

# **New Static Analysis Techniques to Detect Entropy Failure Vulnerabilities**

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Andrew Russell & Rushi Shah

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The University of Texas at Austin

# Entropy Failures In the Wild

- OpenSSL
- FreeBSD

## How Could This Have Been Avoided?

- Audit code once, then use relational verification to prove you haven't introduced bugs with small changes to program
- Differential approach works well with way software is written (CI, etc.)

## Proposed Static Analysis Approach

## Problem Statement

Given two versions  $V_1, V_2$  of a program, prove that if legitimate sources of entropy in  $V_1$  flow into their sinks properly, then the same is true of  $V_2$ .

If  $v_1$  is the taint set of variable  $v$  passed to sink in program one and  $v_2$  is the taint set of  $v$  in program two, then we would like

$$\text{assert}(v_1 == v_2)$$

2-safety property: making an assertion based on two runs of programs.

- Static-analysis technique called predicate abstraction can prove 1-safety properties.
- Existing techniques can transform 2-safety properties into 1-safety properties.

## Our Approach

*Statement*  $S$   $:=$   $A$   
                                   $| S_1 ; S_2$   
                                   $| \text{if } p \text{ then } S_1 \text{ else } S_2$   
                                   $| \text{while } p \text{ } S$   
*Predicate*  $p$   $:=$   $\top$   $| \perp$   $| A$   $| \neg p$   $| p \odot p$   
*Operator*  $\odot$   $:=$   $\wedge$   $| \vee$



- Off-the-shelf state-of-the-art: CPAChecker

# High level overview

1. Instrumentation
2. Product Program
3. Assertions + CPAChecker

- Sequential Composition

$$S_1 ; S_2$$

- Sequential Composition

$$S_1 ; S_2$$

- Synchronized Composition

$$S_1 \otimes S_2$$

- Sequential Composition

$$S_1 ; S_2$$

- Synchronized Composition

$$S_1 \otimes S_2$$

- Hybrid?

## Technical Details

- Replace sources with labelled constants.
- For values that are tainted by more than one source (for example  $S_1 + S_2$ ) replace with one of two uninterpreted functions over the sources:
  1. *preserving*( $s_1, s_2, \dots, s_n$ ). For example  $+$ , XOR, etc.
  2. *nonPreserving*( $s_1, s_2, \dots, s_n$ ). For example left or right shift, etc.
- Perform taint analysis on sources to generate environment  $\Gamma$  which marks statements involving tainted variables.

# Sequential Product Program

- Most straightforward
- Hard for CPAChecker to reason about



# Synchronized Product Program

- Easiest for CPAChecker to reason about
- Exponential blowup

$$\overline{A_1 \otimes A_2 \rightsquigarrow A_1 ; A_2}$$

$$\frac{S_2 \otimes S_1 \rightsquigarrow P}{S_1 \otimes S_2 \rightsquigarrow P}$$

$$\frac{S_1 \otimes S \rightsquigarrow S'_1 \quad S_2 \otimes S \rightsquigarrow S'_2 \quad P = \text{if}(p) \text{ then } S'_1 \text{ else } S'_2}{\text{if}(p) \text{ then } S_1 \text{ else } S_2 \otimes S \rightsquigarrow P}$$

$$\frac{P_0 = \text{while}(p_1 \wedge p_2) S_1 ; S_2 \quad P_1 = \text{while}(p_1) S_1 \quad P_2 = \text{while}(p_2) S_2}{\text{while}(p_1) S_1 \otimes \text{while}(p_2) S_2 \rightsquigarrow P_0 ; P_1 ; P_2}$$

# Hybrid Product Program

- Based on key insight: don't reason precisely about unrelated parts of the program
- “Unrelated” if not tainted. Use environment  $\Gamma$  and add following inference rule:

$$\frac{\begin{array}{l} \Gamma \not\vdash S_1 \\ \Gamma \not\vdash S_2 \end{array}}{\Gamma \vdash S_1 \otimes S_2 \rightsquigarrow S_1 ; S_2}$$

For every variable  $v$  that is tainted in a statement  $s$  that is marked as a sink, insert an assertion:

$$\text{assert}(v_1 == v_2)$$

Recall we replaced sources with labelled constants and propagated them, so this will be asserting the taintsets of the two variables are equivalent

CPAChecker returning TRUE means that  $V_2$  is correct modulo  $V_1$

## Future Work

# Push Button Implementation

Evaluate conjectures about differences between three constructions of the product programs.

An experiment comparing the three approaches will determine which one works best in practice.

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