# Macroeconomics Assignment

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#### Abstract

Almost an abstract

Start writing about what you are planning to do, note that this is an assignment and what it is (introduction vibes)

Please give credit: I haved used an R package from Mati (2019)

# 1. Model Specification

## Core RBC Foundations

Above could note be a heading on itself. Just a paragraph that it is a core rbc foundations and what that means.

Note that capital letters denote nominal amounts and lowercase denote real values.

## 1.1. Households

$$C_t = P_t c_t, \qquad I_t = P_t i_t \tag{1.1}$$

$$\max_{\{C_t, h_t, M_t, B_t, K_t, I_t\}} \mathbb{E}_0 \sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \beta^{t-1} \left[ \frac{\left(\frac{C_t}{P_t} - \eta \frac{C_{t-1}}{P_{t-1}}\right)^{1-\theta}}{1-\theta} - \chi \frac{h_t^{1+\gamma}}{1+\gamma} + \psi \ln\left(\frac{M_t}{P_t}\right) \right]$$
(1.2)

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$$C_t + I_t + B_t + M_t \le R_{t-1}^B B_{t-1} + M_{t-1} + W_t h_t + R_t^k K_{t-1} + \Pi_t - P_t \tau_t \tag{1.3}$$

$$K_{t} = (1 - \delta) K_{t-1} + I_{t} - \frac{\phi}{2} \left( \frac{I_{t}}{K_{t-1}} - \delta \right)^{2} K_{t-1}$$
 (1.4)

From which we can derive the following equations, found in full form in Appendix 3.1.1

$$(c_t - \eta c_{t-1})^{-\theta} = \beta \mathbb{E}_t \Big[ R_t^B \frac{P_t}{P_{t+1}} (c_{t+1} - \eta c_t)^{-\theta} \Big]$$
 (1.5)

Interpretation: Marginal rate of substitution between current and future consumption equals the expected real bond return. Habit persistence  $(\eta)$  links today's utility to past and future consumption, and inflation  $(P_t/P_{t+1})$  scales the real payoff on bonds.

$$\frac{W_t}{P_t} = \frac{\chi h_t^{\gamma}}{(c_t - \eta c_{t-1})^{-\theta} - \beta \eta \mathbb{E}_t[(c_{t+1} - \eta c_t)^{-\theta}]}$$
(1.6)

Interpretation: Habit formation reduces effective marginal utility of consumption, so stronger habits  $(\eta \uparrow)$  or more elastic labour supply  $(\gamma \uparrow)$  require a higher real wage to induce the same hours.

$$M_{t} = \frac{\psi}{\beta \mathbb{E}_{t} \left[ (R_{t}^{B} - 1) \cdot \frac{(c_{t+1} - \eta c_{t})^{-\theta} - \beta \eta \mathbb{E}_{t+1} \left[ (c_{t+2} - \eta c_{t+1})^{-\theta} \right]}{P_{t+1}} \right]}$$
(1.7)

Interpretation: Higher expected nominal rates  $(R_t^B - 1)$  raise the opportunity cost of money, while habits and inflation expectations shape the curvature of demand. The denominator captures the liquidity premium adjusted for consumption dynamics.

$$q_{t} \equiv 1 - \phi \left( \frac{I_{t}}{K_{t-1}} - \delta \right)$$

$$\frac{\beta \mathbb{E}_{t} \left[ \lambda_{t+1} R_{t}^{B} \right]}{q_{t}} = \beta \mathbb{E}_{t} \left[ \lambda_{t+1} \left( R_{t+1}^{k} + \frac{1}{q_{t+1}} \left( 1 - \delta + \frac{\phi}{2} \left[ (I_{t+1}/K_{t})^{2} - \delta^{2} \right] \right) \right) \right]$$
(1.8)

Interpretation: The bond-return-scaled discount factor divided by  $q_t$  equals expected return on capital plus adjustment-cost terms. If  $I_t/K_{t-1} > \delta$ , then  $q_t > 1$  signals profitable expansion; disinvestment flips the sign. Adjustment costs  $(\phi)$  create investment frictions.

#### 1.2. Production

While the RBC model features a single representative firm under perfect competition, we now introduce two layers of firms to capture monopolistic competition and nominal rigidities:

- 1. Final goods producer (perfectly competitive aggregator)
- 2. Intermediate goods producers (monopolistically competitive with sticky prices)

#### 1.2.1. Final Goods Producer

## (Perfectly competitive, zero profits)

Role: Aggregates differentiated inputs into final output.

**Key equations:** 

**CES Production Function:** 

$$Y_t = \left(\int_0^1 Y_t(j)^{\frac{\epsilon - 1}{\epsilon}} dj\right)^{\frac{\epsilon}{\epsilon - 1}}, \quad \epsilon > 1$$
(1.9)

Demand for Good j:

$$Y_t(j) = \left(\frac{P_t(j)}{P_t}\right)^{-\epsilon} Y_t \tag{1.10}$$

Aggregate Price Index:

$$P_t = \left(\int_0^1 P_t(j)^{1-\epsilon} dj\right)^{\frac{1}{1-\epsilon}} \tag{1.11}$$

Equations 1.10 and 1.11 are derived from 1.9 in Appendix 3.2.1.

#### **Economic Intuition:**

- $\epsilon$ : Elasticity of substitution (lower  $\epsilon$  implies more market power)
- Demand for j decreases with its relative price  $\frac{P_t(j)}{P_t}$

### 1.2.2. Intermediate Goods Producers

(Monopolistic competitors, indexed by  $j \in [0,1]$ ) Each firm j produces with Cobb-Douglas technology:

$$Y_t(j) = A_t K_t(j)^{\alpha} h_t(j)^{1-\alpha}$$

$$\tag{1.12}$$

- Identical technology  $A_t$  (common TFP shock)
- Firms rent capital  $K_t(j)$  and labor  $h_t(j)$  from households
- Competitive factor markets: prices  $R_t^k$ ,  $W_t$

Minimizing costs yields nominal marginal cost (common to all firms - derived in Appendix 3.2.2):

$$MC_t = \frac{1}{A_t} \left(\frac{R_t^k}{\alpha}\right)^{\alpha} \left(\frac{W_t}{1-\alpha}\right)^{1-\alpha}$$
(1.13)

Firms face Rotemberg (1982) price adjustment costs.

$$AdjCost_t(j) = \frac{\psi}{2} \left( \frac{P_t(j)}{P_{t-1}(j)} - 1 \right)^2 Y_t$$

The real profit function is:

$$\Pi_t(j) = \underbrace{\frac{P_t(j)}{P_t} Y_t(j)}_{\text{real revenue}} - \underbrace{\frac{MC_t}{P_t} \cdot Y_t(j)}_{\text{real cost}} - \underbrace{\frac{\psi}{2} \left(\frac{P_t(j)}{P_{t-1}(j)} - 1\right)^2 Y_t}_{\text{adjustment cost}}$$
(1.14)

$$\max_{P_{t}(j)} \mathbb{E}_{t} \sum_{s=0}^{\infty} \beta^{s} \Lambda_{t,t+s} \left[ \frac{P_{t+s}(j)}{P_{t+s}} Y_{t+s}(j) - m c_{t+s} Y_{t+s}(j) - \frac{\psi}{2} \left( \frac{P_{t+s}(j)}{P_{t+s-1}(j)} - 1 \right)^{2} Y_{t+s} \right]$$

where:  $-\Lambda_{t,t+s} = \beta^s \frac{\lambda_{t+s}}{\lambda_t} = \text{Stochastic discount factor (from households)} - mc_t = \frac{\text{MC}_t}{P_t} = \text{Real marginal cost (eq 3.12)} - Y_t(j) = \left(\frac{P_t(j)}{P_t}\right)^{-\epsilon} Y_t \text{ (demand curve from eq 1.10)}$ 

### **Optimal Price Setting**

Each intermediate firm j maximizes discounted real profits, accounting for future adjustment costs. In symmetric equilibrium  $(P_t(j) = P_t, \pi_t = P_t/P_{t-1})$ , this yields the **Rotemberg Phillips Curve**:

$$(\pi_t - 1)\pi_t = \frac{\epsilon}{\psi} \left( mc_t - \frac{\epsilon - 1}{\epsilon} \right) + \beta \mathbb{E}_t \left[ \frac{\lambda_{t+1}}{\lambda_t} \frac{Y_{t+1}}{Y_t} (\pi_{t+1} - 1)\pi_{t+1} \right]$$
 (1.15)

where  $mc_t = \mathrm{MC}_t/P_t$  (real marginal cost) and  $\lambda_t$  is the household's marginal utility of consumption. This links inflation to:

- 1. Deviations of real marginal cost from its flexible-price level  $\frac{\epsilon-1}{\epsilon}$
- 2. Expected future inflation (weighted by discounting and output growth)
- 3. Adjustment cost parameter  $\psi$  (higher  $\psi$  = stickier prices)

## 3.2.2

### 1.3. Government Sector

Fiscal rule:  $T_t = \tau Y_t$  (lump-sum taxes)

Monetary authority ideas (not set in stone because unsure): - Taylor Rule:  $R_t = \rho R_{t-1} + (1-\rho)[\phi_\pi \pi_t + \phi_y \hat{Y}_t] + \varepsilon_t^r$ 

-Money Growth Rule:  $\ln \mu_t = \rho_\mu \ln \mu_{t-1} + \varepsilon_t^m$ 

#### 1.4. Exogenous Processes

Unsure on the following before i look up if it at all breaks my model - TFP shock:  $\ln A_t = (1 - \rho_A) \ln A_{ss} + \rho_A \ln A_{t-1} + \varepsilon_t^A$ 

• Monetary policy shocks  $(\varepsilon_t^r, \varepsilon_t^m)$ 

#### 1.5. Equilibrium and Model Closure

- Output Gap:  $\hat{Y}_t = Y_t Y_t^n$  (natural rate output)
- Market clearing conditions
- Determinacy Requirements: Blanchard-Kahn conditions for policy rules

Market Clearing Aggregate production:

$$Y_t = A_t K_{t-1}^{\alpha} h_t^{1-\alpha} \tag{1.16}$$

Resource constraint (adjustment costs reduce output):

$$Y_t = C_t + I_t + \underbrace{\frac{\psi}{2}(\Pi_t - 1)^2 Y_t}_{\text{price adjustment cost}}$$
(1.17)


Factor markets clear:

$$\int_{0}^{1} h_{t}(j)dj = h_{t}$$

$$\int_{0}^{1} K_{t}(j)dj = K_{t-1}$$
(1.18)

$$\int_{0}^{1} K_{t}(j)dj = K_{t-1} \tag{1.19}$$

# 2. Steady State



# 3. Appendix

#### 3.1. Households

Define Lagrangian

$$\mathcal{L} = \mathbb{E}_0 \sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \beta^{t-1} \left\{ \underbrace{\frac{\left(\frac{C_t}{P_t} - \eta \frac{C_{t-1}}{P_{t-1}}\right)^{1-\theta}}{1-\theta}}_{\text{Consumption utility}} - \underbrace{\chi \frac{h_t^{1+\gamma}}{1+\gamma}}_{\text{Labor disutility}} + \underbrace{\psi \ln\left(\frac{M_t}{P_t}\right)}_{\text{Money utility}} + \underbrace{\lambda_t \left[R_{t-1}^B B_{t-1} + M_{t-1} + W_t h_t + R_t^k K_{t-1} + \Pi_t - P_t \tau_t - C_t - I_t - B_t - M_t\right]}_{\text{Nominal flow constraint}} + \underbrace{\mu_t \left[(1-\delta)K_{t-1} + I_t - \frac{\phi}{2}\left(\frac{I_t}{K_{t-1}} - \frac{\delta}{2}\right)\right]}_{\text{Capital accumulation}} + \underbrace{\mu_t \left[(1-\delta)K_{t-1} + I_t - \frac{\phi}{2}\left(\frac{I_t}{K_{t-1}} - \frac{\delta}{2}\right)\right]}_{\text{Capital accumulation}} + \underbrace{\mu_t \left[(1-\delta)K_{t-1} + I_t - \frac{\phi}{2}\left(\frac{I_t}{K_{t-1}} - \frac{\delta}{2}\right)\right]}_{\text{Capital accumulation}} + \underbrace{\mu_t \left[(1-\delta)K_{t-1} + I_t - \frac{\phi}{2}\left(\frac{I_t}{K_{t-1}} - \frac{\delta}{2}\right)\right]}_{\text{Capital accumulation}} + \underbrace{\mu_t \left[(1-\delta)K_{t-1} + I_t - \frac{\phi}{2}\left(\frac{I_t}{K_{t-1}} - \frac{\delta}{2}\right)\right]}_{\text{Capital accumulation}} + \underbrace{\mu_t \left[(1-\delta)K_{t-1} + I_t - \frac{\phi}{2}\left(\frac{I_t}{K_{t-1}} - \frac{\delta}{2}\right)\right]}_{\text{Capital accumulation}} + \underbrace{\mu_t \left[(1-\delta)K_{t-1} + I_t - \frac{\phi}{2}\left(\frac{I_t}{K_{t-1}} - \frac{\delta}{2}\right)\right]}_{\text{Capital accumulation}} + \underbrace{\mu_t \left[(1-\delta)K_{t-1} + I_t - \frac{\phi}{2}\left(\frac{I_t}{K_{t-1}} - \frac{\delta}{2}\right)\right]}_{\text{Capital accumulation}} + \underbrace{\mu_t \left[(1-\delta)K_{t-1} + \frac{\delta}{2}\left(\frac{I_t}{K_{t-1}} - \frac{\delta}{2}\right)\right]}_{\text{Capital accumulation}} + \underbrace{\mu_t \left[(1-$$

#### 3.1.1. First Order Conditions

#### FOC w.r.t. Consumption:

$$\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial C_t} = 0$$

$$\left[ (c_t - \eta c_{t-1})^{-\theta} / P_t - \lambda_t \right] - \beta \, \mathbb{E}_t \left[ \eta \, (c_{t+1} - \eta c_t)^{-\theta} / P_t \right] = 0$$

Combine terms over  $1/P_t$ 

$$\frac{1}{P_t} [(c_t - \eta c_{t-1})^{-\theta} - \beta \eta \, \mathbb{E}_t [(c_{t+1} - \eta c_t)^{-\theta}]] - \lambda_t = 0$$

Multiply by  $P_t$ 

$$(c_t - \eta c_{t-1})^{-\theta} - \beta \eta \, \mathbb{E}_t[(c_{t+1} - \eta c_t)^{-\theta}] - \lambda_t P_t = 0$$

$$\lambda_t P_t = (c_t - \eta c_{t-1})^{-\theta} - \beta \eta \, \mathbb{E}_t [(c_{t+1} - \eta c_t)^{-\theta}]$$
(3.1)

FOC w.r.t. Labour:

$$\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial h_t} = 0$$
$$-\chi h_t^{\gamma} + \lambda_t W_t = 0$$

Rearrange

$$\lambda_t W_t = \chi h_t^{\gamma}$$

$$\lambda_t W_t = \chi h_t^{\gamma} \tag{3.2}$$

### FOC w.r.t. Real Money Balances:

$$\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial M_t} = 0$$
$$\beta^{t-1} [\psi/M_t - \lambda_t] + \beta^t \mathbb{E}_t [\lambda_{t+1}] = 0$$

Divide by  $\beta^{t-1}$  and rearrange

$$\psi/M_t - \lambda_t + \beta \, \mathbb{E}_t[\lambda_{t+1}] = 0$$

$$\frac{\psi}{M_t} = \lambda_t - \beta \,\mathbb{E}_t[\lambda_{t+1}] \tag{3.3}$$

FOC w.r.t. Bonds (3.4):

$$\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial B_t} = 0$$
$$-\beta^{t-1}\lambda_t + \beta^t \mathbb{E}_t[\lambda_{t+1} R_t^B] = 0$$

Divide by  $\beta^{t-1}$  and simplify

$$-\lambda_t + \beta \, \mathbb{E}_t[\lambda_{t+1} R_t^B] = 0$$

$$\lambda_t = \beta \, \mathbb{E}_t[\lambda_{t+1} R_t^B] \tag{3.4}$$

FOC w.r.t. Capital:

$$\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial K_t} = 0$$

$$-\beta^{t-1} \mu_t + \beta^t \mathbb{E}_t \left[ \lambda_{t+1} R_{t+1}^k + \mu_{t+1} (1 - \delta + \frac{\phi}{2} ((I_{t+1}/K_t)^2 - \delta^2)) \right] = 0$$

Divide by  $\beta^{t-1}$  and solve

$$\mu_t = \beta \, \mathbb{E}_t \left[ \lambda_{t+1} R_{t+1}^k + \mu_{t+1} (1 - \delta + \frac{\phi}{2} ((I_{t+1}/K_t)^2 - \delta^2)) \right]$$

$$\mu_t = \beta \mathbb{E}_t \left[ \lambda_{t+1} R_{t+1}^k + \mu_{t+1} (1 - \delta + \frac{\phi}{2} ((I_{t+1}/K_t)^2 - \delta^2)) \right]$$
 (3.5)

### FOC w.r.t. Investment:

$$\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial I_t} = 0$$

$$\beta^{t-1} \left[ -\lambda_t + \mu_t (1 - \phi(\frac{I_t}{K_{t-1}} - \delta)) \right] = 0$$

Divide by  $\beta^{t-1}$  and isolate

$$\lambda_t = \mu_t \left( 1 - \phi \left( \frac{I_t}{K_{t-1}} - \delta \right) \right)$$

$$\lambda_t = \mu_t \left( 1 - \phi(\frac{I_t}{K_{t-1}} - \delta) \right) \tag{3.6}$$

## 3.1.2. Household Final Equations

## Consumption Euler Equation

Combines consumption-habit dynamics with bond returns (from (3.4) and (3.1)):

Start with FOC for Bonds

$$\lambda_t = \beta \mathbb{E}_t[\lambda_{t+1}R_t^B]$$
 (Equation 3.4)

Substitute  $\lambda_t$  and  $\lambda_{t+1}$  from FOC for Consumption

$$\lambda_t = \frac{(c_t - \eta c_{t-1})^{-\theta}}{P_t}$$
 (from Equation 3.1 rearranged)

$$\lambda_{t+1} = \frac{(c_{t+1} - \eta c_t)^{-\theta}}{P_{t+1}} \quad \text{(time-shifted)}$$

text Combine results

$$\frac{(c_t - \eta c_{t-1})^{-\theta}}{P_t} = \beta \, \mathbb{E}_t \left[ R_t^B \cdot \frac{(c_{t+1} - \eta c_t)^{-\theta}}{P_{t+1}} \right]$$

Clear denominator

$$(c_t - \eta c_{t-1})^{-\theta} = \beta \mathbb{E}_t \left[ R_t^B \cdot \frac{P_t}{P_{t+1}} \cdot (c_{t+1} - \eta c_t)^{-\theta} \right]$$

$$(c_t - \eta c_{t-1})^{-\theta} = \beta \mathbb{E}_t \Big[ R_t^B \frac{P_t}{P_{t+1}} (c_{t+1} - \eta c_t)^{-\theta} \Big]$$
 (3.7)

Interpretation: Marginal rate of substitution between current and future consumption equals the expected real bond return. Habit persistence  $(\eta)$  links today's utility to past and future consumption, and inflation  $(P_t/P_{t+1})$  scales the real payoff on bonds.

## Labour Supply

Real wage equals the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption (from (3.1) and (3.2)):

Start with FOC for Hours Worked

$$\lambda_t W_t = \chi h_t^{\gamma}$$
 (Equation 3.2)

Solve for  $\lambda_t$ 

$$\lambda_t = \frac{\chi h_t^{\gamma}}{W_t}$$

Equate to FOC of Consumption expression

$$\frac{\chi h_t^{\gamma}}{W_t} = \frac{(c_t - \eta c_{t-1})^{-\theta} - \beta \eta \mathbb{E}_t[(c_{t+1} - \eta c_t)^{-\theta}]}{P_t}$$

Solve for real wage  $(W_t/P_t)$ 

$$\frac{W_t}{P_t} = \frac{\chi h_t^{\gamma}}{(c_t - \eta c_{t-1})^{-\theta} - \beta \eta \mathbb{E}_t [(c_{t+1} - \eta c_t)^{-\theta}]}$$

$$\frac{W_t}{P_t} = \frac{\chi h_t^{\gamma}}{(c_t - \eta c_{t-1})^{-\theta} - \beta \eta \mathbb{E}_t[(c_{t+1} - \eta c_t)^{-\theta}]}$$
(3.8)

Interpretation: Habit formation reduces effective marginal utility of consumption, so stronger habits  $(\eta \uparrow)$  or more elastic labour supply  $(\gamma \uparrow)$  require a higher real wage to induce the same hours.

#### Money Demand

Opportunity cost of holding money vs. bonds (from (3.3), (3.4) and (3.1)):

Combine FOC for Money and Bonds

$$\frac{\psi}{M_t} = \lambda_t - \beta \, \mathbb{E}_t[\lambda_{t+1}] \quad \text{(Equation 3.3)}$$
$$\lambda_t = \beta \, \mathbb{E}_t[\lambda_{t+1} R_t^B] \quad \text{(Equation 3.4)}$$

Substitute  $\lambda_t$  into FOC of money

$$\frac{\psi}{M_t} = \beta \, \mathbb{E}_t[\lambda_{t+1} R_t^B] - \beta \, \mathbb{E}_t[\lambda_{t+1}]$$
$$\frac{\psi}{M_t} = \beta \, \mathbb{E}_t \left[ \lambda_{t+1} (R_t^B - 1) \right]$$

Substitute  $\lambda_{t+1}$  from FOC of Consumption

$$\lambda_{t+1} = \frac{(c_{t+1} - \eta c_t)^{-\theta} - \beta \eta \mathbb{E}_{t+1} [(c_{t+2} - \eta c_{t+1})^{-\theta}]}{P_{t+1}}$$

Solve for  $M_t$ 

$$M_{t} = \frac{\psi}{\beta \mathbb{E}_{t} \left[ (R_{t}^{B} - 1) \cdot \frac{(c_{t+1} - \eta c_{t})^{-\theta} - \beta \eta \mathbb{E}_{t+1} [(c_{t+2} - \eta c_{t+1})^{-\theta}]}{P_{t+1}} \right]}$$

$$M_{t} = \frac{\psi}{\beta \mathbb{E}_{t} \left[ (R_{t}^{B} - 1) \cdot \frac{(c_{t+1} - \eta c_{t})^{-\theta} - \beta \eta \mathbb{E}_{t+1} \left[ (c_{t+2} - \eta c_{t+1})^{-\theta} \right]}{P_{t+1}} \right]}$$
(3.9)

Interpretation: Higher expected nominal rates  $(R_t^B - 1)$  raise the opportunity cost of money, while habits and inflation expectations shape the curvature of demand. The denominator captures the liquidity premium adjusted for consumption dynamics.

Capital Euler Equation Defines Tobin's q and links required returns on capital to bond returns (from (3.6), (3.5) and (3.4)):

Define Tobin's q from FOC for Investment

$$\lambda_t = \mu_t q_t$$
 where  $q_t \equiv 1 - \phi \left( \frac{I_t}{K_{t-1}} - \delta \right)$ 

Rearrange FOC for Capital

$$\mu_t = \beta \mathbb{E}_t \left[ \lambda_{t+1} R_{t+1}^k + \mu_{t+1} \left( 1 - \delta + \frac{\phi}{2} \left[ (I_{t+1}/K_t)^2 - \delta^2 \right] \right) \right]$$

Substitute  $\mu_t = \lambda_t/q_t$  and  $\mu_{t+1} = \lambda_{t+1}/q_{t+1}$ 

$$\frac{\lambda_t}{q_t} = \beta \mathbb{E}_t \left[ \lambda_{t+1} R_{t+1}^k + \frac{\lambda_{t+1}}{q_{t+1}} \left( 1 - \delta + \frac{\phi}{2} \left[ (I_{t+1}/K_t)^2 - \delta^2 \right] \right) \right]$$

Factor  $\lambda_{t+1}$ 

$$\frac{\lambda_t}{q_t} = \beta \, \mathbb{E}_t \left[ \lambda_{t+1} \left( R_{t+1}^k + \frac{1}{q_{t+1}} \left( 1 - \delta + \frac{\phi}{2} \left[ (I_{t+1}/K_t)^2 - \delta^2 \right] \right) \right) \right]$$

Substitute FOC for Bonds  $(\lambda_t = \beta \mathbb{E}_t[\lambda_{t+1}R_t^B])$ 

$$\frac{\beta \mathbb{E}_t[\lambda_{t+1} R_t^B]}{q_t} = \beta \mathbb{E}_t \left[ \lambda_{t+1} \left( R_{t+1}^k + \frac{1}{q_{t+1}} \Gamma_{t+1} \right) \right]$$
  
where  $\Gamma_{t+1} \equiv 1 - \delta + \frac{\phi}{2} \left[ (I_{t+1}/K_t)^2 - \delta^2 \right]$ 

$$q_{t} \equiv 1 - \phi \left( \frac{I_{t}}{K_{t-1}} - \delta \right)$$

$$\frac{\beta \mathbb{E}_{t}[\lambda_{t+1} R_{t}^{B}]}{q_{t}} = \beta \mathbb{E}_{t} \left[ \lambda_{t+1} \left( R_{t+1}^{k} + \frac{1}{q_{t+1}} \left( 1 - \delta + \frac{\phi}{2} \left[ (I_{t+1}/K_{t})^{2} - \delta^{2} \right] \right) \right) \right]$$
(3.10)

Interpretation: The bond-return-scaled discount factor divided by  $q_t$  equals expected return on capital plus adjustment-cost terms. If  $I_t/K_{t-1} > \delta$ , then  $q_t > 1$  signals profitable expansion; disinvestment flips the sign. Adjustment costs  $(\phi)$  create investment frictions.

## 3.2. Production

#### 3.2.1. Final Good Producer

## Derivation of Intermediate Goods Demand and Aggregate Price Index

Final goods producer's profit:

$$\Pi_t = P_t Y_t - \int_0^1 P_t(j) Y_t(j) dj$$
subject to  $Y_t = \left(\int_0^1 Y_t(j)^{\frac{\epsilon - 1}{\epsilon}} dj\right)^{\frac{\epsilon}{\epsilon - 1}}$ 

Substitute production function into profit:

$$\Pi_t = P_t \left( \int_0^1 Y_t(j)^{\frac{\epsilon - 1}{\epsilon}} dj \right)^{\frac{\epsilon}{\epsilon - 1}} - \int_0^1 P_t(j) Y_t(j) dj$$

First-order condition for  $Y_t(j)$ :

$$\frac{\partial \Pi_t}{\partial Y_t(j)} = P_t \cdot \frac{\epsilon}{\epsilon - 1} \left( \int_0^1 Y_t(i)^{\frac{\epsilon - 1}{\epsilon}} di \right)^{\frac{1}{\epsilon - 1}} \cdot \frac{\epsilon - 1}{\epsilon} Y_t(j)^{-\frac{1}{\epsilon}} - P_t(j) = 0$$

$$\Rightarrow P_t \cdot Y_t^{\frac{1}{\epsilon}} Y_t(j)^{-\frac{1}{\epsilon}} = P_t(j)$$

Rearrange to obtain demand curve:

$$Y_t(j) = \left(\frac{P_t}{P_t(j)}\right)^{\epsilon} Y_t$$

Substitute demand into production function:

$$Y_t = \left(\int_0^1 \left[ \left(\frac{P_t}{P_t(j)}\right)^{\epsilon} Y_t \right]^{\frac{\epsilon - 1}{\epsilon}} dj \right)^{\frac{\epsilon}{\epsilon - 1}}$$
$$= Y_t \left(\int_0^1 \left(\frac{P_t}{P_t(j)}\right)^{\epsilon - 1} dj \right)^{\frac{\epsilon}{\epsilon - 1}}$$

Simplify to obtain price index:

$$1 = \left( \int_0^1 \left( \frac{P_t}{P_t(j)} \right)^{\epsilon - 1} dj \right)^{\frac{\epsilon}{\epsilon - 1}}$$

$$\Rightarrow P_t^{1 - \epsilon} = \int_0^1 P_t(j)^{1 - \epsilon} dj$$

$$\Rightarrow P_t = \left( \int_0^1 P_t(j)^{1 - \epsilon} dj \right)^{\frac{1}{1 - \epsilon}}$$

$$Y_t(j) = \left(\frac{P_t(j)}{P_t}\right)^{-\epsilon} Y_t$$

$$P_t = \left(\int_0^1 P_t(j)^{1-\epsilon} dj\right)^{\frac{1}{1-\epsilon}}$$
(3.11)

### 3.2.2. Intermediate Goods Producers

Cost minimization for intermediate firm j:

$$\min_{K_t(j),h_t(j)} \left\{ R_t^k K_t(j) + W_t h_t(j) \right\}$$
  
subject to  $Y_t(j) = A_t K_t(j)^{\alpha} h_t(j)^{1-\alpha}$ 

Lagrangian:

$$\mathcal{L} = R_t^k K_t(j) + W_t h_t(j) + \lambda_t \left[ A_t K_t(j)^{\alpha} h_t(j)^{1-\alpha} - Y_t(j) \right]$$

First-order conditions:

$$\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial K_t(j)} = 0: \quad R_t^k = \lambda_t \alpha A_t K_t(j)^{\alpha - 1} h_t(j)^{1 - \alpha}$$
$$\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial h_t(j)} = 0: \quad W_t = \lambda_t (1 - \alpha) A_t K_t(j)^{\alpha} h_t(j)^{-\alpha}$$

Rearrange FOCs:

$$\lambda_t = \frac{R_t^k}{\alpha} \left( \frac{K_t(j)}{h_t(j)} \right)^{1-\alpha} \frac{1}{A_t}, \quad \lambda_t = \frac{W_t}{1-\alpha} \left( \frac{K_t(j)}{h_t(j)} \right)^{\alpha} \frac{1}{A_t}$$

Equate expressions:

$$\frac{R_t^k}{\alpha} \left( \frac{K_t(j)}{h_t(j)} \right)^{-\alpha} = \frac{W_t}{1 - \alpha} \left( \frac{K_t(j)}{h_t(j)} \right)^{1 - \alpha}$$

$$\Rightarrow \frac{K_t(j)}{h_t(j)} = \frac{\alpha}{1 - \alpha} \frac{W_t}{R_t^k}$$

Substitute into capital FOC:

$$\lambda_t = \frac{R_t^k}{\alpha A_t} \left( \frac{\alpha}{1 - \alpha} \frac{W_t}{R_t^k} \right)^{\alpha - 1}$$
$$= \frac{1}{A_t} \left( \frac{R_t^k}{\alpha} \right)^{\alpha} \left( \frac{W_t}{1 - \alpha} \right)^{1 - \alpha}$$

$$MC_t = \frac{1}{A_t} \left( \frac{R_t^k}{\alpha} \right)^{\alpha} \left( \frac{W_t}{1 - \alpha} \right)^{1 - \alpha}$$
 (3.12)

Intermediate-goods producer's problem:

$$\max_{P_{t}(j)} \mathbb{E}_{t} \sum_{s=0}^{\infty} \Lambda_{t,t+s} \left[ \left( \frac{P_{t+s}(j)}{P_{t+s}} \right)^{1-\epsilon} Y_{t+s} - m c_{t+s} \left( \frac{P_{t+s}(j)}{P_{t+s}} \right)^{-\epsilon} Y_{t+s} - \frac{\psi}{2} \left( \frac{P_{t+s}(j)}{P_{t+s-1}(j)} - 1 \right)^{2} Y_{t+s} \right]$$
 subject to  $Y_{t}(j) = \left( \frac{P_{t}(j)}{P_{t}} \right)^{-\epsilon} Y_{t}$ 

First-Order Condition w.r.t.  $P_t(j)$ :

$$\begin{split} &\mathbb{E}_t \Big[ \frac{\partial \Pi_t(j)}{\partial P_t(j)} + \beta \, \Lambda_{t,t+1} \frac{\partial \Pi_{t+1}(j)}{\partial P_t(j)} \Big] = 0 \\ &\frac{\partial \Pi_t}{\partial P_t(j)} = (1 - \epsilon) \big( \frac{P_t(j)}{P_t} \big)^{-\epsilon} \frac{Y_t}{P_t} + \epsilon \, mc_t \big( \frac{P_t(j)}{P_t} \big)^{-\epsilon - 1} \frac{Y_t}{P_t} - \psi \big( \frac{P_t(j)}{P_{t-1}(j)} - 1 \big) \frac{Y_t}{P_{t-1}(j)} \\ &\frac{\partial \Pi_{t+1}}{\partial P_t(j)} = \psi \big( \frac{P_{t+1}(j)}{P_t(j)} - 1 \big) \, \frac{P_{t+1}(j)}{P_t(j)^2} \, Y_{t+1} \end{split}$$

Impose symmetry: 
$$P_{t}(j) = P_{t}$$
,  $Y_{t}(j) = Y_{t}$ ,  $\pi_{t} = \frac{P_{t}}{P_{t-1}}$ .  
 $(1 - \epsilon) + \epsilon \, mc_{t} = \epsilon \left( mc_{t} - \frac{\epsilon - 1}{\epsilon} \right)$ ,  $\frac{P_{t}(j)}{P_{t-1}(j)} = \pi_{t}$ ,  $\frac{P_{t+1}(j)}{P_{t}(j)} = \pi_{t+1}$   
 $0 = \epsilon \left( mc_{t} - \frac{\epsilon - 1}{\epsilon} \right) - \psi \left( \pi_{t} - 1 \right) \pi_{t} + \beta \, \mathbb{E}_{t} \left[ \Lambda_{t,t+1} \, \psi \left( \pi_{t+1} - 1 \right) \pi_{t+1} \, \frac{Y_{t+1} P_{t}}{Y_{t} P_{t+1}} \right]$ 

Noting  $\Lambda_{t,t+1} = \beta \frac{\lambda_{t+1}}{\lambda_t}$  and  $P_{t+1}/P_t = \pi_{t+1}$ , the bracket simplifies to  $\beta \frac{\lambda_{t+1}}{\lambda_t} \frac{Y_{t+1}}{Y_t}$ .

$$0 = \epsilon \left( mc_t - \frac{\epsilon - 1}{\epsilon} \right) - \psi \left( \pi_t - 1 \right) \pi_t + \beta \mathbb{E}_t \left[ \frac{\lambda_{t+1}}{\lambda_t} \psi \left( \pi_{t+1} - 1 \right) \pi_{t+1} \frac{Y_{t+1}}{Y_t} \right]$$
 (3.13)

# 4. Old Stuff

Net transfers:  $-P_t\tau_t$ 

# References

Mati, S. 2019. DynareR: Bringing the power of Dynare to R, R Markdown, and Quarto. *CRAN*. [Online], Available: https://CRAN.R-project.org/package=DynareR.