

Cyber Defense Project

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Malware Analysis

Static Analysis

Here are the steps I'll be following throughout this Static Analysis.

- ☐ Obtain the Malware File
- ☐ Check File Information
- ☐ Extract Strings
- ☐ Analyze File Headers
- ☐ Perform Anti-Virus Scan

Obtain the Malware File:

- Let's first identify the file that we wanna analyze.
- Then download or take a copy of the Malware file to your system.

```

L$ git clone https://github.com/kunaldg01/Virus.git
Cloning into 'Virus'...
remote: Enumerating objects: 156, done.
remote: Counting objects: 100% (74/74), done.
remote: Compressing objects: 100% (56/56), done.
remote: Total 156 (delta 21), reused 58 (delta 13), pack-reused 82
Receiving objects: 100% (156/156), 48.09 MiB | 2.76 MiB/s, done.
Resolving deltas: 100% (48/48), done.

L$ ls
1.abc
1.zip
2.abc
9ab777f5635c5d46ad448c2f2.zip
'batch_76.zip'
dc030778938b8b6f98236a709d0d18734c325accf44b12a55ecc2d56b8bb9000
DLL_INJECTION.zip

'Exam 74'
'Exam 75'
exam.doc
example1.pdf
example2.pdf
example3.pdf
LOKI.docx
malicious2.js
Malicious.js
Mal23.zip
mal24.zip
payment.doc
Practical - 7.zip
PracticalMalwareAnalysis-Labs.7z

'quiz - 2.zip'
reverseMe.exe
Sample1.exe
Sample2.exe
'Scylla v0.8.7c.zip'
statements.abc
statements.docx
StolenImages_Evidence.js
task2.zip
test1.js
'University Exam 2022.zip'
Uni.zip

(voldemort@fsociety)-[~/7 SEM/Malware Analysis (MA)/PROJECT/Virus]
L$

```

This is the file I'll be using for further Analysis

Check File Information:

- Use the “file” command to determine the file type and basic information.
- Run the following command.

```

L$ file payment.doc
payment.doc: Composite Document File V2 Document, Little Endian, Os: Windows, Version 6.1, Code page: 1252, Author: admin, Template: Normal.dotm, Last Saved By: admin,
Revision Number: 1, Name of Creating Application: Microsoft Office Word, Total Editing Time: 03:00, Create Time/Date: Wed Jun 29 17:09:00 2016, Last Saved Time/Date: We
d Jun 29 17:12:00 2016, Number of Pages: 1, Number of Words: 0, Number of Characters: 0, Security: 0

```

Extract Strings:

- Let's now extract readable strings from the file using the “strings” command.
- Run the following command.

```
L$ strings payment.doc
bjbj
pa!\pa!\
hi=f
[Content_Types].xml
_rels/.rels
theme/theme/themeManager.xml
sQ}#
theme/theme/theme1.xml
QV32#y7&
rC!f;
Z1B$v
]f0>
4;]?
&sA,
5$Cr`T
]|d"
h.Pds9D
)szc
D}9(
^fW%
Mfz[0
IBEF
D-W.?0
A8>v
T6X=
4TEvM
Q[MfP
7eXjv6j
*MBS
theme/theme/_rels/themeManager.xml.rels
6?$Q
K(M&$R(.1
[Content_Types].xmlPK
_rels/.relsPK
theme/theme/themeManager.xmlPK
theme/theme/theme1.xmlPK
theme/theme/_rels/themeManager.xml.relsPK
```

This output is too big to display on the terminal, so I've pasted the strings below.

Analyze File Headers:

- Use “hexdump” command to analyze the headers from this malware file.
- Run the following command.

```

└─$ hexdump -C payment.doc
00000000  d0 cf 11 e0 a1 b1 1a e1  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |.....|
00000010  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  3e 00 03 00 fe ff 09 00  |.....>.....|
00000020  06 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00  |.....|
00000030  27 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 10 00 00 29 00 00 00  |'.....)....|
00000040  01 00 00 00 fe ff ff ff  00 00 00 00 26 00 00 00  |.....&....|
00000050  ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff  ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff  |.....|
*
00000200  ec a5 c1 00 5b e0 09 04  00 00 f0 12 bf 00 00 00  |....[.....|
00000210  00 00 00 10 00 00 00 00  00 08 00 00 01 08 00 00  |.....|
00000220  0e 00 62 6a 62 6a 12 0b  12 0b 00 00 00 00 00 00  |..bjbj.....|
00000230  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 0c 04 16 00  |.....|
00000240  2e 0e 00 00 70 61 21 5c  70 61 21 5c 01 00 00 00  |....pa!\pa!\....|
00000250  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |.....|
00000260  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 ff ff 0f 00  |.....|
00000270  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ff ff 0f 00 00 00 00 00  |.....|
00000280  00 00 00 00 ff ff 0f 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |.....|
00000290  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  b7 00 00 00 00 00 36 07  |.....6..|
000002a0  00 00 00 00 00 00 36 07  00 00 ba 14 00 00 00 00  |.....6.....|
000002b0  00 00 ba 14 00 00 00 00  00 00 ba 14 00 00 00 00  |.....|
000002c0  00 00 ba 14 00 00 00 00  00 00 ba 14 00 00 14 00  |.....|
000002d0  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 ff ff ff ff 00 00  |.....|
000002e0  00 00 ce 14 00 00 00 00  00 00 ce 14 00 00 00 00  |.....|
000002f0  00 00 ce 14 00 00 00 00  00 00 ce 14 00 00 0c 00  |.....|
00000300  00 00 da 14 00 00 0c 00  00 00 ce 14 00 00 00 00  |.....|
00000310  00 00 8a 16 00 00 30 01  00 00 e6 14 00 00 00 00  |.....0.....|
00000320  00 00 e6 14 00 00 00 00  00 00 e6 14 00 00 00 00  |.....|
*
00000340  00 00 c1 15 00 00 00 00  00 00 c1 15 00 00 00 00  |.....|
00000350  00 00 c1 15 00 00 00 00  00 00 09 16 00 00 02 00  |.....|
00000360  00 00 0b 16 00 00 00 00  00 00 0b 16 00 00 00 00  |.....|
*
00000380  00 00 0b 16 00 00 00 00  00 00 0b 16 00 00 24 00  |.....$.|
00000390  00 00 ba 17 00 00 b6 02  00 00 70 1a 00 00 3e 00  |.....p...>.|

```

Because the output is too big, I couldn't show everything in the screenshot.

Let's now look at the file headers based on this hexdump.

- **File Type:**

The file begins with the signature "D0CF11E0A1B11AE1" (not visible in the provided snippet, but common for MS Office files). The document type is identified as "Microsoft Word 97-2003 Document" in the ASCII representation.

- **Structure:**

The file structure includes information about the Word document, such as version compatibility, CMG, DPB, GC, and Host Extender Info.

- **Version:**

The Word version compatibility is set to "393222000" (probably indicating compatibility with Word 2003).

- **Other Information:**

The document mentions a host extender with a specific ID.

Perform Anti-Virus Scan:

- I'll be running an anti-virus scan on the malware file using a command-line antivirus scanner like "clamscan".
- Run the following command.

```

L-$ clamscan payment.doc
LibClamAV Warning: *****
LibClamAV Warning: *** The virus database is older than 7 days! ***
LibClamAV Warning: *** Please update it as soon as possible. ***
LibClamAV Warning: *****
Loading: 14s, ETA: 0s [=====>] 8.67M/8.67M sigs
Compiling: 2s, ETA: 0s [=====>] 41/41 tasks

/home/voldemort/Documents/7 SEM/Malware Analysis (MA)/PROJECT/payment.doc: Doc.Macro.Downloader-6360616-1 FOUND

----- SCAN SUMMARY -----
Known viruses: 8672428
Engine version: 1.0.3
Scanned directories: 0
Scanned files: 1
Infected files: 1
Data scanned: 0.03 MB
Data read: 0.02 MB (ratio 1.33:1)
Time: 18.428 sec (0 m 18 s)
Start Date: 2023:11:25 22:06:56
End Date: 2023:11:25 22:07:15

```


Dynamic Analysis

Here are the steps I'll be following throughout this Dynamic Analysis.

- ☐ Set up a Sandbox Environment
- ☐ Monitor System Activities
- ☐ Analyze Process Activities
- ☐ Monitor File System Changes
- ☐ Capture System Memory

Set up a Sandbox Environment:

- Let's create a virtual machine to isolate the malware and protect the host system.



Monitor System Activities:

- I'll be using tools like “strace” or “ltrace” to monitor system calls and library calls made by the malware.
- Run the following command.

soffice.bin

```
strace /usr/lib/libreoffice/program/soffice.bin >  
strace_soffice.log
```

The output is much larger.

The summary of this log file is:

1. The malware attempts to connect to a UNIX socket at “/var/run/nscd/socket”, but it fails due to “No such file or directory” (ENOENT).
2. It reads the “/etc/nsswitch.conf” file and “/etc/passwd” file, performing file operations like opening, reading, and closing.
3. It checks the existence of directories such as “/home/user/.config/libreoffice/4” and “/tmp”.
4. It tries to launch “javaldx”, but there’s a warning that it failed, indicating a potential issue with java functionality.
5. The malware makes use of pipes and clones processes.

To monitor the system calls and library calls in real-time, use the following “strace” command.

```
strace -o output.txt -e trace=all -f -p 14845
```

Here, I’ve given the <PID> of soffice.bin process.

oosplash

1. File Operations:

- Opened files using ‘**openat**’ and checked file status using ‘**newfstatat**’.
- Read content from files using ‘**read**’.
- Closed files with ‘**close**’.
- Accessed user-related information in “/etc/passwd”.

2. File System Operations:

- Created directories with ‘**mkdir**’.
- Checked file existence and permissions with ‘**access**’.
- Investigated symbolic links with ‘**readlink**’.

3. Socket Operations:

- Created a Unix domain socket using ‘**socket**’.

- Attempted to connect to a socket file in “/tmp”, but failed (**‘connect’**).

4. Process and Thread Operations:

- Used **‘clone3’** to create new process/thread.
- Various operations related to process signals (**‘rt_sigaction’**, **‘rt_sigprocmask’**, **‘futex’**, **‘exit_group’**).

5. Memory Operations:

- Allocated memory using **‘mmap’**.
- Set memory protection with **‘mprotect’**.

6. Miscellaneous:

- Checked user ID using **‘getuid’**.
- Checked and manipulated the current working directory with **‘getcwd’**.

To monitor the system calls in real-time, we can use the following strace command.

```
strace -f -o strace_oosplash.log -p 14828
```

Here, I’ve given the <PID> of oosplash process.

Analyze Process Activities:

- Monitor the process activities of the malware using tools like "ps" or "top".
- Run the following command.

```
top
```

```

top - 23:57:23 up 2:11, 1 user, load average: 0.19, 0.28, 0.42
Tasks: 297 total, 1 running, 295 sleeping, 0 stopped, 1 zombie
%Cpu(s): 21.0 us, 9.9 sy, 0.0 ni, 68.5 id, 0.0 wa, 0.0 hi, 0.7 si, 0.0 st
MiB Mem : 3871.6 total, 1137.9 free, 1612.0 used, 1121.7 buff/cache
MiB Swap: 3220.0 total, 3096.2 free, 123.8 used. 1967.9 avail Mem

```

PID	USER	PR	NI	VIRT	RES	SHR	S	%CPU	%MEM	TIME+	COMMAND
14845	meet	20	0	1034428	265044	140556	S	43.5	6.7	0:02.54	soffice.bin
1246	meet	20	0	4514176	220808	88092	S	18.9	5.6	3:29.16	gnome-shell
1108	meet	9	-11	1693072	19040	13664	S	1.0	0.5	0:31.82	pulseaudio
1539	meet	20	0	323736	10668	5760	S	0.7	0.3	0:04.92	ibus-daemon
1615	meet	20	0	356464	22928	12928	S	0.7	0.6	0:02.19	ibus-extension-
352	root	-51	0	0	0	0	S	0.3	0.0	0:03.89	irq/16-vmwgfx
1632	meet	20	0	297812	26584	17368	S	0.3	0.7	0:21.04	vmtoolsd
9151	meet	20	0	576804	46516	31068	S	0.3	1.2	0:24.07	gnome-terminal-
14173	root	20	0	0	0	0	I	0.3	0.0	0:01.40	kworker/0:3-events
14812	meet	20	0	21884	4224	3328	R	0.3	0.1	0:00.39	top
1	root	20	0	168128	11208	6216	S	0.0	0.3	0:04.66	systemd
2	root	20	0	0	0	0	S	0.0	0.0	0:00.05	kthreadd
3	root	0	-20	0	0	0	I	0.0	0.0	0:00.00	rcu_gp
4	root	0	-20	0	0	0	I	0.0	0.0	0:00.00	rcu_par_gp
5	root	0	-20	0	0	0	I	0.0	0.0	0:00.00	slub_flushwq
6	root	0	-20	0	0	0	I	0.0	0.0	0:00.00	netns
8	root	0	-20	0	0	0	I	0.0	0.0	0:02.11	kworker/0:0H-kblockd
10	root	0	-20	0	0	0	I	0.0	0.0	0:00.00	mm_percpu_wq
11	root	20	0	0	0	0	I	0.0	0.0	0:00.00	rcu_tasks_kthread
12	root	20	0	0	0	0	I	0.0	0.0	0:00.00	rcu_tasks_rude_kthread
13	root	20	0	0	0	0	I	0.0	0.0	0:00.00	rcu_tasks_trace_kthread
14	root	20	0	0	0	0	S	0.0	0.0	0:02.65	ksoftirqd/0
15	root	20	0	0	0	0	I	0.0	0.0	0:08.85	rcu_preempt
16	root	rt	0	0	0	0	S	0.0	0.0	0:00.07	migration/0
17	root	-51	0	0	0	0	S	0.0	0.0	0:00.00	idle_inject/0
19	root	20	0	0	0	0	S	0.0	0.0	0:00.00	cpuhp/0
20	root	20	0	0	0	0	S	0.0	0.0	0:00.00	cpuhp/1
21	root	-51	0	0	0	0	S	0.0	0.0	0:00.00	idle_inject/1
22	root	rt	0	0	0	0	S	0.0	0.0	0:00.87	migration/1

```
ps -ef
```

```

meet 1952 1094 0 21:46 ? 00:00:00 /usr/libexec/ibus-x11
root 2001 1 0 21:46 ? 00:00:07 /usr/libexec/fwupd/fwupd
meet 2673 1094 0 21:46 ? 00:00:00 /usr/bin/snap userd
meet 3312 1220 0 21:46 ? 00:00:00 update-notifier
root 4183 2 0 22:00 ? 00:00:01 [kworker/1:2H-kblockd]
meet 6426 1246 0 22:54 ? 00:00:03 gjs /usr/share/gnome-shell/extensions/ding@rastersoft.com/ding.js -E -P /usr/share/gnome-shell/ext
root 6673 1 0 23:03 ? 00:00:00 /usr/sbin/cupsd -l
root 6675 1 0 23:03 ? 00:00:00 /usr/sbin/cups-browsed
meet 8227 1094 0 23:04 ? 00:00:00 /usr/bin/gnome-calendar --gapplication-service
meet 8228 1094 0 23:04 ? 00:00:00 /usr/bin/seahorse --gapplication-service
meet 9151 1094 0 23:07 ? 00:00:23 /usr/libexec/gnome-terminal-server
meet 9774 1094 0 23:12 ? 00:00:26 /usr/bin/nautilus --gapplication-service
root 10873 2 0 23:18 ? 00:00:01 [kworker/1:2-events]
meet 11535 1094 0 23:22 ? 00:00:01 /usr/bin/speech-dispatcher -s -t 0
meet 11547 11535 0 23:22 ? 00:00:00 [sd_espeak-ng-mb] <defunct>
meet 11550 11535 0 23:22 ? 00:00:00 /usr/lib/speech-dispatcher-modules/sd_espeak-ng /etc/speech-dispatcher/modules/espeak-ng.conf
meet 11554 11535 0 23:22 ? 00:00:00 /usr/lib/speech-dispatcher-modules/sd_dummy /etc/speech-dispatcher/modules/dummy.conf
root 11964 2 0 23:24 ? 00:00:01 [kworker/u256:5-events_unbound]
meet 12047 9151 0 23:26 pts/1 00:00:00 bash
root 12081 2 0 23:26 ? 00:00:00 [tls-strp]
root 13214 2 0 23:30 ? 00:00:00 [kworker/1:0-cgroup_destroy]
root 13225 2 0 23:31 ? 00:00:01 [kworker/u256:0-flush-8:0]
root 13590 2 0 23:43 ? 00:00:00 [kworker/1:0H]
meet 13783 1246 0 23:43 ? 00:00:01 wireshark
root 13799 2 0 23:43 ? 00:00:00 [cfg80211]
root 14173 2 0 23:45 ? 00:00:01 [kworker/0:3-events]
clanav 14427 1 1 23:46 ? 00:00:11 /usr/bin/freshclam -d --foreground=true
root 14659 2 0 23:47 ? 00:00:00 [kworker/u256:2-events_unbound]
root 14706 2 0 23:50 ? 00:00:00 [kworker/0:0-events]
meet 14812 12047 0 23:55 pts/1 00:00:00 top
root 14819 2 0 23:56 ? 00:00:00 [kworker/0:1-events]
meet 14828 1094 0 23:56 ? 00:00:00 /usr/lib/libreoffice/program/oosplash --writer file:///home/meet/payment.doc
meet 14845 14828 4 23:56 ? 00:00:01 /usr/lib/libreoffice/program/soffice.bin --writer file:///home/meet/payment.doc
meet 14864 9151 0 23:56 pts/0 00:00:00 bash
meet 14871 14864 0 23:56 pts/0 00:00:00 ps -ef
meet@meet-virtual-machine:~$

```

Monitor File System Changes:

- Observe any changes made to the file system by the malware using tools like "inotifywait" or "auditctl".
- Run the following command.

```
root@meet-virtual-machine:~# $ inotifywait -r -m .
Setting up watches. Beware: since -r was given, this may take a while!
Watches established.
./ OPEN payment.doc
./ ACCESS payment.doc
./ ACCESS payment.doc
./ ACCESS payment.doc
./ ACCESS payment.doc
./ ACCESS payment.doc
./ ACCESS payment.doc
./ ACCESS payment.doc
./ ACCESS payment.doc
./ ACCESS payment.doc
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./ ACCESS payment.doc
./ ACCESS payment.doc
./ ACCESS payment.doc
./ ACCESS payment.doc
./ ACCESS payment.doc
./ ACCESS payment.doc
./ ACCESS payment.doc
./ CLOSE_WRITE,CLOSE payment.doc
./local/share/CREATE recently-used.xbel.QLQCF2
./local/share/OPEN recently-used.xbel.QLQCF2
./local/share/MODIFY recently-used.xbel.QLQCF2
./local/share/CLOSE_WRITE,CLOSE recently-used.xbel.QLQCF2
./local/share/MOVED_FROM recently-used.xbel.QLQCF2
```

- 1. Repetitive Changes:** The file “./ ACCESS payment.doc” is repeatedly accessed, suggesting potential modification or access.
- 2. LibreOffice Configuration Changes:** There are multiple entries related to changes in LibreOffice configurations, such as modifications to toolbar, menubar, popupmenu, and statusbar.
- 3. Recent Files:** The log shows activities related to recently-used.xbel, indicating modifications, movements, and attribute changes.
- 4. User Configuration Changes:** Entries related to user configurations, like the creation and modification of files in the “./config/libreoffice/4/user/config/” directory.

Capture System Memory:

- Capture and analyze the memory of the running malware using tools like "volatility" or "gdb".
- Run the following command.

```
meet@meet-virtual-machine:~$ volatility -f tcpdump.dmp pslist
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6.1
No suitable address space mapping found
Tried to open image as:
MachOAddressSpace: mac: need base
LimeAddressSpace: lime: need base
WindowsHiberFileSpace32: No base Address Space
WindowsCrashDumpSpace64BitMap: No base Address Space
WindowsCrashDumpSpace64: No base Address Space
HPAKAddressSpace: No base Address Space
VMWareMetaAddressSpace: No base Address Space
VirtualBoxCoreDumpElf64: No base Address Space
QemuCoreDumpElf: No base Address Space
VMWareAddressSpace: No base Address Space
WindowsCrashDumpSpace32: No base Address Space
SkipDuplicatesAMD64PagedMemory: No base Address Space
WindowsAMD64PagedMemory: No base Address Space
LinuxAMD64PagedMemory: No base Address Space
AMD64PagedMemory: No base Address Space
IA32PagedMemoryPae: No base Address Space
IA32PagedMemory: No base Address Space
OSXPmemElf: No base Address Space
MachOAddressSpace: MachO Header signature invalid
LimeAddressSpace: Invalid Lime header signature
WindowsHiberFileSpace32: No xpress signature found
WindowsCrashDumpSpace64BitMap: Header signature invalid
WindowsCrashDumpSpace64: Header signature invalid
HPAKAddressSpace: Invalid magic found
VMWareMetaAddressSpace: VMware metadata file is not available
VirtualBoxCoreDumpElf64: ELF Header signature invalid
QemuCoreDumpElf: ELF Header signature invalid
VMWareAddressSpace: Invalid VMware signature: 0x64706374
WindowsCrashDumpSpace32: Header signature invalid
SkipDuplicatesAMD64PagedMemory: Incompatible profile WinXPSP2x86 selected
WindowsAMD64PagedMemory: Incompatible profile WinXPSP2x86 selected
LinuxAMD64PagedMemory: Incompatible profile WinXPSP2x86 selected
AMD64PagedMemory: Incompatible profile WinXPSP2x86 selected
IA32PagedMemoryPae: No valid DTB found
```


Cyber Defense Techniques

Both in Windows & Linux Operating Systems

For Linux:

- Update your system regularly to ensure you have the latest security patches and updates.

Command: `sudo apt update && sudo apt upgrade`

- Install and configure a firewall to monitor and control incoming and outgoing network traffic.

Command: `sudo apt install ufw` (for Ubuntu-based systems)

Command: `sudo ufw enable`

- Use strong passwords and enforce password policies to prevent unauthorized access.

Command: `sudo passwd <username>` (to change user password)

You can also use apg tool in Linux.

The apg tool in Linux is a password generator that is used to generate strong and secure passwords. It stands for “**Automated Password Generator**.” The apg tool uses a combination of various algorithms to generate random and complex passwords that are difficult to guess. It takes into consideration factors like password length, character set, and randomness to generate secure passwords. The generated passwords can be used for various purposes, including creating strong passwords for user accounts, securing network devices, or generating random encryption keys.

- Disable unnecessary services and remove any unnecessary software or packages.

Command: `sudo systemctl disable <service>` (to disable a service)

- Regularly scan your system for malware using antivirus software.

Command: `sudo apt install clamav` (for installing ClamAV)

Command: `sudo clamscan -r /` (to scan the entire system)

- Monitor system logs for any suspicious activities or anomalies.

Command: `sudo tail -f /var/log/syslog` (to monitor system logs)

For Windows:

- Keep your operating system and applications up to date with the latest patches.

Command: `wuauclt /detectnow` (to check for Windows updates)

- Install and configure a reputable antivirus software and keep it updated.

Command: `Get-MpComputerStatus` (to check Windows Defender status)

- Enable and configure Windows Firewall to control inbound and outbound network traffic.

Command: `Set-NetFirewallProfile -Profile Domain,Public,Private -Enabled True`

- Regularly backup important files and data to prevent loss in case of an infection.

Command: `robocopy <source> <destination> /MIR` (to create a mirror backup)

- Use strong and unique passwords for user accounts and enable multi-factor authentication where possible.

Command: `net user <username> *` (to change user password)

- Enable and monitor Windows Event Logs for any suspicious activities or security events.

Command: `Get-WinEvent -LogName Security` (to view security events)

Remember that these techniques should be implemented as part of a comprehensive cybersecurity strategy, and it's advisable to consult with a cybersecurity professional for a more tailored approach.