

Decentralised Mining Pool for Bitcoin

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Abstract

Bitcoin p2pool's usage has steadily declined over the years and its decline impacts bitcoin's ability to remain decentralised. The primary problems with p2pool include large variance in earnings for miners, large number of dead on arrival blocks and the need for consuming block space for making payouts to miners. Braidpool and the use of channel payments are two proposals that have been put forward as possible means to alleviate these problems faced by p2pool. In this document, we present a unified solution that uses a directed acyclic graph to track miners shares and uses payments channels to reward miners. The shares calculation can be carried out by all nodes on the p2p, and the rewards are paid out by the pool operator. Using the payment channels construction neither the pool operator nor the miners can cheat each other. We show that our approach is incentives compatible and can reduce variance in earnings for miners. The approach presented here to use a DAG for tracking shares is a modified version of the proposal first put forward as BraidCoin.

1 Motivation

P2Pool [1] helped decentralise bitcoin by enabling miners to select which transactions they mined and thus avoid any potential censorship by pool operators. However, the construction used by P2Pool faced a number of problems that lead to miners abandoning the pool.

1. Large variance in earnings for miners.
2. Large number of dead on arrival blocks.
3. Large block space requirement.

The first two problems are a direct consequence of the shares block rate limited to 30 seconds. With only one block possible every thirty seconds, any increase of hashrate on P2Pool resulted in shares competing to be the next block in the p2pool chain.

There is a clear tension in play here, increasing the block rate frequency doesn't scale the throughput of the pool in terms of number of shares found,

as most of them are orphaned and the miners not being rewarded for those orphans. Ethereum's inclusive protocols [4] help alleviate the problem for the Ethereum blockchain, where small pools can work with a reduced variance in their rewards as shown in the analysis by McElrath [5].

2 Current Proposals

TerraHash Coin [5], Jute [8] and [7] are some of the attempts to use a DAG for faster block times. However, these works focus on changing the consensus layer of bitcoin itself. The ideas in these proposals allowed miners to produce shares that have conflicting transactions and then apply rules to find a set of transactions acceptable at various cuts of the DAG.

Instead we propose to build a DAG of miner shares to enable faster block times and using this DAG for calculating distribution of payouts between miners. We then propose using payment channels as defined by Belcher [2] to avoid using block space for making payouts to miners.

2.1 Hash Rate Futures

TerraHash Coin [5] introduced the idea of generating a coin native to the shares chain and enabling miners to hedge against the insecurities of bitcoin's hashrate and bitcoin's price moving against them.

Smaller, more faster blocks, called beads help reduce the variance in the earnings for miners. The key idea there is that if miners can produce blocks faster, say within 1 to 2 second periods, and that those blocks are accepted by the decentralised pool. Then the number of their blocks that get orphaned reduces and therefore the variance in their earnings are a function of the pool size goes reduces.

Miners in TerraHash Coin earn the coin native to the shares chain for each share they find. These native coins are used as a commodity to hedge against the uncertainties of the total network hashrate in the future and/or the price of bitcoin. This idea has a small problem that the instruments that help miners hedge their risks are designed and honoured by centralised parties. [to confirm]: However, if we allow miners to earn their reward from hubs for each bitcoin block the pool mines *and* hedge their TerraHash coins against uncertainty, then maybe we can sell this to bitcoin miners.[/to confirm]

2.2 Payment Channels For Rewards Payout

Apart from the work for increasing block rates using DAGs, Belcher [2] proposes a different idea to help decentralise mining deals with the problem of a paying miners from a decentralised mining pool. P2Pool uses the coinbase transaction of a block to pay out miners. Belcher shows how a scheme can be constructed using payment channels between federated hubs to pay miners after a block has been successfully mined. The payouts can be paid after a long enough period,

similar to the 100 blocks requirements for spending from coinbase transactions. Miners can register with hubs where bitcoin has been locked in to open payment channels to miners. The construction presented by Belcher show how both miners and hubs can't cheat and how the funders of the hub can earn a reward for providing the services accounting, distributing rewards and keeping the hub secure and attack resistant.

The ideas of the Hash Rate Futures and Payment Channels for Rewards Payouts together present a potential path for rebooting P2Pool. In the rest of the document we present a slightly modified version of TerraHash Coin and show how the various components can work together.

3 Decentralised Bitcoin Mining

In this section we present a modified version of TerraHash Coin and show how it can use payments channels with hubs to deliver a decentralised mining pool for bitcoin.

3.1 A DAG of Shares

TerraHash Coin shows how smaller more frequent blocks can form a directed acyclic graph (DAG) of blocks, with each block pointing to one or more one previous blocks. In TerraHash Coin all blocks are smaller bitcoin blocks, each with fewer transactions than a bitcoin block. Blocks in TerraHash Coin can have transactions repeated in different blocks. The TerraHash Coin proposal describes how repeated and potentially some double spend transactions can be resolved to decide on the state of the ledger at any cut of the DAG.

The rewards that miners earn in TerraHash Coin is a coin native to TerraHash Coin. This coin native to TerraHash Coin can then be swapped for Bitcoin. The proposal suggest two alternatives to deliver this swap. One approach is to burn the native coin and receive bitcoin. The other approach is that the native coin can be swapped for bitcoin via financial instruments like derivatives of the network's hash rate.

We propose taking a slightly different approach, where the blocks of a DAG represent shares of the mining pool and are entire bitcoin blocks as opposed to being smaller blocks.




Figure 1: Each WORK generated and shared by a miner is then followed by a number of SHARES the miner finds.

Each miner builds their own block, selecting transactions as they want, we call this “WORK”. The description of WORK is then disseminated to the p2p network of miners. The miner then starts mining on WORK and generates “SHARE”. Each SHARE is mined at a difficulty level chosen by the miner. This difficulty can be dynamically chosen by the miner after each SHARE, depending on what the miner observes on the p2p network. This dynamic adjustment of difficulty is not included in our proposal, but we note here that this is possible.

Figure 1 shows the relationship between WORK and its SHARES. Each WORK created by a miner has multiple SHARES and they are both broadcast on the p2p network.

The nodes in the DAG are SHARES mined at varied difficulty levels. Each SHARE that matches or exceeds the current bitcoin difficulty starts a new *epoch* for the p2p mining pool. Figure 2 shows l and r as the two valid bitcoin blocks that have been mined such that they meet bitcoin’s difficulty at the time the block was mined, and all the blocks between l and r are in the same *epoch*.




Figure 2: A epoch is defined as all the SHARES mined between two bitcoin blocks. Here all the SHARES between l and r are in the same *epoch*.

WORK is created by miners and is shared with others on a peer to peer network of miners using the compact block [3] specification. Each block created by a miner is a valid bitcoin block, apart from the fact that it is mined using a lower difficulty. The difficulty is chosen by the miner creating the block such that it can mine blocks with their hash rate to match the block rate of other miners in the p2p network.

When a miner starts working on a SHARE it includes a reference to the highest known SHARE from all other miners that the miner has received valid shares from. Note, the miner also has access to WORK blocks from all participating miners. If a miner doesn’t have the WORK block from another miner, then it rejects any SHARES received from the other miner. This is to the detriment of the other miners as we show in Section 3.2.

In the next section we then describe how all peers compute their fair share of profits using the DAG of shares. We show how our reward computation algorithm is incentives compatible [6].

3.2 Incentives Compatible Rewards

Each participating node, which includes the miners and the hub, is able to see the DAG of SHARES as broadcast on the network. Each SHARE includes a reference to the blocks the miner was aware of when the SHARE was found. The reason for doing so is simple. If a miner a doesn't include the SHARES of miner b , then b has a clear signal to stop including the SHARES of a , and as we will see a miner wants that their SHARES are referenced by other miners as only then they will be rewarded for their work.

The incentive in lay terms is that all miners should honestly include the SHARES discovered by other miners, as otherwise they will most likely be excluded by other miners and they will lose the opportunity to be rewarded for their work. We call this the degenerative case of "isolated miners" and argue that miners have no incentives to act in this manner. Figure 3 shows a DAG where all three miners a , b and c are working independently. In such a situation when the miner a discovers a share and the reward is not shared with any other miner.




Figure 3: a discovers a share and the reward is not shared with any other miner.

With the above understanding of why miners will co-operate, we now state the rules to calculate how the block reward should be divided between miners.

1. Traverse the DAG in reverse order from the SHARE that found the latest bitcoin block to the previous bitcoin block found and collect a set of shares.
2. From the above set of shares remove all shares that don't have a reverse path to the previous bitcoin block.
3. Distribute the reward between miners weighted by the sum of the difficulty of all SHARES found by miners.

As an example consider the p2p network of miners a , b and c with the DAG of shares as shown in Figure 4. In the DAG the set of shares that receive reward

proportional to their difficulty are $\{a_i..a_5, b_1..b_3\}$. The shares $\{c_1..c_3\}$ do not receive any reward as they are not reachable from the bitcoin block, a_5 , even if they are reachable from l .

For the second bitcoin block b_5 only the miners a and b receive rewards in proportion to the difficulties of their shares $\{b_4, b_5, a_6\}$. c doesn't receive any reward for c_4 as it doesn't include a reference to the last found bitcoin block a_5 .




Figure 4: Two epochs in a DAG of shares mined by three mines — a , b and c . The shares in grey meet the bitcoin difficulty at the time they were mined.

With the above rules, it should be easy to prove that the rule reward is an incentives compatible reward function as defined by [ref:incentives compatibility], and we present an outline of proofs that will be formalised in future work.

Incentive Compatibility Given the rules above, if a miner finds a bitcoin block the miner wants to get maximum reward possible based on all the shares it has found and therefore is incentivized to announce their SHARE as soon as they find it.

Proportional Payments Since rewards are calculated at the end of an epoch, that is when all the valid shares found by all miners have been discovered, all miners are guaranteed payments for the shares that have reached the miner who found the block.

Budget Balanced Again, since rewards are paid at the end of the epoch, a hub pays out rewards without losing or retaining any amount.

3.3 Payment Channels and Hubs

The Hubs and payments channels proposal is exactly the same as that described by Belcher [2]. The only difference is that Hubs calculate and distribute the rewards according to the incentives compatible rewards scheme described above. We also adopt the proposal that rewards are paid out after a 100 blocks of a block being mined.

We would like to extend the proposal to include funding of hubs by more than one party in a trustless manner, so that parties with small BTC parties can engage in the peer to peer mining economy. This will encourage faster adoption of our p2p mining network and make the network stronger against DDoS attacks with multiple hub operators available online.

4 Future Work

4.1 Proofs

We want to use the model presented by Boneh et.al. to provide proofs for how the rewards distribution is incentives compatible.

4.2 Simulations

Before we work on implementing the system, our next step is to simulate p2p mining network using ns-3 [ref] and make informed decisions about how large a network each hub will want to support. The observations we want to make are how large a p2p network can be sustained without an increase in work lost by miners. Each hub and p2p network can grow as long as miners are communicate WORK and SHARES with each other with bounded latency and can limit their lost work. With a simulation we want to find out the bounds of these.

4.3 Specifications and Implementation

We want to specify the p2p protocol messages and the rules more precisely. We also plan to implement the specifications and we expect the two tasks to proceed hand in hand.

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