

# Beyond Tit-for-Tat

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## Abstract

Beyond Tit-for-tat: Set up a repeated prisoner's dilemma computer tournament, in which strategies compete against each other. Write a report on your findings.

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## 1. Introduction

Here are the articles that i have downloaded and are in the sources folder. You might need to look at the bibref doc in “/Tex” to know which abbreviated document name is which doc in the sources folder, however the dates can help. Or you can knit the doc and then you should be able to see. Lets compare and rate each source for its usefulness. I still need to look over them and to select which one to incorporate in the coding and essay.

Lange & Baylor ([2007code ]), Farrell & Ware ([1989code ]), Kreps, Milgrom, Roberts & Wilson ([1982code ]), Romero & Rosokha ([2018code ]), Bó & Fréchette ([2019code ]), Breitmoser ([2015code ]), Gaudesi, Piccolo, Squillero & Tonda ([2016code ]), García & Veelen ([2018code ]), Embrey, Fréchette & Yuksel ([2018code ]),

## 2. Literature Review

## 3. Game Construction

##		Player 2	
##	Player 1	Cooperate	Defect
##	Cooperate	3	0
##	Defect	5	1

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#### 4. Conclusion

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## References

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