests, Panel and Sarajevo Only)

	Mean Before	Mean After	Sig
Paired T-test (Panel Wave 1 vs. Panel Wave 2)	2.41 (0.07)	2.58 (0.08)	4.07***
Paired T-test (Panel Wave 1 + Panel Wave 2, 3)	2.41 (0.08)	2.61 (0.07)	4.13***
Two-sample T-test (All Sarajevo Before + All Sarajevo After)	2.23 (0.06)	2.05 (0.06)	3.08***

Note: the final T-test includes pooled panel + nationwide data from Sarajevo

Next, we apply panel fixed effects to the basic model.

Appendix Table 7. Effect of the Pride March on Support for LGBT+ Activism (Panel fixed effects)

VARIABLES	(1) Support for Sarajevo Pride	(2) Support for Sarajevo Pride	(3) Support for Sarajevo Pride
Treatment	0.160*** (0.0407)	0.160*** (0.0386)	0.160* (0.0531)
Constant	2.434*** (0.0305)	2.434*** (0.0224)	2.434*** (0.0308)
SEs	Standard	Robust	Clustered
Observations	579	579	579
R-squared	0.046	0.046	0.046
Number of sms_id	255	255	255
adj. r2	-0.708	0.0439	0.0439

Standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Next, we show Pride effects when combining the panel sample with 170 respondents from Sarajevo in the nationwide sample.

Appendix Table 8. Effect of the Pride March on Support for LGBT+ Activism (Panel + Nationwide)

VARIABLES	(1) Support for Sarajevo Pride	(2) Support for Sarajevo Pride	(3) Support for Sarajevo Pride	(4) Support for Sarajevo Pride
Treatment	0.270*** (0.0877)	0.270*** (0.0876)	0.270** (0.0738)	0.206** (0.0607)
Constant	2.230*** (0.0648)	2.230*** (0.0641)	2.230*** (0.158)	2.230*** (0.158)
SE	Standard	Robust	Clustered	Clustered, omit panel wave 3
Observations	737	737	737	640
R-squared	0.013	0.013	0.013	0.008

Standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

## Robustness Checks for Manuscript Figure 3

### Nationwide + Sarajevo Online Panel

First, we report the regression results from manuscript Figure 3 in Table format. Model 1 is the model used in Figure 3 which examines treatment effects for the combined 170 nationwide respondents + online panel respondents from Sarajevo. Estimates include weights generated from coarsened exact matching on age and rural respondents and standard errors are clustered by municipality.

Appendix Table 9. Pride Effects on LGBT+ Activism, Extended Controls (OLS)

VARIABLES	(1) Support for Sarajevo Pride
Treatment	-0.0179 (0.0534)
Sarajevo	-0.131 (0.0881)
Treatment x Sarajevo	0.160*** (0.0601)
LGBT+ contact, support index	0.330*** (0.0168)
Heard of Prides	0.00904 (0.0408)
Awareness of Sarajevo Pride	0.0212 (0.0141)
EU Membership Support	0.0934* (0.0475)
Ethnonationalism	-0.133*** (0.0459)
Religiosity	-0.115*** (0.0370)
Bosniak	-0.241*** (0.0527)
Croat	-0.117 (0.0905)
Serb	-0.304*** (0.0726)
Men	-0.00452 (0.0329)
age	0.00125 (0.00129)
Education	0.00925 (0.0100)

rural	-0.0418 (0.0431)
unemployed	-0.0568 (0.0520)
Constant	1.399*** (0.167)
Observations	2,190
R-squared	0.473
adj. r2	0.469

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Next, we report basic treatment effects of the Pride on Support for LGBT+ Activism using different estimation methods to include inverse probability regression weighting and propensity score matching from Manuscript Figure 3.

Appendix Table 10. Treatment Effects Estimation

	ATE of Pride on Support for LGBT Activism in Sarajevo (SE)
Difference-in-Difference Estimation (without extended controls)	0.294*** (0.081)
Difference-in-Difference Estimation (with extended controls, coarsened exact matching on age, rural)	0.160*** (0.06)
Inverse Probability Weighted Regression (weighting on age, rural)	0.275*** (0.87)
Propensity Score Matching (matching on age, rural)	0.285*** (0.82)



Next, we estimate Figure 3 with ordered probit regression instead of OLS.

Appendix Table 11. Pride Effects on LGBT+ Activism, Extended Controls (Ordered Probit)

VARIABLES	Support for Sarajevo Pride
Treatment	-0.0275 (0.0991)
Sarajevo	-0.298** (0.141)
Treatment x Sarajevo	0.240** (0.105)
LGBT+ contact, support	0.464*** (0.0279)
Heard of Prides	0.0142 (0.0844)
Awareness of Sarajevo Pride	0.0532** (0.0251)
EU Membership Support	0.162** (0.0781)
Ethnonationalism	-0.196*** (0.0745)
Religiosity	-0.186*** (0.0557)
Bosniak	-0.289*** (0.0797)
Croat	-0.0792 (0.131)
Serb	-0.359*** (0.121)
Men	-0.0179 (0.0540)
Age	0.00191 (0.00215)
Education	0.0225 (0.0191)
Rural	-0.0893 (0.0745)
Unemployed	-0.103 (0.0888)
/cut1	0.678** (0.298)
/cut2	1.539*** (0.313)

/cut3	2.512*** (0.298)
Observations	2,190
Adj. R2	0.232
Robust standard errors in parentheses	
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1	

Next, we estimate the effects of including municipal level conflict variables using data reported by Hadzic et al. (2017). We find our results are robust to controls for war-time casualties and displacement during the Bosnian war. Our results are also robust to controls for municipal level ethno-nationalist voting in the 2014 general elections using data from Hadzic et al. (2017). The negative correlation with ethnic\_vote share suggests how ethnocentrism moderates support for LGBT+ rights at the municipal level as well as at the individual level from our survey data.

Appendix Table 12. Pride Effects on LGBT+ Activism, Extended Controls (OLS inclusion of additional municipal level controls for war-time conflict and ethnic vote share from Hadzic 2017)

VARIABLES	(1) Support for Sarajevo Pride	(2) Support for Sarajevo Pride
Treatment	-0.0247 (0.0531)	-0.00934 (0.0571)
Sarajevo	0.682*** (0.197)	-0.231* (0.125)
Treatment x Sarajevo	0.285*** (0.0788)	0.146** (0.0634)
Ethnic Vote Share	-0.00387 (0.00306)	-0.00708* (0.00386)
log(Municipal Casualties)	-0.0688 (0.0477)	-0.0462 (0.0364)
Refugees	0.0127 (0.0112)	0.00821 (0.0112)
LGBT+ contact, support		0.324*** (0.0176)
Heard of Prides		0.0127 (0.0411)
Aware of Sarajevo Pride		0.0264* (0.0140)
EU Membership Support		0.103**

		(0.0466)
Ethnonationalism		-0.130***
		(0.0478)
Religiosity		-0.114***
		(0.0398)
Bosniak		-0.265***
		(0.0512)
Croat		-0.0648
		(0.102)
Serb		-0.214**
		(0.0839)
Men		8.12e-05
		(0.0358)
Age		0.00144
		(0.00132)
Education		0.00897
		(0.00978)
Rural		-0.0656
		(0.0455)
Unemployed		-0.0741
		(0.0524)
Constant	1.784***	1.925***
	(0.264)	(0.321)
Observations	2,218	1,986
R-squared	0.179	0.490
adj. r2	0.177	0.485

---

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Note: See Hadzic, Dino, David Carlson, and Margit Tavits. "How exposure to violence affects ethnic voting." *British journal of political science* (2017): 1-18.

## Sarajevo Panel Sample

Here, we show that our treatment effects are robust when excluding the nationwide sample, focusing on panel level fixed effects in the Sarajevo online sample. Using Logit regression, Model 1 examines basic Pride effects on LGBT+ related covariates in the panel (excluding the nationwide sample). It shows how Awareness of the Sarajevo Pride taking place increased after the Pride, which is a logical mechanism for how the Pride resulted in increased LGBT+ activist support in Sarajevo. Using OLS regression, Models 2 and 3 show the Pride effect for the online Sarajevo excluding the nationwide sample on the main dependent variable. Support for LGBT+ rights and contact with gay people have an independent pre-treatment effect on support for LGBT+ activism in the online panel.

Appendix Table 13. Effect of the Pride March on Support for LGBT+ Activism (Panel Only, Panel Fixed Effects)

VARIABLES	(1) Pride treatment	(2) Support for Sarajevo Pride	(3) Support for Sarajevo Pride
Treatment		0.178*** (0.0469)	0.178*** (0.0431)
Support LGBT+ Rights	0.0534 (0.0658)	0.0282* (0.0168)	0.0229 (0.0186)
Contact with LGBT+ People	-0.236 (0.198)	-0.0701 (0.0527)	-0.0839 (0.0611)
Close to LGBT+ People	-0.0557 (0.0723)	0.0771*** (0.0181)	0.0496** (0.0213)
Contact with LGBT+ Victims	-0.488*** (0.179)	0.00720 (0.0486)	-0.0548 (0.0517)
Heard of Prides	-2.206** (1.104)	0.545** (0.241)	0.540** (0.236)
Awareness of Sarajevo Pride	0.547*** (0.100)	0.0216 (0.0230)	0.0497 (0.0305)
EU Membership Support	0.532 (0.534)	-0.0597 (0.129)	0.0835 (0.163)
Ethnonationalism	0.234 (0.380)	-0.146 (0.0988)	-0.258** (0.111)
Religious	0.639 (0.468)	-0.00265 (0.119)	0.0162 (0.142)
Constant		1.599*** (0.390)	1.789*** (0.437)
Observations	489	501	414
R-squared		0.178	0.204
Number of FE	206	241	234
adj. r2	0.154	0.204	0.178

Standard errors in parentheses  
 \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

#### Robustness Checks for Manuscript Figure 4

First, we show that the randomization of pro-LGBT and anti-LGBT treatments are balanced compared to the control group on key demographics.

Appendix Table 14. Balance Tests for Randomization to Treatment and Control (Logit Regression)

VARIABLES	(1) LGBT+ Activist Treatment	(2) LGBT+ Opposition Treatment
Serb	0.0506 (0.119)	-0.0332 (0.119)
Bosniak	0.0502 (0.103)	-0.0694 (0.103)
Men	-0.0515 (0.0784)	-0.0488 (0.0785)
Age	-0.00350 (0.00264)	0.00153 (0.00265)
Education	-0.0127 (0.0207)	0.0207 (0.0208)
Rural	-0.0879 (0.0843)	0.0986 (0.0843)
Unemployed	0.00609 (0.101)	0.149 (0.101)
Constant	0.249 (0.278)	-0.400 (0.278)
SEs	Robust	Robust
Observations	2,671	2,671
adj. r2	0.00102	0.00138

Robust standard errors in parentheses  
 \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

### Nationwide + Sarajevo Online Panel

Next, we report results from Figure 4 without extend controls. Controls for Sarajevo include the Sarajevo online panel and 170 respondents from the nationwide survey in Sarajevo. Models 2 and 4 report the results for the online panel only with panel fixed effects.

Appendix Table 15. Mobilization for and Counter-Mobilization against LGBT+ rights (OLS, Full sample)

VARIABLES	(1) Mobilization Support	(2) Mobilization Support	(3) Mobilization Opposition	(4) Mobilization Opposition
LGBT+ Activist Txt	0.231** (0.0988)	0.822*** (0.165)		
LGBT+ Opposition Txt			0.509*** (0.122)	0.647*** (0.240)
Pride Treatment	-0.778*** (0.152)		0.139 (0.273)	
Sarajevo	0.436* (0.238)		-0.435 (0.338)	
Pride Txt x Sarajevo	0.773** (0.301)	0.498*** (0.136)	-0.719** (0.325)	0.0663 (0.197)
Sample	Full sample	Panel fixed effects	Full sample	Panel fixed effects
Constant	1.788*** (0.138)	1.431*** (0.108)	2.193*** (0.169)	0.853*** (0.151)
Observations	2,560	604	2,518	587
R-squared	0.033	0.094	0.042	0.024
adj. r2	0.0311	0.0907	0.0400	0.0206

Mobilization Support: 0 (Not likely to attend Pride) – 10 (Very likely to attend Pride).  
 Mobilization Opposition: 0 (Not likely to protest Pride) – 10 (Very likely to protest Pride).  
 Sarajevo: 0 (Bosnia-wide survey), 1 (Sarajevo survey). Pride Treatment: 0 (pre-Pride data), 1 (post-Pride data). Robust standard errors clustered by municipality in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Next, we report results from Figure 4 with and without extend controls, where the control for Sarajevo includes the nationwide and online panel participants.

Appendix Table 16. Mobilization for and Counter-Mobilization against LGBT+ rights (OLS, full sample)

VARIABLES	(1) Mobilization Support	(2) Mobilization Support	(3) Mobilization Opposition	(4) Mobilization Opposition
LGBT+ Activist Txt	0.231** (0.0988)	0.249*** (0.0857)		
LGBT+ Opposition Txt			0.509*** (0.122)	0.550*** (0.122)
Pride Treatment	-0.778*** (0.152)	-0.644*** (0.158)	0.139 (0.273)	0.161 (0.285)
Sarajevo	0.436* (0.238)	-0.962** (0.415)	-0.435 (0.338)	-0.547 (0.433)
Pride Txt x Sarajevo	0.773** (0.301)	0.594** (0.254)	-0.719** (0.325)	-0.623* (0.336)
Support for LGBT+ Rights		-0.0143 (0.0171)		-0.194*** (0.0270)
Contact with LGBT+ People		0.351*** (0.0360)		0.104** (0.0422)
Closeness to LGBT+ People		-0.0304 (0.0976)		0.0408 (0.123)
Contact with LGBT+ Victims		0.344*** (0.0951)		0.272** (0.130)
Heard of Prides		-1.126*** (0.257)		-0.282 (0.262)
Awareness of Sarajevo Pride		0.0464 (0.0577)		0.129* (0.0742)
EU Membership Support		0.166 (0.134)		-0.343* (0.173)
Ethnonationalism		-0.311* (0.157)		0.305 (0.200)
Religiosity		-0.299** (0.123)		0.0662 (0.140)
Bosniak		-0.422* (0.220)		0.132 (0.294)
Croat		0.213 (0.445)		0.935* (0.518)
Serb		-0.714*** (0.255)		-0.518 (0.406)

Men		-0.161 (0.102)		0.0164 (0.128)
Age		-0.00135 (0.00371)		-0.0110* (0.00587)
Education		0.0363 (0.0415)		-0.0905** (0.0407)
Rural		-0.00897 (0.154)		-0.588* (0.307)
Unemployed		0.396** (0.168)		0.489*** (0.178)
Constant	1.788*** (0.138)	2.911*** (0.717)	2.193*** (0.169)	4.001*** (0.679)
Observations	2,560	2,109	2,518	2,079
R-squared	0.038	0.241	0.024	0.114
adj. r2	0.0363	0.233	0.0225	0.105

Mobilization Support: 0 (Not likely to attend Pride) – 10 (Very likely to attend Pride).  
Mobilization Opposition: 0 (Not likely to protest Pride) – 10 (Very likely to protest Pride).  
Sarajevo: 0 (Bosnia-wide survey), 1 (Sarajevo survey). Pride Treatment: 0 (pre-Pride data), 1 (post-Pride data). Robust standard errors clustered by municipality in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1



Next, we show that Figure 4 results are robust to tobit regression.

Appendix Table 17. Mobilization and Counter Mobilization (tobit regression, inclusion of Sarajevo nationwide and Online panel)

VARIABLES	(1) Mobilization Support	(2) Mobilization Support	(3) Mobilization Opposition	(4) Mobilization Opposition
LGBT+ Activist Txt	0.390** (0.167)	0.404*** (0.146)		
LGBT+ Opposition Txt			0.775*** (0.222)	0.837*** (0.209)
Treatment	-3.934*** (0.476)	-3.383*** (0.375)	-1.870*** (0.512)	-1.835*** (0.519)
Sarajevo	-0.863** (0.438)	-3.008*** (0.693)	-2.745*** (0.766)	-2.638*** (0.745)
Treatment x Sarajevo	3.617*** (0.713)	2.869*** (0.547)	0.206 (0.658)	0.485 (0.670)
Support for LGBT+ Rights		-0.0309 (0.0320)		-0.358*** (0.0625)
Contact with LGBT+ People		0.538*** (0.0637)		0.143* (0.0736)
Closeness to LGBT+ People		0.00201 (0.177)		0.0436 (0.233)
Contact with LGBT+ Victims		0.649*** (0.166)		0.504** (0.234)
Heard of Prides		-1.688*** (0.435)		-0.385 (0.411)
Awareness of Sarajevo Pride		0.0637 (0.107)		0.246* (0.145)
EU Membership Support		0.412** (0.203)		-0.499* (0.293)
Ethnonationalism		-0.721** (0.293)		0.430 (0.358)
Religiosity		-0.476* (0.248)		0.225 (0.259)
Bosniak		-0.525 (0.363)		0.681 (0.624)
Croat		0.462 (0.650)		1.621* (0.889)
Serb		-0.985** (0.405)		-0.503 (0.750)
Men		-0.223 (0.165)		0.0748 (0.215)
Age		0.00131		-0.0130

		(0.00548)		(0.00950)
Education		0.0500		-0.162**
		(0.0685)		(0.0707)
Rural		0.00856		-1.033**
		(0.261)		(0.475)
Unemployed		0.683**		0.872***
		(0.300)		(0.328)
Constant	1.737***	2.997**	2.143***	4.374***
	(0.154)	(1.254)	(0.200)	(1.125)
SEs	Clustered	Clustered	Clustered	Clustered
Observations	2,560	2,109	2,518	2,079
adj. r2	0.0348	0.0857	0.0207	0.0429

Robust standard errors in parentheses  
\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Results are also robust to Tobit regression omitting 170 respondents from the nationwide sample in the Sarajevo control.

Appendix Table 18. Mobilization and Counter Mobilization (Tobit regression, online panel)

VARIABLES	(1) Mobilization Support	(2) Mobilization Support	(3) Mobilization Opposition	(4) Mobilization Opposition
LGBT+ Activist Txt	0.374** (0.162)	0.429*** (0.147)		
LGBT+ Opposition Txt			0.800*** (0.226)	0.855*** (0.218)
Treatment	-3.881*** (0.406)	-3.208*** (0.312)	-1.909*** (0.469)	-1.820*** (0.463)
Sarajevo	-2.427*** (0.473)	-5.966*** (0.549)	-5.367*** (0.527)	-5.989*** (0.658)
Treatment x Sarajevo	4.959*** (0.446)	4.277*** (0.324)	1.924*** (0.542)	2.175*** (0.713)
Support for LGBT+ Rights		0.0295 (0.0342)		-0.305*** (0.0537)
Contact with LGBT+ People		0.579*** (0.0604)		0.173** (0.0721)
Closeness to LGBT+ People		0.151 (0.166)		0.225 (0.221)
Contact with LGBT+ Victims		0.731*** (0.148)		0.608*** (0.226)

Heard of Prides	-1.243***			0.0313
	(0.328)			(0.341)
Awareness of Sarajevo Pride	-0.0833			0.0818
	(0.102)			(0.147)
EU Membership Support	0.404**			-0.580**
	(0.206)			(0.292)
Ethnonationalism	-0.629**			0.561*
	(0.263)			(0.331)
Religiosity	-0.354*			0.327
	(0.194)			(0.225)
Bosniak	-0.914***			0.264
	(0.328)			(0.622)
Croat	0.114			1.242
	(0.562)			(0.855)
Serb	-1.599***			-1.162*
	(0.363)			(0.701)
Men	-0.339**			-0.0567
	(0.142)			(0.223)
Age	-0.00176			-0.0179*
	(0.00580)			(0.0103)
Education	0.0958			-0.105
	(0.0682)			(0.0658)
Rural	0.0633			-0.919**
	(0.265)			(0.429)
Unemployed	0.413			0.599*
	(0.278)			(0.306)
Constant	1.929***	2.453**	2.270***	3.939***
	(0.163)	(1.055)	(0.186)	(1.067)
SEs	Clustered	Clustered	Clustered	Clustered
Observations	2,560	2,109	2,518	2,079
adj. r2	0.0374	0.103	0.0336	0.0548

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

### Sarajevo Online Panel

Next, we examine the activist treatment effects on the Sarajevo Online Sample only.


Appendix Table 19. Mobilization and Counter Mobilization (OLS, Sarajevo Online panel, panel fixed effects)

VARIABLES	(1) Mobilization Support	(2) Mobilization Support	(3) Mobilization Opposition	(4) Mobilization Opposition
LGBT+ Activist Txt	0.822*** (0.178)	0.813*** (0.193)		
LGBT+ Opposition Txt			0.647*** (0.230)	0.734*** (0.253)
Pride Treatment	0.498*** (0.139)	0.462*** (0.165)	0.0663 (0.182)	-0.0127 (0.210)
Support for LGBT+ Rights		0.0128 (0.0593)		-0.159** (0.0765)
Close to LGBT+ People		0.167*** (0.0628)		0.0811 (0.0801)
Contact with LGBT+ People		-0.0767 (0.172)		-0.332 (0.229)
Contact with LGBT+ Victims		0.120 (0.169)		-0.158 (0.215)
Heard of Prides		1.221 (0.861)		1.502 (1.065)
Awareness of Sarajevo Pride		0.0414 (0.0806)		0.0657 (0.103)
EU Membership Support		-0.0562 (0.460)		-0.699 (0.588)
Ethnonationalism				0.482 (0.447)
Religiosity				1.590*** (0.539)
Constant	1.431*** (0.136)	-0.556 (1.145)	0.853*** (0.177)	-1.326 (1.771)
Observations	604	518	587	509
R-squared	0.094	0.131	0.024	0.097
Number of FEs	256	242	253	240

Standard errors in parentheses  
\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

### Alternative Specifications for Manuscript Figure 5.


Bar graphs, histograms and kernel density plots show the distribution of choices in the dictator games within, outside Sarajevo, before and after the Pride.




## Dictator Giving to Pro-LGBT Advocacy Group



## Dictator Giving to LGBT Advocacy Group



## Dictator Giving to LGBT+ Advocacy Group



### Robustness Checks for Manuscript Figure 6.

First, we provide the original model 1 from manuscript Figure 6. Model 2 shows how the Pride effect is moderated by extended controls.

Appendix Table 20. Mobilization of Resources for LGBT+ Activism (OLS)

VARIABLES	Model 1 Contributing to LGBT+ rights	Model 2 Contributing to LGBT+ rights
Pride Treatment	-21.95 (20.67)	-3.365 (20.99)
Sarajevo	310.5*** (52.92)	33.47 (31.79)
Pride Treatment x Sarajevo	71.83** (34.29)	21.97 (25.51)
Support for LGBT+ Rights		28.49*** (3.336)
Contact with LGBT+ People		34.02*** (3.176)
Closeness to LGBT+ People		0.460 (8.028)
Contact with LGBT+ Victims		37.09*** (9.583)
Salience of Prides		39.08** (16.84)
Awareness of Sarajevo Pride		-13.37** (6.176)
EU Membership Support		29.75** (11.62)
Men		-3.261 (10.27)
Age		0.317 (0.349)
Education		6.907 (4.509)
Ethnonationalism		-46.27*** (15.03)
Religiosity		-38.22*** (13.25)
Bosniak		-86.01*** (16.57)
Croat		-43.21 (32.97)



Serb		-141.9***
		(19.95)
Rural		6.427
		(15.65)
Unemployed		-0.999
		(17.90)
Constant	153.1***	97.01***
	(15.24)	(34.20)
Observations	2,685	2,151
R-squared	0.220	0.541
adj. r2	0.220	0.537

Contributing to LGBT+ rights organization: 0 (marks, currency, allocated to a pro-gay group) – 1000 (marks, currency, allocated to a pro-LGBT+ group). Sarajevo: 0 (Bosnia-wide survey), 1 (Sarajevo survey). Pride Treatment: 0 (pre-Pride data), 1 (post-Pride data). Robust standard errors clustered by municipality in parentheses \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Next, we take the difference between what was given in the DG to the Pro-LGBT+ organization and anti-LGBT organization. The DV is coded 1 if subjects gave more to the anti-LGBT+ organization than the pro-LGBT+ organization (0 represented those who gave equal amounts to pro- and anti- groups, or more to pro- groups). It shows that subjects from Sarajevo were less biased against LGBT+ organizations before the Pride, but the Pride also had a further reductive effect on bias. This is consistent with manuscript Figure 6.

Appendix Table 21. Anti-LGBT Bias in Dictator Giving (logit, Sarajevo nationwide + online panel)

VARIABLES	(1) Dictator Bias	(2) Dictator Bias
Treatment	0.245 (0.199)	0.217 (0.272)
Sarajevo	-1.558*** (0.283)	0.252 (0.316)
Treatment x Sarajevo	-0.533** (0.223)	-0.376 (0.287)
Support for LGBT+ Rights		-0.257*** (0.0241)
Close to LGBT+ People		-0.240*** (0.0334)
Contact with LGBT+ People		-0.0509 (0.0940)
Contact with LGBT+ Victims		-0.310*** (0.0920)
Heard of Prides		-0.230 (0.221)
Awareness of Sarajevo Pride		0.107 (0.0817)
EU Membership Support		-0.331** (0.155)
Ethnonationalism		0.601*** (0.158)
Religiosity		0.214 (0.153)
Bosniak		0.408 (0.270)
Croat		0.00416 (0.421)
Serb		1.160*** (0.286)
Men		0.104 (0.117)
Age		0.00287

		(0.00458)
Education		-0.0912*
		(0.0491)
Rural		0.0727
		(0.181)
Unemployed		-0.0298
		(0.183)
Constant	1.198***	2.202***
	(0.138)	(0.476)
Observations	2,685	2,151
adj. r2	0.125	0.400

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Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Pride effects are weaker when excluding the 170 Sarajevo Residents. This is partly because of pre-treatment moderators. The online panel is ex-ante more generous to LGBT+ advocacy groups than other cohorts.

Appendix Table 22. Dictator Giving for Sarajevo Panel Only

VARIABLES	(1) Contributing to LGBT+ rights	(2) Contributing to LGBT+ rights	(3) Contributing to LGBT+ rights
Treatment	-20.65 (19.17)	-10.30 (20.43)	
Sarajevo	396.5*** (20.49)	91.29*** (29.54)	
Treatment x Sarajevo	38.77* (19.88)	26.42 (19.03)	18.12* (6.428)
Support for LGBT+ Rights		27.22*** (3.108)	
Close to LGBT+ People		33.08*** (3.864)	
Contact with LGBT+ People		-3.986 (7.851)	
Contact with LGBT+ Victims		36.55*** (9.862)	
Heard of Prides		30.78* (16.61)	
Awareness of Sarajevo Pride		-8.850* (5.084)	
EU Membership Support		33.31*** (11.26)	
Ethnonationalism		-48.25*** (15.05)	
Religiosity		-38.49*** (12.56)	
Bosniak		-75.47*** (17.66)	
Croat		-31.22 (35.37)	
Serb		-121.6*** (23.85)	
Men		0.300 (10.58)	
Age		0.427 (0.369)	
Education		4.499	

		(3.354)	
Rural		7.927	
		(15.54)	
Unemployed		4.887	
		(18.81)	
Constant	158.7***	94.20***	555.2***
	(15.99)	(35.55)	(19.43)
Observations	2,685	2,151	620
R-squared	0.268	0.547	0.001
adj. r2	0.267	0.543	-0.00107
Contributing to LGBT+ organizations: 0 (marks, currency, allocated to a pro-gay group) – 1000 (marks, currency, allocated to a pro-gay group). Robust standard errors in parentheses			
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1			

## Bosnia and LGBT+ Support in a Global Context

In the figure below, we situate LGBT+ attitudes into a broader global context utilizing common survey items from the most recent Wave 7 of the World Values Survey conducted between 2017 and 2020. Each survey asked the respondents to indicate whether they would dislike having homosexuals as neighbors. The figures below provide the percent of respondents who mentioned not wanting to have homosexuals as neighbors by country and who think homosexuality is ‘never justifiable’. Bosnia falls in the conservative range among countries in the WVS on these items. This shows that while Bosnia may be atypical of attitudes toward LGBT+ rights in liberal Western democracies, attitudes are more comparable to Latin America, Asia, Africa, and the Middle East. We consider Bosnia as a moderate conservative case for LGBT+ attitudes in the world today, and reflective of societies which are divided and, in some cases, polarized on questions of LGBT+ rights. As such our research in Bosnia speaks primarily to those moderate or middle-range conservative cases, where LGBT+ rights are contentious. It is unclear how generalizable our results are to the most deeply conservative societies on LGBT+ rights. In those environments, we would anticipate significant restrictions on LGBT+ activism, and if Prides do take place, they are often of the “Ghost” Pride variety or conducted without official government sanctioning.

Question Wording: On this list are various groups of people. Could you please mention any that you would not like to have as neighbors? (% mentioned *Homosexuals*):


### Reference

Inglehart, R., C. Haerpfer, A. Moreno, C. Welzel, K. Kizilova, J. Diez-Medrano, M. Lagos, P. Norris, E. Ponarin & B. Puranen et al. (eds.). 2020. World Values Survey: Round Six - Country-Pooled Datafile Version: <https://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSDocumentationWV7.jsp> Madrid: JD Systems Institute.

*Samples Include: Albania EVS, Andorra 2018, Argentina 2017, Armenia EVS, Australia 2018, Austria EVS, Azerbaijan EVS, Bangladesh 2018, Belarus EVS, Bolivia 2017, Bosnia and Herzegovina EVS, Brazil 2018, Bulgaria EVS, Colombia 2018, Croatia EVS, Cyprus 2019, Czech Rep. EVS, Chile 2018, China 2018, Denmark EVS, Ecuador 2018, Egypt 2018, Estonia EVS, Ethiopia 2020, Finland EVS, France EVS, Georgia EVS, Germany 2017, Germany-EVS, Greece 2017, Guatemala 2019, Hong Kong SAR 2018, Hungary EVS, Iceland EVS, Indonesia 2018, Iran 2020, Iraq 2018, Italy EVS, Japan 2019, Jordan 2018, Kazakhstan 2018, Kyrgyzstan 2019, Lebanon 2018, Lithuania EVS, Macau SAR 2019, Malaysia 2018, Mexico 2018, Montenegro EVS, Myanmar 2020, Netherlands EVS, New Zealand 2019, Nicaragua 2019, Nigeria 2018, North Macedonia EVS, Norway EVS, Pakistan 2018, Peru 2018, Philippines 2019, Poland EVS, Puerto Rico 2018, Romania EVS, Romania 2017, Russia EVS, Russia 2017, Serbia 2017, Serbia EVS, Slovakia EVS, Slovenia EVS, South Korea 2018, Spain EVS, Sweden EVS, Switzerland EVS, Taiwan ROC 2019, Tajikistan 2020, Thailand 2018, Tunisia 2019, Turkey 2018, United Kingdom - Great Britain EVS, USA 2017, Vietnam 2020, Zimbabwe 2020*

## LGBT+ Opposition in a Global Context


[% respondents who would not like to have Homosexuals as neighbors]



Source: World Values Surveys 2017-2020

## Attitudes toward Homosexuality in Global Context

[% responding that homosexuality is never justifiable]



Source: World Values Surveys 2017-2020



## Pride Support vs. LGBT+ Support

There is generally a strong correlation between support for LGBT+ rights and support for the Sarajevo Pride (Pearson's  $r = 0.58$ ). However, one question about Prides in a conservative context like Bosnia is whether some who supports LGBT+ rights might also oppose Prides. Prides may be seen as attracting undesirable attention and detrimental for LGBT+ communities. Furthermore, some may also regard them as overly commercialized and mainstream – though we think these two factors apply less to a first-Pride context like Bosnia. In order to further unpack support for Pride, we examined those who oppose Pride while supporting LGBT+ rights. We do this by creating a dummy variable for respondents who indicated they opposed the Sarajevo Pride but also indicated a positive response to the question that “Gay people should have the right to live their own lives as they wish”. 16% of respondents could be identified as Pro-LGBT+ rights but opposed to the Pride using this categorization.

In the table below, we compare these respondents to those who were both Pro-LGBT+ rights and supported the Sarajevo Pride. Model 1 is a logit regression where the dependent variable is coded 1 for people who support LGBT+ rights and support the Sarajevo Pride and 0 for everyone else. It shows that the Pride had a significant impact on those respondents in raising support for LGBT+ activism. In Model 2, the dependent variable is coded 1 for those who support LGBT+ rights but opposed the Sarajevo Pride and 0 for everyone else. For those who did not support the Pride, Model 2 shows that the Pride had no significant effect on raising their support for Pride-type activism. Pro-LGBT+/anti-Pride respondents are also not distinctive from other respondents in the survey on other items related to contact with members of the LGBT+ community or feelings of closeness to LGBT+ people. They are more likely to have heard of Prides, and Bosniaks and Serbs are more likely to be in the Pro-LGBT+/anti-Pride category than Croats. Finally, Model 3 provides a logit regression analysis on a subsample of respondents where the dependent variable is coded 1 for Pro-LGBT+/Pro-Pride respondents and 0 for Pro-LGBT+rights/Anti-Pride respondents. Model 3 shows a significant Pride effect on increasing Pro-LGBT/Pro-Pride respondent support for Prides compared to the anti-Pride group. Pro-LGBT/Pro-Pride respondents also feel closer to other LGBT+ people and are more likely to have known LGBT+ victims of violence than the anti-Pride group, which suggests a mechanism for how violence and group cohesion amplify Pride support. They are also less likely to be ethnonationalistic or religious, which is correlated with opposition to LGBT+ activism. It may be that pro-LGBT+/anti-Pride respondents represent a middle or transitional category between strong activist support and moderate opposition.

In summary, not everyone who supports LGBT+ rights see Pride as an appropriate mechanism to raise awareness. It may be that opposition to Pride is a function of risk tolerance, consistent with other research on high risk, high cost mobilization (McAdam 1986). This is something we need to explore in more detail in future research.

Appendix Table 23. Pride Support vs. LGBT+ Support (Logit Regression)

VARIABLES	(1) Rights Yes and Pride Yes	(2) Rights Yes but Pride No (nationwide)	(3) Rights Yes and Pride Yes vs. Rights Yes but Pride No
Treatment	-0.349 (0.331)	-0.0602 (0.250)	-0.344 (0.340)
Sarajevo	0.182 (0.283)	0.518* (0.277)	-0.567** (0.251)
Treatment x Sarajevo	0.847*** (0.317)	-0.0952 (0.271)	0.904** (0.354)
Close to LGBT+ People	0.0121 (0.0923)	0.128 (0.0822)	-0.0967 (0.106)
Contact with LGBT+ People	0.293*** (0.0331)	-0.0480 (0.0314)	0.241*** (0.0325)
Contact with LGBT+ Victims	0.341*** (0.0769)	-0.115 (0.0856)	0.267*** (0.0910)
Heard of Prides	1.536*** (0.419)	0.932*** (0.266)	0.501 (0.508)
Awareness of Sarajevo Pride	0.102 (0.0630)	0.122* (0.0648)	0.0461 (0.0620)
EU Membership Support	0.106 (0.215)	-0.120 (0.241)	-9.86e-05 (0.293)
Ethnonationalism	-0.939*** (0.152)	-0.116 (0.155)	-0.703*** (0.217)
Religiosity	-0.544*** (0.138)	0.109 (0.150)	-0.553*** (0.175)
Bosniak	-0.320* (0.180)	0.418** (0.178)	-0.374** (0.190)
Croat	-0.498* (0.267)	-0.411 (0.309)	0.0954 (0.337)
Serb	-0.652** (0.332)	0.926*** (0.236)	-1.139*** (0.335)
Men	-0.118 (0.158)	0.0730 (0.103)	-0.233 (0.169)
Age	0.00517 (0.00566)	0.00724 (0.00488)	-0.00253 (0.00725)
Education	0.0897 (0.0550)	0.0630 (0.0386)	0.0486 (0.0562)
Rural	-0.256 (0.272)	-0.0200 (0.201)	-0.275 (0.320)
Unemployed	0.0387	-0.150	0.185

	(0.273)	(0.192)	(0.359)
Constant	-3.295***	-4.062***	0.659
	(0.731)	(0.604)	(0.813)
Observations	2,039	2,039	739
adj. r2	0.406	0.0496	0.258

Robust standard errors in parentheses


\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

### Context of Pride Support in Bosnia

Here, we examine the relationship between Pride Support in Bosnia and ethnicity, ethnocentrism, religiosity, ethno-federalism, urban-rural effects, within Sarajevo municipal-level effects, and conflict-related legacies of the Bosnian war more closely.


#### *Ethnicity and Pride Support*

Ethnic divisions have been shown to undermine the ability of groups to pursue common goals in many contexts (Balliet et al. 2013; Bauer et al. 2016). We consider how basic ethnic divisions affect Pride support in our nationally representative samples from across Bosnia and our online panel. The figure below reports mean Pride support for all ethnic demographic categories in the survey with 95% confidence intervals. Approximately 55.2% of respondents in the sample identify as Bosniak, 8.9% as Bosnian Croats, 24.8% as Bosnian Serbs, 3.8% as “other”. In addition, 7.3% identify as “Bosnian” which represents a national- or citizenship-based understanding of ethnicity. This is often recognized as a protest response against being categorized by war-time divisions. In prior surveys, people often put the term “Yugoslav” to emphasize their rejection of ethnic categorization. The figure below shows that Bosnian Serbs are the group most opposed to the Sarajevo Pride, while those who indicate their ethnic identity as “other” or “Bosnian” are most supportive. Hence, we do not find that Bosniaks, who are the majority ethnic group in Sarajevo, are clearly the most supportive of the Pride.



Note: Pools all respondents from before and after the Pride

Next, we consider the distribution of those in the “other” and “Bosnian” categories within Sarajevo relative to the rest of the country. The figure below reports the % of respondents identifying as Bosniak, Croat, Serb, Other, and Bosnian inside vs. outside Sarajevo. We find that, consistent with demographics, the majority of respondents in Sarajevo are Bosniak with very few Bosnian Serbs and a limited number of Bosnian Croats remaining inside Sarajevo. We also see a much higher % of people identifying as “other” and “Bosnian” within Sarajevo. This could be indicative of greater rejection of ethnic categorization within Sarajevo relative to other locations in Bosnia.



Note: Pools all respondents from before and after the Pride

Given that respondents in the “other” and “Bosnian” categories have higher Pride support, we regress these categories on our dependent variable below. The table below indicates the basic model presented in Manuscript Table 2 Model 1 and then Model 2 with extended controls for ethnic categories. In Model 2, Bosniaks are the constant comparison group. The models show that Bosnian Serbs are comparable to Bosniaks on LGBT+ support, while Bosnian Croats and those who identify as “Other” or “Bosnian” are significantly more supportive of the Sarajevo Pride. However, there is still a robust treatment effect of the Pride on increasing LGBT+ support within Sarajevo. Hence, ethnicity plays an important role in explaining overall variation in Pride support but it is not solely responsible for driving the treatment effect. The analysis does suggest how moving away from ascriptive ethnic identification based on war-time cleavages toward more superordinate identities based on inclusive Bosnian citizenship could enhance LGBT+ support. It also suggests that non-titular minorities (non-Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs) may have more liberal views regarding LGBT+ rights.

Appendix Table 24. Impact of Ethnicity on Pride Support (OLS Regression)

VARIABLES	(1) Support for Sarajevo Pride	(2) Support for Sarajevo Pride
Pride treatment	-0.0241 (0.0379)	-0.0190 (0.0387)
Sarajevo	0.714*** (0.0696)	0.614*** (0.0707)
Pride txt x Sarajevo	0.294*** (0.0954)	0.265*** (0.0913)
Bosnian Croat		0.297*** (0.0635)
Bosnian Serb		0.0722* (0.0424)
Other ethnicity		0.451*** (0.131)
Bosnian		0.713*** (0.0854)
Constant	1.516*** (0.0274)	1.435*** (0.0349)
Observations	2,430	2,430
R-squared	0.164	0.202
adj. r2	0.163	0.200


Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p&lt;0.01, \*\* p&lt;0.05, \* p&lt;0.1

*Ethnonationalism and Pride Support/Opposition*

Beyond ethnic identification, we also consider how ethnonationalism could impact Pride support. Ethnonationalism as measured by whether respondents view member of their in-group more favorably than out-groups. We asked respondents whether they had highly unfavorable, somewhat unfavorable, somewhat favorable, or highly favorable views of Bosniaks, Bosnian Croats, and Bosnian Serbs ranging from 1 to 4. We then constructed a simple dummy variable on whether one ethnic group (the in-group) is rated more favorably than other groups (see section: Ethnonationalism index Construction for more detail). Among respondents in the nationwide and panel surveys (N = 2,647), 49.98% indicate that they feel no closer to one group than any other, as indicated by a score of 0. In contrast, 50.02% indicated an ethnonational bias where they rated one group more favorably than others, which is coded 1. Overall, Bosnia is a highly ethnonationalistic society consistent with prior research. This observation holds with more expanded coding of ethnonationalism based on magnitude of biases.

Next, we consider whether people in Sarajevo might be less ethno-nationalistic than elsewhere in the population. The figure below reports the average ethnocentrism score within vs. outside Sarajevo before and after the Pride. It shows that outside Sarajevo, ethnonationalism is greater than inside Sarajevo. However, we see rising ethnonationalism both within and outside Sarajevo after the Pride, which speaks to the possibility that Pride events could induce counter-mobilization by channeling ethnonationalism.



Next, we regress ethnocentrism on Pride support as in Manuscript Table 2. Below we report the basic Model 1 from Manuscript Table 2 alongside a Model 2 with extended controls for ethnicity and Model 3 with an additional control for ethnocentrism. In Model 3, we lose those in the sample who identified as “Other” or “Bosnian”, but the inclusion of the ethnonationalism variable has a strong negative effect on Pride support, while the basic treatment effect of the Pride remains positive and significant. Hence, we would argue that ethnonationalism, like ethnicity, plays an important role in explaining Pride opposition both within and outside Sarajevo.

Appendix Table 25. Impact of Ethnicity on Pride Support (OLS Regression)

VARIABLES	(1) Support for Sarajevo Pride	(2) Support for Sarajevo Pride	(3) Support for Sarajevo Pride
Pride treatment	-0.0241 (0.0379)	-0.0190 (0.0387)	0.0145 (0.0393)
Sarajevo	0.714*** (0.0696)	0.614*** (0.0707)	0.588*** (0.0702)
Pride txt x Sarajevo	0.294*** (0.0954)	0.265*** (0.0913)	0.240*** (0.0905)
Bosnian Croat		0.297*** (0.0635)	0.333*** (0.0634)
Bosnian Serb		0.0722* (0.0424)	0.0821* (0.0427)
Other ethnicity		0.451*** (0.131)	0.402*** (0.131)
Bosnian ethnonationalism		0.713*** (0.0854)	0.647*** (0.0875)
Constant	1.516*** (0.0274)	1.435*** (0.0349)	1.558*** (0.0402)
Observations	2,430	2,430	2,393
R-squared	0.164	0.202	0.215
adj. r2	0.163	0.200	0.213

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p&lt;0.01, \*\* p&lt;0.05, \* p&lt;0.1




Finally, the impact of ethnicity is not conditional only to our main dependent variable. The table below shows that Bosniaks, Serbs tend to be more conservative and Croats tend to be more liberal on other dimensions of LGBT+ support.

Table 26 : Unpacking attitudes regarding LGBT+ rights by ethnicity with 95 percent CIs in parentheses			
	Bosniak	Serb	Croat
<b>Means</b>			
Support for Pride (1-4 scale)	1.69 (1.64-1.74)	1.51 (1.45-1.57)	1.88 (1.74-2.01)
Support for LGBT+ Rights (0-10 scale)	3.84 (3.64-4.04)	3.53 (3.24-3.82)	3.69 (3.23-4.15)
Closeness to LGBT+ People (0-10 scale)	1.49 (1.35-1.63)	0.90 (0.74-1.06)	2.22 (1.83-2.61)
Willingness to Attend Pride (0-10 scale)	1.62 (1.49-1.75)	1.15 (1.01-1.30)	2.94 (2.53-3.34)
Willingness to Protest Pride (0-10 scale)	2.39 (2.22-2.55)	1.88 (1.66-2.09)	3.46 (3.01-3.91)
<b>Proportion</b>			
Knowing a gay person	0.25 (0.23-0.27)	0.12 (0.097-0.15)	0.25 (0.20-0.31)
Source: July, September, November Surveys of Bosnia and Herzegovina 2019			


### *Municipal-level Ethnic voting and Ethnic fractionalization on Pride Support*

We now consider at the municipal level whether ethnic voting and ethnic fractionalization could impact Pride support. Ethnic voting represents a proxy for municipal level ethnonationalism which could explain the limited diffusion of Pride messaging beyond Sarajevo. Ethnic fractionalization provides another ethnicity-driven explanation for why diffusion did not occur beyond Sarajevo. If Sarajevo is majority Bosniak, then it is possible that non-Bosniak regions of Bosnia simply did not follow cues on social norms from out-group others. We rely on municipal level ethnic voting and fractionalization data from Hadzic et al. (2017). The figure below indicates the mean ethnic vote share, as measured by Hadzic et al. (2017) as the % vote by municipality of ethno-nationalist political parties (ex. SDA for Bosniaks, HDZ for Croats, and SDS for Serbs) in the 2014 national elections. The figure compares the ethnic vote share for Sarajevo city municipalities relative to the rest of the country and shows nearly 30% less ethnic voting in Sarajevo compared to the average municipality outside Sarajevo.



Note: Pools all respondents from before and after the Pride

Next, we compare municipal level ethnic fractionalization inside and outside Sarajevo using Herfindahl-Hirschman Indices (HHI) compiled by Hadzic et al. (2017) from the 2013 Census in Bosnia. These indices estimate the probability of selecting a Serb or a Croat relative to a Bosniak from the same municipality. The figure below plots the average municipal HHI for municipalities outside Sarajevo city compared to Sarajevo. Serb and Croat probabilities are computed separately. The first figure shows that the probability of selecting a Serb at random from a municipality is significantly greater outside Sarajevo than inside Sarajevo, while Croat-Bosniak fractionalization differences not significant. We can include these indices in a model to assess whether Pride support is more likely to diffuse to municipalities with a lower Serb and Croat concentration relative to Bosniaks.



Note: Pools all respondents from before and after the Pride

We now turn to regression analysis to show how increased ethnic vote share at the municipal level is negatively associated with Pride support. This finding is consistent with the observation that ethnonationalism might be an important driver of the lack of diffusion of Pride support outside Sarajevo (Model 1). Next, we examine ethnic fractionalization between Serbs and Croats relative to Bosniaks (Model 2). We label these variables as Serb concentration and Croat concentration which indicate increasing number of Serbs and Croats within a municipality relative to Bosniaks respectively. We find that increasing Serb and Croat concentration has a negative association with Pride support. Hence, there is evidence that ethnic diversity itself is a driver of opposition to Prides. However, it is not clear that simply increasing the number of Bosniaks in a municipality leads to greater Pride support. Though Sarajevo is a majority Bosniak city, most Bosniaks are also conservative with respect to LGBT+ rights. 85% of Bosniaks nationwide opposed the Sarajevo Pride in our sample compared to 65% in Sarajevo.

Appendix Table 27. Municipal Ethnic Vote Share, Ethnic Fractionalization, and Pride Support  
(OLS Regression)

VARIABLES	(1) Support for Sarajevo Pride	(2) Support for Sarajevo Pride
Pride treatment	0.0313 (0.0417)	0.0291 (0.0420)
Sarajevo	0.443*** (0.0850)	0.425*** (0.0847)
Pride txt x Sarajevo	0.225** (0.0911)	0.218** (0.0907)
Bosniak	-0.603*** (0.0771)	-0.583*** (0.0767)
Croat	-0.130 (0.0981)	-0.143 (0.102)
Serb	-0.319*** (0.0917)	-0.369*** (0.0953)
ethnonationalism	-0.240*** (0.0397)	-0.236*** (0.0397)
ethnic_vote_share	-0.00877*** (0.00218)	-0.00871*** (0.00220)
Serb concentration		-0.260** (0.117)
Croat concentration		-0.315*** (0.102)
Constant	2.750*** (0.184)	3.017*** (0.196)
Observations	2,181	2,181
R-squared	0.233	0.238
adj. r2	0.231	0.235

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Finally, when we include the additional controls for municipal ethnic vote share and ethnic fractionalization into our main model as below in Model 1, the Pride effect remains robust. The inclusion of municipal fixed effects in Model 2 indicates that Pride effects are robust to time invariant municipal level conditions, as well as to panel-related individual level fixed effects in Model 3. All models include robust standard errors clustered at the municipal level.

Appendix Table 28. Municipal Ethnic Vote Share, Ethnic Fractionalization, and Pride Support (Extended Controls, OLS)

VARIABLES	(1) Support for Sarajevo Pride	(2) Support for Sarajevo Pride	(3) Support for Sarajevo Pride
Pride Treatment	-0.00951 (0.0529)	0.0115 (0.0570)	
Sarajevo	-0.201*** (0.0699)	-0.101 (0.0660)	
Pride txt x Sarajevo	0.177*** (0.0567)	0.151** (0.0602)	0.159** (0.0448)
Support for LGBT+ Rights	0.327*** (0.0182)	0.325*** (0.0211)	0.111*** (0.0164)
Close to LGBT+ People	0.0361 (0.0434)	0.00868 (0.0445)	0.587 (0.482)
Contact with LGBT+ People	0.0258* (0.0138)	0.0326** (0.0142)	0.0265 (0.0203)
Contact with LGBT+ Victims	0.115** (0.0477)	0.0961* (0.0542)	-0.0527 (0.0614)
Heard of Prides	-0.136*** (0.0481)	-0.140*** (0.0431)	-0.108 (0.154)
Awareness of Sarajevo Pride	-0.00442* (0.00232)		
EU Membership Support	-0.0261 (0.195)		
Ethnonationalism	0.0880 (0.183)		
Ethnic_vote_share	-0.106*** (0.0380)	-0.126*** (0.0367)	0.0360 (0.152)
Serb concentration	-0.254*** (0.0533)	-0.263*** (0.0537)	
Croat concentration	-0.0653 (0.112)	0.00551 (0.115)	
Religious	-0.194* (0.0986)	-0.228** (0.0985)	
Bosniak	0.00769 (0.0364)	0.00137 (0.0359)	


Croat	0.00155 (0.00127)	0.00162 (0.00130)	
Serb	0.00938 (0.00993)	0.0141 (0.0105)	
Men	-0.0488 (0.0513)	-0.0406 (0.0568)	
Age	-0.0766 (0.0535)	-0.0647 (0.0494)	
Education	0.0176 (0.0136)	0.0231* (0.0134)	
Rural	-0.0496 (0.0516)	-0.0455 (0.0606)	
Unemployed	-0.108** (0.0537)	-0.108** (0.0523)	
Constant	1.597*** (0.216)	1.308*** (0.185)	1.337* (0.464)
Observations	1,986	1,986	537
R-squared	0.491	0.378	0.115
adj. r2	0.486	0.373	0.103
		Municipal Fixed Effects	Panel Fixed Effects
Number of Municipal FEs		69	
Number of Individual FEs			248

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Robust standard errors in parentheses  
\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

### *Ethno-federalism and Pride Support*

Next, we consider whether ethno-territorial autonomy in the form of Republika Srpska (RS) can explain reduced LGBT+ support outside Sarajevo. Bosnian Serbs in the RS have titular autonomy within Bosnia as an ethno-federal sub-state. One possibility is that the RS serves as an institutional barrier for the diffusion of Pride effects across Bosnia. The figure below suggests that there is some validity to this claim. Average Pride support is lower in the RS before and after the Pride compared to the Bosnian Federation, where Pride support increases on average after the Pride is held.



In addition, the table below shows that the Serb nationalist-dominated Republika Srpska exhibits higher levels of social conservatism concerning LGBT+ rights in comparison to the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Appendix Table 29 : Unpacking attitudes regarding LGBT+ rights by Bosnia's ethnic entities with 95 percent CIs in parentheses		
	Republika Srpska (Serb entity)	Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosniak and Croat entity)
<b>Means</b>		
Support for Pride (1-4 scale)	1.52 (1.46-1.58)	1.86 (1.81-1.91)
Support for LGBT+ Rights (0-10 scale)	3.42 (3.15-3.69)	4.35 (4.17-4.53)
Closeness to Gay People (0-10 scale)	0.79 (0.65-0.94)	2.05 (1.91-2.19)
Willingness to Attend Pride (0-10 scale)	1.14 (1.00-1.28)	2.03 (1.90-2.16)
Willingness to Protest Pride (0-10 scale)	1.99 (1.77-2.20)	2.41 (2.26-2.56)
<b>Proportion</b>		
Knowing a gay person	0.12 (0.095-0.14)	0.30 (0.28-0.33)
Source: July, September, November Surveys of Bosnia and Herzegovina 2019		



In the table below, we regress a dummy variable for the Federation in place of Sarajevo on our main dependent variable: Pride support. In Model 1 we see a significant effect of residing in the Bosnian Federation on Pride Support (Republika Sprska is the constant comparison group). However, when we exclude Sarajevo residents from the sample in Model 2, there is no longer any difference between RS residents and Federation residents on Pride support. Hence, Sarajevo is the main driver of greater Pride support within the Federation compared to the RS. This underscores that proximity, rather than ethno-federal institutional divisions are most likely responsible for Pride effects. We do not see barriers to diffusion at the borders of the RS compared to the Federation. Instead, diffusion appears to stop outside the main city municipalities of Sarajevo itself.

Appendix Table 30. Ethno-federalism and Pride Support (OLS)


VARIABLES	(1) Support for Sarajevo Pride	(2) Support for Sarajevo Pride
Pride Treatment	0.0412 (0.0637)	0.0412 (0.0637)
Federation	0.301*** (0.0564)	0.0242 (0.0567)
Pride Treatment x Federation	0.0634 (0.0811)	-0.105 (0.0797)
Constant (RS)	1.503*** (0.0440)	1.503*** (0.0440)
	Including Sarajevo	Excluding Sarajevo
Observations	2,410	1,673
R-squared	0.023	0.002
adj r2	0.0223	-0.000204

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1


### *Religiosity and Pride Support*

Next, we consider how religious cleavages, which overlap and reinforce ethnic cleavages, may affect Pride support. The figure below reports the distribution of responses to the question “How religious do you consider yourself?” Response options range from 1= not religious, 2=somewhat religious and 3 = very religious over ethnicity. The figure below shows that religiosity does not vary significantly across ethnicity. All three dominant ethnic groups are moderately religious, while those in the ethnic “other” category and “Bosnian” category are less religious. Recall as well that there are more people in Sarajevo who reject ethnic categorization based on war-time cleavages and claim “Bosnian” status as their ethnicity.




Note: Pools all respondents from before and after the Pride

Next, we report the relationship between religiosity and Pride support. The figure below shows that the more religious one is, the less likely they are to support the Sarajevo Pride.



Note: Pools all respondents from before and after the Pride

Next, we compare changes in religiosity before and after the Pride inside and outside Sarajevo. The figure below shows that people in Sarajevo are less religious compared to outside Sarajevo. However, religiosity increased in both samples post-Pride, which suggests that the Pride had a backlash effect on religious Bosnians.



When we plot the effects of religiosity on Pride support using regression analysis in the table below, we find that religiosity has a significant negative effect on Pride support. We also include a control for ethnonationalism and an interaction term between ethnonationalism and religiosity. Although religious cleavages overlap with ethnicity (Bosniaks are predominantly Muslim, Bosnian Croats are predominantly Catholic, and Bosnian Serbs are Orthodox), there appear to be independent effects of ethnonationalism and religiosity on opposition to the Pride. Furthermore, ethnonationalism and religiosity are not as strongly intercorrelated as one might assume (Pearson's  $R = 0.19$ ,  $p < 0.0000$ ). Hence, religiosity and ethnonationalism offer distinct pathways for countermobilizing against LGBT+ activism.

Appendix Table 31. Ethnocentrism, Religiosity and Pride Support

VARIABLES	(1) Support for Sarajevo Pride	(2) Support for Sarajevo Pride
Pride Treatment	0.0481 (0.0396)	0.0471 (0.0396)
Sarajevo	0.564*** (0.0704)	0.561*** (0.0707)
Pride txt x Sarajevo	0.225** (0.0901)	0.228** (0.0901)
Bosniak	-0.504*** (0.0770)	-0.498*** (0.0778)
Croat	-0.195** (0.0954)	-0.189** (0.0956)
Serb	-0.440*** (0.0846)	-0.432*** (0.0850)
Ethnonationalism	-0.222*** (0.0381)	-0.315** (0.139)
Religiosity	-0.202*** (0.0317)	-0.222*** (0.0491)
Ethnonationalism x Religiosity		0.0428 (0.0617)
Constant	2.488*** (0.0950)	2.525*** (0.118)
Observations	2,356	2,356
R-squared	0.230	0.230
adj r2	0.228	0.227


Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$

### *Urban-Rural Divisions and Pride Support*

Urban environments have been shown to be more open, liberal and cosmopolitan compared to rural locations in other European contexts (Maxwell 2019; Ayoub and Kollman 2020). In the former Yugoslavia, Hodson et al. (1994), Massey et al. (1999) also found greater cosmopolitan attitudes and less in tolerance in urban ethnically mixed areas compared to rural enclaves, and Bosnia was especially tolerant compared to other Yugoslav republics. We consider whether there is a strong urban-rural effect in the data on Pride support that can help explain the lack of diffusion outside Sarajevo. We measure urban-rural differences using a simple binary marker from our sampling frame for urban vs. rural sampling locations as well as a more refined measure of population density based on the 2013 census, as reported by Hadzic et al. 2017 at the municipal level. First, 39.2% of our sampling municipalities are classified as rural and 60.8% urban in the stratification process. Using 2013 census data from Hadzic et al. (2017), population density ranges from 15 people per square km to 2846. The average population density in Bosnia excluding Sarajevo is 141 per sq. km, while Sarajevo is 2248 per sq. km. Hence, most of Bosnia is exceedingly rural by comparison. Bosnia's second most dense city is Tuzla at 434 people per sq. km. The largest city in Republika Srpska is Banja Luka with a population density of only 158 people per sq. km.

The figure below indicates the average Pride support response in urban vs. rural municipalities using the binary sampling stratum for both before and after the Sarajevo Pride. The figure shows that urban municipalities are more supportive of the Pride than rural municipalities and that Pride support increases in urban municipalities following the Sarajevo Pride but not in rural municipalities.



Next, we report the results of OLS regression on Pride support using the binary urban/rural control and the log of population density. In Model 1, we find a negative effect on Pride support in rural locations, while in Model 2, we find that Pride support increases with the log of population density.

Appendix Table 32. Urban-Rural Population Density and Pride Support (OLS Regression)

VARIABLES	(1) Support for Sarajevo Pride	(2) Support for Sarajevo Pride
Pride Treatment	-0.00699 (0.0385)	-0.0217 (0.0401)
Sarajevo	0.656*** (0.0714)	0.379*** (0.0989)
Pride txt x Sarajevo	0.278*** (0.0955)	0.281*** (0.0953)
rural	-0.135*** (0.0388)	
Log (pop_density)		0.124*** (0.0248)
Constant	1.714*** (0.0634)	0.916*** (0.119)
Observations	2,430	2,218
R-squared	0.167	0.182
adj r2	0.166	0.180

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Next, while noting differences in Sarajevo to other urban and rural locations in terms of LGBT+ support, the table below shows that urban-rural locational differences and population density alone do not have a significant impact on Pride support when controlling for other covariates.

Appendix Table 33. Urban-Rural Population Density and Pride Support  
(OLS Regression, Extended Controls)

VARIABLES	(1) Support for Sarajevo Pride	(2) Support for Sarajevo Pride
Pride Treatment	-0.0201 (0.0576)	-0.0242 (0.0584)
Sarajevo	-0.115 (0.0866)	-0.200 (0.159)
Pride txt x Sarajevo	0.157** (0.0633)	0.150** (0.0628)
Support for LGBT+ Rights	0.0818*** (0.0126)	0.0803*** (0.0137)
Close to LGBT+ People	0.000855 (0.0261)	-0.00401 (0.0280)
Contact with LGBT+ People	0.0937*** (0.0127)	0.0942*** (0.0138)
Contact with LGBT+ Victims	0.159*** (0.0350)	0.156*** (0.0373)
Heard of Prides	0.0187 (0.0446)	0.0128 (0.0467)
Awareness of Sarajevo Pride	0.0210 (0.0135)	0.0276** (0.0132)
EU Membership Support	0.0854 (0.0542)	0.105* (0.0547)
Ethnonationalism	-0.144*** (0.0418)	-0.136*** (0.0442)
Religiosity	-0.114*** (0.0356)	-0.111*** (0.0385)
Bosniak	-0.227*** (0.0398)	-0.241*** (0.0383)
Croat	-0.0994 (0.0856)	-0.0688 (0.0904)
Serb	-0.304*** (0.0648)	-0.290*** (0.0659)
Men	-0.0222 (0.0345)	-0.0149 (0.0381)
Age	0.00113 (0.00114)	0.00123 (0.00113)



Education	0.0150 (0.0114)	0.0160 (0.0110)
Unemployed	-0.0726 (0.0509)	-0.0917* (0.0514)
Rural	-0.0421 (0.0439)	
Log (pop_density)		0.0539 (0.0473)
Constant	1.378*** (0.171)	1.008*** (0.269)
Observations	2,039	1,848
R-squared	0.484	0.499
adj. r2	0.479	0.494

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Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Next, we consider whether Sarajevo exclusively drives the urban effect in Pride support. In the table below, we exclude Sarajevo from the analysis. Model 1 shows the interaction between the urban location dummy variable for all other non-Sarajevo urban locations in the sample. Model 2 does the same thing using a continuous population density variable but excluding Sarajevo. Model 3 looks exclusively at the second largest city in the Federation, Tuzla, and Model 4 examines changes in Pride Support in Republika Srpska's largest city, Banja Luka. None of these models show a significant Pride effect.


Appendix Table 34. Pride Support in Other Urban Locations Outside Sarajevo (OLS)

VARIABLES	(1) Support for Sarajevo Pride	(2) Support for Sarajevo Pride	(3) Support for Sarajevo Pride	(4) Support for Sarajevo Pride	(5) Support for Sarajevo Pride
Pride treatment	-0.0295 (0.0512)	-0.0438 (0.0508)	0.136 (0.229)	-0.0111 (0.0388)	-0.0386 (0.0388)
Urban locations	0.350*** (0.0543)	0.0718 (0.0548)			
Pride x urban	0.273*** (0.0763)	0.0720 (0.0776)			
Ln(pop_density)			0.0420 (0.0364)		
Pride x popdens			-0.0357 (0.0488)		
Tuzla				0.144 (0.138)	
Pride x Tuzla				-0.256 (0.176)	
Banja Luka					0.0847 (0.115)
Pride x BL					0.216 (0.173)
	Including Sarajevo	Excluding Sarajevo	Excluding Sarajevo	Excluding Sarajevo	Excluding Sarajevo
Constant	1.489*** (0.0396)	1.478*** (0.0397)	1.306*** (0.171)	1.508*** (0.0279)	1.511*** (0.0282)
Observations	2,430	1,693	1,481	1,693	1,693
R-squared	0.064	0.005	0.001	0.002	0.005
adj r2	0.0624	0.00356	-0.000700	-0.000203	0.00314

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Next, we show that few sampling locations in Bosnia have levels of Pride support that mirror Sarajevo. The figure below provides box whisker plots of Pride support for the combined 4 municipalities in Sarajevo city followed by all other municipalities in the same. In total we have 790 observations from Sarajevo, which is far more than other locations in the sample. For example, there are only 92 observations from Tulza and 104 from Banja Luka. Most of these locations have a lower mean and inter-quartile range compared to Sarajevo. Exceptions include Bihac (N = 53), Modrica (N = 25), Gracanica (N = 45), and Teslic (N = 16), and Novo Gorazde (N = 16) which are comparable to Sarajevo but with such a small N, it is difficult to assess how robust those results are.



Finally, urban-rural divisions in Pride support are prevalent across other LGBT+ items in our survey. The table below indicates that rural areas tend to be more socially conservative concerning LGBT+ rights in comparison to urban areas.


Appendix Table 35 : Unpacking attitudes regarding LGBT+ rights by rural/urban with 95 percent CIs in parentheses		
	Rural	Urban
<b>Means</b>		
Support for Pride (1-4 scale)	1.47 (1.42-1.52)	1.96 (1.90-2.01)
Support for LGBT+ Rights (0-10 scale)	2.89 (2.67-3.10)	4.89 (4.69-5.09)
Closeness to Gay People (0-10 scale)	0.69 (0.58-0.80)	2.33 (2.17-2.49)
Willingness to Attend Pride (0-10 scale)	1.48 (1.33-1.63)	1.95 (1.81-2.08)
Willingness to Protest Pride (0-10 scale)	2.36 (2.16-2.55)	2.22 (2.06-2.37)
<b>Proportion</b>		
Knowing a gay person	0.12 (0.098-0.14)	0.34 (0.31-0.36)
Source: July, September, November Surveys of Bosnia and Herzegovina 2019		

Also, the table below shows that Sarajevo tends to be more liberal, but willingness to attend and protest pride are higher in comparison to other cities, suggestive of the salience of Pride to the Sarajevo community.


Appendix Table 36 : Unpacking attitudes regarding LGBT+ rights by major city with 95 percent CIs in parentheses			
	Sarajevo	Tuzla	Banja Luka
<b>Means</b>			
Support for Pride (1-4 scale)	2.41 (2.24-2.59)	1.53 (1.35-1.70)	1.69 (1.52-1.86)
Support for LGBT+ Rights (0-10 scale)	6.09 (5.53-6.64)	2.36 (1.75-2.96)	4.79 (4.06-5.51)
Closeness to Gay People (0-10 scale)	3.39 (2.90-3.87)	0.78 (0.41-1.14)	1.26 (0.74-1.78)
Willingness to Attend Pride (0-10 scale)	2.68 (2.24-3.11)	1.36 (0.91-1.82)	1.34 (0.99-1.68)
Willingness to Protest Pride (0-10 scale)	2.2 (1.76-2.64)	2.78 (2.08-3.48)	1.38 (1.01-1.74)
<b>Proportion</b>			
Knowing a gay person	0.55 (0.48-0.62)	0.099 (0.051-0.18)	0.18 (0.11-0.27)
Source: July, September, November Surveys of Bosnia and Herzegovina 2019			

### *Pride Support Variation Within Sarajevo City*


Next, we examine variation in Pride support within the main 4 municipalities in Sarajevo city: Stari Grad, Centar, Novo Sarajevo, and Novi Grad (see Maps below). Stari Grad or “Old Town” is the least dense section in Sarajevo (dens = 400 people per sq km), home to the Baščaršija, and other legacies of Sarajevo’s Ottoman period, and is considered a more conservative Bosniak quarter of the town (88% of the municipal population) (Gül and Dee 2015). On the opposite end of the city is Novi Grad or “New Town” which was largely an expansion of the city under socialist Yugoslavia, is a much more densely populated section of the city (2846 people per sq km) and is also largely Bosniak (86% as of 2013). In the middle are Novo Sarajevo or “New Sarajevo”, an earlier expansion of the city in the 1960s and is also a densely populated Sarajevo municipality (2023 people per sq km). In 2013, 74% of residents identified as Bosniak and 13% as “other”. Finally, there is Centar or “Center” Sarajevo (pop dens 2402 per sq. km), which houses most of the main federal and cantonal government buildings and more of the city’s Austro-Hungarian architectural influence. By the 2013 census, 14.5% of Centar Sarajevo residents chose a category other than Bosniak, Croat, or Serb as their ethnicity (75.5% are Bosniak). Centar is also the location where the Pride took place, beginning at the “Eternal Flame” WWII memorial on Marshal Tito Street and ending at the Bosnian Parliament building. The remaining municipalities are part of Sarajevo canton and are much less dense. In the Republika Srpska, there are also six small municipalities that comprise “East Sarajevo” or “Serb Sarajevo” created after the war and are comprised of over 90% Bosnian Serbs, predominantly rural, under separate administrative control (see Aquilué and Roca 2016).



From Gül and Dee (2015)




From (Aquilué and Roca 2016)





From Gül and Dee (2015)

The figure below includes box-wisher plots of Pride Support for each of the 4 main city municipalities within the Sarajevo sample. The plots show a distribution of support across all 4 municipalities with stronger support in the more densely populated municipalities of Novi Grad, Centar, and Novo Sarajevo compared to the sparser and socially conservative Stari Grad municipality.




We also note that ethnonationalism and religiosity are higher in Stari Grad Municipality than in the other three municipalities. The figure below reports mean levels of ethnonationalism across each municipality. The figure below reports mean religiosity. Both show greater ethnonationalism and religiosity in Stari Grad compared to other municipalities in Sarajevo city.






Finally, the figure below reports average Pride support within each municipality compared to Outside Sarajevo. Even in Stari Grad, Pride support is greater than what is observed outside Sarajevo. The advantage of pooling the municipalities for analysis is that it provides a larger N of cases within close vicinity of the Pride event from which to assess an effect on changes in Pride support. Examining Pride effects within each municipality separately is challenged by the reduced N (only 60 cases in Stari Grad, for example). However, the inclusion of our Sarajevo panel sample reduces time invariant concerns regarding treatment effects.



### *Conflict-related violence and Pride Support*

We examine whether conflict-related casualties and conflict displacement could impact Pride support within Bosnia's post-war municipalities. We rely on municipal-level data from Hadzic et al. (2017) for this analysis. The figure reports average war-related casualties as a percentage of the pre-war municipal population within and outside Sarajevo. Sarajevo is significantly higher in average war-related casualties compared to other sampling locations reflecting its frontline status during the war.



The table below includes a control for war-related casualties and finds a negative effect on Pride support. This may be consistent with other research on how war increases ethnonationalism and religiosity, which may impede support for LGBT+ rights. However, the effect is not robust to clustering standard errors by municipality or to the inclusion of extended controls in the analysis, so any effects of conflict-related violence on LGBT+ support appear weak.

Appendix Table 37. Conflict-related Violence and Pride Support (OLS Regression)

VARIABLES	(1) Support for Sarajevo Pride	(2) Support for Sarajevo Pride	(3) Support for Sarajevo Pride
Pride Treatment	-0.0351 (0.0399)	-0.0351 (0.0525)	-0.0135 (0.0609)
Sarajevo	0.744*** (0.0711)	0.744*** (0.147)	-0.0121 (0.0907)
Pride txt x Sarajevo	0.305*** (0.0962)	0.305*** (0.0830)	0.151** (0.0692)
Log(casualties)	-0.0465** (0.0214)	-0.0465 (0.0414)	-0.0118 (0.0316)
Support for LGBT+ Rights			0.0799*** (0.0138)
Close to LGBT+ People			0.000316 (0.0278)
Contact with LGBT+ People			0.0953*** (0.0132)
Contact with LGBT+ Victims			0.162*** (0.0377)
Heard of Prides			0.00590 (0.0480)
Awareness of Sarajevo Pride			0.0245* (0.0131)
EU Membership Support			0.143** (0.0553)
Ethnonationalism			-0.164*** (0.0441)
Religiosity			-0.129*** (0.0402)
Bosniak			-0.0440 (0.0548)
Croat			0.117 (0.0702)
Serb			-0.0125 (0.0389)
Men			0.00131 (0.00117)

age			0.00998 (0.0108)
Education			-0.0775* (0.0447)
Rural			-0.100* (0.0536)
Unemployed			1.217*** (0.187)
Constant	1.522*** (0.0303)	1.522*** (0.0470)	1,848
Standard Errors	Robust	Clustered	0.494
Observations	2,218	2,218	0.489
R-squared	0.175	0.175	0.403
adj. r2	0.174	0.174	0.395

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Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

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## Exploring Causal Mechanisms: Mediators, Moderators, Confounders and Covariates

While theory is ultimately critical to distinguishing among potential mediators, moderators, confounders, or independent covariates of LGBT+ activist support, given the early state of research on Pride events and their effects, we treat this analysis as an exploratory theory-building exercise to inform future research on causal mechanisms and pathways.

In estimating the impact of the Sarajevo Pride on support for LGBT+ activism, we consider the possibility that other observable covariates in our dataset confounded, moderated, or mediated the Pride effect. The following diagram, taken from Field-Fote (2019) illustrates the difference among mediator, moderator, confounding variables, and otherwise independent covariates with our outcome variable. A moderator variable is one that influences the strength of the relationship between an intervention (the Sarajevo Pride) and an outcome measure (support for LGBT+ activism). Moderation occurs when an interaction between the intervention and the moderator variable produces a change in the outcome. For example, in our study, proximity to the Pride is a moderator of Pride effects. The interaction between the Pride treatment and a dummy variable for Sarajevo leads to positive outcomes in Sarajevo, but no effect outside Sarajevo. In contrast, a mediator variable *explains* the relationship between an intervention and an outcome variable such that the intervention produces a change in the mediator variable which produces a change in the outcome variable (Baron and Kenney 1986; Imai et al. 2010). Both moderators and mediators can play an important role in the causal mechanism or pathway between an intervention and an outcome, such as how the Sarajevo Pride “works” to increase support and/or opposition to LGBT+ activism.

Moderators can include time invariant factors like ethnicity, gender, age, education, urban-rural demographics that might influence the effect of the Pride on support or opposition to LGBT+ activism. In contrast, time invariant factors cannot be mediators because the treatment cannot change them (ex. the Pride cannot make someone become more rural or more Bosniak). However, time variant factors like attitudes toward LGBT+ rights, ethnocentrism, or religiosity could be either moderators or mediators, depending on their relationship to the intervention and the outcome in question.

For example, if Prides help increase awareness and visibility for the LGBT+ community, which in turn increases support for LGBT+ activism, then raising awareness could be a mediator of Pride effects. As another example, contact with LGBT+ people could be a mediator of Pride effects if it increases as a result of the Pride and leads to greater support for LGBT+ activism. However, if Pride effects vary with contact but the Pride itself does not lead to increased contact with the LGBT+ community, then contact is more of a moderator than a mediator.

Mediator and moderator variables could also have negative effects on the relationship between the Pride and LGBT+ support. We examine the possibility that the Pride could have provoked anti-LGBT sentiment in the population, resulting in a backlash against gay-rights activism. If ethnocentrism and religiosity intensify as a result of the Pride, increasing opposition to LGBT+ activism, then they are negative mediators. If ethnocentrism and religiosity are not affected by the Pride itself, but reduce the impact of the Pride on support for LGBT+ activism through interaction effects, then they are more likely negative moderator variables.


In contrast to mediators and moderators, confounders are variables that operate outside the causal pathway that predict both the intervention and the outcome variable. Confounders are similar to mediators except for the direction of the causal arrows. Also, like moderators, confounders can also include both time invariant (ethnicity, gender, education, urban-rural



division) as well as time variant factors (etc. awareness, support for LGBT+ rights, ethnocentrism, religiosity). Whether a variable is a confounder, moderator, or mediator depends again on the theoretical pathways under consideration as well as the empirical relationship between the intervention, outcome, and confounder/mediator in question.

Confounding is made possible because the Sarajevo Pride is not a random intervention. Pride effects could be endogenous and therefore confounded by demographic covariates or pre-existing attitudes or support for LGBT+ activism. For example, if controlling for pre-existing attitudes toward the LGBT+ community eliminates any measurable impact of the Pride on LGBT+ support, then we might consider this a confounding variable (or a fully moderating variable depending on the causal pathway in question). EU support could serve as another potential confounder of Pride effects, because many people desire EU membership for Bosnia, and the EU has mandated some degree of tolerance and legal acceptance of LGBT+ rights as conditional to EU membership. Ethnonationalism and religiosity might also confound the effects of the Pride if these factors are associated with homophobia and elevated in areas outside Sarajevo. As always, much depends on the specification of the causal pathway under consideration. Confounders, unlike moderators and mediators, are operating outside of the theorized causal framework.

Finally, there may be covariates that predict the outcome variable independently of the intervention which neither confound, mediate, or moderate the effect of the intervention itself. For example, how close one feels to LGBT+ people would be an independent covariate if it is not correlated with the intervention but positively correlated with the outcome variable.



From: Field-Fote, Edelle. 2019. "Mediators and Moderators, Confounders and Covariates: Exploring the Variables That Illuminate or Obscure the "Active Ingredients" in Neurorehabilitation." *Journal of Neurologic Physical Therapy* 43(2): 83-84.

To explore the impact of these changes on support for LGBT+ activism, we turn to formal causal mediation analysis (Barron and Kenney 1986; Imai et al. 2010). For a variable to mediate the effect of the Pride on support for LGBT+ activism, it must predict the outcome variable, it must also be predicted by the intervention or treatment (the Pride event), and the inclusion of the mediator must lead to an increase or decrease in the treatment effect on the outcome variable. The table below shows the effect of including potential mediator variables on Pride effects within Sarajevo. Model 1 indicates the basic model where the interaction term Pride x Sarajevo is positive and significant. Models 2-10 include plausible mediator variables. Model 2-8 show that mediator variables for support for LGBT+ rights, contact with LGBT+ people, feeling close to LGBT+ people, and knowing LGBT+ people who are victims of violence, salience of (heard of) Prides, awareness of the Sarajevo Pride, and EU support are all positively correlated with support for the Pride. In contrast, ethnocentrism and religiosity in Models 8-9 are negatively correlated with support for the Sarajevo Pride. The mediating effect of each variable on support for the Pride in Sarajevo pre-treatment and post-treatment can be observed in how the coefficients for Sarajevo and Pride x Sarajevo change with the inclusion of the mediator.

Appendix Table 38. Mediation of Pride Awareness, Contact, and Religiosity on Pride Effects (OLS, Logit)

VARIABLES	(1) Support for Sarajevo Pride	(2) Support for Sarajevo Pride	(3) Support for Sarajevo Pride	(4) Support for Sarajevo Pride	(5) Support for Sarajevo Pride
Treatment	-0.0241 (0.0379)	-0.00216 (0.0599)	-0.0735 (0.0486)	-0.0104 (0.0475)	-0.0791 (0.0482)
Sarajevo	0.714*** (0.0696)	0.290*** (0.108)	0.329*** (0.107)	0.174* (0.0900)	0.501*** (0.118)
Treatment x Sarajevo	0.294*** (0.0954)	0.158* (0.0855)	0.305*** (0.0594)	0.211*** (0.0688)	0.312*** (0.0721)
Support for LGBT+ rights		0.130*** (0.0167)			
Contact with LGBT+ people			0.297*** (0.0302)		
Closeness to LGBT+ people				0.175*** (0.0112)	
Knew victims					0.375*** (0.0316)
Constant	1.516*** (0.0274)	1.143*** (0.0628)	1.122*** (0.0563)	1.380*** (0.0417)	1.016*** (0.0571)
Observations	2,430	2,363	2,389	2,398	2,339
R-squared	0.164	0.366	0.251	0.347	0.266
adj.r2	0.163	0.365	0.250	0.346	0.264

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

VARIABLES	(6) Support for Sarajevo Pride	(7) Support for Sarajevo Pride	(8) Support for Sarajevo Pride	(9) Support for Sarajevo Pride	(10) Support for Sarajevo Pride
Pride Treatment	-0.0352 (0.0508)	-0.130** (0.0570)	-0.0352 (0.0508)	0.0114 (0.0502)	0.0236 (0.0521)
Sarajevo	0.707*** (0.144)	0.701*** (0.139)	0.707*** (0.144)	0.661*** (0.141)	0.655*** (0.141)
Pride txt x Sarajevo	0.296*** (0.0814)	0.338*** (0.0821)	0.296*** (0.0814)	0.265*** (0.0867)	0.274*** (0.0943)
Heard of Prides	0.164*** (0.0533)				
Awareness of Sarajevo Pride		0.0939*** (0.0238)			
Support EU membership			0.164*** (0.0533)		
Ethnonationalism				-0.289*** (0.0746)	
Religiosity					-0.281*** (0.0803)
Constant	1.396*** (0.0531)	1.357*** (0.0514)	1.396*** (0.0531)	1.665*** (0.0589)	2.116*** (0.177)
Observations	2,430	2,269	2,430	2,393	2,393
R-squared	0.169	0.175	0.169	0.182	0.193
adj. r2	0.167	0.173	0.167	0.181	0.191

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1


As a further assessment of mediation effects, we utilize a mediation package developed by Hicks and Tingley (2011) for use in Stata. The following tables report bi-variate direct effects of the Sarajevo Pride on support for LGBT+ activism, the Average Causal Mediating Effect (ACME) for each proposed mediator variable, the total effect resulting from the Sarajevo Pride + mediation, and the % of the total effect that is mediated. Each table also reports the results from sensitivity analysis, which provide an estimate of the likelihood that the mediating effect could be confounded by the inclusion of additional covariate controls. As a rule of thumb, the greater the value of Rho, and the product of the R2 for the mediation and outcome models, the less likely the mediation effect (ACME) would be confounded by an omitted variable. As there was no treatment effect outside Sarajevo, this mediation analysis is restricted to the Sarajevo sample.

Appendix Table 39. Mediation Analysis on Pride Effects (OLS, Logit)

	Support for LGBT+ Rights	Contact with LGBT+ People	Knew Victims	Heard of Pride
ACME	0.178	0.024	0.031	0.096
Direct Effect	0.102	0.235	0.237	0.182
Total Effect	0.280	0.260	0.268	0.279
% of Tot Eff mediated	0.634	0.093	0.114	0.344
Rho at which ACME = 0	0.6285	0.4186	0.4216	0.2298
$R^2_M \cdot R^2_Y$ at which ACME = 0:	0.395	0.1752	0.1777	0.0528
$R^2_M \sim R^2_Y$ at which ACME = 0:	0.2319	0.1428	0.1442	0.0479

	Awareness of Sarajevo Pride	EU Support	Ethno- nationalism	Religiosity
ACME	0.034	0.019	-0.043	-0.091
Direct Effect	0.255	0.261	0.306	0.355
Total Effect	0.289	0.281	0.263	0.264
% of Tot Eff mediated	0.119	0.069	-0.158	-0.339
Rho at which ACME = 0	0.0468	0.1138	-0.2602	-0.346
$R^2_M \cdot R^2_Y$ at which ACME = 0:	0.0022	0.013	0.0677	0.1197
$R^2_M \sim R^2_Y$ at which ACME = 0:	0.002	0.0126	0.0621	0.1029



Among the positive mediators, support for LGBT+ rights and Pride awareness have the strongest mediating effect on overall support for LGBT+ activism. In contrast, ethnonationalism and religiosity have a strong negative mediating effect. Not only did religiosity increase after the pride, but the increase had a negative impact on LGBT+ support. The % total positive and negative mediating effect of Pride awareness, Contact, and Religiosity are graphed in the Figure above.

Next, we consider how these potential mediators interact in combined models. We utilize regression models to explore the mediating, moderating, confounding or independent predictive effects of key covariates (Baron and Kenney 1986) In the table below, we examine the possible relationship between the Pride and covariates of LGBT+ activist support in our Sarajevo and nationwide samples. In Model 1, we search for possible pre-treatment covariates with our dependent variable, *Support for the Sarajevo Pride*, in the form of support for LGBT+ rights, contact with LGBT+ people in general, contact with LGBT+ victims of violence, Pride awareness variables, EU support, ethnonationalism, and religiosity as well as demographic controls. Model 1 includes only the pre-Pride sample. Before the Pride took place, we find that contact with LGBT+ people, including victims of violence (*Contact with LGBT+ Victims*), and feelings of closeness to LGBT+ people were all predictive of support for the Pride. However, salience of Prides (*Heard of Prides*) and awareness of Sarajevo Pride are not predictive of support *prior to* the Sarajevo Pride. Demographically, age is correlated with greater support for activism pre-treatment, while Serbs and Bosniaks are less supportive compared to other groups. Finally, items measuring ethnonationalism and religiosity predict opposition to LGBT+ activism, as theorized. We do not yet know if these items are indeed moderators, mediators, or confounders of Pride effects, but they are at least significant covariates with our outcome variable.

Next, we explore possible moderators or mediators of Pride effects in relation to Sarajevo. In Model 2, we show with logit regression that the Sarajevo panel sample, pre-treatment, has more positive LGBT+ attitudes than the nationwide sample. The dependent variable is coded 1 if a subject, pre-treatment, took part in the online or 0 if in the nationwide sample. Results are robust to the inclusion or exclusion of people who took part in the nationwide sample inside Sarajevo city. The results show that Sarajevo residents, compared to the nationwide sample, are more supportive of LGBT+ rights, have more contact with LGBT+ people, and have a greater awareness of Prides before the actual Pride took place in September. These variables could potentially help explain why the Pride treatment has a greater impact inside rather than outside Sarajevo. The negative correlation on treatment salience (*Awareness of Sarajevo Pride*) indicates that Sarajevo residents are less likely to think the city has already held a Pride in the past compared to the nationwide sample, which is, of course, correct and this serves as a measure of treatment salience. Finally, Bosniaks, Croats, and especially Serbs are underrepresented in the online panel compared to the nationwide sample because fewer Serbs live in Sarajevo, and more people in the Sarajevo panel identified as “Bosnian” than nationwide. The online Sarajevo panel also tends to be more female, younger, better educated, less likely to be unemployed, and less rural than the nationwide sample. However, except for age, none of these demographic covariates are significant pre-treatment predictors of support for LGBT+ activism (as shown in Model 1).

Next, we explore possible mediators of Pride effects by examining how the Pride impacted key covariates of LGBT+ support. Model 3 indicates the treatment effect of the Pride on covariates of LGBT+ support using logit regression. The dependent variable is coded 1 for the post-treatment group and 0 for the pre-treatment group. Model 3 shows that the Pride did not have a significant impact on increasing support for LGBT+ rights. It is likely that people in Sarajevo were more already more supportive of LGBT+ rights *before* the Pride. The main treatment effects appear to

be increased contact with LGBT+ people, which is a plausible mediator if gay people became more visible as a result of the Pride. More people also indicate salience that a Pride in Sarajevo took place after the actual event than before it (*Awareness of Sarajevo Pride*), underscoring the effect of the Pride on raising awareness. The positive effect on *Rural* people simply reflects the imbalance between pre-post treatment groups discussed in the sampling section of the manuscript, which we will address through covariate matching. In addition, the results show an increase in religiosity following the treatment. We note that the LGBT+ activism items in our survey preceded the religiosity question, so they likely had a priming effect on religious Bosnians. This suggests to us that religiosity is not only an important covariate of LGBT+ rights support at the onset but may have intensified as a result of the actual Pride.

Appendix Table 40. Exploring Mediators, Moderators, and Confounders of Pride Effects (OLS, Logit)

VARIABLES	Model 1 Support for Sarajevo Pride Pre-Treatment	Model 2 Sarajevo Pre- treatment	Model 3 Possible Treatment effects
Support for LGBT+ rights	0.0849*** (0.0125)	0.161*** (0.0587)	0.0131 (0.0299)
Contact with LGBT+ people	0.0417 (0.0420)	0.470*** (0.126)	0.119** (0.0552)
Close to LGBT+ People	0.0793*** (0.0207)	0.0386 (0.0598)	-0.00584 (0.0268)
Contact with LGBT+ Victims	0.0985*** (0.0345)	0.370** (0.178)	0.102 (0.0753)
Heard of Prides	0.124* (0.0694)	2.978*** (0.853)	-0.360 (0.240)
Awareness of Sarajevo Pride	0.0296 (0.0317)	-0.355** (0.157)	0.875*** (0.117)
EU Membership Support	0.0757 (0.0760)	-0.390 (0.257)	0.261** (0.128)
Ethnonationalism	-0.125*** (0.0424)	0.0675 (0.281)	0.304** (0.145)
Religious	-0.167*** (0.0436)	0.323 (0.216)	0.457*** (0.0971)
Bosniak	-0.109** (0.0481)	-0.760** (0.358)	-0.558*** (0.174)
Croat	-0.0979 (0.100)	-1.132** (0.489)	-0.614** (0.290)
Serb	-0.203** (0.0805)	-4.085*** (0.640)	-0.861*** (0.215)
Men	0.0152 (0.0381)	-0.722*** (0.146)	0.0298 (0.0715)

Age	0.00387** (0.00155)	-0.032*** (0.00442)	-0.000373 (0.00272)
Education	0.00640 (0.0140)	0.458*** (0.0691)	-0.00189 (0.0356)
Rural	-0.0335 (0.0612)	-2.161*** (0.394)	0.435** (0.177)
Unemployed	-0.107 (0.0715)	-0.857*** (0.316)	-0.0375 (0.123)
Constant	1.212*** (0.240)	-4.396*** (1.421)	-3.353*** (0.636)
	OLS	Logit	Logit
Observations	1,012	1,062	2,151
R-squared	0.455		
adj. r2	0.446	0.617	0.184

Support for Sarajevo Pride: 1 (strongly oppose Pride) – 4 (strongly support Pride). Sarajevo: 0 (Bosnia-wide survey), 1 (Sarajevo survey). Pride Treatment: 0 (pre-Pride data), 1 (post-Pride data). Robust standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Finally, we compare Pride effects with and without extended controls. Model 1 includes the basic treatment effect on the Sarajevo panel group while Model 2 includes extended controls. First, the effect of Sarajevo being more supportive of LGBT+ activism is fully moderated by the inclusion of extended controls related to attitudes toward LGBT+ rights, contact with and closeness to LGBT+ people, as well as ethnonationalism and religiosity. However, the Pride effect remains strong. This suggests that these items are weak moderators or mediators collectively when factoring in other extended controls or their combined positive and negative mediating/moderating effects may cancel each other out. In terms of omitted variable bias, using the Altonji et al. (2005) method, we estimate that the effect of an unobserved confounder would need to be roughly 10 times greater than the effects of all covariates in the model to explain away the impact of the Pride on LGBT+ activism in Sarajevo.<sup>3</sup> This is highly unlikely. Furthermore, variance inflation factor tests preclude the likelihood of multi-collinearity problems in our model due to interactions among covariates (Mean VIF = 1.86). Each covariate is sufficiently independent from the others to include in a combined OLS model. This increases confidence that the Pride effect we observe is unlikely to be easily confounded or explained away by pre-treatment moderators or independent covariates. The mediation we observe is fairly limited, which means that causal mechanisms related to Pride events require further exploration from future research.

<sup>3</sup> Altonji et. al. (2005) use a ratio of regression coefficients from models with full and restricted control variables ( $\beta_F/(\beta_R - \beta_F)$ ) to assess how much greater the effect of an unobserved variable would need to be relative to observable factors to explain away a key explanatory variable. In our case, the restricted coefficient is obtained in Model 1, which is  $\beta_R = 0.222$ . The coefficient from the full model, Model 2 is 0.201. The ratio of full to restricted models is 9.6.

Appendix Table 41. Pride Effects with Extended Controls (OLS)

VARIABLES	(1) Support for Sarajevo Pride	(2) Support for Sarajevo Pride
treatment	-0.0161 (0.0468)	-0.0206 (0.0536)
Sarajevo	0.868*** (0.0794)	-0.154** (0.0722)
Treatment x Sarajevo	0.222*** (0.0504)	0.201*** (0.0568)
Support for LGBT+ Rights		0.0825*** (0.0129)
Contact with LGBT+ People		0.00173 (0.0263)
Closeness to LGBT+ People		0.0939*** (0.0125)
Contact with LGBT+ Victims		0.161*** (0.0351)
Awareness of Prides		0.0285 (0.0453)
Salience of Treatment		0.0202 (0.0137)
EU support		0.0871 (0.0547)
Ethnonationalism		-0.142*** (0.0427)
religious		-0.108*** (0.0349)
Bosniak		-0.231*** (0.0418)
Croat		-0.102 (0.0817)
Serb		-0.308*** (0.0626)
Men		-0.0229 (0.0343)
age		0.00111 (0.00112)
Education		0.0147 (0.0119)
rural		-0.0391 (0.0454)



unemployed		-0.0767 (0.0528)
Constant	1.539*** (0.0450)	1.354*** (0.165)
Observations	2,430	2,039
R-squared	0.179	0.484
adj. r2	0.178	0.479

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Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

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## Description and Summaries of Interview Fieldwork Findings

The paper includes a discussion of qualitative semi-structured interviews (conducted with IRB approval, protocol # 202008-957) with the central organizers connected to the 2019 Bosnia and Herzegovina Pride, as well as other leading LGBT activists working in Bosnia with perspectives on the event. These interviews allowed us to reflect on and validate our results by exploring the mechanisms driving the correlations we uncover in the experimental analysis in an explanatory sequential order (see Creswell 2014). While some of the team working on this study has multiple years of fieldwork experience with LGBT activists in Europe, we felt it important to elaborate on our findings by highlighting qualitative context and local voices in our study.

To identify the organizers involved in the 2019 Pride, we used our existing fieldwork networks with LGBT activists in Europe, which we also cross-checked with LGBT NGOs and scholars working on LGBT politics in the Balkans. The interview subjects were selected for their direct involvement in the pride and/or local LGBT politics, but came from various organizations and perspectives. In the end, we reached out to seven potential interviewees—four of which we identified as centrally involved in the organizing of Pride and three that play a central role in LGBT+ activism in Bosnia—one of the latter three is also involved in activism in other countries and added a comparative perspective. We attained a 100% response rate, though one person declined a face-to-face interview, referring us to someone they deemed to have greater expertise—a person we had already interviewed. Of the interviewees, we obtained a relatively diverse spread on gender identity (66% woman, 33% man, 0% non-binary) and sexual orientation (33% lesbian, 33% gay, 17% bisexual, 17% mainly-heterosexual/bi ally). Questions relating to ethnic identification were difficult to code, as almost all organizers disavowed strong ethnonational identification and said they had mixed-ethnic identities and or politically identified as Bosnian *and* Herzegovinian or Yugoslav, which represents a national- or citizenship-based understanding of ethnicity. Though several noted having identified differently earlier in life, which uncovered a diverse sample including Muslim Bosniak, Orthodox Serb, and Catholic Croat. One interviewee's ethnic identity is rooted in a non-Balkan country. We also had diversity in interviewees that were originally from Sarajevo and that no longer live there or moved there later in life – though the latter category (live in Sarajevo but originally from another part of Bosnia) was the most common response.

We asked them all to reflect on the effects of the event itself and the role it played on shaping attitudes in the highly diverse terrain of Bosnian public opinion. We compensated activists for their time with a \$25 gift card, though two insisted in volunteering their time, saying they appreciated the research. In every case, activists were eager to share their knowledge, and have expressed continued enthusiasm for this research endeavor, given the practical knowledge they feel will be relevant to their communities on the ground. We have committed to sharing our research and data with all interviewees, pending successful peer review. The confidential interviews themselves ranged between 41 and 56 minutes (mean=46 minutes) and activists could consent or opt out of recordings. Due to the COVID pandemic's interference with the safety of in-person interviews, we conducted them remotely via Zoom.

Based on an analysis of our transcribed interview records, the following themes emerged. We have anonymized responses below with numbers in place of names, as well as stripping any identifying information.

### Support of Pride:

Interviewees note broad support for the pride, with a wide coalition of activists from across Bosnia supporting it. This perception was shared whether or not the interviewee was directly involved in organizing the pride. By this we mean, there was little pushback or disagreement on hosting a Pride among a broad coalition of activists from across Bosnia. There was some concern among members of the community rooted in a fear of post-Pride targeted violence, but this was minimal and overall the plan to organize Pride won far-reaching support (interview nos. 302 and 303).

“We always ha[d] in mind that [Pride] is really important. It's not a question of just to have a Pride [for the sake of having one]; you know, [just] because we were the last country in the region to organize a Pride. It's not [about] that. It's a matter of changing things faster than usual... I mean, there are a lot of changes that happened in the last 10 to 15 years in Bosnia, but when it comes to LGBT rights everything [was] moving really slow and it's frustrating to live in Bosnia [as a queer person]... to see those changes [being] really slow... I think five years ago we started to speak in circles with activists [about the potentials of a Pride]” (interview no. 301).

“Pride [as an organizing tactic] came naturally to a group of activists *from the whole country*, which I'm really happy [about] because it's the Pride March *of Bosnia-Herzegovina*, of *the whole country*, not just Sarajevo, but that's why it's really important to mention the ‘Bosnia-Herzegovina’ in the title of Pride. It's really important politically and in context of Bosnia to call it like that because everything is somehow divided after the war, and we wanted to create something new and to create something that will reunite again” (interview no. 301).

### Effects of Pride on Attitudes

Every interviewee also perceived the Pride's effects positively—“If I would put [it's effects] on a [scale] from negative to positive is very close to extreme positive” (interview no. 300)—with several describing a mechanism rooted in contact. Pride compelled people to discuss LGBT+ people. Whether or not people attended the pride, they had to have a conversation about it at the dinner table (interview no. 300). The perception among organizers was that especially people on the fence (without strong prior positions) were largely swayed by the positive depictions of LGBTI visibility that Pride offers (interview nos. 302 and 303). Across the board, interviewees noted that average people had the opportunity to “see us” and were confronted with the fact that some of their stereotypes did not hold. Two organizers mentioned that they also actively combated these stereotypes by making sure that this visibility was not in the form of celebratory floats (as we might expect in some Western Prides) (interview nos. 300, 302, 303) (*see also* Ayoub 2013). Instead, the Bosnia-Herzegovina Pride felt like a political demonstration.

“[Pride] contributed to portraying a positive picture of the LGBT community and people being forced in a way to again discuss LGBT rights in a private matter. I mean, as it was really extremely present, I would say into [broader] society” (interview no. 300).

“Actually [the effects are] very positive...I believe people’s perception or what we can see from our work has changed” (interview no. 302).

“It was a very big success. The country recognizes it as a success. We achieved something that we could not envision prior to organizing the pride” (interview no. 303).

One organizer said that some politicians eventually saw the protest as a way to exhibit the country as democratic and tolerant: “Generally it’s seen as a very big success on our organization [by] both the [LGBT+ community], but also the country. And I think that a lot of media has also transferred [it to suggest] how we proved ourselves as a democracy and as a very tolerant country, which was [also] very important to [some] politicians” (interview no. 303).

“If I had to quantify [the effect], I would say 90% of it was good and you know this was a milestone in our LGBT movement” (interview no. 302).

“Those that might be in a way in the political center [not scoring high on ethnic nationalism or religion], they were having an opportunity really to see, [and think] ‘Okay, this doesn't look that bad’, you know, and, and ‘it seems to be a very normal thing’ or you know that ‘there's a social group that’s just demanding their rights, and for sure’ ” (interview no. 300).

“It was so powerful. To see so many people there. As it was the last of the ‘first prides’ it had a specific meaning for the region. I was almost in tears in walking there. And again now [tears up]” (interview no. 305).

Alongside, broader society, organizers also see effects of interpersonal visibility (Ayoub 2016) within the LGBT+ community: “I think that the focus of organizing Pride that is beginning is to be felt is [the] empowering the LGBT community in Bosnia. Every day losing hope to live here because of the economic and political situation, unemployment is really terrible. [Especially] being LGBTI, it’s quite frustrating to live every day here. So what’s happened after pride is that a lot of people from the community got hope [to] actually try to face with problems that they have and to try to live here, which is, for the beginning, really important. They were really empowered and happy that something like [Pride] happened. We got a lot of messages from LGBT people from smaller communities; smaller cities and places [from people] that we never heard about [saying] that Pride gave them hope to continue life, so I think that’s the first thing that is really important. And when it comes to general society, I would say that impact was more positive but [we’re a] really homophobic society still, so [continue to] have a lot of people who are against LGBT people, who are violent and who think that we don’t deserve to live here in Bosnia. But by organizing something like our Pride, where there were 3,000 people mixed with a lot of positive energy, without any kind of incident, where the whole organization was perfect. I think that that gave the whole society, a picture that we are serious in our fight and that we will never give up [on] our lives and that people just be more and more visible and active. To show them that we are part of the society and we will not disappear” (interview no. 301).

## On Proximity

But this positive effect was qualified for many participants, who early on in the interviews suggested that the felt intensity of the event had diminishing returns the further one was removed from it geographically. This largely had to do with the more limited opportunity for contact such a performance holds as one becomes more physically distant. All but one of the activists preemptively mentioned some factor relating to proximity before the end of the interview when we shared one table of the findings, to which we'd get reactions like: "That was more or less what I said without any knowledge of the results" (interview no. 305) and "I'm not surprised" (interview no. 303). In the end, it was a vibrant visible protest, but the felt intensity of it, the permeability of the visibility of it, required proximity.

"[With certainty] I would say it has had an especially positive impact on those that were physically closer to it. In a socially, geographically, and ethnically divided society, I would say that people in Sarajevo, in the Sarajevo region, were more confronted to react, to react and to have an opinion to it, than compared to others. So even though it was called *BiH Pride*, defacto it was *Sarajevo Pride*, in that it was Sarajevo... the urban population there was more confronted to it, compared to ... places far away from Sarajevo. People [outside Sarajevo] could go about their regular life rather than dealing with it" (interview no. 300).

Many mentioned that the event was not fully processed or experienced further way from Sarajevo.

"When it comes to the rural, urban distance. Those things don't matter for people, you know, happening living in, let's say, in [the] east of Bosnia... for a significant portion of the population, either because of the physical distance or because of the technical distance [related to media coverage]" (interview no. 300).

"I think this [proximity effect] is expected. Our message was that we want to show this [countrywide] unity. We want to bring people across ethnic lines. But people *felt it more here* [in Sarajevo] because they took part and *could see* what happened in Sarajevo." (interview no. 302).

"The necessity to have Pride happen in public space because then it really changes to make it real. [It was] 'virtual' for those people [outside of Sarajevo]. Unless it happens there [physically], you know, in a very material way with people on the streets, knowing what was happening and so on, [then you don't have the same type of contact to it]. So it doesn't surprise me. The idea of the Pride was to really let people see LGBT people, [and that happened primarily in Sarajevo]. For most of the country, it was just virtual. [The only thing we had to combat that was saying it was a country-wide matter, but in the end, it really wasn't felt equally everywhere in the country]. But we can hold it in other towns [moving forward], and we hopefully see it in other towns" (interview no. 303).

One interview adds to this by also mentioning local government support in Sarajevo Canton, as well as the centralization of activism there, that helps to make performances visible. "More or less everything is happening in Sarajevo. People will be more engaged with us there. When it comes to other cities or parts of Bosnia there is a lack of activism. In this period there are only two orgs

working in two other cities... this is a huge problem. It's logical that where activism is visible you'll have more positive opinions on it. It's quite hard to organize the message everywhere the same. The political system means the govt was really localized, we could educate our local govt... there is less possibility to be active" (interview no. 301).

### Types of Contact:

Organizers deemed that visibility was productive for the cause, but that the form of contact attached to public visibility required proximity. Proximity led to various forms of contact in Sarajevo that were less felt outside it.

All interviewees told us that Sarajevo citizens interacted with the Pride in multiple ways:

- People saw it and interacted with from the sides of the street and from windows and balconies (also cf. Images 1 and 2).

"They were quite positive and that was really interesting to see.... we didn't expect something like that for the first Pride. But I think that the energy that we provided during the march was actually something that engaged those people to come to their windows and to see what actually is happening there. And I think that I think that that was really positive when it comes to reactions of like general people" (interview no. 301).

"... of course it was sort of shielded... but there were loads of people hanging out of windows, who were really positive and waving. And the participants reacted to so enthusiastically. Anyone who waves, we would wave; we waved back so passionately and blew kisses. There was a shopping mall we passed, and people hanging out there in the shopping window. People applauded and throwing kissing, some on the other side flipping the bird, but on the whole, most people were very positive" (interview no. 305).

- They had to move around it because the Pride disrupted the main thruway in Sarajevo. This means the accessibility of the city changed and there was no way for people in Sarajevo to go about their business without being confronted by Pride. While this could be seen negatively, interviewees saw it positively as a type of interaction that didn't exist for people living outside of Sarajevo Canton: "There was a significant majority [of the Sarajevo] population that [couldn't] drive a car to the city center. They had to organize their weekend differently... everyone was aware of it, you know, that the town will be blocked" (interview no. 300).

These types of disruptions forced people in Sarajevo to "tackle the issue ... Everyone talked about it at the dinner table... They tackled it. I mean, people were confronted with 'Does this mean, my neighbors will go there, will my family members show up there, you know, the Pride?'. [People thought about and "imagined" that]. Over family debates around, you know, Sunday lunches or coffee breaks you know if a member of the family will go" (interview no. 300).

- They could only see people as visibly linked to the Pride in the proximity of the event itself. Indeed, due to safety concerns, people were specifically asked to change their appearance before and after being at the actual event. People were told to take off their rainbow attire after the march, in fear of violence commonly experienced in countries hosting their first prides. “We asked everyone who will come to the pride, not to wear any kind of [Pride-looking] t-shirts or rainbow colors. There were thousands of people, but everyone was really respectful of everything we asked of them, to [take off] all those rainbow things.... We were afraid the most that there could be violence after pride. [There was none] I'm really happy that people took it seriously” (interview no. 301).
- All interviewees mentioned that media coverage is naturally going to pay more attention to local events, and when elevated to an issue of national concern, it includes ‘concerned’ and speculative voices. They argued that media coverage outside of Sarajevo didn’t provide the indirect contact of LGBT+ visibility to the same degree as in the Sarajevo Canton; whereas media in Sarajevo had to engage it fully as a local event.

“Media around the Pride ignored [it] elsewhere. [The attitude of the media outside Sarajevo] was ‘we don’t care. It’s happening in Sarajevo.’ Some parts of the community [outside Sarajevo] didn’t even know it was happening. In Sarajevo it was impossible to move without knowing the Pride was happening” (interview no. 303).

While the focus was on the lower quantity of media attention outside Sarajevo, some also discussed its lower quality: “[Outside of Sarajevo] they just were not that much confronted with LGBTI visibility, you know, or visible LGBTI existence. And in that sense, I would say that media in the Republika Srpska are still reporting more negatively on the issue and there's maybe again a link to nationalism and this ethnicity-focused media ... saying it's a something you know that's destroying traditional values” (interview no. 300).

“We started Pride march prep one year before. Our main messages, how we communicate with media, what are they going to say. We could control the narrative a bit [but more in Sarajevo]” (interview no. 302).

“The presence of the international community [as watchdogs related to past conflict] in Sarajevo is strong. You have more checks on the media because of the international community here. That is different when you see the discourse on the women’s movement in Croatia. Media are more careful in Sarajevo” (interview no. 302).

So even though the 3,000-person pride included many people that “[organizers] had never seen” and “from the all around the country,” the visibility of the event itself was not carried far from the local (interview no. 300).





**Image 1: Waving and clapping at Pride Route**

Source: (SOC archive, author \*Imrana Kapetanovic)

*\*Note:* Photo credit named at request of Sarajevski Otvoreni Centar (SOC). Neither photographer was an interview participant in this study.



**Image 2: Pride Route Support**

Source: (SOC archive, author \*Martina Salov)

### On Ghost Pride:

Interviewees uniformly distanced the Pride from the concept of a ‘Ghost Pride,’ referencing Belgrade Pride. All were familiar with Belgrade Pride as hidden and militarized (using horses and tanks) and several had also taken part in it. One interviewee referred to BiH Pride instead as a ‘Zoo Pride,’ which captured the characterization of most: “we had protection but we were visible” (interview no. 300).

“We are organizing pride to be visible and to interact with our citizens ... There was openness [despite police protection]. I mean, no one could come inside of the march off the road [you could only enter the active procession with a stamp from the entry point, after that you could watch from the street and windows]. But still, people were gathering all around to watch us, which was really great. And a lot of people were interacting with us and like they were waving their hands.” (interview no. 301).

“We expected the Belgrade scenario, but this did not happen. And Ghost Pride doesn’t fully fulfill the mission. Not the same level of interaction we had. The city was not locked down. The area the Pride passed through was closed off. You could only go if you went to the pride entry start point. But [onlookers] could access and view the pride from the sidewalk and wave. There were a lot of old people in the windows and balcony waving. Women standing in a café waving a rainbow flag. People were close to it. They were right there” (interview no. 302).

“The police did close off the park for security, but they allowed people to interact. People sitting in the terraces of the bars, cafes, shopping malls that were close. Citizens were close.” (interview no. 303).



“First prides are always [shielded] to a certain extent. But Belgrade was different. They cordoned us off entirely. We couldn’t even see the police. But that is a first pride. A first pride needs to happen. In a lot of countries, many of those participating are internationals and allies. Regular LGBTI people will come out, but the first pride is a start. The balance changes as it goes on, with more locals going [in future events]” (interview no. 305).

### On Ethnic Cleavages:

All interviews noted that there was shared homo- and trans-phobia across ethnic / religious lines, with it being worse among more ethnonational and religious people within each group.

“LGBTI people are associated with a prejudice related to them being ‘only concerned with sex’ and there was a worry across groups that ‘Pride was just a big public orgy’ ... That was the general picture that is what they thought we want to bring in, spoil the kids, and their gender identity” (interview no. 302).

Three interviews (302, 303, and 305) however noted that support from leaders tied to Muslim community was highest. Those interviews mentioned Muslim leadership calling for tolerance toward Pride—though not outright support, as Pride was still considered attached to ‘sin’—on the basis of a shared experience of intolerance surrounding discrimination and Islamophobia.

“They [Muslims] used a frame of pro-tolerance and anti-violence in response to the Pride more than the other groups. The head of the community said that Pride was a secular matter, and while ‘homosexuality is a sin, violence is twice the bigger sin’” (interview no. 302). Reminiscent of the concept of intersectionally-linked fate (Strolovitch 2007), organizers told us that the intellectual Muslim community emphasized the importance of tolerance, highlighting that Muslims must extend their experience with Islamophobia to not treat LGBT people in a discriminatory way. “The Muslims/Bosniaks in the capital in Sarajevo didn’t want to have Bosniaks portrayed as conservative or not valuing diversity” (interview no. 302).

“No differences across ethnic cleavages. Some backlash from conservative religious groups, but from all sides. Muslims are the only ones that have not thrown rocks at me” (interview no. 305).

### On Cosmopolitanism or Urban/Rural Divisions:

Interviewees had mixed reactions to associating Pride with Sarajevo’s capital city status and cosmopolitanism.

“I mean, it’s not like attitudes in Sarajevo were wildly positive before either. So we still are seeing an interesting change, but there is of course some research that says cosmopolitan areas are the ones where we can see change. Though, I wouldn’t [call Sarajevo cosmopolitan]. Sarajevo was extremely nationalistic as well. I mean, there must be a difference, but compared to other capitals and other countries, I would say it would be less cosmopolitan because we suffered as a town significantly... after the war, elites have left the town. A significant portion of elites never came back. I mean, when you when you looked at, you know, almost a million people never came back

to Bosnia. After the war, you will find Bosnians [in the abroad] as representative of the elites in academia. Those people never came back. Circumstances in the sense of social values and attitudes and those were then created out of the nationalism. I would dare to say [the difference between Sarajevo and the rest] is not that that big” (interview no. 300).

“I would say that there is a wide divide between capital and outside of the capital. We have that in Albania as well. Tirana has seen lots of development, but nothing one foot outside the capital. In Bosnia, [by contrast] there has been efforts outside of Sarajevo, but it’s not as sustainable.... Pride receiving media coverage will end up in the countryside, but what I have experienced... they don’t really identify with that” (interview no. 305).

### Pride Itself:

Activists described the 3,000-person pride as feeling safe and in cooperation with police.

#### *Frames:*

- Countrywide for all of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Organizers emphasized that they wanted it to be country-wide and thus included activists from across the country and purposefully called it the *Bosnia and Herzegovina Pride*” (interview no. 302).

- No concrete demands, but the motto: “We want to come out.” This phrase is resonant both internationally and locally, where it is a play on words because it is what people say to get out of the bus. “That’s what you yell to the driver to get off. You don’t push the button.” (interview nos. 302 and 303).

- We as a community are discriminated against, just as are many other groups. We experience the same things and we need solidarity.

- Human rights especially in the terms of access and freedom of assembly.

- They emphasized it was a local event, *not* an international one. “We had to explain this to our supporters from the international community. We didn’t want them in the first line and [be super] visible. We didn’t want the U.S. ambassador on the first line. No [solo international] statements to journalists. They were super helpful and we issued statements jointly. [And they respected our requests] to keep out of it and pushed things to us. We knew we needed their support. And we said ‘yes please help us’ [but don’t take center stage]. The diplomats help [with generating] the police protection” (interview no. 303) (*see also* Ayoub 2013 on this dynamic).

#### *Selected Quotes:*

They also emphasized that it was a demonstration: “Some people expected you know, like a celebration and everything, but we were focused on the Pride march as a protest against the violation of human rights and we wanted to show that. And that's why we didn't have a lot of music ... [instead] we singing [songs] all the time that have a strong message about anti-fascism and the fight for rights. [Some] were expecting something else also based on how we think of prides in other countries. This kind of float celebration. [Our Pride was] to raise awareness about all those problems that we have in our country” (interview no. 301).

“I think that's the importance of pride that no one can ignore you. [That] you are everywhere. That gives you power and the possibility to be visible and to have that space that you can act” (interview no. 301).

“One of the things that influenced my LGBTI activism in these countries is research on morality by Jonathan Haidt... Conservative people have five traits: (1) share equally, (2) take care of each other, (3) group cohesion, (4) purity, and (5) hierarchy. As liberal people, we only like the first two. For conservative people they have this group purity/hierarchy as well, but they are not opposed to taking care of each other sharing equally. They just want to know that the other three things are not undermined by that in the process. It is always a struggle to have a first Pride, and then it happens, and people wake up in the morning and find that nothing has changed. Purity has not been overthrown, the leaders of the church have not disappeared. If you can show that these two first moralities don’t take away the others, then it’s okay. That’s why Pride matters” (interview no. 305).

### On Counter-Protest:

Counter protests to the event were anticipated, as they are for any first Pride (interview no. 305), but they were described as largely ineffective. Bosnian activists gave examples of the dynamic Ayoub (2016) and O’Dwyer (2018) discusses with counter-protesters at Pride, who inadvertently “shot themselves in the foot” in their selection of tactics.

“When you look at the counter-protests there were very few people. 100 people the first day, 40-50 the second” (interview no. 303).

“The counter-protesters shot themselves in the foot by having a young girl, about 15 years old, hold a sign displaying a key and lock [to convey a] ‘normal’ type of sexual relationship. That was widely criticized for sexualizing a child and flipped the script on who was violating morals. Also, they held [baby-]blue and pink balloons, which they intended to have represented [binary] genders for ‘boy’ and ‘girl’. But, unintentionally, [they used] the trans activism flag[’s colors], which created confusion for spectators, whose side they were supporting. It was a funny mistake” (interview no. 303).

“In general, I would say the first pride is always the most difficult. The hooligans (as I call them in blanket name, which might not be fair to all hooligans) they came out to try and prevent the first pride from happening. Once that has happened and it has been safe, people are accepting. Once it has happened and was media-tized, people seem to accept rather quickly that they are a country that has had a Pride. [For example,] in Bratislava – that happened. The second pride is always easier and always goes much better. The backlash is highest around the first pride and before the pride when groups are trying to prevent it ever happening” (interview no. 305).

### Public Quotes:

On visibility localized at Pride: One reason why direct visibility – mentioned above under contact – is limited to the route in contexts with little prior public visibility is partly because participants’ visibility is often limited to the physical space the Pride provides. This means that LGBTQ people are limited to showing themselves to the safety of the group at the Pride route. For example, according to organizers, “Wary of counterdemonstrators and other potential backlash, organizers urged participants to arrive early and avoid displaying ‘any identifiable LGBTIQ features before

entering the secure area,' saying rainbow banners and other materials will be available once inside." Yet, once there, the event is highly visible to onlookers. "Many marchers wore rainbow T-shirts, and beat drums and blew whistles. Others carried rainbow flags and signs that read "United in Differences" and chanted "Death to fascism, freedom to the people!" Many studying Pride in contexts with long traditions of their happening underestimate the political violence that public visibility carries in much of the world. Especially around issues of sexuality and gender, which are deemed as particularly threatening to the social order and national identity, as this paper argues.

Source: <https://www.rferl.org/a/sarajevo-lgbt-pride-parade/30152579.html>

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