

# Appendix for “Corruption, Party Leaders, and Candidate Selection: Evidence from Italy”

Raffaele Asquer\*      Miriam A. Golden<sup>†</sup>      Brian T. Hamel<sup>‡</sup>

September 10, 2019

---

\*Independent Researcher ([raffasquer@gmail.com](mailto:raffasquer@gmail.com))

<sup>†</sup>Peter Mair Chair in Comparative Politics, Department of Political and Social Sciences, European University Institute, Via dei Roccettini 9, I-50014 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI), Italy ([miriam.golden@eui.eu](mailto:miriam.golden@eui.eu))

<sup>‡</sup>Ph.D. Student, Department of Political Science, University of California, Los Angeles, 4289 Bunche Hall, Los Angeles, CA 90095-1472 ([bhamel@ucla.edu](mailto:bhamel@ucla.edu))

## Variable Descriptions and Data Sources

*Renomination:* Indicates whether the legislator was nominated for reelection by his/her own party, or a successor to the original party of affiliation, regardless of whether the individual was nominated for the Chamber or the Senate. Incumbents nominated by other parties, or self-nominated, are coded 0. Chang, Golden, and Hill (2010) codes whether legislators were nominated for the Chamber in the 1992 election. We use the Electoral Archive of the Italian Ministry of the Interior (available at <http://elezionistorico.interno.it/>) to code whether legislators were nominated for the Senate. For Legislatures XI, XV, and XVI, we merged legislator data with a dataset of candidates in the 1994, 2006, and 2008 elections. We use first name, last name, year of birth, and birth province as key variables to merge legislator and candidate records. To assemble the candidate dataset, we integrated existing datasets with data scraped from the Electoral Archive of the Italian Ministry of the Interior (available at <http://elezionistorico.interno.it/>).

*Corrupt:* Indicates whether the legislator was accused of corruption by the judiciary. In Legislatures X–XI, it refers to legislators investigated by the judiciary for corruption-related crimes during the legislature. In Legislatures XV–XVI, *corrupt* identifies the legislators who, as of the end of the legislature, were under investigation or on trial for corruption-related crimes, or who had avoided a final judgment thank to the statute of limitations (*prescrizione*). Corruption-related crimes are: bribery (*corruzione*), extortion by a public official (*concussione*), abuse of office (*abuso d'ufficio*), embezzlement (*peculato*), illegal party funding (*violazione delle leggi sul finanziamento pubblico ai partiti*), and fraud against the State or the regional government (*truffa ai danni dello Stato/ai danni della Regione*). For Legislatures X–XI, we use data on the requests to lift parliamentary immunity issued by Italian prosecutors (*richieste di autorizzazione a procedere*), drawn from Chang, Golden, and Hill (2010), Ceron (2014), and records

from Parliament (<http://legislature.camera.it>). For Legislature XV, criminal records are from Gomez and Travaglio (2008), integrated with data compiled by *La Repubblica*.<sup>1</sup> For Legislature XVI, we use data compiled by *La Repubblica* and *Il Fatto Quotidiano*.<sup>2</sup>

*Seniority*: Number of previous parliamentary terms served. We not distinguish between terms served in the Chamber of Deputies and in the Senate. For Legislatures X, XI, and XV, variables were coded by Gagliarducci, Nannicini, and Naticchioni (2011). For Legislature XVI, variables were coded by Center for the Study of Political Change (CIRCaP) (2013).

*Elite*: Indicates whether the legislator held national-level offices within his/her party apparatus at the opening of the legislature. For Legislatures X, XI, and XV, variables were coded by Gagliarducci, Nannicini, and Naticchioni (2011). For Legislature XVI, variables were coded by Center for the Study of Political Change (CIRCaP) (2013).

*Age*: Legislator's age as of the election year. For Legislatures X, XI, and XV, variables were coded by Gagliarducci, Nannicini, and Naticchioni (2011). For Legislature XVI, variables were coded by Center for the Study of Political Change (CIRCaP) (2013).

*Job*: Indicates whether the legislator had a nonpolitical, high-status previous occupation in the private or public sector (e.g. private sector manager, business owner, university professor, or judge). Variable coded using data from Gagliarducci, Nannicini, and Naticchioni (2011), following the criteria set out by Chang, Golden, and Hill (2010).

*College*: Indicates whether the legislator had a university degree. For Legislatures X, XI, and XV, variables were coded by Gagliarducci, Nannicini, and Naticchioni (2011). For

---

<sup>1</sup>“Tutti i guai con la giustizia degli aspiranti onorevoli,” *La Repubblica*, March 16, 2008.

<sup>2</sup>“Gli 84 sotto accusa,” *La Repubblica*, July 22, 2011; “I cento parlamentari condannati, imputati, indagati o prescritti,” *Il Fatto Quotidiano*, September 30, 2012; and “La lista dei parlamentari indagati e condannati,” *Il Fatto Quotidiano*, November 5, 2012.

Legislature XVI, variables were coded by Center for the Study of Political Change (CIRCaP) (2013).

*Female:* Indicates whether the legislator was a female or not. For Legislatures X, XI, and XV, variables were coded by Chang, Golden, and Hill (2010) and Gagliarducci, Nannicini, and Naticchioni (2011). For Legislature XVI, variables were coded by Center for the Study of Political Change (CIRCaP) (2013).

*Governing Party:* Indicates whether the legislator was affiliated with a party in the governing coalition during the legislature. For Legislatures X, XI, and XV, variables were coded by Gagliarducci, Nannicini, and Naticchioni (2011). For Legislature XVI, variables were coded by Center for the Study of Political Change (CIRCaP) (2013).

*Major Party:* Indicates whether the legislator was affiliated with a major party during the legislature. For Legislatures X, XI, and XV, variables were coded by Gagliarducci, Nannicini, and Naticchioni (2011). For Legislature XVI, variables were coded by Center for the Study of Political Change (CIRCaP) (2013). In Legislatures X and XI, we code the DC, the PSI, and the PCI/PDS as major parties, and all other as minor parties. In Legislature XV, we code the National Alliance (*Alleanza Nazionale*, or AN), Berlusconi's *Forza Italia*, and the Sinistra Democratica-Ulivo as major parties. In Legislature XVI, we code the PD and PdL as Italy's major parties.

*South:* Indicates that the legislator was elected in one of the following regions: Abruzzo, Basilicata, Calabria, Campania, Molise, Apulia (Puglia), Sardinia (Sardegna), Sicily (Sicilia). For Legislatures X, XI, and XV, variables were coded by Gagliarducci, Nannicini, and Naticchioni (2011). For Legislature XVI, variables coded by Center for the Study of Political Change (CIRCaP) (2013).

Table A1: **Summary Statistics**

<i>Legislature X</i>			
Variable	Min.	Mean	Max.
log(Press Mentions)	0.00	0.05	4.03
log(Base Mentions)	0.00	3.00	8.04
Seniority	0.00	1.63	9.00
Elite	0.00	0.22	1.00
Age	25.00	49.21	76.00
Job	0.00	0.46	1.00
College	0.00	0.61	1.00
Female	0.00	0.13	1.00
Governing Party	0.00	0.59	1.00
South	0.00	0.36	1.00
<i>Legislature XI</i>			
Variable	Min.	Mean	Max.
log(Press Mentions)	0.00	0.28	4.38
log(Base Mentions)	0.00	2.47	7.48
Seniority	0.00	1.43	10.00
Elite	0.00	0.23	1.00
Age	26.00	51.42	82.00
Job	0.00	0.33	1.00
College	0.00	0.68	1.00
Female	0.00	0.09	1.00
Governing Party	0.00	0.52	1.00
South	0.00	0.37	1.00
<i>Legislature XV</i>			
Variable	Min.	Mean	Max.
log(Press Mentions)	0.00	0.28	4.26
log(Base Mentions)	0.00	2.20	8.06
Seniority	0.00	1.29	10.00
Elite	0.00	0.47	1.00
Age	28.00	53.61	83.00
Job	0.00	0.59	1.00
College	0.00	0.73	1.00
Female	0.00	0.16	1.00
Governing Party	0.00	0.51	1.00
South	0.00	0.36	1.00
<i>Legislature XVI</i>			
Variable	Min.	Mean	Max.
log(Press Mentions)	0.00	0.06	3.61
log(Base Mentions)	0.00	2.56	7.67
Seniority	0.00	2.36	10.00
Elite	0.00	0.19	1.00
Age	31.00	57.19	90.00
Job	0.00	0.57	1.00
College	0.00	0.71	1.00
Female	0.00	0.21	1.00
Governing Party	0.00	0.89	1.00
South	0.00	0.36	1.00

## Major Parties vs. Minor Parties

The key argument we make is that the incentive to protect the party valence brand motivates party elites to deselect from the party list legislators incriminated in wrongdoing. These incentives are greater when malfeasance is a more salient issue to the public. In a similar vein, we also expect major parties to be more likely than minor parties to deselect corrupt politicians. Major parties are those which have a large number of members in the lower house, and thus stand to lose more in a political context where malfeasance is a salient political issue among voters. These same parties then stand to gain more by declining to renominate publicly-incriminated politicians — doing so absolves the party of ties to corrupt legislators, weakening the link between corruption and the party brand. Minor parties, on the other hand, are less likely to be tied to corruption in the minds of voters — if only because minor parties are not at the forefront of electoral and legislative politics — and minor party leaders do not view elections as a chance to maintain power. Minor parties arguably thereby face lower incentives to deselect corrupt politicians. At the same time, major parties are more visible publicly and enjoy greater political responsibilities. For all these reasons, we expect them to be more sensitive to the incrimination of their legislators.

To examine if this is supported by the evidence, we replicate our main specifications but with a new variable — an indicator for whether the legislator served with a major party (vs. a minor party) — and interact it with the legislator’s press mentions about corruption as well as an indicator for Legislature XI/XVI. The triple interaction term allows us to determine whether major party leaders were more likely than minor party leaders to deselect legislators in the second legislature of each pair (relative to the first) as the number of press mentions associating the legislator with malfeasance increases. A negative and significant interaction term suggests that major party leaders and minor party leaders behaved differently, and that major party leaders were less likely to renominate corrupt politicians than minor party leaders.

Table A2 presents these results. We find some evidence that major party leaders and

minor party leaders behaved differently, consistent with our expectations. In particular, the results reported in column 4 show that major party leaders were less likely to renominate politicians than were minor party leaders as press mentions increased during the second legislative session. However, we find no evidence of this pattern in the first pair of legislatures, Legislatures X–XI. This suggests that major party leaders and minor party leaders did not systematically behave differently in their handling of corrupt politicians during the Clean Hands investigations. We think these differences may stem from variation in the level and importance of corruption across the two periods. During the Clean Hands investigations, many more politicians were accused by the judiciary of involvement of corruption. With the exception of the Italian Communist Party, allegations of corruption were widespread across the political spectrum, and malfeasance figured as the primary issue in the 1994 election campaign. In contrast, although corruption during Legislatures XV and XVI was a salient national issue, the number of politicians incriminated was much smaller. Corruption was salient, but did not implicate an entire political class as it had in the Clean Hands period.

Not surprisingly, then, in Legislature XI, party leaders — regardless of the strength or status of their party — felt the need to respond to scandal because of its overwhelming significance as a national political issue. In contrast, in Legislature XVI, corruption was less prominent, and so only leaders of those parties with significant governing power felt the pressure to respond to the political climate. We interpret this result as confirming the importance of the political environment for conditioning the behavior of political elites. Elites are motivated to protect the party brand, but their incentives to do depend on the potential for electoral backlash as well as the position of their party within the political system.

Table A2: Corruption Mentions and Renomination – Major vs. Minor Parties

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
log(Press Mentions)	−0.439 (0.454)	−0.332 (0.580)	−0.048 (0.528)	−0.248 (0.564)
Legislature XI	−0.448 <sup>†</sup> (0.232)	−0.450 <sup>†</sup> (0.252)		
Major Party	0.415 <sup>†</sup> (0.230)	0.587* (0.254)	0.092 (0.165)	0.228 (0.185)
log(Press Mentions) x Legislature XI	−2.971* (1.393)	−3.653* (1.527)		
log(Press Mentions) x Major Party	1.438 (1.084)	1.257 (1.123)	1.016 (1.125)	2.043 (1.355)
Legislature XI x Major Party	−1.202*** (0.276)	−1.123*** (0.295)		
log(Press Mentions) x Legislature XI x Major Party	0.769 (1.720)	1.402 (1.818)		
Legislature XVI			−0.951*** (0.177)	−0.447* (0.214)
log(Press Mentions) x Legislature XVI			−0.175 (0.630)	0.472 (0.694)
Legislature XVI x Major Party			0.244 (0.218)	0.537* (0.254)
log(Press Mentions) x Legislature XVI x Major Party			−1.823 (1.233)	−3.293* (1.465)
Intercept	1.078*** (0.196)	2.217*** (0.462)	1.060*** (0.135)	4.887*** (0.448)
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	1,555	1,538	1,834	1,675

\*\*\* $p < 0.001$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \* $p < 0.05$ , <sup>†</sup> $p < 0.1$



## References

- Center for the Study of Political Change (CIRCaP). 2013. “Archivio sulla classe politica italiana.” Unpublished paper, University of Siena.
- Ceron, Andrea. 2014. “Twitter and the Traditional Media: Who Is the Real Agenda Setter?” Unpublished paper, .
- Chang, Eric C.C., Miriam A. Golden, and Seth J. Hill. 2010. “Legislative Malfeasance and Political Accountability.” *World Politics* 62(2): 177–220.
- Gagliarducci, Stefano, Tommaso Nannicini, and Paolo Naticchioni. 2011. “Electoral Rules and Politicians’ Behavior: A Micro Test.” *American Economic Journal: Economic Policy* 3(3): 144–174.
- Gomez, Peter, and Marco Travaglio. 2008. *Se li conosci li eviti*. Milan: Chiarelettere.