

Structural Information Flow: A Fresh Look at Types for Non-Interference

Hemant Gouni with Frank Pfenning & Jonathan Aldrich
MWPLS 2025 and previously OOPSLA 2025


Information Flow Tracks *Dependencies*

Information Flow Tracks *Dependencies*

Information
Leakage



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Information
Leakage



Program Slicing



Concurrent
+
Distributed
Systems

Information Flow Tracks Dependencies

Information
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Program Slicing A knife and fork icon.

Build Systems A grey gear icon.



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
Program Slicing



Build Systems




Incremental Computation



Information Flow Tracks Dependencies

Information
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Program Slicing



Build Systems



Incremental Computation



Controlling Opaque Definitions



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
Incremental Computation



Controlling Opaque Definitions



Proof Irrelevance + Type Erasure



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Program Slicing



Build Systems



Incremental Computation



Controlling Opaque Definitions



Proof Irrelevance + Type Erasure



...and much more!!

How to Reinvent Our Approach From Scratch 🍔

A Familiar Friend: Parametric Polymorphism

val id : $\alpha \rightarrow \alpha$

val snd : $\alpha \rightarrow \beta \rightarrow \alpha$

val map : $(\alpha \rightarrow \beta) \rightarrow \text{list } \alpha \rightarrow \text{list } \beta$

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What about `incr` : `int -> int`?

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val snd : $\alpha \rightarrow \beta \rightarrow \alpha$

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What about `incr : int -> int`?

Insight 1

Separate data abstraction from information flow.

Relaxing Parametricity

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Result: $\text{incr} : \alpha \text{ int} \rightarrow \alpha \text{ int}$

What about $\text{add} : \alpha \text{ int} \rightarrow \beta \text{ int} \rightarrow ? \text{ int}$?

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Insight 2

Track sets of dependencies in types.

Generalizing to Dependency Sets

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Let's work a more interesting example of information flow!

A Password Checker

```
let pass : [pwd] string = "katya"  
  
let check : [ $\alpha$ ] string -> [ $\alpha$  pwd] bool =  
    fun attempt -> attempt == pass
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The conventional solution to this issue is *declassification*...

...which *subverts* the type system.

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[Non-interference] is too strict to be usable in realistic programs.

— Wikipedia (Information Flow)

Non-interference says dependency tracking must be faithful; declassification opposes it.

Noninterference is over-restrictive for programs with intentional information release (average salary, information purchase and password checking programs are flatly rejected by noninterference).

— Sabelfeld and Sands 07

Non-interference says dependency tracking must be faithful; declassification opposes it.

We resolve this conflict: the tools we've already introduced suffice for realistic programs.

Declassification for Free 

Step 0: Wishful Thinking

```
signature PasswordChecker = sig
```

```
end
```

```
open PasswordChecker as pc
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let _ : [pwd] string = pc.pass ++ "arren"
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let _ : [pwd] string = pc.pass ++ "arren"
let _ : [ ] bool = pc.check "nemmerle"
```

Step 0: Wishful Thinking

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signature PasswordChecker = sig
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  pass : [pwd] string
  check : [ $\alpha$ ] string -> [ $\alpha$ ] bool
  encrypt : [pwd  $\alpha$ ] string -> [ $\alpha$ ] string
end
```

```
open PasswordChecker as pc
```

```
let _ : [pwd] string = pc.pass ++ "arren"
let _ : [ ] bool = pc.check "nemmerle"
let _ : [ ] string = pc.encrypt pc.pass
```

Step 1: Expose Lurking Quantifiers 😈

`id` : $\alpha \rightarrow \alpha$

`map` : $(\alpha \rightarrow \beta) \rightarrow \text{list } \alpha \rightarrow \text{list } \beta$

`add` : $[\alpha] \text{ int} \rightarrow [\beta] \text{ int} \rightarrow [\alpha \beta] \text{ int}$

Step 1: Expose Lurking Quantifiers 😈

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Insight 3

Construct `exists α` from `forall α` + higher-order functions

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Insight 3

Construct `exists α` from `forall α` + higher-order functions

Existentials are better known as *modules* or *classes*!*

*(roughly)

Step 2: Dependency Abstraction 🧱

```
signature Queue = sig
  type t

  enqueue : int -> t -> t
  dequeue : t -> t * int
end

structure naive_queue : Queue = struct
  type t = List int

  enqueue x q = Cons(x, q)
  dequeue q = match q with ...
end
```

Step 2: Dependency Abstraction 🤖

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signature Queue = sig
  type t ←———— Existentially Quantified!
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client view

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implementation view

```
structure naive_queue : Queue = struct
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Step 3: Our New Password Checker

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    = fun attempt -> attempt == pass
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    = fun str -> gpg str
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Takeaway: Full-strength **non-interference** and **practical programming** are perfectly aligned.

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POPL 2026:

Security Reasoning via Substructural Dependency Tracking

[HEMANT GOUNI](#), Carnegie Mellon University, USA

[FRANK PFENNING](#), Carnegie Mellon University, USA

[JONATHAN ALDRICH](#), Carnegie Mellon University, USA

Substructural type systems provide the ability to speak about *resources*. By enforcing usage restrictions on *inputs* to computations they allow programmers to reify limited system units—such as memory—in types. We demonstrate a new form of resource reasoning founded on constraining *outputs* and explore its utility for security by example. Our initial results show that it is possible to reason about security properties of programs that are otherwise difficult to verify.